VIENNA CIRCLE INSTITUTE YEARBOOK [2002] 10

VIENNA CIRCLE INSTITUTE YEARBOOK [2002]

10 Institut ‘Wiener Kreis’

Society for the Advancement of the Scientific World Conception

Series-Editor:

Friedrich Stadler University of Vienna, Austria and Director, Institut ‘Wiener Kreis’

Advisory Editorial Board: Honorary Consulting Editors:

Rudol f Haller, University of Graz, Austria, Coordinator

Kurt E. Baier

Nancy Cartwright, London School of Economics, UK Francesco Barone † Robert S. Cohen, Boston University, USA

C.G. Hempel †

Wilhelm K. Essler, University of Frankfurt/M., Germany Stephan Körner † Kurt Rudolf Fischer, University of Vienna, Austria

Henk Mulder †

Michael Friedman, University of Indiana, Bloomington, USA

Arne Naess

Peter Galison, Harvard University, USA

Paul Neurath †

Adolf Grünbaum, University of Pittsburgh, USA Willard Van Orman Quine † Rainer Hegselmann, University of Bayreuth, Germany

Marx W. Wartofsky † Michael Heidelberger, University of Tübingen, Germany Jaakko Hintikka, Boston University, USA

Review Editor:

Gerald Holton, Harvard University, USA Michael Stöltzner, University of Bielefeld, Germany Don Howard, University of Notre Dame, USA Allan S. Janik, University of Innsbruck, Austria

Richard Jeffrey, Princeton University, USA

Editorial Work/Layout/Production:

Andreas Kamlah, University of Osnabrück, Germany

Hartwig Jobst

Eckehart Köhler, University of Vienna, Austria

Robert Kaller

Anne J. Kox, University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands Camilla R. Nielsen Saul A. Kripke, Princeton University, USA

Erich Papp

Elisabeth Leinfellner, University of Vienna, Austria Christopher Roth Werner Leinfellner, Technical University of Vienna, Austria

James G. Lennox, University of Pittsburgh, USA Brian McGuinness, University of Siena, Italy Kevin Mulligan, Université de Genève, Switzerland

Editorial Address:

Elisabeth Nemeth, University of Vienna, Austria Institut ‘Wiener Kreis’ Julian Nida-Rümelin, University of Göttingen, Germany

Museumstrasse 5/2/19, A–1070 Wien, Austria Helga Nowotny, ETH Zürich, Switzerland

Tel.: +431/5261005 (international) Erhard Oeser, University of Vienna, Austria

or 01/5261005 (national) Joëlle Proust, École Polytechnique CREA Paris, France

Fax.: +431/5248859 (international) Alan Richardson, University of British Columbia, CDN

or 01/5248859 (national) Peter Schuster, University of Vienna, Austria

email: ivc.zuef@univie.ac.at Jan Šebestik, CNRS Paris, France

homepage: http://ivc.philo.at Karl Sigmund, University of Vienna, Austria

Hans Sluga, University of California at Berkeley, USA Elliott Sober, University of Wisconsin, USA Antonia Soulez, Université de Paris 8, France Wolfgang Spohn, University of Konstanz, Germany Christian Thiel, University of Erlangen, Germany Walter Thirring, University of Vienna, Austria Thomas E. Uebel, University of Manchester, UK Georg Winckler, University of Vienna, Austria Ruth Wodak, University of Vienna, Austria

Jagiellonian University, Cracow, Poland Anton Zeilinger, University of Vienna, Austria

The titles published in this series are listed at the end of this volume.

THE VIENNA CIRCLE AND LOGICAL EMPIRICISM RE-EVALUATION AND FUTURE PERSPECTIVES

Edited by FRIEDRICH STADLER

University of Vienna, and Institute Vienna Circle, Austria

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E DITORIAL

On the occasion of its anniversary, the Institut Wiener Kreis/Vienna Circle Institute, together with the Zentrum für überfakultäre Forschung/Center for In- terdisciplinary Research of the University of Vienna, organized an international symposium on “The Vienna Circle and Logical Empiricism. Re-Evaluation and Future Perspectives of Research and Historiography”. This event was hosted by the Department of Contemporary History at the Campus of the University of

Vienna, in Vienna July 12 – 14, 2001. The Institute Vienna Circle (IVC) was founded in 1991 as a non-profit society. It has been supported ever since by the Austrian Ministry of Science and Re- search and the City of Vienna. The institute is a member of the International

Union of the History and Philosophy of Science – Division of Logic, Methodol- ogy and Philosophy of Science, and has been working together with the Univer- sity of Vienna since 1997 on the basis of a co-operation agreement.

Since the very outset, the IVC has worked together closely with similar institutes and societies in Austria and abroad, focusing on the promotion, culti- vation and dissemination of a scientific philosophy and history and philosophy of science in the tradition and spirit of the Vienna Circle/Logical Empiricism. The Institute’s research activities also include the documentation, application and development of its results. IVC adheres to a pluralist and (post-)enlightened conception of science and philosophy of science that is committed to the democrati- zation of knowledge and science and the critique of all forms of irrationalism, dogmatism, and fundamentalism. To this end, the IVC regularly organizes conferences and lectures in Austria and abroad, edits three book series (in English and German), and maintains a library and archives with materials by, and on, members of the Vienna Circle and associated philosophers as well as scientists. (cf. survey at the IVC’s Website: http://ivc.philo.at).

As regards the most recent activities, one should draw attention to the Vienna International Summer University – Scientific World Conceptions, which has been taking place every year (in July) since 2001 at the University Campus. Each summer university has had a different focus on research-related topics: 2001 (Unity and Plurality of Science), 2002 (Mind and Computation), and 2003 (Cosmological and Biological Evolution). Another current activity is our participation in the ongoing ESF-Network on “Historical and Contemporary Perspec- tives of Philosophy of Science in Europe ”, from 2001 to 2003, which is planned to be extended as a follow-up program of ESF. The edition of Moritz Schlick’s papers (Moritz Schlick Edition) is another international research and publication project, which is presently underway with a team of scholars from the University of Graz and the University of Rostock (Germany). The proceedings of the “Third

VI E DITORIAL

International History of Philosophy of Science Conference” (HOPOS 2000) are to be found here in the Vienna Circle Institute Yearbook 9/2001.

