Scenario Theory: An Overview

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1. Scenario Theory: An Overview

This chapter provides a brief overview of the development of the theory of scenarios, which are mental networks of information, formed by categorizing our experiences into related concepts, and used for understanding the world and communicating with others. In this chapter I also list and compare various terms used to describe scenarios, and suggest how scenario theory is relevant for exegesis and translation.

1.1. The development of scenario theory

Scenario theory is being developed and applied in a wide range of disciplines. Lin- guists, artificial intelligence researchers, educationalists, and cognitive psychologists have made observations which have contributed toward the theory of scenarios, and to the potential of this theory in helping us understand the nature of learning, communicating, and understanding. I list some important theorists, in broad chronological order, noting their key points and how these relate to translation.

1.1.1. Bartlett

Bartlett, a social psychologist conducting experiments on memory, was apparently the first to describe scenarios, using the term “schema”. In his book, Remembering: A study in experimental and social psychology 1932 , he argued from experimental evidence, testing English speakers’ recall of a North American Indian story, that memory is a “construction” rather than a “copy” of the information presented, and that our previous knowledge stored as large chunks of organized information in the brain, affects, and indeed may distort, what we remember. Although his experimental procedures can be faulted, his basic findings have been confirmed by further research Eysenck 1993 :88–89. The way scenario mismatch distorts the understanding and recall of a text is of great significance for Bible translation.

1.1.2. Rumelhart

Rumelhart 1975 , 1980 , et al., a cognitive psychologist developing the theory of cognition and comprehension, proposed a more developed concept of the scenario, which he terms “schema”. Information is organized in the brain in schemas. Each schema con- sists of a number of nodes, each of which corresponds to a conceptual category. Within each schema the nodes are interlinked, being related to each other in a variety of ways. Each schema is also interlinked with other schemas, and these are also interrelated in a variety of ways. This means that words do not relate to dictionary-type entries in the brain, but to much more complex interlinked schemas. Rumelhart 1980 sees these schemas as not simply a means of storing facts, but together constituting the individual’s view of the world, enabling the individual to meaningfully interpret events, objects, and situations. Since the interlinking of nodes and schemas is conceptually based, according to our individual experiences of the world, people of different languages and cultures have different interlinking conceptual networks. Consequently translators must know what 1. Scenario Theory: An Overview 7 conceptual links are implicit between items in the original text, and make them explicit if necessary.

1.1.3. Minsky

Minsky 1975 , calling scenarios “frames”, defines them as mental structures repre- senting stereotyped situations, by which we understand new situations, and which we constantly update in the light of experience. Stereotypical elements function as “defaults” within these frames unless contradicted. Since understanding and interpretation is based on comparison between the “remem- bered framework” and the actual situation, it is vital in communication that the audience access the appropriate “frame”. However, as we shall see below, experience, and thus “remembered frameworks” are affected by culture. So translations, which normally involve transfer of meaning not just across language but also across culture, will be interpreted in the light of different frames from those of the original author and audience. This means that a translation must do more than duplicate words, it must duplicate the situational frames those words originally referred to. Minsky acknowledges that people’s mental frames can be modified in the light of new experience. This means that translated Scriptures can modify people’s scenarios, e.g. connecting God with love and forgiveness.

