TRUSTED EXTENSIONS MULTILEVEL SERVICES TRUSTED EXTENSIONS MULTILEVEL SERVICES 117
8.9. SUMMARY 119
via the Trusted Path and is transparent to users and roles running in labeled zones. The auditing system is robust and cannot be tampered with by processes running in labeled zones. Even processes with all privileges in a labeled zone cannot observe the audit trail nor tamper with any records.8.9 SUMMARY
Solaris Trusted Extensions builds on the security features in Solaris 10 in an upward compatible fashion. Administrators of Solaris 10 can enable Trusted Extensions by turning the labeling service on with a single SMF command. Because it is now integrated with the Solaris OS, all of the latest Solaris functionality is supported by Trusted Extensions, and all hardware platforms are supported. Conversely, privileges and RBAC are fully supported in regular Solaris without the need to make use of the MLS features of Trusted Extensions. The MLS policy is enforced at the zone boundaries, rather than on individual processes or files, so access control is coarser-grained than traditional MLS operating systems. Note that this approach is similar to that envisioned for virtual machine systems, see Chapter 11. User applications running within zones require no customization for the Trusted Extensions platform. Trusted Extensions provides multilevel services that provide general services for applications at all levels without requiring application modifications. 120 121 C H A P T E R 9 Case Study: Building a Secure Operating System for Linux The Linux operating system is a complete reimplementation of the POSIX interface initiated by Linus Torvalds [ 187 ]. Linux gained popularity throughout the 1990s, resulting in the promotion of Linux as a viable alternative to Windows, particularly for server systems e.g., web servers. As Linux achieved acceptance, variety of efforts began to address the security problems of traditional UNIX systems see Chapter 4. In this chapter, we describe the resulting approach for enforcing mandatory access control, the Linux Security Modules LSM framework. The LSM framework defines a reference monitor interface for Linux behind which a variety of reference monitor imple- mentations are possible. We also examine one of the LSM reference monitors, Security-enhanced Linux SELinux, and evaluate how it uses the LSM framework to implement the reference monitor guarantees of Chapter 2.9.1 LINUX SECURITY MODULES
The Linux Security Modules LSM framework is a reference monitor system for the Linux ker- nel [ 342 ]. The LSM framework consists of two parts, a reference monitor interface integrated into the mainline Linux kernel since version 2.6 and a reference monitor module, called an LSM, that implements reference monitor function i.e., authorization module and policy store, see Chapter 2 for the reference monitor concept definition behind that interface. Several independent modules have been developed for the LSM framework [ 228 , 183 , 127 , 229 ] to implement different forms of reference monitor function e.g., different policy modules. We examine the LSM reference monitor interface in this section, and one of its LSMs, Security-Enhanced Linux SELinux [ 229 ] in the subsequent section. There are other LSMs and a debate remains over which LSM approach is most effective, but SELinux is certainly the most comprehensive of the LSMs.9.1.1 LSM HISTORY
