Scenarios and Discourse 50670 Hoyle ScenariosDiscourseTranslation.

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4. Scenarios and Discourse

Since scenarios not only affect the writer’s choice of grammar and the audience’s interpretation of vocabulary, but also provide the information base for the audience to predict likely events and fill in implicatures, it is crucial to look at their role in discourse. In this chapter I consider the role of scenarios in dividing text into discourse units and I make the hypothesis that New Testament Greek uses a combination of Main Verbs and Participles to show such chunking, demonstrating this within a single pericope. I also show, using New Testament Greek examples, how scenarios are the basis for both lexical cohesion and semantic coherence in discourse, and review the theory and research which suggests how scenarios guide an audience in predicting, comprehending, and remembering discourse.

4.1. Scenarios break discourse into chunks

Because scenarios are information chunks, whole clusters of information can be communicated simply by referring to the scenario. The opened scenario guides the audience’s expectations, and enables them to correctly infer implicatures. Scenarios also provide the cognitive basis by which the audience divides a discourse into chunks, since a scenario not only communicates clusters of related information, but also integrates clusters of related information into a single conceptual unit.

4.1.1. Chunking information and text processing

Scenarios, by clustering information in chunks, make the processing of texts simpler. Scenarios enable the hearer to correctly identify elements of the text and to cluster them appropriately, either linking them within an open scenario, or opening a new scenario where they belong. In this way, scenarios enable the audience to analyse the discourse into distinct conceptual units. Once the hearer has chunked the text into scenarios, he does not need to store in memory the masses of minor details which are specific to particular scenarios, but can simply store the scenario “titles”, and these will enable him to recall the scenarios and retrieve the scenario contents, as and when required. So a scenario, regardless of its internal complexity, is not only a unit in memory, but can also function as a unit in discourse structure and memory recall. Schank and Abelson 1977 :151, in the context of making theoretical representations of stories, make this same point: it is clear that we do not want to represent every event in a script explicitly every time the story invokes it. The level of detail would be overwhelming. Furthermore, psychologically such a representation would seem to indicate that people always actually think of all the detail in the particular script they are using. This seems quite wrong. Similarly, Pike 1992 :232, terming scenarios “vectors”, notes they fill a single slot in the macrostructure of a text: The macro structure of the referential hierarchy is made up of vectors … Vectors of more than one event are sequences of happenings which are more closely related to each other than they are to events in other vectors and fill a single higher-level slot role. For example, Mark 1:4 states that “John came baptizing in the desert region”. Only in verse 5 does he mention “in the Jordan river”, and only in verse 10 “coming up out of 68 Section 1. Scenarios the water”. Yet every instance of baptism involved going into the river, being baptized, and coming out of the river. The word βαπτίζω ‘baptize, wash’, when people are the goal of the event, is the title of a scenario which includes these details, but can function in discourse as a single information chunk.