This Yearbook presents the contributions of invited lecturers as well as a selection of contributed papers of the aforementioned anniversary jubilee conference. It also features work from international research and historiography on Logical Empiricism and its influence, in addition to its further development by renowned scholars and a younger generation of philosophers. We have di- vided this yearbook papers into thematic chapters that focus on the origins, history and historiography, with such leading figures as Schlick and Reichenbach along with other members of this influential movement. The yearbook also addresses more topical issues such as the unity and plurality of science, contexts of science, epistemology and ethics, and some (long neglected) women of Logical Empiricism. The reception of the Vienna Circle/Logical Empiricism in the So- viet Union and Russia is dealt with in a special concluding report section.

As usual, the volume also has a review section on recent publications dealing with scientific philosophy and philosophy of science. In this regard it is important to note that the selected papers on Rudolf Carnap have been published separately in the

volume of the IVC series “Vienna Circle Institute Library” established this year. This volume, Language, Truth, and Knowledge, edited by Thomas Bonk, is to appear at the same time as this Yearbook published by Kluwer. Several other invited papers will be part of the forthcoming Cambridge Companion to Logical Empiricism, ed. by Alan Richardson and Thomas Uebel.

Last not least let me thank to all who helped make the anniversary conference possible and contributed to the publication of the proceedings in these two vol- umes: my colleagues Elisabeth Nemeth and Eckehart Koehler as members of the Program Committee, the members of the Local Organizing Committee with Margit (Mischa) Kurka, Daria Mascha, Robert Kaller from the IVC and Marianne Ertl from the Department of Contemporary History. Here I would like to express my sincere gratitude to our financial supporters: the Austrian Ministry of Education, Science and Culture, the City of Vienna (Division of Culture) and the Bank Austria. Finally, I would like to thank our review editor Michael Stöltzner, and Camilla Nielsen, Christopher Roth and Hartwig Jobst, who, together with members of the Advisory Editorial Board, were involved in the production of this Yearbook.

Vienna, October 2002 Friedrich Stadler (University of Vienna, and Vienna Circle Institute)

T ABLE OF C ONTENTS

A. THE VIENNA CIRCLE AND LOGICAL EMPIRICISM

F RIEDRICH S TADLER: What is the Vienna Circle? Some Methodological and Historiographical Answers

I. O RIGINS AND H ISTORY

A RNE N AESS : Pluralism of Tenable World Views 3 P AOLO P ARRINI : On the Formation of Logical Empiricism

A NITA V ON D UHN: Bolzano’s Account of Justification 21

D AVID J ALAL H YDER: Kantian Metaphysics and Hertzian Mechanics

II. M ORITZ S CHLICK

H UBERT S CHLEICHERT: Moritz Schlick’s Idea of Non-territorial States 49

M ASSIMO F ERRARI : An Unknown Side of Moritz Schlick’s Intellectual Biography: the Reviews for the “Vierteljahrschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie und Soziologie” (1911-1916)

H ANS J ÜRGEN W ENDEL : Between Meaning and Demarcation 79

D AGMAR B ORCHERS : “Let’s Talk about Flourishing!” – Moritz Schlick and the Non-cognitive Foundation of Virtue Ethics

III. H ANS R EICHENBACH

C ARSTEN K LEIN : Coordination and Convention in Hans Reichenbach’s Philosophy of Space

VIII

R OBERT R YNASIEWICZ : Reichenbach’s of Simultaneity in Historical and Philosophical Perspective

IV. O THER P ROPONENTS AND P ERIPHERY

J UHA M ANNINEN : Towards a Physicalistic Attitude 133 W OLFGANG H UEMER : Logical Empiricism and Phenomenology:

Felix Kaufmann 151

A RTUR K OTERSKI : Béla von Juhos and the Concept of “Konstatierungen” 163 P AOLO M ANCOSU /M ATHIEU M ARION : Wittgenstein’s Constructivization

of Euler’s Proof of the Infinity of Primes 171

G RACIELA D EPIERRIS : Quine’s Historical Argument for Epistemology Naturalized

V. U NITY AND P LURALITY

E LLIOTT S OBER : Two Uses of Unification 205

C HRISTOPHER H ITCHCOCK : Unity and Plurality in the Concept of

Causation 217

D IEDERICK R AVEN : Edgar Zilsel’s Research Programme: Unity of Science as an Empirical Problem

VI. C ONTEXTS OF S CIENCE

G REGOR S CHIEMANN : Criticizing a Difference of Contexts – On Reichenbach’s Distinction between “Context of Discovery” and “Context of Justification”

G IORA H ON : Contextualizing an Epistemological Issue: the Case of Error in Experiment

253 J UTTA S CHICKORE : The Contexts of Scientific Justification.

Some Reflections on the Relation Between Epistemological Contextualism and Philosophy of Science

VII. E PISTEMOLOGY

D ANIEL C OHNITZ : Modal Skepticism. Philosophical Thought Experiments and Modal Epistemology

281 F.O. E NGLER : Structure and Heuristic: in Praise of Structural Realism

in the Case of Niels Bohr 297

VIII. E THICS U WE C ZANIERA : The Neutrality of Meta-Ethics Revisited – How to Draw

on Einstein and the Vienna Circle in Developing an Adequate Account of Morals

IX. W OMEN OF L OGICAL E MPIRICISM

D AGMAR B ORCHERS : No Woman, no Try? – Else Frenkel-Brunswik and the Project of Integrating Psychoanalysis into the Unity of Science

