SECURITY GOALS 5 Operating Systerm Security
1.5 SUMMARY
While building a truly secure operating system may be infeasible, operating system security will improve immensely if security becomes a focus. To do so requires that operating systems be designed to enforce security goals, provide a clearly-identified trusted computing base that defines a trust model, define a threat model for the trusted computing base, and ensure protection of the trusted computing base under that model. 9 C H A P T E R 2 Access Control Fundamentals An access enforcement mechanism authorizes requests e.g., system calls from multiple subjects e.g., users, processes, etc. to perform operations e.g., read, write, etc. on objects e.g., files, sockets, etc.. An operating system provides an access enforcement mechanism. In this chapter, we define the fundamental concepts of access control: a protection system that defines the access control specifi- cation and a reference monitor that is the system’s access enforcement mechanism that enforces this specification. Based on these concepts, we provide an ideal definition for a secure operating system. We use that definition to evaluate the operating systems security of the various systems examined in this book.2.1 PROTECTION SYSTEM
The security requirements of a operating system are defined in its protection system. Definition 2.1. A protection system consists of a protection state, which describes the operations that system subjects can perform on system objects, and a set of protection state operations, which enable modification of that state. A protection system enables the definition and management of a protection state. A protection state consists of the specific system subjects, the specific system objects, and the operations that those subjects can perform on those objects. A protection system also defines protection state operations that enable a protection state to be modified. For example, protection state operations are necessary to add new system subjects or new system objects to the protection state.2.1.1 LAMPSON’S ACCESS MATRIX
Lampson defined the idea that a protection state is represented by an access matrix, in general, [ 176 ]. Definition 2.2. An access matrix consists of a set of subjects s ∈ S, a set of objects o ∈ O, a set of operations op ∈ OP , and a function opss, o ⊆ OP , which determines the operations that subject s can perform on object o. The function opss, o is said to return a set of operations corresponding to cell s, o. Figure 2.1 shows an access matrix. The matrix is a two-dimensional representation where the set of subjects form one axis and the set of objects for the other axis. The cells of the access matrix store the operations that the corresponding subject can perform on the corresponding object. For example, subject Process 1 can perform read and write operations on object File 2.Parts
» SECURE OPERATING SYSTEMS 3 Operating Systerm Security
» SECURE OPERATING SYSTEMS Operating Systerm Security
» SECURITY GOALS Operating Systerm Security
» SECURITY GOALS 5 Operating Systerm Security
» TRUST MODEL Operating Systerm Security
» THREAT MODEL 7 Operating Systerm Security
» THREAT MODEL Operating Systerm Security
» SUMMARY Operating Systerm Security
» MANDATORY PROTECTION SYSTEMS PROTECTION SYSTEM 11
» PROTECTION SYSTEM 13 Operating Systerm Security
» REFERENCE MONITOR Operating Systerm Security
» REFERENCE MONITOR 15 Operating Systerm Security
» SECURE OPERATING SYSTEM DEFINITION
» SECURE OPERATING SYSTEM DEFINITION 17
» ASSESSMENT CRITERIA 19 ASSESSMENT CRITERIA
» SUMMARY 21 Operating Systerm Security
» MULTICS HISTORY THE MULTICS SYSTEM
» MULTICS FUNDAMENTALS THE MULTICS SYSTEM 25
» MULTICS SECURITY FUNDAMENTALS THE MULTICS SYSTEM 25
» MULTICS PROTECTION SYSTEM MODELS
» MULTICS PROTECTION SYSTEM THE MULTICS SYSTEM 29
» MULTICS REFERENCE MONITOR THE MULTICS SYSTEM 31
» MULTICS SECURITY 33 Operating Systerm Security
» MULTICS SECURITY Operating Systerm Security
» MULTICS SECURITY 35 Operating Systerm Security
» MULTICS VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS Operating Systerm Security
» SUMMARY 37 Operating Systerm Security
» UNIX HISTORY SYSTEM HISTORIES
» WINDOWS HISTORY SYSTEM HISTORIES
» UNIX SECURITY 41 Operating Systerm Security
» UNIX PROTECTION SYSTEM UNIX SECURITY
» UNIX AUTHORIZATION UNIX SECURITY 43
» Complete Mediation: How does the reference monitor interface ensure that all security-
» Complete Mediation: Does the reference monitor interface mediate security-sensitive oper-
» Complete Mediation: How do we verify that the reference monitor interface provides com-
» Tamperproof: How does the system protect the reference monitor, including its protection
» Tamperproof: Does the system’s protection system protect the trusted computing base pro-
» UNIX VULNERABILITIES UNIX SECURITY 47
» WINDOWS SECURITY 49 Operating Systerm Security
» WINDOWS PROTECTION SYSTEM WINDOWS SECURITY
» WINDOWS AUTHORIZATION WINDOWS SECURITY 51
» Verifiable: What is basis for the correctness of the system’s trusted computing base?
