E VALUATION OF THE R EPROACH

2. E VALUATION OF THE R EPROACH

2.1 I nput vs. Output Neutrality of Meta-ethics My answer to this first question runs as follows: “Yes; under certain circum-

stances there may be an important grain of truth to be found in the suspicion.” Most members of the Vienna Circle and Logical Empiricism would have denied this (a member who would have assented to my answer was Otto Neurath). They would have maintained that the results of philosophical analysis on a meta- ethical level could not affect moral practice on the ethical level (“neutrality of meta-ethics” (= NOM)). But if we distinguish between two meanings of NOM, we see that in one decisive respect they were not right:

In an input sense, NOM seems to be true: From a meta-ethical point of view, moral principles provide the input for an investigation that does not neces- sarily miss its aim if it fails to justify these principles. The leading questions of meta-ethics are Herbert Feigl’s famous two questions – tailored appropri- ately: “What do we mean if we talk about a moral principle?” and “How do we know it?” The question is not: “How can we make sure that every moral principle survives scrutiny?” We might propose the following methodologi- cal standard for meta-ethical theories: that they regard norms and value

judgements merely as their subject of inquiry. If there is a true meta-ethical theory, then it should be derivable by separate philosophers even when they disagree on certain ethical issues. Put in this input sense, I assume that the

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logical empiricists and at least many moral philosophers would agree to NOM.

In an output sense, NOM seems to be false: Output neutrality of meta-ethics would mean that meta-ethical views do not influence ethical views. But it seems conceivable that the moral decisions of a person are, at least to a cer- tain degree, influenced by her assumptions concerning the nature of moral values.

I think that there is nothing contradictory in the idea that noncognitivism may knock the bottom out of a given moral position. Consider the following example. The leader of a rough gang of youths might say: “What I order is right. I order you to kick the dog; therefore, it is right to kick the dog”. A weak-minded member of the gang might obey his leader at first, but might come to another conclusion after reading Ayer’s “Language, Truth, and Logic”: “Well, the noncognitivist analysis of our leader’s orders yields the following result: ‘Our leader’s commands express her feelings. Therefore, if she orders us to kick the dog, she wants me to kick the dog’”. Reformulated this way, the order of the leader loses authority, and our member might say: “Hey, you are only telling us what you want us to do. There are no binding reasons behind your orders, and I will not obey them any longer, since I myself like dogs!” It is not even necessary that our member be confronted with the theory of noncognitivism – if it is the right and complete meta- ethical theory, a rather minor occasion that initiates reflection upon values should yield a similar result.

This might be generalized. It is conceivable that some people think that cer- tain acts should be committed or omitted because certain propositions about values or duties are right. And it is certainly logically possible that these people will not think likewise about those acts if they come to think that the relevant propositions about values and duties are, in fact, meaningless propositions. If a moral judgement MJ is asserted, and either a noncogni- tivist replies or one’s own reflection shows that there are no reasons to believe in the truth of MJ, then this might be relevant for the adherents of MJ – even if the judgement about MJ is not conceived of as a moral judgement

itself, but as a meta-ethical judgement. It is then not neutral with regard to the ethical level.

2.2 Incompleteness of Noncognitivism The obvious reaction to meta-ethics’ lack of output neutrality is to reject non-

cognitivism. How should it otherwise be possible to explain the relative stability and uniformity of moral systems? If noncognitivism is right, should we not expect a much more variable and much more scattered pattern of morals to

prevail in the world? I, for one, do not think that this would be the right approach to easing the tension between

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(1) the falsity of output NOM, (2) the stability and uniformity of moral evaluation systems, and (3) noncognitivism.

It is not the right approach because there seems to be no possibility of building up a satisfactory cognitivist meta-ethics. Cognitivism, although proposed in a great variety of theories, either runs into relativism or cannot explain why moral

values should be of any relevance to our practical life. 5 The right approach seems to me to be a move that may be called a “Humean move”, adding a fourth element to the scene – a theory that explains (2) in light of the fact that (3) is cor- rect. Noncognitivism is not false, but incomplete.

After all, this also seems to have been the view of the logical empiricists. They did not blindly accept output NOM, and I even think that a major part of logical empiricist moral philosophy can be read as being devoted to the project of combining (3) and (2). They saw that noncognitivism and output neutrality cannot both be asserted simulteanously and coherently. In the light of (1), one has to provide reasons that show how (3) and (2) might be combined. But what- ever they saw, the logical empiricists did not offer a satisfactory, comprehensive and systematic treatment for these problems. It is Schlick who comes closest to such a treatment. 6

How could such a systematic treatment look, and what would be the conse- quences?