1.1.4. Fillmore

Fillmore, a linguist, had already recognized how event words presuppose the exist- ence of wider frames. Verbs have a frame which includes certain participant roles, and this affects both grammar and semantics. The grammatical marking of participants e.g. case, prepositions, word order identifies the participants’ underlying semantic role. Each language has its own rules as to which role slots must be made explicit in the grammar. So the “case frame” for any given lexical item contains both semantic roles “deep structure” and grammatical markers “surface structure”. Fillmore 1968 :31–32 explains: the deep structure of the propositional component of every simple sentence is an array consisting of a V plus a number of NP ’s holding special labeled relations cases to the sentence. These relations, which are provided for categorially, include such concepts as Agentive, Instrumental, Objective, Factitive, Locative, Benefactive … A surface case system may be related to the set of underlying cases in a variety of ways. Fillmore’s “case frame” was similar to the core participant roles of an “event” scenario, but without any encyclopaedic information, such as who would prototypically fill these roles. Later Fillmore 1982a showed how words relate not to simple dictionary definitions in the brain, but to complex scenarios based on cultural norms and expectations. He gives the example of “bachelor”, which does not simply mean “unmarried man” but pre- supposes a society with specific expectations that males of a certain age should marry. Consequently it is odd to call the Pope a bachelor. Though we cannot say the Pope is not a bachelor, we can say he is not a prototypical bachelor, since a bachelor prototypically has the option of marriage available, but the Pope does not. 8 Section 1. Scenarios Fillmore’s concept of case frames has been applied to New Testament Greek by Danove 1993a in his analysis of the choice between genitive and accusative cases with the verb ἀκούω ‘hear’, and in arguing for the reading in 1 John 2:20 as πάντες mas- culine plural nominative since the case frame for οἶδα ‘know’ need not grammaticalize the contents of the complement slot where it is recoverable from the immediate context. Danove 1993b also uses case frames in the analysis of the discourse structure of Mark’s Gospel, showing how the roles of participants help identify pericopes, and how the ex- plicit surface representation of optional elements of the case frame, such as “gladly” in “hear gladly” is used to set up specific linguistic frames thematic to the book. As regards translation, Fillmore, by identifying that scenarios are culture-specific, and that the grammatical markers of the case-frame are language-specific, gives a theo- retical basis for understanding common translation problems of lexical and grammatical mismatch. Case frame mismatch, including the mismatch of which participants must be grammatically marked, can result in instances where what is implicit in the source lan- guage must grammatically be made explicit in the target language. In such instances exegetical decisions must be made based on context rather than the text itself. For example, in languages which must grammatically show the agent, all source language passive constructions must be given explicit agents e.g. God, people, or someone specific depending on the wider context. Part of this context is, of course, the case frame i.e. core participants of the event scenario of the source language.

1.1.5. Schank and Abelson

Schank, working in artificial intelligence, and Abelson, a social psychologist, in their book, Scripts, Plans, Goals, and Understanding 1977 , develop scenario theory by using the computer as a metaphor for expressing and evaluating a possible model of cognition. They see their work as relevant to artificial intelligence, psychology, and linguistics and argue that what works on a computer is probably close to the way the mind works 1977 :175–176: we have presented the theories outlined in this book as theories of human natural language processing. One possible test of the adequacies of those theories is their viability as the basis of computer programs… if understanding programs can be written we have a viable theory… the fact that a theory works for the basis of a computer program means that it effectively characterizes the process that it is modelling. They stress that understanding any section of text depends on identifying a scenario into which the elements of that text fit. Thus comprehension depends on previous experi- ence, which allows accurate communication without making everything explicit. They argue that memory is organized on the basis of experience, putting similar experiences into the one grouping. They emphasize the need to correctly understand the intention of characters in order to predict their likely actions, and so follow the plot of a narrative. Since explicit language in a text is like shorthand referring to preexisting scripts in the audience’s mind, in translation, if the target audience has no such script, the “short- hand” will need to be made “longhand”, i.e. implicit facts and relationships must be made explicit. They note that intention is often implicit, since it is part of known scripts. There- fore, in translation, the purpose of certain actions may need to be made explicit if it is not clear from the target language scripts. 1. Scenario Theory: An Overview 9 Schank 1981 also proposes that memory is arranged hierarchically in Memory Organization Packets MOP s with higher levels being generalized scenarios and lower levels storing specific details of particular events. This low-level memory is normally only short term, being absorbed in generalized form into the higher level scenarios. Only if an event is peculiar or untypical are the details retained in low-level memory. This accounts for both “semantic” memory with generalized information stored in high-level structures, i.e. scenarios, and “episodic” memory with significant details of events stored in low-level memory.