4.1.2. Role of Greek Participles and Main Verbs in chunking text

Since scenarios affect information status and consequently grammatical forms, the grammar of a text often gives clear indications as to which information should be clus- tered within a single scenario. This works alongside lexical clues, enabling the audience to correctly assign concepts into distinct scenario chunks. I posit that Greek uses a Main Verb to mark the core event in a scenario, and uses Participles, or verbs in subordinate clauses, to refer to other events which are concep- tually part of the Main Verb’s scenario. Thus the cluster of Main Verb plus related Participles represents one mental scenario and fills one memory slot in the macro structure of the text. For example, Mark 1:31 chunked according to Main Verbs, bolded, Participles underlined: καὶ προσελθὼν ἤγειρεν αὐτὴν κρατήσας τῆς χειρός· and having-come-toward he-raised her having-seized the hand καὶ ἀφῆκεν αὐτὴν ὁ πυρετός, and it-left her the fever καὶ διηκόνει αὐτοῖς. and she-was-serving them Note that the first line has two event ideas in participial form, which both belong to the “raise” scenario, “come” being a preceding stage, and “seize” being the means used to “raise”. Thus this story segment, although it has five verbal forms, has only three information “chunks”: Jesus raised her, the fever left her, she served them. Similarly, in Acts 9:36–41, chunking and numbering the text according to Main Verbs clearly identifies scenario units Main Verbs bolded, subordinate clauses indented, Participles underlined. The section headings are from a “story grammar” analysis by Callow and Callow 1996 : SETTING 1 ν όππϮ δέ τις ἦν μαθήτρια ὀνόματι Ταβιθά, in Joppa certain was female-disciple by-name Tabitha ἣ διερμηνευομένη λέγεται Δορκάς· which being-interpreted is-called Dorcas 4. Scenarios and Discourse 69 2 αὕτη ἦν πλήρης ἔργων ἀγαθῶν καὶ ἐλεημοσυνῶν she was full of-works good and almsgiving ὧν ἐποίει. which she-was-doing PROBLEM 3 ἐγένετο δὲ ἐν ταῖς ἡμέραις ἐκείναις ἀσθενήσασαν αὐτὴν ἀποθανεῖν· it-happened in the days those having-sickened she to-die HOLDING INCIDENT would be PARTIAL RESOLUTION in normal storyline 4 λούσαντες δὲ ἔθηκαν [αὐτὴν] ἐν ὑπερЏЎ. having-washed they-placed [her] in upper-room PARTIAL RESOLUTION 1 5 ἐγγὺς δὲ οὔσης Λύδδας τῇ όππϮ near being Lydda to-the Joppa οἱ μαθηταὶ ἀκούσαντες the disciples having-heard ὅτι Πέτρος ἐστὶν ἐν αὐτῇ that Peter is in it ἀπέστειλαν δύο ἄνδρας πρὸς αὐτὸν παρακαλοῦντες, sent two men toward him requesting Μὴ ὀκνήσϮς διελθεῖν ἕως ἡμῶν. do-not hesitate to-come to us PARTIAL RESOLUTION 2 6 ἀναστὰς δὲ Πέτρος συνῆλθεν αὐτοῖς· having-risen Peter went-with them ὃν παραγενόμενον ἀνήγαγον εἰς τὸ ὑπερῷον whom having-arrived they-led-up into the upper-room 70 Section 1. Scenarios HOLDING INCIDENT 7 καὶ παρέστησαν αὐτῷ πᾶσαι αἱ χῆραι κλαίουσαι and they-stood-beside him all the widows weeping καὶ ἐπιδεικνύμεναι χιτῶνας καὶ ἱμάτια and showing under-garments and over-garments ὅσα ἐποίει μετ᾽ αὐτῶν οὖσα ἡ Δορκάς. which she-was-making with them being the Dorcas PARTIAL RESOLUTION 3 a 8 ἐκβαλὼν δὲ ἔξω πάντας ὁ Πέτρος having-ejected outside all the Peter καὶ θεὶς τὰ γόνατα προσηύξατο and having-placed the knees prayed 3 b 9 καὶ ἐπιστρέψας πρὸς τὸ σῶμα εἶπεν, and having-turned toward the body said Ταβιθά, ἀνάστηθι. Tabitha risebe-raised RESOLUTION: PART i 10 ἡ δὲ ἤνοιξεν τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς αὐτῆς, she opened the eyes of-her 11 καὶ ἰδοῦσα τὸν Πέτρον ἀνεκάθισεν. and having-seen the Peter sat-up RESOLUTION: PART ii a 12 δοὺς δὲ αὐτῇ χεῖρα ἀνέστησεν αὐτήν· having-given to-her hand he-raised her ii b 13 φωνήσας δὲ τοὺς ἁγίους καὶ τὰς χήρας παρέστησεν αὐτὴν ζῶσαν. having-called the saints and the widows he-presented her living. In section 3, ἐγένετο ‘it happened’ acts as a dummy Main Verb, the semantic Main Verb being the Infinitive ἀποθανεῖν ‘die’. It should be noted that there is generally one Main Verb i.e. excluding subordinate clauses per structural section. Exceptions are in the setting, and in the resolution, both part i and part ii, each of which contains two Main Verbs. 