In the late 1990s, the Linux operating system gained the necessary support to make it a viable alternative in the UNIX system market. Although there were a variety of UNIX variants, such as AIX and HPUNIX, and even other open source systems, such as the BSD variants, Linux became the mindshare leader among UNIX systems. Large server vendors, such as IBM and HP, threw their support behind Linux, and it soon became the main competitor to Microsoft Windows. Also, in the late 1990s, a number of projects emerged that retrofit various security features into the Linux kernel. Since Linux was open source, anyone could modify it to meet their requirementsParts
» SECURE OPERATING SYSTEMS 3 Operating Systerm Security
» SECURE OPERATING SYSTEMS Operating Systerm Security
» SECURITY GOALS Operating Systerm Security
» SECURITY GOALS 5 Operating Systerm Security
» TRUST MODEL Operating Systerm Security
» THREAT MODEL 7 Operating Systerm Security
» THREAT MODEL Operating Systerm Security
» SUMMARY Operating Systerm Security
» MANDATORY PROTECTION SYSTEMS PROTECTION SYSTEM 11
» PROTECTION SYSTEM 13 Operating Systerm Security
» REFERENCE MONITOR Operating Systerm Security
» REFERENCE MONITOR 15 Operating Systerm Security
» SECURE OPERATING SYSTEM DEFINITION
» SECURE OPERATING SYSTEM DEFINITION 17
» ASSESSMENT CRITERIA 19 ASSESSMENT CRITERIA
» SUMMARY 21 Operating Systerm Security
» MULTICS HISTORY THE MULTICS SYSTEM
» MULTICS FUNDAMENTALS THE MULTICS SYSTEM 25
» MULTICS SECURITY FUNDAMENTALS THE MULTICS SYSTEM 25
» MULTICS PROTECTION SYSTEM MODELS
» MULTICS PROTECTION SYSTEM THE MULTICS SYSTEM 29
» MULTICS REFERENCE MONITOR THE MULTICS SYSTEM 31
» MULTICS SECURITY 33 Operating Systerm Security
» MULTICS SECURITY Operating Systerm Security
» MULTICS SECURITY 35 Operating Systerm Security
» MULTICS VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS Operating Systerm Security
» SUMMARY 37 Operating Systerm Security
» UNIX HISTORY SYSTEM HISTORIES
» WINDOWS HISTORY SYSTEM HISTORIES
» UNIX SECURITY 41 Operating Systerm Security
» UNIX PROTECTION SYSTEM UNIX SECURITY
» UNIX AUTHORIZATION UNIX SECURITY 43
» Complete Mediation: How does the reference monitor interface ensure that all security-
» Complete Mediation: Does the reference monitor interface mediate security-sensitive oper-
» Complete Mediation: How do we verify that the reference monitor interface provides com-
» Tamperproof: How does the system protect the reference monitor, including its protection
» Tamperproof: Does the system’s protection system protect the trusted computing base pro-
» UNIX VULNERABILITIES UNIX SECURITY 47
» WINDOWS SECURITY 49 Operating Systerm Security
» WINDOWS PROTECTION SYSTEM WINDOWS SECURITY
» WINDOWS AUTHORIZATION WINDOWS SECURITY 51
» Verifiable: What is basis for the correctness of the system’s trusted computing base?
» WINDOWS VULNERABILITIES WINDOWS SECURITY 55
» INFORMATION FLOW Operating Systerm Security
» INFORMATION FLOW SECRECY MODELS 59
» INFORMATION FLOW SECRECY MODELS
» BELL-LAPADULA MODEL INFORMATION FLOW SECRECY MODELS 61
» INFORMATION FLOW SECRECY MODELS 63
» INFORMATION FLOW INTEGRITY MODELS
» BIBA INTEGRITY MODEL INFORMATION FLOW INTEGRITY MODELS 65
» LOW-WATER MARK INTEGRITY INFORMATION FLOW INTEGRITY MODELS 67