1.1.6. Sanford and Garrod

Sanford and Garrod 1981 :5, as discourse analysts, demonstrate conclusively the essential role of scenarios in correctly understanding a text: the message conveyed goes far beyond the individual sentences which make up a text … 1 Jill came bouncing down the stairs. 1 Harry rushed off to get the doctor. Most readers would interpret this in terms of Jill falling on the stairs injuring herself, and as a result of this Harry calling a doctor. Notice how different the interpretation is when 1 is followed by a slightly different sentence. 1 Jill came bouncing down the stairs. 1 Harry rushed over to kiss her. What this suggests is that far from being tied to the literal content of the component sentences, the message in a text is dependent on the reader bringing in additional knowledge in an attempt to come up with a coherent interpretation of the passage as a whole. This “additional knowledge” used to interpret the text is stored in scenarios. The relevant scenario is called from long-term memory by a particular linguistic input. Each scenario consists of a framework with labelled “slots” for different elements which are expected to occur. When reading or listening to a message, once we recognize which scenario is being referred to by the writer or speaker, the framework of that scenario provides us with the background information necessary for correctly interpreting the message Sanford and Garrod 1981 :115: we use a linguistic input to call up representations of situations or events from long-term memory as soon as we have enough information to do so. In other words a scenario is invoked. Implicit background information would be incorporated within the structure of the initial scenario as part of its definition, while new information from the text would be used to fill partially defined slots available in the skeleton structure, or to otherwise modify it. They note that mental scenarios are used for making all types of inferences: • Lexical inferences e.g. for solving problems of lexical ambiguity or nominal reference • Inferences of space and time • Extrapolative inferences such as Jill hurting herself in the first example above • Evaluative inferences about the significance of a given statement Sanford and Garrod 1981 :8 also stress the contractual nature of communication: The basis on which discourse is produced is essentially contractual. A writer wishes to convey an idea to his readers. In essence, this means that he must establish in the mind of his reader a situational model which is the same or closely similar to the one in his own mind. He can then refer to this model as his discourse unfolds and be reasonably certain that what he says will be intelligible. 10 Section 1. Scenarios Their work is important for translation, because they show not only that texts are understood by the reader’s interlinking the text with existing mental scenarios, but also that the writer has the responsibility to make the appropriate scenario clear to the reader. The implicitexplicit issue then, concerns not simply translation, but communication. Translators, as communicators to a new target audience, must reevaluate the level of implicit information in accordance with their new audience’s mental scenarios, so that essential links missing in the hearers’ scenarios are supplied explicitly in the text.

1.1.7. Sperber and Wilson

Sperber and Wilson, the proponents of Relevance Theory, in their book Relevance: Communication and Cognition 1986 emphasize that successful communication is not achieved through language alone, but by the combination of language and a “mutual cognitive environment”, in the light of which that language is structured by the speaker, and understood and interpreted by the hearer. Sperber and Wilson 1986 :39 state: 40 A cognitive environment of an individual is a set of facts that are manifest to him. To be manifest, then, is to be perceptible or inferable. An individual’s total cognitive environment is the set of all the facts that he can perceive or infer: all the facts that are manifest to him. An individual’s total cognitive environment is a function of his physical environment and his cognitive abilities. It consists of not only all the facts that he is aware of, but also all the facts that he is capable of becoming aware of, in his physical environment. The individual’s actual awareness of facts, i.e., the knowledge that he has acquired, of course contributes to his ability to become aware of further facts. Memorized information is a component of cognitive abilities. Although they speak of “cognitive environment”, which also includes the real life situation at the time of communication, the “memorized information”, which makes up the bulk of an individual’s “cognitive environment” and which facilitates perception and inference, is of course the organized body of information categorized and stored in the individual’s mental scenarios. For Sperber and Wilson, the communicator’s role is to express the message in the most “relevant” way, in the light of assumptions about the audience’s cognitive environ- ment. This includes communicating in the most efficient way, omitting what can be easily inferred, but making explicit anything whose omission would make the text harder to process. If translation is to be “relevant” it must communicate in this same manner, saying neither too much nor too little to efficiently communicate the author’s intended message. Thus in translation, the decision whether to make part of the message explicit should not be decided simply by what was explicit in the source language text, but rather be based on whether the target audience, in the light of their preexisting mental scenarios, will understand the original message easily and accurately.