4. Scenarios and Discourse 71 The setting, then, contains two chunks: • Line 1 identifying the new participant • Line 2 giving information about her character Resolution part i lines 10 and 11 also contains two chunks. It has two Main Verbs, conjoined by καί ‘and’, both with the same subject. This co-occurrence marking occurring only here and in lines 8 and 9 shows that the two verbs “open” eyes and “sit up” both belong in the same scenario. Here Luke opens the “come alive again” scenario by stating two of the elements within it. They both belong in the “result” section of that scenario, thus implying that the cause “coming alive again” has taken place. Schank and Abelson 1977 :47 argue that if only the title of a script is used, the script is presumed to be a “fleeting script” and understood and remembered as a single chunk which occurs according to the expected pattern in the script. If, however, a script is referred to not only by a header but by some other element from the same script, then the script is “nonfleeting” and details from the script are accessed. Here the “instantiation” of the “coming alive again” scenario, by both “open” eyes and “sit up”, marks it out formally as a “nonfleeting script” whose details are to be remembered. Resolution part ii lines 12 and 13 also contains two chunks, each marked by the developmental particle δέ Levinsohn 1992 :32–40. This Callow and Callow divide into two subsections, noting that, in line with Longacre’s observations 1996 :36, line 13 would be the climax of this story, since: In Longacre’s theory of narrative analysis, the ‘peak’ or ‘climax’ of the narrative is characteristically indicated by the presence ‘on stage’ of all or most of the participants in the story. At this point, Peter, Dorcas, the saints and the widows are all referred to…. Further evidence in support of the accuracy of this “chunking” is that the develop- mental particle δέ normally occurs here with each “Main Verb plus Participles” chunk. Exceptions occur where the Main Verb is not developmental to the plot i.e. the holding incident, line 7, and where two Main Verbs belong in the same section i.e. the setting, lines 1 and 2, where the second line, the character of Dorcas, is linked to the first by an anaphoric pronoun; the partial resolution 3, lines 8 and 9, where parts a and b are joined by καί ‘and’; and the resolution part i where lines 10 and 11 are conjoined by καί ‘and’. Thus the holding incident is the only section in the Callows’s analysis which does not have δέ in second position, which supports this hypothesis for chunking. Note that the developmental particle δέ marks out the “Main Verb plus Participles” chunk or “Main Verb and Main Verb” chunk as developmental, i.e. it operates at “chunk” level in the hierarchy, not “event” level, marking out whole scenario blocks as developmental. For example in section 6: 6 ἀναστὰς δὲ Πέτρος συνῆλθεν αὐτοῖς· having-risen Peter went-with them ὃν παραγενόμενον ἀνήγαγον εἰς τὸ ὑπερῷον whom having-arrived they-led-up into the upper-room It is not Peter’s rising which is marked by δέ as developmental, but the whole script-type scenario of Peter “rising, accompanying them, and being led into the upper-room”. This 72 Section 1. Scenarios whole scenario, as indicated by the Main Verb, can be given the title “accompany”. I posit then that all of section 6 can be stored in the brain as the chunk “Peter accompanied them”, and only this need be remembered as the “prompt” for successful recovery of the story from memory. The “chunks” of text marked by nonsubordinated Main Verbs, i.e. the distinct scenarios which form the story framework, and which the hearers need to consciously remember, are as follows with Main Verb in bold as the scenario title, followed by all the verbal forms listed in that scenario: 1 was disciple—was a disciple, whose name being translated is called … 2 was good—was full of good works and almsgiving, which she did 3 died—sickened, died 4 placed body—washed body, placed in upper room 5 sent for Peter—towns were near, heard Peter is near, sent requesting he come quick 6 Peter went along—Peter got up, went along, arrived, they led him up 7 widows stood beside—stood, weeping and showing clothes which Dorcas had made when she was with them 8 Peter prayed—ejected, knelt, prayed 9 and said—turned, said “rise” 10 she opened eyes 11 and sat up—saw Peter, sat up 12 he raised her—gave her his hand, raised her 13 presented her—called people, presented her alive A caveat to this process, which does not affect the chunking per se, but rather the way the hearer “titles” the chunks, is that when a chunk consists of a verb of speech or thought, etc. followed by what is spoken, the title of the chunk is the sum of these two, i.e. not just “X said” but “X said Y”. Within the speech itself, the same kind of grammat- ical analysis can be used to chunk the content of the speech and find the scenarios. In line 9 above the best summary is clearly: 9 and said rise—turned, said “rise” Using this grammatical approach to “chunking” the text, we can see that not only is the story line presented in its briefest form by the sequence of Main Verbs, but also the strings of verbs which are grammatically related to each Main Verb can be seen to be semantically related also. This tends to support the analysis that independent Main Verbs are used in Greek narrative to chunk the text into scenarios, or semantic clusters, which form the building blocks of the story. In contrast, events which are grammatically encod- ed in subordinate clauses or as Participles