339 N IKOLAY M ILKOV : Susan Stebbing’s Criticism of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus

M ICHAEL B EANEY : Susan Stebbing on Cambridge and Vienna Analysis

A DELHEID H AMACHER -H ERMES : Rose Rand: a Woman in Logic 365

B. GENERAL PART R EPORT – D OCUMENTATION

O LESSIA N AZAROVA : Logical Positivism in Russia 381

R EVIEWS

Ernst Mach’s Vienna 1895-1930 or Phenomenalism as Philosophy of Science. Edited by John Blackmore, Ryoichi Itagaki and Setsuko Tanaka. Kluwer Academic Publishers: Dordrecht 2001. (Erik Banks)

389 Herbert Hochberg, The Positivist and the Ontologist. Bergmann, Carnap

and Logical Realism, Rodopi: Amsterdam/Atlanta 2001. (Erwin Tegtmeier)

393 Liliana Albertazzi / Dale Jacquette / Roberto Poli (eds.), The School of

Alexius Meinong (= Western philosophy series 57), Aldershot et al.: Ashgate, 2001. (Maria Reicher)

397 M. Ferrari / I.-O. Stamatescu (eds.), Symbol and Physical Knowledge.

On the Conceptual Structure of Physics, Springer: Berlin 2002. (Thomas Mormann)

401 Uwe Czaniera, Gibt es moralisches Wissen? Die Kognitivismusdebatte

in der analytischen Moralphilosophie, Mentis: Paderborn 2001. (Gabriele Mras)

A CTIVITIES OF THE I NSTITUTE V IENNA C IRCLE Activities 2002

411 Preview 2003

O BITUARY

Eugene T. Gadol (1920-2000) (Friedrich St adler)

Index of Names 419

F RIEDRICH S TADLER W HAT I S THE V IENNA C IRCLE ? S OME M ETHODOLOGICAL AND H ISTORIOGRAPHICAL A NSWERS

“What is the Vienna Circle?” is a question which is neither rhetorical nor trivial. It is perhaps an attempt to ‘square the circle’ – which is, meanwhile, mathemati- cally possible, as Karl Menger described as early as 1934. 1

This question might be also a problem of how the whole relates logically to the parts or the parts to the whole, which was already addressed by mereology

(whole-part theory) according to Stanislaw 2 (1916). Of course, we are all familiar with the irritating fact that one and the same

phenomenon can be described consistently by more than one theory (underdeter- mination of a theory by observation).

A popular way for beginners to proceed is to check the lexical entries on a concept that might merit further discussion. But is this enough? If we look at the current definitions of the Vienna Circle, we quickly recognize the difficulty of providing a representative description of the circle and of Logical Empiricism in its entirety. Even the autobiographical accounts given since the classical period of the Schlick Circle show a remarkable variance – depending on focus and un- derlying motivations.

The locus classicus is – and remains – the manifesto of 1929 entitled Scien- tific Conception of the World. The Vienna Circle, published by the Ernst Mach Society and co-authored by Rudolf Carnap, Hans Hahn and Otto Neurath. 3

A second milestone in the diffusion of Vienna Circle ideas, especially in the Anglo-Saxon world, was the article written by Herbert Feigl and Albert Blum- berg: “Logical Positivism – A New Movement in European Philosophy” (1931) in the Journal of Philosophy. Here, both authors underscored the (anti-Kantian) synthesis of rationalism and empiricism. 4

What is so striking about these representative text excerpts? The “scientific world conception” (as opposed to Weltanschauung) is directed against metaphysics as well as philosophy as a discipline in its own right. As an alternative, we can note a tendency towards a (physicalist) unified science that later culminated in an empiricist encyclopedia project and includes the principle of toler-

ance as applied to logic and scientific languages. Already here, the contours of epistemological options emerge: phenomenalism vs. physicalism, coherence theory vs. correspondence theory of truth, syntax vs. semantics as regards the “logic of science”, ideal vs. normal language as scientific language and, last not least, verification vs. confirmation (or falsification) of empirical statements.

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If one also takes into account that the manifesto represents only one (“left”) wing of the Vienna Circle at the end of the twenties (one simply need recall the negative stance of Schlick under Wittgenstein’s influence), then it becomes

abundantly clear that there existed only a limited consensus. Is it possible, even so, to find a sort of basic agreement here – one that unites the members of the Vienna Circle – both the central figures and those on the periphery? 5

A simple theoretical framework can be found in the following description: a basic scientific orientation grounded in logical and linguistic analysis, an ex- planatory and epistemological monism in terms of methodology and research subjects, and finally a sort of fallibilistic epistemology with interdisciplinarity featuring as a program that opposes any sort of foundationalist “system”.

First, let me point out that until the end of the Vienna Circle’s existence the tensions between scientific philosophy on the one hand, and empirical science (dualism of philosophy and science) on the other, went unresolved. These differ- ences were most pronounced in the discussions between Moritz Schlick and Otto

Neurath. 6 We can conclude that neither the autobiographical accounts of contemporar-

ies nor the historical accounts originating shortly after 1945 were able to provide an adequate picture of the Vienna Circle. Moreover, we can only recognize a

partial, albeit broad, overlap with Logical Empiricism in general when we take into account the related movements of the Berlin Circle around Hans Reichen-

bach or the Warsaw Group around Alfred Tarski. 7 Here I think that a historical reconstruction is indeed called for, even if it ul-

timately proves insufficient. Such a reconstruction was already briefly sketched by Gustav Bergmann in his letter to Neurath in 1938: 8

Seen in this way, the important scientific movements which until now had their common center of radiation in Vienna – psychoanalysis, the philosophy of the Vienna Circle, and

Kelsen’s legal and political philosophy, really belonged together and they determined the specific intellectual atmosphere of the Austria that vanished, just as did, in the artistic

sphere, the authors Broch, Canetti and Musil. The importance of the Vienna Circle as a cultural phenomenon within the con-

text of New Objectivity (Neue Sachlichkeit) is illustrated by contemporary figures and their more or less positive reactions to its program, e.g. the writers

Hilde Spiel, Jean Améry, Bertolt Brecht and Robert Musil. 9 But what does present-day research and history have to say about all this? To

be sure, the (hidden) history of the reception of Logical Empiricism ranks worldwide as a real success story in the field of history and philosophy of science. Moreover, there has been a remarkable renaissance in research of this area over the past two decades. There seems to be a real interest in the study of the emergence, development and impact of this specifically Central European

tradition. 10

W HAT IS THE V IENNA C IRCLE?

