1989 resulted in trends of economic decline and resistance by governors of the fastest growing provinces Weingast 1995.
Second, both countries are characterized by uneven development. In China, the most developed parts of the country are the coastal areas. Upon embarking on fiscal
federalism, China did not apply the rule uniformly to all provinces or cities, but initially only to four coastal areas which it designated as special economic zones in 1980. Similarly,
Indonesia’s most developed parts are found in Java, Bali and Sumatera. Attempts to introduce regulations that enable local governments to be accountable for its own
economic performance could start from cities in these islands, and then expand from there. Of course, giving up assurance of central government transfers need to be offset
by the possibility of retaining a significant amount of income and property taxes by the local governments, as incentive. The point is that a balanced decentralization does not
necessarily have to be symmetrical. An asymmetrical approach may work just as well to achieve a balanced process which caters to different starting points of local governments.
III. CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
In contrast to those who consider Indonesia’s decentralization as a bold and over- reaching effort, I argue that the country has not decentralized enough. Indonesia’s
decentralization is driven more by political goals to ensure equitable distribution of resources, rather than by economic goals which aim to efficiently serve the needs of local
residents, workers and firms. This has led to a largely one-sided process of fiscal decentralization which focuses on decentralization of expenditure and ignores
decentralization of revenue. The assurance of unconditional transfers from the central government compounded by lack of pressure from local citizens has, arguably, reduced
much incentive for regional governments to enhance their own economic competitiveness.
To reverse the perverse outcomes of the game theoretical model as presented above, there are two incentive structures that need to be changed. The first is lack of demand
pressure control from local citizens on the performance of regional governments. As long
as citizen’s awareness remains low, tangible benefits of decentralization will remain elusive.
Lewis 2010 offers the “civil society solution”, which is basically to raise public
awareness on what they should expect from their regional governments, and to develop further mechanisms to improve public accountability at the local level.
The second incentive structure that needs to be revised is the general public’s preference to redistribute resources to the regions without instilling a hard budget constraint. This
creates a perverse incentive on the part of central government to be lenient on regional governments. As long as there are no hard performance-based rewards and punishments
that apply to regional governments, the use of resources at the local level is likely to be
unchecked. A restructuring of this incentive requires the building of an alternative “social consensus” that does not see natural resources as an automatic entitlement, but as a
loan from the future generation. Without the proper institutions to manage it, natural resource can turn into a curse. Fear of secession and independence movements must
also be managed well. Applying a lenient attitude toward regional governments due to
fear of secessionist tendencies will ultimately prevent the natural development of regional competitiveness.
Indonesia is a unique case where for the most part, politics does not have to be disciplined by the economy. Leniency and shirking is made possible by both easy money and easy
attitude, resulting in the public’s loss. But as the citizens become more educated and exposed to information and benchmarks from other places, things are starting to change.
Citizen pressure is rising, and starting to manifest in the growing popularity of public figures that has clean track record and promises a more serious attitude to deliver quality
public goods and services. These are the factors that can ultimately overturn the harmoniously perverse incentive
s that currently plague Indonesia’s decentralization.
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ANALYSING E-ADMINISTRATION IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES : CHALLENGES BEST PRACTICES
Sofiarti Dyah Anggunia ICT for Development, The University of Manchester, Manchester
West Kalimantan Provincial Government, Pontianak, angguniakalbarprov.go.id
ABSTRACT
The new concept of Digital Era Governance has enhanced government reform. E-administration as a G2G application is a key point to success back-office within agencies. Many electronic public administrations
have been deployed, due to forcing from political, economic, organisational and technological factors. These three drivers enable development of government performances on doing cheaper, more, quicker,
better and new capabilities. However, implementing e-Administration is not as simple as it designed. There are three main challenges as barriers in most of developing countries: policy and political will; the lack of
resources; sourcing and internal collaboration. These challenges might be solved by the best practices that also occurred in developing countries, i.e.: e-leadership; resource management; outsourcing and
effective collaboration. But the most importantly, a successful e-administration project needs strong commitment from all stakeholders.
Keywords: e-administration,
e-government,
G2G I. INTRODUCTION
It is a widely held belief that e –government has an important role to reform a better
public service, both in state and local government. In Western countries, e-government has already been started in the mid-1990s, nonetheless developing countries have just
begun implementing this system. E-government drives the New Public Management NPM Bellamy Taylor 1998 which adopts private sector techniques Heeks 2001.
Indeed, there are some typical issues in public sector that could not be found in private sector.
Introduced in twentieth century, NPM offers new approach of way in which the public sector is to be governed without replacing the older frameworks Lane 2000.
Nevertheless, as a refinement of NPM, Digital Era Governance DEG now offers future public management which involves flexible principles, i.e. reintegration, holism and
digitalization Dunleavy et al 2006.
Regarding the development of e-government, as described above, the main aim of each theory is to enhance better public management Lane 2000. One of successful
key in delivering this aim is the improvement of public administration. The well-organised internal administration within the bureaucrat is prior to public service enhancement, both
for citizens and businesses Government of Romania 2001. This paper discusses e- government application which has role on improving internal administration processes as
known as e-administration. Furthermore, the objective of this essay is to analyse the challenges and good practices of the changes from manual administrative jobs to
electronic application.
To that end, the following part describes e-administration and what aspects are driving the change. Subsequently, the next part analyses some key challenges that may
be occurred during the implementation of the application, particularly in developing countries. Several good practices in implementing this system will be elaborated in the
penultimate section. Finally, the last part concludes this paper.
Introduced in twentieth century, NPM offers new approach of way in which the public sector is to be governed without replacing the older frameworks Lane 2000.
Nevertheless, as a refinement of NPM, Digital Era Governance DEG now offers future public management which involves flexible principles, i.e. reintegration, holism and
digitalization Dunleavy et al 2006. Regarding the development of e-government, as described above, the main aim of each
theory is to enhance better public management Lane 2000. One of successful key in delivering this aim is the improvement of public administration. The well-organised
internal administration within the bureaucrat is prior to public service enhancement, both for citizens and businesses Government of Romania 2001. This paper discusses e-
government application which has role on improving internal administration processes as known as e-administration. Furthermore, the objective of this essay is to analyse the
challenges and good practices of the changes from manual administrative jobs to electronic application.
To that end, the following part describes e-administration and what aspects are driving the change. Subsequently, the next part analyses some key challenges that may be
occurred during the implementation of the application, particularly in developing countries. Several good practices in implementing this system will be elaborated in the penultimate
section. Finally, the last part concludes this paper.
II. DISCUSSION II.1 e-ADMINISTRATION