are part of the same scenario as the Main Verb. This does not mean that nonmain-verb events are inherently less important than Main Verb events, but rather that, once you have heard the whole story, you need only to recall the flow of Main Verbs, and the rest of the events can be assigned their place in the story automatically, since they belong in the “normal place” of the relevant scenarios. Thus the Greek grammatical structure of main clause and subordinated clauses reflects the semantic structure of the discourse in terms of nuclear concepts and related or 4. Scenarios and Discourse 73 “satellite” concepts. In Mann and Thompson’s words, “Nuclearity in text structure is a plausible communicative basis for the grammar of hypotactic clause combining” 1987 :35. This concept of nuclearity explains why the Main Verbs, referring to the nuclei of scenarios, constitute the main storyline in narrative. As Mann and Thompson 1987 :32 predict underlining theirs, “If units that only function as satellites and never as nuclei are deleted, we should still have a coherent text with a message resembling that of the original; it should be something like a synopsis of the original text. If, however, we delete all units that function as nuclei anywhere in the text, the result should be incoher- ent and the central message difficult or impossible to understand”. Discourse structure, however, is not only based on nucleus-satellite relationships between units, but on hierarchical relationships. The number of levels in the hierarchy is theoretically limitless, since any text parts which are related functionally constitute one level of the hierarchical structure Mann and Thompson 1987 :2, 25. Practically, how- ever, it is useful to limit the number of levels when describing texts generically, rather than describing a specific text, whilst recognizing that there may be several levels of structural relationship within a single broad hierarchical level. This study recognizes the following hierarchical levels of discourse as useful in discussing New Testament texts: Terms used here Equivalent terms Examples TEXT Discourse includes oral texts Matthew’s Gospel, Paul’s letter to Philemon THEME UNIT Pericope cluster with same theme Matthew 1:1–25 Jesus’s birth EPISODE Pericope Matthew 1:1–17, 1:18–25 PARAGRAPH Matthew 1:1–6a, 1:6b–11 SENTENCE Matthew 1:21 CLAUSE Proposition Matthew 1:21a These discourse levels, apart from EPISODE and THEME UNIT, are defined functionally by Reed 1997 :46: Each level [of semantic hierarchy] … adds a function to the hierarchy resulting in the following scheme. WORD = sound +sense PHRASE = sound +sense +attribution CLAUSE = sound +sense +attribution +transitivity [+relation] SENTENCE = sound +sense +attribution +transitivity PARAGRAPH = sound +sense +attribution +transitivity +social task [+relation] DISCOURSE = sound +sense +attribution +transitivity +social task An EPISODE is made up of PARAGRAPHS and is potentially a TEXT in its own right, but it also functions to fulfil a specific social task in the context of the whole book or letter. Translations of the Bible which use section headings typically divide the text at the level of EPISODE. Similarly, a THEME UNIT is made up of distinct EPISODES which are grouped together, in the context of the whole book or letter, because of a common theme or “topic”, defined by Callow 1998 :218 as “conceptual material which is of central importance throughout a unit - what a unitary stretch of text is primarily about”. Using this terminology, Acts 9:36–41 above, the story of Tabitha, is an EPISODE within the TEXT of Acts 1:1–28:31. The elements of “story grammar” such as Setting, 74 Section 1. Scenarios Problem, Holding incident, Resolution, each constitute a PARAGRAPH, which is made up of one or more SENTENCES e.g. the Setting is made up of two sentences, the Problem of one. Acts 9:32–11:18 could be understood as a THEME UNIT about Peter’s ministry. Since scenarios are also structured hierarchically, they relate to all levels of this structure, for example: • The “sitting up” scenario relates to the SENTENCE unit 11 above. • The “prayer” scenario relates to the PARAGRAPH units 8 and 9 above. • The “healing” scenario relates to the EPISODE. • The “Peter” scenario relates to the THEME UNIT. • The “apostles” scenario relates to the whole TEXT. 4.2. Scenarios provide cohesion and coherence in discourse 4.2.1. Scenarios and lexical cohesion Lexical cohesion “refers to the role played by the selection of vocabulary in organ- izing relations within a text” Baker 1992 :203. Lexical cohesion relies on the fact that vocabulary is tagged to concepts which are already stored in prototypical relationships within a scenario. Baker 1992 :203 gives two categories of lexical cohesion, reiteration and collocation. These have distinct discourse functions.