1.1.8. Howard

Howard 1987 writes as an educationalist to help teachers develop in pupils the concepts they need for comprehension. Howard’s summaries give an excellent overview of the structure and role of scenarios. 1. Scenario Theory: An Overview 11 Howard 1987 :31, using the term “schema” for scenario, emphasizes that one’s mental scenarios are based on one’s experience, and are used in categorization and making inferences: A schema can be defined as an organized body of knowledge, a mental structure that represents some part of some stimulus domain Rumelhart and Ortony 1977 ; Rumelhart 1980 . Like a concept, a schema is a representation abstracted from experience, which is used to understand the world and deal with it. It consists of a set of expectations about how part of the world is organized; these expectations are applied to categorize various stimuli. He stresses that in education it is vital to teach new information by systematically connecting it to what is already known, i.e. to relate new concepts to the scenarios they belong in. This is a conscious attempt to facilitate what cognitive theorists posit happens naturally over time through multiple experiences. Translators, like teachers, must ensure that they accurately communicate a new concept, by enabling their audience to identify the scenario the new concept belongs in, and also how that concept relates to other elements of the same scenario.

1.1.9. Wierzbicka

Anna Wierzbicka, a semanticist, in her books The Semantics of Grammar 1988 and Semantics, Culture, and Cognition 1992 , argues forcibly that there are indeed some universal concepts, but vocabulary tends to refer to culturally relevant clusters of con- cepts i.e. scenarios. Thus the lexicon of a given language reflects the culture of the people who speak it. Although the real world may be common to people, nevertheless it is people themselves who classify whatever exists in the real world, and different peoples classify the world differently. She also emphasizes the meaning of words in relation to real life human experiences, rather than the Saussurean idea of contrastive definitions. Wierzbicka also gives an enormous amount of detail in her dictionary entries, re- flecting the encyclopaedic nature of scenarios. This is totally in contrast to a Saussurean approach which would give the minimum amount of information necessary to distinguish one word from another. As regards translation, her work reinforces the need for the translator to be aware of the full range of semantic associations of words in both source and target language, and not to assume that any word in one language means exactly the same as a word in another language.