» WINDOWS VULNERABILITIES WINDOWS SECURITY 55
» INFORMATION FLOW Operating Systerm Security
» INFORMATION FLOW SECRECY MODELS 59
» INFORMATION FLOW SECRECY MODELS
» BELL-LAPADULA MODEL INFORMATION FLOW SECRECY MODELS 61
» INFORMATION FLOW SECRECY MODELS 63
» INFORMATION FLOW INTEGRITY MODELS
» BIBA INTEGRITY MODEL INFORMATION FLOW INTEGRITY MODELS 65
» LOW-WATER MARK INTEGRITY INFORMATION FLOW INTEGRITY MODELS 67
» CLARK-WILSON INTEGRITY INFORMATION FLOW INTEGRITY MODELS 67
» THE CHALLENGE OF TRUSTED PROCESSES
» COVERT CHANNELS Operating Systerm Security
» CHANNEL TYPES COVERT CHANNELS 71
» SUMMARY 73 Operating Systerm Security
» THE SECURITY KERNEL Operating Systerm Security
» SECURE COMMUNICATIONS PROCESSOR 77 Operating Systerm Security
» SCOMP ARCHITECTURE SECURE COMMUNICATIONS PROCESSOR
» SCOMP HARDWARE SECURE COMMUNICATIONS PROCESSOR 79
» SCOMP TRUSTED OPERATING PROGRAM
» SCOMP KERNEL INTERFACE PACKAGE
» SECURE COMMUNICATIONS PROCESSOR 85 Operating Systerm Security
» GEMINI SECURE OPERATING SYSTEM
» GEMINI SECURE OPERATING SYSTEM 87
» SUMMARY 89 Operating Systerm Security
» RETROFITTING SECURITY INTO A COMMERCIAL OS
» HISTORY OF RETROFITTING COMMERCIAL OS’S 93
» HISTORY OF RETROFITTING COMMERCIAL OS’S COMMERCIAL ERA
» MICROKERNEL ERA 95 Operating Systerm Security
» MICROKERNEL ERA Operating Systerm Security
» UNIX ERA 97 Operating Systerm Security
» RECENT UNIX SYSTEMS UNIX ERA 99
» SUMMARY 101 Operating Systerm Security
» TRUSTED EXTENSIONS ACCESS CONTROL
» SOLARIS COMPATIBILITY 105 Operating Systerm Security
» SOLARIS COMPATIBILITY Operating Systerm Security
» TRUSTED EXTENSIONS MEDIATION Operating Systerm Security
» TRUSTED EXTENSIONS MEDIATION 107 Operating Systerm Security
» PROCESS RIGHTS MANAGEMENT PRIVILEGES
» PRIVILEGE BRACKETING AND RELINQUISHING
» CONTROLLING PRIVILEGE ESCALATION PROCESS RIGHTS MANAGEMENT PRIVILEGES 111
» ASSIGNED PRIVILEGES AND SAFEGUARDS
» RBAC AUTHORIZATIONS ROLE-BASED ACCESS CONTROL RBAC
» CONVERTING THE SUPERUSER TO A ROLE
» TRUSTED EXTENSIONS NETWORKING 115 Operating Systerm Security
» TRUSTED EXTENSIONS NETWORKING Operating Systerm Security
» TRUSTED EXTENSIONS MULTILEVEL SERVICES TRUSTED EXTENSIONS MULTILEVEL SERVICES 117
» TRUSTED EXTENSIONS ADMINISTRATION Operating Systerm Security
» SUMMARY 119 Operating Systerm Security
» LSM HISTORY LINUX SECURITY MODULES
» LSM IMPLEMENTATION LINUX SECURITY MODULES 123
» LINUX SECURITY MODULES 125 Operating Systerm Security
» SELINUX REFERENCE MONITOR SECURITY-ENHANCED LINUX
» SECURITY-ENHANCED LINUX 127 Operating Systerm Security
» SELINUX PROTECTION STATE SECURITY-ENHANCED LINUX 129
» SELINUX LABELING STATE SECURITY-ENHANCED LINUX 131
» SELINUX TRANSITION STATE SECURITY-ENHANCED LINUX 133
» SELINUX TRUSTED PROGRAMS SECURITY-ENHANCED LINUX 135
» SUMMARY 139 Operating Systerm Security
» CAPABILITY SYSTEM FUNDAMENTALS Operating Systerm Security
» CAPABILITY SECURITY Operating Systerm Security
» CHALLENGES IN SECURE CAPABILITY SYSTEMS 143
» CAPABILITIES AND THE ⋆-PROPERTY
» CAPABILITIES AND CONFINEMENT CHALLENGES IN SECURE CAPABILITY SYSTEMS
» CAPABILITIES AND POLICY CHANGES
» ENFORCING THE ⋆-PROPERTY BUILDING SECURE CAPABILITY SYSTEMS
» ENFORCING CONFINEMENT BUILDING SECURE CAPABILITY SYSTEMS 147
» REVOKING CAPABILITIES BUILDING SECURE CAPABILITY SYSTEMS 149
» SUMMARY 151 SUMMARY Operating Systerm Security
» SEPARATION KERNELS 155 SEPARATION KERNELS
» VAX VMM DESIGN VAX VMM SECURITY KERNEL
» SECURITY IN OTHER VIRTUAL MACHINE SYSTEMS 163
» SECURITY IN OTHER VIRTUAL MACHINE SYSTEMS
» SECURITY IN OTHER VIRTUAL MACHINE SYSTEMS 165
» SUMMARY 167 Operating Systerm Security
» ORANGE BOOK Operating Systerm Security
» ORANGE BOOK 171 Operating Systerm Security
» COMMON CRITERIA CONCEPTS COMMON CRITERIA
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