» CLARK-WILSON INTEGRITY INFORMATION FLOW INTEGRITY MODELS 67
» THE CHALLENGE OF TRUSTED PROCESSES
» COVERT CHANNELS Operating Systerm Security
» CHANNEL TYPES COVERT CHANNELS 71
» SUMMARY 73 Operating Systerm Security
» THE SECURITY KERNEL Operating Systerm Security
» SECURE COMMUNICATIONS PROCESSOR 77 Operating Systerm Security
» SCOMP ARCHITECTURE SECURE COMMUNICATIONS PROCESSOR
» SCOMP HARDWARE SECURE COMMUNICATIONS PROCESSOR 79
» SCOMP TRUSTED OPERATING PROGRAM
» SCOMP KERNEL INTERFACE PACKAGE
» SECURE COMMUNICATIONS PROCESSOR 85 Operating Systerm Security
» GEMINI SECURE OPERATING SYSTEM
» GEMINI SECURE OPERATING SYSTEM 87
» SUMMARY 89 Operating Systerm Security
» RETROFITTING SECURITY INTO A COMMERCIAL OS
» HISTORY OF RETROFITTING COMMERCIAL OS’S 93
» HISTORY OF RETROFITTING COMMERCIAL OS’S COMMERCIAL ERA
» MICROKERNEL ERA 95 Operating Systerm Security
» MICROKERNEL ERA Operating Systerm Security
» UNIX ERA 97 Operating Systerm Security
» RECENT UNIX SYSTEMS UNIX ERA 99
» SUMMARY 101 Operating Systerm Security
» TRUSTED EXTENSIONS ACCESS CONTROL
» SOLARIS COMPATIBILITY 105 Operating Systerm Security
» SOLARIS COMPATIBILITY Operating Systerm Security
» TRUSTED EXTENSIONS MEDIATION Operating Systerm Security
» TRUSTED EXTENSIONS MEDIATION 107 Operating Systerm Security
» PROCESS RIGHTS MANAGEMENT PRIVILEGES
» PRIVILEGE BRACKETING AND RELINQUISHING
» CONTROLLING PRIVILEGE ESCALATION PROCESS RIGHTS MANAGEMENT PRIVILEGES 111
» ASSIGNED PRIVILEGES AND SAFEGUARDS
» RBAC AUTHORIZATIONS ROLE-BASED ACCESS CONTROL RBAC
» CONVERTING THE SUPERUSER TO A ROLE
» TRUSTED EXTENSIONS NETWORKING 115 Operating Systerm Security
» TRUSTED EXTENSIONS NETWORKING Operating Systerm Security
» TRUSTED EXTENSIONS MULTILEVEL SERVICES TRUSTED EXTENSIONS MULTILEVEL SERVICES 117
» TRUSTED EXTENSIONS ADMINISTRATION Operating Systerm Security
» SUMMARY 119 Operating Systerm Security
» LSM HISTORY LINUX SECURITY MODULES
» LSM IMPLEMENTATION LINUX SECURITY MODULES 123
» LINUX SECURITY MODULES 125 Operating Systerm Security
» SELINUX REFERENCE MONITOR SECURITY-ENHANCED LINUX
» SECURITY-ENHANCED LINUX 127 Operating Systerm Security
» SELINUX PROTECTION STATE SECURITY-ENHANCED LINUX 129
» SELINUX LABELING STATE SECURITY-ENHANCED LINUX 131
» SELINUX TRANSITION STATE SECURITY-ENHANCED LINUX 133
» SELINUX TRUSTED PROGRAMS SECURITY-ENHANCED LINUX 135
» SUMMARY 139 Operating Systerm Security
» CAPABILITY SYSTEM FUNDAMENTALS Operating Systerm Security
» CAPABILITY SECURITY Operating Systerm Security
» CHALLENGES IN SECURE CAPABILITY SYSTEMS 143
» CAPABILITIES AND THE ⋆-PROPERTY
» CAPABILITIES AND CONFINEMENT CHALLENGES IN SECURE CAPABILITY SYSTEMS
» CAPABILITIES AND POLICY CHANGES
» ENFORCING THE ⋆-PROPERTY BUILDING SECURE CAPABILITY SYSTEMS
» ENFORCING CONFINEMENT BUILDING SECURE CAPABILITY SYSTEMS 147
» REVOKING CAPABILITIES BUILDING SECURE CAPABILITY SYSTEMS 149
» SUMMARY 151 SUMMARY Operating Systerm Security
» SEPARATION KERNELS 155 SEPARATION KERNELS
» VAX VMM DESIGN VAX VMM SECURITY KERNEL
» SECURITY IN OTHER VIRTUAL MACHINE SYSTEMS 163
» SECURITY IN OTHER VIRTUAL MACHINE SYSTEMS
» SECURITY IN OTHER VIRTUAL MACHINE SYSTEMS 165
» SUMMARY 167 Operating Systerm Security
» ORANGE BOOK Operating Systerm Security
» ORANGE BOOK 171 Operating Systerm Security
» COMMON CRITERIA CONCEPTS COMMON CRITERIA
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