1.1.10. Lakoff

Lakoff, a linguist, also reacted against the Saussurean “objectivist” view of language, characterizing it as the “ CONDUIT theory” Lakoff and Johnson 1980 :231: When it really counts, meaning is almost never communicated according to the CONDUIT metaphor, that is where one person transmits a fixed, clear proposition to another by means of expressions in a common language, where both parties have all the relevant common knowledge, assumptions, values etc. When the chips are down, meaning is negotiated… He stresses that the speaker must communicate in the light of what he assumes to be the knowledge, assumptions, and values of the audience i.e. their mental scenarios. The speaker’s role is to present his message in such a way that the audience understands it accurately. Meaning is “negotiated” inasmuch as the speaker tries to guess what the 12 Section 1. Scenarios audience will understand, and the audience draws their own conclusion as to the meaning Lakoff and Johnson 1980 :179: We understand a statement as true in a given situation when our understanding of the statement fits our understanding of the situation closely enough for our purposes. Lakoff 1987 :21 also reacted against the “objectivist” view of categories, where groups are defined by sharing a common property. He argues that categorization can be related to “holistically structured activities”, i.e. categories that are related experientially: A modifier like cricket in cricket bat, cricket ball, cricket umpire, and so on does not pick out any common property or similarity shared by bats, balls, and umpires. It refers to the structured activity as a whole. And the nouns that cricket can modify form a category, but not a category based on shared properties… Cognitive psychologists have recently begun to study categories based on such holistically structured activities… Such categories, among their other properties, do not show family resemblances among their members. Lakoff’s main thesis in his book, Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things 1987 :68, is that “we organize our knowledge by means of structures called Idealized Cognitive Mod- els, or ICM s, and that category structures and prototype effects are byproducts of that organization”. In other words our experience is understood and organized according to our own culturally-specific idealized model of reality, not reality itself. Lakoff’s defini- tions of ICM s provide a detailed account of scenario structure. Lakoff 1987 :68 explicitly traces his ideas to four sources within cognitive linguistics: • Fillmore’s frame semantics Fillmore 1982b , which he compares to ƒ schema theory Rumelhart 1975 ƒ scripts Schank and Abelson 1977 , and ƒ frames with defaults Minsky 1975 • Lakoff and Johnson’s theory of metaphor and metonymy Lakoff and Johnson 1980 • Langacker’s cognitive grammar Langacker 1986 • Fauconnier’s theory of mental spaces Fauconnier 1985 Since Langacker and Fauconnier’s work is largely outside the scope of this study, and Lakoff incorporates their specific observations concerning image-schematic structure Langacker 1986 :38–40 and metonymy Fauconnier 1985 :3–34, they are not included in this overview. Lakoff 1987 :68 defines these Idealized Cognitive Models as follows: Each ICM is a complex structured whole, a gestalt, which uses four kinds of structuring principles: - propositional structure, as in Fillmore’s frames - image-schematic structure, as in Langacker’s cognitive grammar - metaphoric mappings, as described by Lakoff and Johnson - metonymic mappings, as described by Lakoff and Johnson Lakoff argues that certain basic concepts are associated metaphorically with our bodily experiences as human beings, and these Idealized Cognitive Models, or meta- phorical ways of categorizing our human experience, affect the structuring of our mental structures and our language. These different types of ICM s affect the way scenarios are structured and interlinked. 1. Scenario Theory: An Overview 13 Translation may seem impossible, given Lakoff’s stress on the experiential and holistic nature of mental categorization. However, his definition of “true” as what “fits our understanding of the situation closely enough for our purposes” allows for translation between languages as a possibility. Translation, then, is not transferring identical thoughts, but enabling the new audience to fit what the original author said into their own conceptual viewpoint well enough to achieve the author’s purpose.

1.1.11. Summary

Although in 1932 the psychologist Bartlett recognized that memory was a con- struction based on input rather than a copy of the input, and documented how cultural differences between writer and audience skewed recall, these ideas were left undevel- oped. Much later, in 1968, the linguist Fillmore proposed the concept of “case frames” for verbs, where the participants had both conceptualized semantic roles, and grammatical surface marking. However, the real expansion of research into the theory of scenarios has taken place from the mid-1970s onward, and has involved a fusing of these separate disciplines of psychology and linguistics, together with new input from computer science particularly in the field of artificial intelligence. Currently, not only is the theory being developed and refined, but being applied to other disciplines, for example • by Howard 1987 to education • by Danove 1 993a , 1993b to exegesis and textual criticism, and • in this study to discourse analysis and translation.

1.2. Terminology

As shown above, the theory of scenarios has been developed in a variety of dis- ciplines, and different theorists use different terminology for scenarios, even when referring to essentially the same concepts. The concept of scenarios relates closely to what are called • frames Minsky 1975 ; Fillmore 1982b • schemata or schemas Rumelhart and Ortony 1977 • scripts Schank and Abelson 1977 ; Riesbeck and Schank 1978 • Idealized Cognitive Models Lakoff 1987 , and • relational frameworks Callow 1998 . I compare and contrast the use of terminology below.

