Definition of Speech Acts
13 mentioned” p. 52. Addressing that problem, he says that in identifying the
intended illocutionary force, we can also indentify the word order, stress, and intonation p. 52.
Example 6: a. You’re going
b. You’re going? c. Are you going?
In example 6a, the utterance doesn’t perform any performative verb, but we can indicate that the speaker tells or commands the audience to go by
considering on other indicators such as the word order and the intonation when the speaker utters that utterance. In example 6 b and c, the utterances don’t
perform any performative verb, but we can indicate that in b the speaker requests for a confirmation and in c the speaker delivers a question to the audience by
considering on the word order. The stress and the intonation might be same in those two utterances b and c. However, the difference in ordering the word
indicates that those two utterances have difference illocutionary force. 2. Felicity Condition
The second thing that needs to be considered in indicating the intended illocutionary force is felicity condition. Yule 1996 defines felicity condition as
“certain expected or appropriate circumstances, for the performance of a speech act to be recognized as intended p. 50.
Example 7: I sentence you to six months in prison.
In that example 7, the performance will be inappropriate if the speaker is not a specific person in a special context, in this case is a judge in a courtroom.
14 Moreover, in everyday contexts among ordinary people, Yule 1996 says
that there are also “preconditions on speech act” p. 50. The first one is called general conditions on the participants. Yule 1996 defines general conditions as
conditions “where people can understand the language being used and they are not playing acting or being nonsensical” p. 50.
The second one is called content conditions. According to Yule 1996, content conditions are conditions where the content of the utterance must be in
accordance with the intended illocutionary force p. 50. For example, for both a promise and a warning, the content of the utterance must be about a future event.
The third one is called preparatory conditions. According to Yule 1996, preparatory conditions can be explained by observing the difference of
preparatory conditions used in promise and warning p. 51. In a promise, there are two preparatory conditions: first, the event will not happen by itself, and
second, the event will have beneficial effect. In a warning, the preparatory conditions are the audience doesn’t know whether the event will occur or not, the
speaker does think the event will occur, and the event will not have a beneficial effect.
Related to that condition, there is sincerity condition. According to Yule 1996, in sincerity condition, the speaker genuinely acts as in the condition of the
intended illocutionary force p.51. For example, in a promise, the speaker genuinely intents to carry out the future actions and in a warning, speaker
genuinely believes that the future event will not have a beneficial effect. Finally, there is an essential condition. According to Yule 1996, essential
conditions are conditions where the speaker’s state will change following the conditions created by the utterance p. 51. In a promise, the utterance changes