XIII

As even recent entries on “Vienna Circle” and “Logical Empiricism” present overlapping and incomplete descriptions 11 , my first suggestion is to attempt a historical and genetic reconstruction within the socio-cultural context, together with a description of individuals and theoretical positions from both a diachronic and synchronic perspective. This means dealing with the multi-facetted phenomenon of the Vienna Circle “from a historical point of view”, which can only

be described here in very general terms: 12 The new historiography on Logical Empiricism sets in with the rediscovery of Ernst Mach (1838-1916) as a precursor of Gestalt theory, evolutionary epistemology, (possibly radical) constructivism and the modern historically oriented philosophy of science. But already in Mach’s reception of the Vienna Circle one can see not only a certain pluralism of views but also a polarization of the various positions (Mach’s influence on Carnap’s Aufbau / Logical Construction, the critical distancing to “psychologism” in the manifesto, the alternative to the prin-

ciple of economy in Karl Menger, etc.) 13 Nevertheless, this research program, which was interpreted differently by the Vienna Circle, actually represented a

sort of prototype for Logical Empiricism in the interwar years – irrespective of whether one backs the bold claim as to the existence of a “typical Austrian phi-

losophy” (as opposed to German idealism). Accordingly, Richard von Mises described Mach’s impact as follows: “In the transformation from the formal to the material mode of language, Mach’s elements correspond to the protocol sentences. ” 14

This, of course, can easily be read as being a building stone of the “neutral monism” as represented by Bertrand Russell. In this context, a number of different studies can be seen as focusing on the impact of neo-Kantianism, Russell and Mach on Carnap’s Aufbau philosophy. 15

It is thus not so surprising that, already prior to World War 1, the proto-circle of the later Vienna Circle (the “first Vienna Circle”) began to take shape both organizationally and philosophically. Within a discussion circle (inter alia, with Ph. Frank, Hahn, Neurath, R. v. Mises) at a coffeehouse, traditional “academic philosophy” grew more scientific. The “First Vienna Circle” met regularly as of

1907 to discuss the synthesis of empiricism and symbolic logic as modeled after Mach, Boltzmann and the French conventionalists (Pierre Duhem and Henri Poincaré). This was also regarded as an indirect answer to W.I. Lenin’s polemi- cal remarks against Mach in his book (Materialism and Empirio-criticism. 1909) which remained very influential up to the Velvet Revolution of 1989/90. 16

This early phase in the development of Logical Empiricism can also be interpreted as an anti-Cartesian turn in epistemology and philosophy of science, which undermined both the synthetic apriori and the secure foundations of knowledge. In the middle of the “permanent crisis of philosophy” between reform and revolution in society and science, the further development of this “scientific philosophy” had, in any case, been initiated.

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Focusing on the center of the Vienna Circle we recognize the following development : with the conflict-laden appointment of the physicist and philosopher Moritz Schlick (1882-1936) to Mach’s chair for natural philosophy of “inductivist sciences” in Vienna in 1922 the heyday of scientific philosophizing in the post World War 1- period was prolonged. Even though Schlick felt committed to an epistemological realism in his main oeuvre General Theory of Knowledge (1918/1925), he began his inaugural lecture with a programmatic allusion to Mach under the sway of the Viennese tradition up to Wittgenstein: “Almost all

philosophy is natural philosophy.” 17 Several years thereafter, the intellectual foundations for the formation of the Vienna Circle had been laid: the work of Frege, Russell / Whitehead and Witt- genstein’s Tractatus, together with Duhem’s and Poincaré’s holistic theory of science, paved the way for the emergence of a unique, innovative scientific culture that has remained a subject of international scholarship to this very day and that addresses issues that still have a bearing on modern philosophy of science.

In the phase during which the so-called Schlick Circle on Boltzmanngasse became a veritable institution, there was already a pluralism of positions that emerged in the field of tension between Wittgenstein’s Tractatus (1918/22) and Carnap’s Logischer Aufbau der Welt / Logical Construction of the World (1928). But in spite of all discrepancies between Carnap’s ‘rational reconstruction’ and the philosophy of ideal language (Wittgenstein), all those involved came to

identify with a philosophical reform movement as opposed to academic “traditional philosophy” (Schulphilosophie according to Philipp Frank).

Even the prevailing epistemological options – critical realism (or constructive realism) in Schlick, Feigl, Kraft and later Popper, on the one hand, and phenomenalism / physicalism in Carnap, Neurath, Kaufmann, on the other – could not prevent a reconciliation of rationalism and empiricism.