4.2.1.1. Reiteration

The primary use of reiteration in discourse is to keep track of participants over an extended span of discourse, thus providing “basic continuity”. Jordan 1992 :188 lists various reiteration devices: Basic continuity involves the use of repetition full and partial, substitution, clausal ellipsis deletion, acronyms, synonyms, naming and generic nouns. For example, Mark 5:1–20: First mention: ἄνθρωπος ἐν πνεύματι ἀκαθάρτЎ person in unclean spirit 5:2 Full repetition – Partial repetition: τοῦ ἀνθρώπου the person 5:8 Pronoun: αὐτὸν him 5:3 Null pronoun: 5:5, 5:6, 5:7, … Synonym: τὸν δαιμονιζόμενον the demon-possessed 5:15 Superordinate: ἄνθρωπος person 5:2 General word: – Name: Λεγιὼν Legion 5:9 Another reiteration device in the New Testament is the use of titles, e.g. Matthew 9:27–31: 4. Scenarios and Discourse 75 First mention: τῷ ησοῦ Jesus 9:27 Full repetition: ὁ ησοῦς Jesus 9:28 Partial repetition: – Pronoun: αὐτῷ him 9:28 Null pronoun: 9:29 Synonym: – Superordinate: – General word: κύριε sir 9:28 possibly a title “Lord” Name: τῷ ησοῦ Jesus 9:27 Title: υἱὸς Δαυίδ Son of David 9:27 Although many reiteration devices are grammatical, e.g. use of pronoun and null pronoun, superordinates, and titles are only understood as coreferential if the relationship is already part of the hearer’s scenario. For example, the superordinate “bread” in John 6:31: οἱ πατέρες ἡμῶν τὸ μάννα ἔφαγον ἐν τῇ ἐρήμЎ, ἐστιν καθώς εγραμμένον, the fathers of-us the manna ate in the wilderness as it-is written Ἄρτον ἐκ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ ἔδωκεν αὐτοῖς φαγεῖν. bread from the heaven he-gave to-them to-eat Here coreferentiality depends on a specific-generic link between “manna” and “bread” in the source culture scenario. In English, “bread” is not a natural superordinate, since manna was uncooked. The Greek term, being also a generic term for food, provided better lexical cohesion throughout this discourse section, John 6:25–59. Similarly, in Matthew 27:11–18, the same character is referred to by his title ὁ ἡγεμών ‘the governor’ verses 11 and 15, and by his name ὁ Πιλᾶτος ‘Pilate’ verses 13 and 17. This caused no problem for the original target audience, since Pilate was linked with governor in their existing mental scenario. In the Parkari translation, however, title and name are explicitly linked in verse 13, “Then the ruler Pilate said”. Without such explicit linking, the target audience, who are not familiar with the name Pilate and who he was, would understand Pilate and the governor to be two different individuals. Note that there is no ambiguity at sentence level, only at higher discourse levels. Compare Matthew 17:12b, where “Son of Man” refers to Jesus Matthew 16:21 shows this is not intentionally obscure, and John 18:13–24, where “the high priest” is used both of Caiaphas 18:13, 24 and also apparently of Annas 18:15, 19, 22. The latter requires complex exegetical decisions, and both require careful translation to achieve appropriate coreference.

4.2.1.2. Collocation

Collocation “covers any instance which involves a pair of lexical items that are associated with each other in the language in some way” Baker 1992 :203. Collocation also depends on the word-concept link within scenarios. The major discourse function of collocation is to provide lexical cohesion within paragraphs and episodes, thus helping 76 Section 1. Scenarios the audience understand paragraph and episode boundaries by changes in collocational sets. Jordan 1992 :173 regards lexical continuity as one of three essential strands in text analysis: [There is] the need for a system of analysis which goes beyond just the relations between clauses. Lexical continuity and problem-solution aspects are also … essential parts of the system, and this analysis seeks to show the inter-dependence of these three methods in a full analysis of connections within the text. For example, in Luke 5:12–14, the source culture “leprosy” scenario provided lexical continuity and problem-solution continuity, due to a causal link between leprosy and ritual impurity. The string of lexical items—leprosy, cleanse, touched, be cleansed, leprosy, priest, cleansing, Moses—marked this as a distinct episode or pericope. However, where source and target culture scenarios do not match, collocations are not apparent, and lexical cohesion is lost. The average English audience expects a leper to ask for healing, and to go to a doctor. Moreover, since no ritual-impurity scenario is opened, “touched” is not perceived as contraexpectation. Again semantic relationships within and between sentences are clear. What is unclear is the logic of the discourse. Lexical cohesion is also promoted by “associated nominals”, i.e. KNOWN inferrable referents, which are marked by the definite article in English Jordan 1992 :189: The key to understanding many of the lexical connections in the ZPG letter [letter on Zero Population Growth being analysed] lies in recognizing nominal groups which are “associated” in some way with one or more of the topics. These were named “associated nominals” … [e.g.] once a particular book has been established as a topic in a text, it is quite reasonable to write “The author is unknown.” Similarly, Greek uses the article with KNOWN inferrable referents, for example: Matthew 4:18, 20 ἦσαν γὰρ ἁλιεῖς … they-were for fishermen … οἱ δὲ εὐθέως ἀφέντες τὰ δίκτυα ἠκολούθησαν αὐτῷ. they straightway having-left the fishing-nets followed him The use of the article with τὰ δίκτυα ‘the fishing-nets’ marks them as Hearer-old, indi- cating that these Discourse-new items are linked to an open Discourse-old scenario, here “fishermen”. This clarifies the meaning of “the nets” as “their nets”, and shows verse 20 is part of the same episode as verse 18.