1.2.1. Scenario

This study uses the term “scenario”, as do Sanford and Garrod 1981 , to refer to the cognitive structures in our minds, which we form by categorizing our experiences, and we use to organize information and to retrieve information from memory.

1.2.2. Schema

Schema is the term for scenario used by both Bartlett and Rumelhart. Mandler 1984 lists scenes, scripts, and stories as types of schemata, to which Howard 1987 adds persons and actions. 14 Section 1. Scenarios Scenes and persons are subtypes of “thing” scenarios. Actions are “event” scenarios. Scripts are complex “event” scenarios which contain prototypically co-occurring sequences of events. The story schema is a prototypical framework for a narrative story, and is an ab- straction or generalization of a macro-script, i.e. a series of prototypically co-occurring “event” scenarios. These include participants, purpose, and events to achieve that purpose, and problems which interrupt the successful completion of the script thus initiating subscripts.

1.2.3. Frame, Relational Framework, and Case Frame

Frame is Minsky’s term for scenario. Callow 1998 uses the term “relational framework”. Both terms tend to focus on “event” scenarios. Fillmore’s term “case frame” refers only to the core relationships of an “event” scenario, i.e. the event and its prototypical participants related semantically “deep structure”, together with the ways those relationships are represented in surface structure. Fillmore’s case frames, at the level of “deep structure”, are posited as language universal. As such they exclude the culture-specific elements of the scenario, such as what type of person prototypically fills what case slot, where, when, why such activity takes place, etc.

1.2.4. Script

Script is the term used by Schank and Abelson for a complex type of “event” scenario which includes a prototypical sequence of events. This study also uses the terms “script” and “script-type scenario” for this subtype.

1.2.5. Idealized Cognitive Model

Lakoff uses the term “Idealized Cognitive Models” ICM s. These ICM s describe the way that scenarios are structured and interlinked. Lakoff lists five kinds of ICM: • Image-schematic • Propositional • Metaphoric • Metonymic • Symbolic The “propositional idealized cognitive model” describes the basic structures of typical “event” and “thing” scenarios. The other ICM s are used in structuring the overall structure of scenarios. 1. Scenario Theory: An Overview 15 Chart of terminology Underline = term used for scenario and author Normal = term used for scenario subtype, or link, and author This study Minsky 1975 Fillmore 1982 Callow 1998 Schank and Abelson 1977 Rumelhart 1977 Mandler 1984 Howard 1987 Sanford and Garrod 1981 Lakoff 1987 Scenario “Event” Frame Case frame relational framework Schema Action Scenario Propositional ICM a Proposition Script Script Script b Scenarioscript Joined scripts Story “Thing” Scene person “Attribute” “Relation”Relational link Thing-event-attribute link Part-whole link Generic-specific link Prototypical core Metaphorical link Metonymic link Scenario structure nodes, links, hierarchy, etc. Language to concept link c Feature bundle d Taxonomy d Taxonomy e Radial Metaphoric ICM Metonymic ICM Image-schematic ICM Symbolic ICM