As early as the twenties, a diversity of positions and methods had emerged (a theoretical pluralism which has usually been ignored in the corresponding historiography). The mathematician Karl Menger, who had spent time in Holland, formulated his principle of tolerance regarding the selection of logics and scientific languages (a principle which was only later ascribed to Carnap). He founded an additional platform, namely his influential Mathematisches Kolloquium (“Mathematical Colloquium”), operating in parallel to the Schlick Circle on

Boltzmanngasse. 18 Long before Quine, he criticized the principle of economy, verificationism and the analytic / synthetic dualism which had become well- known in uncritical historical accounts as the standard model of Logical Empiri- cism – an interpretation which was reinforced by Quine’s influential “Two

Dogmas of Empiricism”. 19 The contacts that were initiated with the Polish logicians and Alfred Tarski (fostering the semantic conception of truth) ultimately

W HAT IS THE V IENNA C IRCLE ?

resulted in a further provocation of the “Wittgenstein group” in the Circle (Schlick, Waismann). But undoubtedly the greatest challenge for the early Vienna Circle was the Tractatus which experienced an uneven and fragmentary reception (as had the manifesto in 1929). 20

In sum we can say that, for this formative and non-public phase of the Vienna Circle, certain important components justify the use of the prefix “neo”. A con- ventionalist understanding of scientific theory, the philosophy of ideal language, and the Hilbert program and theory of relativity (especially Einstein’s 1921 published Geometrie und Erfahrung / Geometry and Experience), as well, became the building blocks for the “turning point in philosophy” proclaimed with great optimism in the first volume of Erkenntnis (Schlick 1930). 21

Schlick, Waismann and other members of the Vienna Circle saw knowledge as the correlation of empirical facts with a system of symbols based on formal logic. Such a theoretical innovation was also an intellectual revolution under the

sway of modernism, as Carnap formulated so eloquently in his preface to The Logical Construction. 22

This radical program, in turn, left an indelible mark on avant-garde art (constructivism associated with Gerd Arntz, the artist of Neurath’s pictorial language), literature as well as architecture (Werkbund and Bauhaus) centering around Ludwig Wittgenstein, Paul Engelmann, Adolf Loos, and Josef Frank, as well as in the context of Neurath’s efforts within the Congrés International d’Architecture Moderne

(CIAM). 23 Clarity and precision as both ends in them- selves and features of scientific philosophy bridged both Wittgenstein’s cultural

pessimism and the socio-culturally enlightened impetus of the Vienna Circle. With this convergence of various elements of philosophy of science, the dynamics of theory was accelerated in the phase in which the Vienna Circle made public appearances and expanded its international contacts. The latter development was accompanied by the disintegration and uprooting of Logical Empiricism in the German-speaking world. In this sense, the phenomenon of the

Vienna Circle is a prototypical case study on intellectual emigration. 24 The gradual liberalization of verificationism and – as Wittgenstein’s influ-

ence diminished – the transition from phenomenalism to physicalism (with Carnap and Neurath) was in full swing as already reflected in the publication and

internal reception of the 1929 manifesto. The increasingly international orientation of the Vienna Circle had been evident since the late twenties in the contacts with Hans Reichenbach’s Berlin Group, the Warsaw logicians around Alfred Tarski, and the American neo-pragmatist and semiotic movement (Bridgman,

Tolman and most notably, Charles Morris). 25 By the beginning of the thirties, a research program had emerged with empiricist, physicalist and phenomenalist variants. (e.g., in Felix Kaufmann, the “phenomenologist” of the Vienna Circle,

who had been influenced by Husserl, Kelsen and Carnap). 26 The themes discussed in Schlick’s circle – such as the principle of tolerance,

the disputed foundational problem of empirical science, and the justification and confirmation method with explanation vs. understanding (a variant of the Metho-

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denstreit) – all reflect the seminal methodological debates that were taking place in mathematics / logic (logicism, formalism, Platonism / intuitionism) and in the

natural sciences and humanities. 27 Undoubtedly, the strongest variant had emerged by 1934 from the Unity of Science movement spearheaded by Neurath,

Carnap and later Morris. Their efforts culminated in six well-attended international congresses and the (uncompleted) publication project of the International

Encyclopedia of Unified Science. 28 This theoretical dynamics and process of dif- ferentiation can be illustrated in light of several of the few surviving authentic

Vienna Circle documents. 29 To all appearances, we are confronted here with two diametrically opposed

trends. While the international influence of the Vienna Circle was steadily growing, the group had been systematically marginalized in Austria and Ger- many starting in the early thirties. The murder of Moritz Schlick and the dis- graceful, for the most part anti-semitic, reactions to this, brutally ushered in the

process which I have elsewhere described as the “demise of scientific reason”. 30 This took place parallel to the general trend at universities, which at the time

were increasingly coming under the influence of an growing anti-democratic and racist discourse dominated by clerical-fascist and national socialist forces. This

development led to the “Anschluss” which culminated in systematic dismissals, banishment and annihilation.

II.

Thus far we have focused mainly on the core of the Vienna Circle – the so-called Schlick Circle – which we can describe as being a matter of applied complexity theory, so to avoid the usual clichés of “positivism” and “neopositivism”. The vitality and productivity of this group that transcended the boundaries of both disciplines and countries was, however, a product of the openness of the logico-

empiricist program and the osmosis with the peripheral circles within the socio- cultural setting. By way of illustration, I would like to mention just the three most important networks that have been neglected in the pertinent literature or have recurrently prompted highly divergent interpretations: 31

Karl Menger’s “Mathematical Colloquium” (“Gödel’s universe”) The Wittgenstein group, including primarily Ludwig Wittgenstein, Moritz

Schlick, and Friedrich Waismann The Heinrich Gomperz-Circle, including Karl Popper and Edgar Zilsel, inter

alia In this context, it is worth noting that members of the Vienna Circle in addition

organized the “Verein Ernst Mach” (Ernst Mach Society) between 1929 to 1934 as a parallel movement serving to popularize scientific philosophy and “The Scientific Conception of the World” as part of the Viennese (“Red Vienna’s”)

adult education movement. 32 Moreover, Otto Neurath’s “Gesellschafts- und

W HAT IS THE V IENNA C IRCLE ?