4.2.2. Scenarios and discourse disambiguation

Scenarios can be opened by co-text, or real life context. This causes potential ambiguity in identifying scenarios, and thus in disambiguating a text, for example: Matthew 16:6 ρᾶτε καὶ προσέχετε ἀπὸ τῆς ζύμης τῶν Φαρισαίων καὶ Σαδδουκαίων. look-out and beware of the leaven of-the Pharisees and Sadducees 4. Scenarios and Discourse 77 As presented by the Gospel writer, Jesus expects the preceding “co-text” to provide the scenario, i.e. his calling the Pharisees and Sadducees wicked 16:4. But the disciples take their current real life context as the scenario, i.e. forgetting bread 16:5. Both scenarios are potentially open to Jesus’s disciples, and both are explicit in the co-text for the Gospel readers. When the disciples understand “leaven” as part of the “bread” scenario 16:7, Jesus first shows the “bread” scenario is not focal verses 8–10, then states categorically that “bread” is the wrong scenario verse 11: “How is it you don’t understand that I was not talking to you about bread? But be on your guard against the yeast of the Pharisees and Sadducees.” Simply by dismissing “bread” as the appropriate scenario, Jesus enables the disciples to find the correct scenario for interpreting “leaven” 16:12: “Then they understood that he was not telling them to guard against the yeast used in bread, but against the teaching of the Pharisees and Sadducees.” Scenario theory explains why “leaven” is ambiguous, and how the “leaven” scenario is thematic to the whole section 16:5–12, through its part-whole link with “bread” and its metaphorical link with “evil”. Scenario theory also suggests a reevaluation of Matthew’s intended section bound- ary. Since the “evil” scenario Jesus intended was opened in 16:4, TEV ’s and NIV ’s section 16:5–12 should not be separated from 16:1–4. Both belong in a single section “The wickedness of the Pharisees and Sadducees”.

4.2.3. Scenarios, metaphorical language, and discourse

Scenario theory provides a cognitive framework for understanding the nature of idioms, where a fixed collocation of lexical items is linked by a metaphorical link to a single concept. Chafe 1992 :276 comments: … several content words often combine to form a single lexicalized unit, and thus to express a single idea … The clearest cases are idioms, where the meaning of the lexicalized sequence is unpredictable from the meanings of the individual words. An example … is blow the whistle. Chafe 1992 :276 used the cloze test a comprehension test requiring the reader to supply single words that have been omitted to prove that collocations within idioms are predictable, and Baker 1992 :67 confirms that collocational patterns indicate that a phrase is used idiomatically: Idiomatic and fixed expressions … enter into collocational sets which are different from those of their individual words. Take, for instance, the idiom to have cold feet. Cold as a separate item may collocate with words like weather, winter, feel, or country. Feet on its own will perhaps collocate with socks, chilblain, smelly, etc. However, having cold feet, in its idiomatic use has nothing necessarily to do with winter, feet or chilblains and will therefore generally be used with a different set of collocates. In other words, idioms belong to different scenarios from their individual lexical items, for example: 78 Section 1. Scenarios 2 Corinthians 6:11 Τὸ στόμα ἡμῶν ἀνέЎγεν πρὸς ὑμᾶς, Κορίνθιοι, the mouth of-us has-opened toward you Corinthians ἡ καρδία ἡμῶν πεπλάτυνται· the heart of-us is-widened “Mouth” and “heart” belong in the “body” scenario, and “open” and “widen” are both physical acts. However, lexical collocations in the co-text concern attitudes and emotions “I speak to you as my children,” 6:13. Thus these two clauses are idioms, and should be translated as such, e.g. TEV: “We have spoken frankly to you; we have opened our hearts wide.” Thus collocations within a higher level discourse unit, often paragraph, determine the open scenario in which idioms belong. Any idiomatic language used in a translation must also collocate naturally with the open scenarios at discourse level. This same criterion is valid for identifying metaphorical uses of language, where two scenarios, each quite distinct at the literal level, are joined by a metaphorical link. For example, the Bible has two separate literal scenarios of religious leadership and shepherds. The one includes “rabbi, disciple, teach, obey”, the other “shepherd, sheep, pasture, follow”. Yet in many instances Matthew 26:31; John 10:1–16, 21:15–17, etc. vocabulary from the shepherd scenario bold occurs in contexts of religious leadership underlined, for example: Matthew 26:31 Τότε λέγει αὐτοῖς ὁ ησοῦς, then says to-them [the disciples] the Jesus [religious teacher] Πάντες ὑμεῖς σκανδαλισθήσεσθε ἐν ἐμοὶ ἐν τῇ νυκτὶ ταύτϮ, γέγραπται γάρ, all you will-be-caused-to-sin through me in the night this it-is-written for Πατάξω τὸν ποιμένα, καὶ διασκορπισθήσονται τὰ πρόβατα τῆς ποίμνης. I-will-strike the shepherd and will-be-scattered the sheep of-the fold This collocation of vocabulary from different literal scenarios indicates a metaphorical link between scenarios. Lakoff and Johnson 1980 :105 demonstrate that metaphorical links operate at scenario level, e.g. “the conceptual metaphor ARGUMENT IS WAR ” underlies many metaphors: What may at first appear to be random, isolated metaphorical expressions - for example, cover those points, buttress your argument, get to the core, dig deeper, attack a position, and shoot down - turn out not to be random at all. Rather they are part of whole metaphorical systems that together serve the complex purpose of characterizing the concept of an argument in all of its aspects, as we conceive them. Such scenario-level metaphorical links often provide lexical cohesion at higher discourse levels. For example, in John’s preaching, Matthew 3, the metaphorical link 4. Scenarios and Discourse 79 between “people” and “trees” runs throughout paragraph 3:7–10, and the metaphorical link between “people” and “wheat” runs throughout paragraph 3:11–12. Since metaphorical links are culture- and language-specific, translating metaphors literally may both miscommunicate and destroy lexical cohesion in discourse.

