SOLARIS COMPATIBILITY 105 Operating Systerm Security
8.4 PROCESS RIGHTS MANAGEMENT PRIVILEGES
The Solaris operating system implements a set of privileges that provide fine-grained control over the actions of processes. Traditionally, Unix-based systems have relied on the concept of a specially- identified, super-user, called root.This concept of a Unix super-user has been replaced in a backward compatible manner with the ability to grant one or more specific privileges that enable processes to perform otherwise restricted operations. The privilege-based security model is equally applicable to processes running under user id 0 root or under any other user id. For root-owned processes, the ability to access and modify critical system resources is restricted by removing privileges from these processes. For user-owned processes privileges are added to explicitly allow them to access such critical resources. The implications for such privilege-aware processes are both, that root processes can run more safely because their powers are limited, and that many processes that formerly required to be root processes can now be executed by regular users by simply giving them the additionally required privileges. Experience with modifying a large set of Solaris programs to be privilege-aware revealed an interesting fact. Most programs that formerly required to be executed as user root require only very few additional privileges and in many cases require them only once before they can be relinquished. The change to a primarily privilege-based security model in the Solaris operating system gives developers an opportunity to restrict processes to those privileged operations actually needed instead of having to choose between all super-user or no privileges non-zero UIDs. Additionally, a set of previously unrestricted operations now require a privilege; these privileges are dubbed the basic privileges. These are privileges that used to be always available to unprivileged processes. By default, processes still have the basic privileges. 1 The policy for reading down is configurable because it is not always appropriate. For example, it could result in processes at a higher level executing lower-level applications which manipulate the higher-level data. One way to mitigate that risk is to configure the zone without the privilege to do read down mounts. An additional way is to specify the noexec mount option for lower-level mounts.Parts
» SECURE OPERATING SYSTEMS 3 Operating Systerm Security
» SECURE OPERATING SYSTEMS Operating Systerm Security
» SECURITY GOALS Operating Systerm Security
» SECURITY GOALS 5 Operating Systerm Security
» TRUST MODEL Operating Systerm Security
» THREAT MODEL 7 Operating Systerm Security
» THREAT MODEL Operating Systerm Security
» SUMMARY Operating Systerm Security
» MANDATORY PROTECTION SYSTEMS PROTECTION SYSTEM 11
» PROTECTION SYSTEM 13 Operating Systerm Security
» REFERENCE MONITOR Operating Systerm Security
» REFERENCE MONITOR 15 Operating Systerm Security
» SECURE OPERATING SYSTEM DEFINITION
» SECURE OPERATING SYSTEM DEFINITION 17
» ASSESSMENT CRITERIA 19 ASSESSMENT CRITERIA
» SUMMARY 21 Operating Systerm Security
» MULTICS HISTORY THE MULTICS SYSTEM
» MULTICS FUNDAMENTALS THE MULTICS SYSTEM 25
» MULTICS SECURITY FUNDAMENTALS THE MULTICS SYSTEM 25
» MULTICS PROTECTION SYSTEM MODELS
» MULTICS PROTECTION SYSTEM THE MULTICS SYSTEM 29
» MULTICS REFERENCE MONITOR THE MULTICS SYSTEM 31
» MULTICS SECURITY 33 Operating Systerm Security
» MULTICS SECURITY Operating Systerm Security
» MULTICS SECURITY 35 Operating Systerm Security
» MULTICS VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS Operating Systerm Security
» SUMMARY 37 Operating Systerm Security
» UNIX HISTORY SYSTEM HISTORIES
» WINDOWS HISTORY SYSTEM HISTORIES
» UNIX SECURITY 41 Operating Systerm Security
» UNIX PROTECTION SYSTEM UNIX SECURITY
» UNIX AUTHORIZATION UNIX SECURITY 43
» Complete Mediation: How does the reference monitor interface ensure that all security-
» Complete Mediation: Does the reference monitor interface mediate security-sensitive oper-
» Complete Mediation: How do we verify that the reference monitor interface provides com-
» Tamperproof: How does the system protect the reference monitor, including its protection
» Tamperproof: Does the system’s protection system protect the trusted computing base pro-
» UNIX VULNERABILITIES UNIX SECURITY 47
» WINDOWS SECURITY 49 Operating Systerm Security
» WINDOWS PROTECTION SYSTEM WINDOWS SECURITY
» WINDOWS AUTHORIZATION WINDOWS SECURITY 51
» Verifiable: What is basis for the correctness of the system’s trusted computing base?