XVII

Wirtschaftsmuseum in Wien” (Museum of Society and Economics in Vienna, 1925-1934) played an important role with its pictorial statistics (“Wiener

Methode der Bildstatistik”) which were developed in exile as the “Isotype” movement as part of the International Encyclopedia of Unified Science project. 33

The intellectually fertile ground for all these activities was the remarkably strong participation of Vienna Circle members in the Viennese Adult Education insti-

tutions. 34 These external perspectives have no bearing on the various interpretations of the transition from Wittgenstein 1 to Wittgenstein 1½ to the late Wittgenstein of Philosophical Investigations where, apart from the anti-Enlightenment thrust,

there are remarkable convergences with Neurath’s position in the Encyclopedia of Unified Science. Here I would like to mention the language game conception with its reference to habit, the so-called “scholar’s behavioristics” and “pseudo- rationalism”, all of which are part of the model of an empirical “orchestration of

the sciences”. 35 Since the first Vienna Circle, this fallibilistic concept represented for Neurath a basic motive of his critique of every type of unambiguous verification or falsification, as well as of a hierarchical system of sciences with their ultimate foundation. With such a relativistic motive Neurath formulated on a

number of different occasions as the well-known “boat metaphor”, which was thus mainly directed at the difficult, but successful newcomer Karl Popper. It was also formulated in a more dramatic way to counter the “semantic turn” of his

friend Carnap who stood under the influence of Tarski and Wittgenstein. It was here that the absolutely unbridgeable rifts between philosophical relativism and

absolutism became manifest. 36 Here it should be mentioned that this controversy of philosophical relativism vs. absolutism continued even after the forced emigration of the Vienna Circle to the U.S, in Philipp Frank’s “Institute for the Unity of Science”; it was this dis- pute, by the way, that was reformulated with the so-called “Science Wars” in the

late 1990s. 37

I would also like to make some similar claims with regard to the perhaps more complex and emotion-laden relationship between Karl Popper and the Vienna Circle, since it continues to inform the current debates. This perspective

has long been perpetuated in an uncritical way, most notably in Popper’s own accounts, in his teaching and in his research. 38 Against this historical back-

ground, the relationship between Karl Popper (1902-1994) and the Vienna Circle becomes easier to understand. In his widely-read autobiography Popper pre-

sented – and subsequently criticized – the “Popper legend” in the chapter with the not so modest title: “Logical Positivism is dead: Who killed Logical

Positivism?” 39 As already mentioned, the Vienna Circle did not represent a static, homoge-

neous “school” of philosophy, with one dominant figure, one main work and basic dogmas. The reception and appraisal of Popper’s ideas by different members thus very varied considerably: from positive reactions to the Logic of Scientific

Discovery (1934) in Carnap, Feigl, Schlick and Frank to the vehement principle

XVIII

F RIEDRICH S TADLER

criticism in Neurath. In his above cited review essay of 1935 Neurath had mainly taken issue with the false search for a privileged system of statements as the

paradigm of empirical sciences. 40 Popper found this decisive criticism rather “flattering”, although he did not, however, respond to Neurath’s counter-inter-

pretation. 41 Neurath had given preference to his meta-theoretical holism and an epistemological relativism as an alternative to the philosophical absolutism that

even Popper himself conceded – and this in spite of the fact that, within the Vienna Circle, there were some like Viktor Kraft, Karl Menger, Kurt Gödel and

Herbert Feigl who expressed their allegiance to variants of a metaphysical (constructive) realism and intuitionism. Even Schlick, who – apparently for personal reasons – did not invite Popper to his circle on Boltzmanngasse, paid tribute to Popper’s Logic of Scientific Discovery by including it in the series “Schriften zur Wissenschaftlichen Weltanschauung”, which he and Frank edited. 42

Thus the meaning criterion of verification, too, became increasingly liberal. From the mid-thirties on it hardly played a role anymore in the Encyclopedia of Unified Science. It had originally been intended more as a pragmatic concept of metaphysics (with Ockham’s razor as an antidote) during Vienna’s inter-war years. (Apart from that period, the history of verificationism was more represen-

tative of the status of normal science). 43 In the publications and protocols, the Vienna Circle inductivist and hy-

pothetico-deductive methodologies seemed to co-exist. No strict distinction was made between context of justification and context of discovery, which allows us

to draw the following conclusions – which are also of general import for the interpretation of Vienna Circle and Logical Empiricism:

The history of the development of Logical Empiricist theories since the turn of the century does not allow any clear canonization of a philosophical school in the strict sense, since what we are dealing with is a dynamic between center and periphery. The varying receptions of Wittgenstein, Tarski and Popper have influenced the development of various philosophies of science inspired by rational re-

construction, on the one hand, and by encyclopedic models on the other. Thus, if I were a police commissioner, I would give the following answer to Popper’s rhetorical question: if it’s really true that the patient died, then there is more than one perpetrator, especially from within the circle, both disciples and critics alike. But this, of course, is a completely different story which should be

told in another context.

III.

Let me come to my tentative conclusions with an illustration of the issue at hand, which is to be elaborated on in forthcoming studies:

W HAT IS THE VI ENNA C IRCLE ?