4.2.4. Scenarios and semantic coherence within discourse

Whereas lexical cohesion “refers to the role played by the selection of vocabulary in organizing relations within a text” Baker 1992 :203, semantic coherence refers to the “underlying functional or logical connectedness” of a text Crystal 1995:449. Scenarios not only produce lexical cohesion between items which belong in the same scenario, but also provide the framework for semantic coherence, through the prototypical semantic links already stored within scenarios, such as generic-specific and cause and effect. In discourse, such semantic links may be lexically and grammatically explicit, or may be implicit, recoverable only from the appropriate scenario. Meyer 1992 :84–85 describes five “top-level structures to organize discourse”, summarized below: Description, e.g. newspaper article describing who, where, when and how. Causation, e.g. directions, explanations Response: Problemsolution, e.g. scientific articles Comparison, e.g. political speeches Collection, including Sequence, e.g. recipe procedures, history of Civil War battles, growth from birth to 12 Certain lexical items function as “Signals that Cue Readers to these Structures” Meyer 1992 :84, for example. Description is signalled by: for example, which was one, this particular, for instance, specifically, such as, attributes of, that is, namely, properties of, characteristics are, qualities are, marks of, in describing Causation by: as a result, because, since, for the purpose of, caused, led to, consequence, thus, in order to, that is why, ifthen, the reason, so, in explanation, therefore. Winter 1992 :140 also notes that semantic relations in discourse are not only marked by subordinators e.g. when, before, even though, and conjunctions e.g. at first, now, but also by specific nouns such as Winter 1992 :150: achievement, addition, affirmation, antonymy, basis, cause, comparison, concession, contra- diction, correction, denial, difference, distinction, error, exception, explanation, fact, feature, form, general, grounds, hypothesis, instance, justification, kind, manner, match, means, object, opposite, particulars, point, reason, reality, repetition, requirement, resemblance, result, reversal, sameness, similarity, specification, statement, synonymy, truth, uniqueness, way etc. Such nouns in Greek include certain metaphors, such as “wages” and “fruit” as markers of “cause and result” relationships, for example: 80 Section 1. Scenarios Romans 6:23 τὰ γὰρ ὀψώνια τῆς ἁμαρτίας θάνατος. the for wages of-the sin death i.e. Sin causes death. Death is the result of sin. Galatians 5:22 δὲ καρπὸς τοῦ πνεύματός ἐστιν ἀγάπη χαρά εἰρήνη … the fruit of-the spirit is love joy peace … i.e. The Spirit causes love, joy, peace … Love, joy, peace are the results of the Spirit. See also Ephesians 5:9; Philippians 1:11; and James 3:18. Similarly, many of Jesus’s parables use trees or seed for people, and “fruit” for resulting actions. Such vocabulary is not only referential, but also signals the discourse function of that particular clause, sentence, or paragraph.