» WINDOWS VULNERABILITIES WINDOWS SECURITY 55
» INFORMATION FLOW Operating Systerm Security
» INFORMATION FLOW SECRECY MODELS 59
» INFORMATION FLOW SECRECY MODELS
» BELL-LAPADULA MODEL INFORMATION FLOW SECRECY MODELS 61
» INFORMATION FLOW SECRECY MODELS 63
» INFORMATION FLOW INTEGRITY MODELS
» BIBA INTEGRITY MODEL INFORMATION FLOW INTEGRITY MODELS 65
» LOW-WATER MARK INTEGRITY INFORMATION FLOW INTEGRITY MODELS 67
» CLARK-WILSON INTEGRITY INFORMATION FLOW INTEGRITY MODELS 67
» THE CHALLENGE OF TRUSTED PROCESSES
» COVERT CHANNELS Operating Systerm Security
» CHANNEL TYPES COVERT CHANNELS 71
» SUMMARY 73 Operating Systerm Security
» THE SECURITY KERNEL Operating Systerm Security
» SECURE COMMUNICATIONS PROCESSOR 77 Operating Systerm Security
» SCOMP ARCHITECTURE SECURE COMMUNICATIONS PROCESSOR
» SCOMP HARDWARE SECURE COMMUNICATIONS PROCESSOR 79
» SCOMP TRUSTED OPERATING PROGRAM
» SCOMP KERNEL INTERFACE PACKAGE
» SECURE COMMUNICATIONS PROCESSOR 85 Operating Systerm Security
» GEMINI SECURE OPERATING SYSTEM
» GEMINI SECURE OPERATING SYSTEM 87
» SUMMARY 89 Operating Systerm Security
» RETROFITTING SECURITY INTO A COMMERCIAL OS
» HISTORY OF RETROFITTING COMMERCIAL OS’S 93
» HISTORY OF RETROFITTING COMMERCIAL OS’S COMMERCIAL ERA
» MICROKERNEL ERA 95 Operating Systerm Security
» MICROKERNEL ERA Operating Systerm Security
» UNIX ERA 97 Operating Systerm Security
» RECENT UNIX SYSTEMS UNIX ERA 99
» SUMMARY 101 Operating Systerm Security
» TRUSTED EXTENSIONS ACCESS CONTROL
» SOLARIS COMPATIBILITY 105 Operating Systerm Security
» SOLARIS COMPATIBILITY Operating Systerm Security
» TRUSTED EXTENSIONS MEDIATION Operating Systerm Security
» TRUSTED EXTENSIONS MEDIATION 107 Operating Systerm Security
» PROCESS RIGHTS MANAGEMENT PRIVILEGES
» PRIVILEGE BRACKETING AND RELINQUISHING
» CONTROLLING PRIVILEGE ESCALATION PROCESS RIGHTS MANAGEMENT PRIVILEGES 111
» ASSIGNED PRIVILEGES AND SAFEGUARDS
» RBAC AUTHORIZATIONS ROLE-BASED ACCESS CONTROL RBAC
» CONVERTING THE SUPERUSER TO A ROLE
» TRUSTED EXTENSIONS NETWORKING 115 Operating Systerm Security
» TRUSTED EXTENSIONS NETWORKING Operating Systerm Security
» TRUSTED EXTENSIONS MULTILEVEL SERVICES TRUSTED EXTENSIONS MULTILEVEL SERVICES 117
» TRUSTED EXTENSIONS ADMINISTRATION Operating Systerm Security
» SUMMARY 119 Operating Systerm Security
» LSM HISTORY LINUX SECURITY MODULES
» LSM IMPLEMENTATION LINUX SECURITY MODULES 123
» LINUX SECURITY MODULES 125 Operating Systerm Security
» SELINUX REFERENCE MONITOR SECURITY-ENHANCED LINUX
» SECURITY-ENHANCED LINUX 127 Operating Systerm Security
» SELINUX PROTECTION STATE SECURITY-ENHANCED LINUX 129
» SELINUX LABELING STATE SECURITY-ENHANCED LINUX 131
» SELINUX TRANSITION STATE SECURITY-ENHANCED LINUX 133
» SELINUX TRUSTED PROGRAMS SECURITY-ENHANCED LINUX 135
» SUMMARY 139 Operating Systerm Security
» CAPABILITY SYSTEM FUNDAMENTALS Operating Systerm Security
» CAPABILITY SECURITY Operating Systerm Security
» CHALLENGES IN SECURE CAPABILITY SYSTEMS 143
» CAPABILITIES AND THE ⋆-PROPERTY
» CAPABILITIES AND CONFINEMENT CHALLENGES IN SECURE CAPABILITY SYSTEMS
» CAPABILITIES AND POLICY CHANGES
» ENFORCING THE ⋆-PROPERTY BUILDING SECURE CAPABILITY SYSTEMS
» ENFORCING CONFINEMENT BUILDING SECURE CAPABILITY SYSTEMS 147
» REVOKING CAPABILITIES BUILDING SECURE CAPABILITY SYSTEMS 149
» SUMMARY 151 SUMMARY Operating Systerm Security
» SEPARATION KERNELS 155 SEPARATION KERNELS
» VAX VMM DESIGN VAX VMM SECURITY KERNEL
» SECURITY IN OTHER VIRTUAL MACHINE SYSTEMS 163
» SECURITY IN OTHER VIRTUAL MACHINE SYSTEMS
» SECURITY IN OTHER VIRTUAL MACHINE SYSTEMS 165
» SUMMARY 167 Operating Systerm Security
» ORANGE BOOK Operating Systerm Security
» ORANGE BOOK 171 Operating Systerm Security
» COMMON CRITERIA CONCEPTS COMMON CRITERIA
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