XIX

THE VIENNA CIRCLE / LOGICAL EMPIRICISM ELEMENTS OF A RE-EVALUATION

1. Methods

a) Intradisciplinary: “Scientific Philosophy” b) Interdisciplinary: “Scientific Conception of the World” – “Wissenschaftslogik” –

Philosophy of Science – “Wissenschaftstheorie” c) Transdisciplinary: “Encyclopedia of Unified Science”

Foundations of the Unity of Science d) Philosophy, Science and Art: Werkbund and Bauhaus

External Characteristic: “Coffeehouse Science” (Local and Global Networking) – Science as Culture

2. Scientific Communication

a) International: Urban Cultures of Science (Vienna, Berlin, Prague, Warsaw, Cracow, Budapest, Lvov, Copenhagen, Paris, Cambridge /Oxford, London ...)

b) Multi-ethnic: mainly enlightened Jewish and many Ethnics/Nationalities c) Multi-lingual: Communication /Publication in German, English, French, Italian,

Polish, Turkish Characteristic: “Cultural Exodus” with Disintegration (from the German speaking

World) – Internationalization (into the Anglo-Saxon World)

3. (Self-)Organization

a) Academic Field: Universities /Academy of Science b) Extra-academic Context: Adult Education and Viennese Cultural Movement of

“Spätaufklärung”: Popularisation of “Scientific World Conception” Institutions: ‘Ernst Mach’-Society, Adult Educational Institutions (“Volks- hochschulen”), Pictorial Statistics /Isotype with the Social and Economic Museum (Gesellschafts- und Wirtschaftsmuseum in Wien)

c) Formal /Informal: Conferences, Lectures /Lecture Series, Seminars, Discussion Groups resp. Books /Book Series, Journals, Working Papers

Characteristic: Philosophy of Science as a sort of “Social Epistemology”

4. Sociology of Science and Knowledge

a) Men and Women: Else Frenkel-Brunswik, Olga Hahn-Neurath, Marie Jahoda, Marie

Reidemeister-Neurath, Olga Taussky-Todd, Rose Rand, Hilde Geiringer-Mises, Susan Stebbing, Janina Hosiasson-Lindenbaum . . .

b) Several Generations and Professions: Professors (Distingushed Chairs /Associate/ Assistant), Students and Visiting Scholars from Abroad Characteristic: “Republic of Scholars” (Neurath)

Result

Uprooting and Alienation from Central Europe! “Americanization” with Mutual Change of Theories

XX F RIEDRICH S TADLER

In addition to the well-known insights that still inform today’s history and philosophy of science (e.g., the explanation and validation of scientific theories; foundations and methods of science between induction and deduction; unity and plurality of science, and so on), I would like to emphasize other topical features of the Vienna Circle which meriting further study. Generally, we see the realiza- tion of a common fallibilistic epistemology that points to the hypothetical status of scientific knowledge which is only gradually integrated in everyday experience and language (e.g., common sense). Therefore, the usage of symbolic logic did not contradict a scientific philosophy which is at the same time “a study in human understanding” (Richard von Mises 1951). And I am not reluctant to go back to the classical roots of the Vienna Circle by deliberately using the term

”methodological relativism”. 44 First of all, it is a way of philosophizing based on a language-critical attitude

and a great amount of problem-oriented, open-ended discussion. This is some- thing experienced personally by Arne Naess, who – as the last living member of the Schlick circle – focuses in this volume on the Vienna Circle’s “thought style” which, in (not only) his opinion, leads to an inherent “pluralism of tenable worldviews”.

Secondly, the use of unambiguous language, together with exact methods is certainly a main legacy of the Schlick Circle and those associated with it: it is only given this formal approach that content and positions can be criticized and refuted – a characteristic which most current modern and postmodern philosophies lack.

At least the challenge of factual research, and in particular the – admittedly, non-linear – advancement of science (the humanities and natural science) is an essential reason why the tension between science and philosophy (empiricism and rationalism) cannot be resolved definitively. However, the reconciliation of research in different fields of science facilitates permanent reflection and re- evaluation of the complex concept called “scientific philosophy”.

This reconciliation began in the classical period with its international and interdisciplinary networking, without aiming at one more philosophical dogmatic tradition (which is, by the way, normally characterized by an authoritative head, some leading textbooks and a hierarchical organization covering a limited num-

ber of academic fields.)

A serious alternative to this (Vienna-Circle oriented) open-minded position can hardly be formulated. I believe that the present volume documents the wide range, pluralism and diversity of the Viennese heritage and message, be it called “scientific philosophy” (as initiated by Schlick), “scientific humanism” (according to Carnap) or a “republic of scholars” (following Neurath), as a guide to a intellectual journey which continues through the present day and on into the future.

W HAT IS THE V IENNA C IRCLE ?

XXI

N OTES

1. Karl Menger, “Ist die Quadratur des Kreises lösbar?” (“Is it Possible to Square the Circle?”), in: Alte Probleme – Neue Lösungen in den exakten Wissenschaften. Fünf Wiener Vorträge, Zweiter Zyklus. Leipzig & Wien 1934, 1-28.

2. Barry Smith, Parts and Moments. Studies in Logic and Formal Ontology. Munich: Philosophia 1982. Peter Simons, Parts. A Study in Ontology. Oxford University Press 1987.

3. An abridged reprint in English translation in: Otto Neurath. Empiricism and Sociology. Ed. by Marie Neurath and Robert S. Cohen. Dordrecht: Reidel 1973, 299-318. 4. Albert Blumberg /Herbert Feigl, “Logical Positivism”, in: Journal of Philosophy 28, 1931, 281- 296. 5. Members of the inner circle: Gustav Bergmann, Rudolf Carnap, Herbert Feigl, Philipp Frank, Kurt Goedel, Hans Hahn, Olga Hahn-Neurath, Béla Juhos, Felix Kaufmann, Viktor Kraft, Karl Menger, Richard von Mises, Otto Neurath, Rose Rand, Josef Schächter, Moritz Schlick, Olga

Taussky-Todd, Friedrich Waismann, Edgar Zilsel. Members of the periphery are: Alfred Jules Ayer, Egon Brunswik, Karl Bühler, Josef Frank, Else Frenkel-Brunswik, Heinrich Gomperz, Carl Gustav Hempel, Eino Kaila, Hans Kelsen, Charles W. Morris, Arne Naess, Karl R. Popper, Willard Van Orman Quine, Frank P. Ramsey, Hans Reichenbach, Kurt Reidemeister, Alfred Tarski, Ludwig Wittgenstein. 6. Regarding the relation of Schlick and Neurath cf.: Rudolf Haller (Ed.), Schlick und Neurath. Ein Symposium. Amsterdam: Rodopi 1982. 7. As to the network with Berlin, Warsaw and Prague: Rudolf Haller / Friedrich Stadler (Eds.),