1.3. Relevance of scenario theory to exegesis and translation

The above writers give overwhelming evidence that communication relies on the communicator and audience having similar mental scenarios. These shared scenarios are the “given” in communication, on the basis of which the communicator chooses how explicit or implicit to be, so that the audience is able to accurately guess the fuller picture of what the communicator is trying to say, by “filling in” what is left unsaid from their existing knowledge stored in their mental scenarios. However, these scenarios are not universally the same, but are culture- and language-specific. So to understand any text, we must not rely on our own mental scenarios, but identify the mental scenarios in the mind of the original author. Thus knowledge of New Testament Greek scenarios is vital for exegesis of the New Testament texts. Similarly, to translate, we must also know the mental scenarios of the new target audience, since our message must be framed in such a way that they can accurately fill in what the author intended as implicit information, rather than make incorrect assumptions on the basis of their own cultural presuppositions. But how can we possibly know what other people’s scenarios are? Fortunately, there are lexical and grammatical clues. Because concepts are grouped mentally in scenarios, the grouping of vocabulary in a text indicates which concepts were grouped in the writer’s mind. Also, as Schank and Abelson 1977 :41 point out with respect to scripts, the presence of scenarios may be linked to certain grammatical markers such as the definite article: 16 Section 1. Scenarios Scripts allow for new references to objects within them just as if these objects had been previously mentioned; objects within a script may take ‘the’ without explicit introduction because the script itself has already implicitly introduced them. Since New Testament Greek survives only in texts, without the original writers and audiences being available to explain the content of their mental scenarios, analysis of scenarios in the source text must be based on a correlation between grammar and lexis on the one hand, and probable conceptual associations on the other hand. Where scenarios relate to physical aspects of our existence, such as our bodies, or our mortality, we are on fairly sure ground that certain items are conceptually linked by all humans everywhere. For example, Acts 9:40: θεὶς δὲ τὰ γόνατα ‘having-placed the knees’. Here “the knees” refers to the knees of the person performing this action, i.e. Peter. This suggests that the Greek article marks a noun as being part of another scenario already open in the text. Similarly, Acts 9:37: ἐγένετο … ἀσθενήσασαν αὐτὴν ἀποθανεῖν ‘it-happened … having-become-ill her to-die’. Here “becoming ill” refers to an event which commonly precedes dying. This suggests that the Greek Aorist Participle before the Main Verb marks an event which is part of the expected script of the Main Verb. Where grammatical structures correlate with lexical items in relation to such “universal” scenarios, they suggest a hypothesis which can be used to investigate other possible scenarios in the source text. It will be shown in this study that where gram- matical structures indicate the presence of scenarios, the existence of these scenarios can often be readily confirmed by biblical or extrabiblical texts, or by archaeological and historical evidence. For example, Acts 14:13b: ἐπὶ τοὺς πυλῶνας ‘to the gates’. The article shows that “the gates” belong in an open scenario, here the scenario of the city 14:13a. This suggests it was quite normal for such a city to have a surrounding wall, and hence gates, which history confirms. Similarly, Acts 9:40: θεὶς δὲ τὰ γόνατα προσηύξατο ‘having-placed the knees he-prayed’. Here the Greek Aorist Participle before the Main Verb marks “kneeling” as an event which belongs in the script of the Main Verb “praying”. This is confirmed by Acts 7:60, and 20:36, the only other occurrences of θεὶς in Acts. It is this link between scenarios and both lexicon and grammar which I will investi- gate in New Testament Greek and in Parkari, to discover what explicit markings there may be in a given text to indicate the presence and nature of open scenarios. Once we can identify source language scenarios we can determine on the basis of this what information is implicit, i.e. not written in the text but expected to be inferred by the readers from their own mental scenarios. By comparing the scenarios of the original author and the current target audience, we can determine what of this implicit information is lacking in the scenarios of the target audience, and must, therefore, be made explicit in translation, in order to communicate the original message fully and accurately.

1.4. Chapter summary

Scenarios are networks of information stored in the brain. We form scenarios by categorizing our experiences and organizing them into related concepts. Scenarios are experientially based, so may differ from culture to culture. We use scenarios to interpret new experiences and to understand and structure communication. Scenarios are highly 1. Scenario Theory: An Overview 17 structured, and the information contained in specific “slots” is used as a “default” in comprehension and communication. Despite variations in terminology, there is clear cross-discipline consensus about the existence and nature of scenarios. Accurate communication depends on shared scenarios. Since scenarios affect not only mental conceptualization, but also the grammar and lexicon used in communication, scenarios influence the structure of discourse. This means that the original scenarios can be identified from the grammar and lexicon of the source text, and must be used in exege- sis to discover any implied information. Where scenarios differ between source and target languages, implied information may need to be made explicit in translation to enable the new audience to access the original concepts. 18

2. The Structure of Scenarios