Wien – Berlin – Prag. Der Aufstieg der wissenschaftlichen Philosophie. Wien: Hölder-Pichler- Tempsky 1993; Lutz Danneberg /Andreas Kamlah /Lothar Schäfer (Hrsg.), Hans Reichenbach

und die Berliner Gruppe. Braunschweig-Wiesbaden: Vieweg 1994. Klemens Szaniawski (Ed.), The Vienna Circle and the Lvov-Warsaw School. Dordrecht-Boston-London: Kluwer 1989; Francesco Coniglione, Roberto Poli, Jan Wolenski (Eds.), Polish Scientific Philosophy. The Lvov-Warsaw School. Amsterdam-Atlanta: Rodopi 1993; Katarzyna Kijania-Placek and Jan Wolenski (Eds.), The Lvov-Warsaw School and Contemporary Philosophy. Dordrecht-Boston- London: Kluwer 1998; Jan Wolenski, Essay in the History of Logic and Logical Philosophy. Cracow: Jagiellonian University Press 1999. 8. Gustav Bergmann, “Memories of the Vienna Circle. Letter to Otto Neurath (1938)”, in: Friedrich Stadler (Ed.), Scientific Philosophy. Origins and Developments. Dordrecht-Boston- London: Kluwer 1993, 207. 9. Cf. Volker Thurm-Nemeth (Hrsg.), Konstruktion zwischen Werkbund und Bauhaus. Wissen- schaft – Architektur – Wiener Kreis. Wien: Holder-Pichler-Tempsky 1998; Wendelin Schmidt- Dengler (Hrsg.), Fiction in Science - Science in Fiction . Zum Gespräch zwischen Literatur und

Wissenschaft. Wien: Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky 1998. 10. To mention only two examples. Ronald Giere and Alan Richardson (Eds.), Origins of Logical Empiricism. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press 1996; Gary Hardcastle /Alan Richard- son (Eds.), Logical Empiricism in North America. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press 2003. 11. Cf. Michael Friedman, “Logical Positivism”, and Friedrich Stadler, ”Vienna Circle”, both in: Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. London-New York 2000. 12. As general reference cf.: Friedrich Stadler, The Vienna Circle. Studies in the Origins, Develop- ment, and Influence of Logical Empiricism. Wien-New York: Springer 2001. 13. Cf. Karl Menger, “A Counterpart of Ockham’s Razor”, and ”Geometry and Positivism. A Posi- tivistic Microgeometry”, in: Karl Menger, Selected Papers in Logic and Foundations, Didac- tics, Economics. Dordrecht-Boston-London: Reidel 1979, 105-135, 225-234. 14. Richard von Mises, Positivism. A Study in Human Understanding. New York: Dover 1951, 99 15. Alberto Coffa, The Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap. To the Vienna Station. Cambridge University Press 1991, Michael Friedman, Rediscovering Logical Positivism. Cambridge Uni-

F RIEDRICH S TADLER

versity Press 1999; Michael Friedman, A Parting of the Ways. Carnap, Cassirer, and Heideg- ger. Chicago and La Salle, Ill.: Open Court 2000; Alan W. Richardson, Carnap’s Construction of the World. The Aufbau and the Emergence of Logical Empiricism. Cambridge University

Press 1998. 16. Thomas Uebel, Vernunftkritik und Wissenschaft: Otto Neurath und der Erste Wiener Kreis. Wien-New York: Springer 2000. 17. Cited in: Stadler, The Vienna Circle, op.cit., 196. 18. Karl Menger, Ergebnisse eines Mathematischen Kolloquiums. Ed. by E. Dierker and K. Sigmund. Wien-New York: Springer 1998; Karl Menger, Reminiscences of the Vienna Circle and the Mathematical Colloquium. Ed. by Louise Golland, Brian McGuinness and Abe Sklar. Dordrecht-Boston-London: Kluwer 1994. 19. First Publication: Willard Van Orman Quine, ”Two Dogmas of Empiricism”, in: Philosophical Review

60, 1951,20-43. 20. Jan Wolenski and Eckehart Köhler (Eds.), Alfred Tarski and the Vienna Circle. Austro-Polish Connections in Logical Empiricism. Dordrecht-Boston-London: Kluwer 1999. 21. Moritz Schlick, “The Turning Point in Philosophy” (1930), in: Schlick, Philosophical Papers. Ed by H.Mulder and Barbara F.B. van der Velde-Schlick. Dordrecht-Boston-London: Reidel

1979, 154-160. 22. Rudolf Carnap, The Logical Structure of the World. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press 1967. Translated by Rolf George. 23. Cf.: Elisabeth Nemeth and Friedrich Stadler (Eds.), Encyclopedia and Utopia. The Life and Work of Otto Neurath (1882-1945). Dordrecht-Boston-London: Kluwer 1996. 24. Cf. Friedrich Stadler, “Transfer and Transformation of Logical Empiricism”, in: Giere/ Richardson (Eds.), op.cit, and “The Wiener Kreis in Great Britain: Emigration and Interaction in the Philosophy of Science”, in: Edward Timms / Jon Hughes (Eds.), Intellectual Migration and Cultural Transformation. Wien-New York: Springer 2002. 25. Cf. Gerald Holton, “From the Vienna Circle to the Harvard Square”, in: Stadler, Scientific Philosophy op.cit., 47-73. 26. Friedrich Stadler (Hrsg.), Phänomenologie und Logischer Empirismus. Zentenarium Felix Kauf- mann. Wien-New York: Springer 1997; Clemens Jabloner / Friedrich Stadler (Eds.), Logischer Empirismus und Reine Rechtslehre. Beziehungen zwischen dem Wiener Kreis und der Hans

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