4.2.5. The cultural basis of scenarios and semantic coherence

What makes a text coherent and comprehensible is our ability to interpret it as normal in the light of a particular scenario or frame, as van Dijk 1977a :99 points out: An important COGNITIVE condition of semantic coherence is the ASSUMED NORMALITY of the worlds involved. … The set of propositions characterizing our conventional knowledge of some more or less autonomous situation activity, course of events, state is called a FRAME. Even the purely physical nature of the world which individuals have experienced varies. In England, sunshine is seen as positive and rain as negative. For Parkaris, living in arid desert areas, the reverse is true. Scenarios also differ due to cultural differences. Shared scenarios provide semantic coherence in discourse, whereas scenario differences destroy it. For example: She had been covered with a paste of flour and oil. Now she was clothed all in red. Her face was hidden behind her headcloth, and a triangular headdress had been fixed around her forehead. Today she would walk four times around the fire. Despite simple vocabulary and grammar, this probably seems disjointed. Who is she? Why is her face hidden? Why will she walk around a fire? Compare: Her hair and her make-up were perfect. She put on her long white dress and her veil. The one and only time she would wear them. She glanced at the single ring on her left hand. Today there would be two This text is clearly about a bride on her wedding day, as shown by the wedding dress, the engagement ring, and the wedding ring. Yet neither wedding nor bride is explicit. The first text is also about a bride, a Parkari bride. The lexicon of each text clearly opens the “wedding” scenario, for its appropriate cultural audience. The “wedding” sce- nario not only identifies “she” as a bride, but determines the specific stage reached in the wedding script, i.e. the preparation of the bride. This also provides semantic coherence with the next section of discourse, which will refer to the next script stage, the wedding itself, or to some interruption or Distraction in that script. 4. Scenarios and Discourse 81 Thus semantic coherence in discourse depends not only on lexically marked semantic relations, nor even on the co-occurrence of lexical items per se, but on cultural and experiential linking of things and events in one’s mental scenarios. It is the ability to correctly identify the author’s intended scenario which produces semantic coherence and makes comprehension possible.

4.3. Scenarios help comprehension and memory

We cannot follow or easily remember what we do not understand. And our under- standing comes not by decoding unambiguous words and grammar, but rather by fitting explicit linguistic information into a conceptual pattern already established in memory Schank and Abelson 1977 :67: The actions of others make sense only insofar as they are part of a stored pattern of actions that have been previously experienced. Deviations from the standard pattern are handled with some difficulty. So when communicator and audience share mental scenarios, communication can be maximally effective, since the communicator can decide both what he says and what he leaves implicit in accordance with this “mutual cognitive environment”. Howard 1987 :176, similarly, states the significance of scenarios for comprehension. Summa- rizing Skemp 1979 , he notes that “Material that cannot be readily assimilated will be poorly understood and poorly retained”, and thus concludes: The most general point to keep in mind is to relate information taught to students’ existing schemata, or to teach them schemata that they can use to assimilate new material.

4.3.1. Scenarios provide a structure for storylines

When speaker and audience share the same cultural scenarios, the communication situation is ideal. Because scenarios contain prototypical characters social stereotypes, and prototypical scripts of what will happen, the story can be easily processed and remembered—it is a prototype with twists. The chains of cause and effect, of intention and action, are clear, even when they are not explicitly stated, because they are part of the common stock of cultural assumptions about the way the world works, embedded in the mental scenarios of both speaker and audience. Howard 1987 :30 lists five types of scenario, “scenes, events, actions, persons, and stories”, all of which, as we have seen above, are culturally-based, and so their contents will vary from language to language. It can be readily seen that these types of scenario form the background of any narrative, and guide the expectations of how a narrative will develop and be resolved. Moreover, storylines themselves follow prototypical patterns Bruner 1986 :16: Narrative deals with the vicissitudes of human intentions. And since there are myriad intentions and endless ways for them to run into trouble - or so it would seem - there should be endless kinds of stories. But, surprisingly, this seems not to be the case. One view has it that lifelike narratives start with a canonical or “legitimate” steady state, which is breached, resulting in a crisis, which is terminated by a redress, with recurrence of the cycle as an open possibility. This implies that narrator and audience typically share common concepts concerning what is normal and expected i.e. the canonical or “legitimate” steady state, what is unexpected i.e. what breaches the norm, what is significant i.e. what constitutes a 82 Section 1. Scenarios crisis, or signifies an intention, and what is the relationship between situations, actions, and motives in order to appreciate the intentions of participants and cause and effect relationships between events within the narrative. Such information, however, is not universal, but is part of each individual’s culturally conditioned scenario bank. If a storyline appears totally unprototypical, it is categorized as a bad story, unreal- istic, far-fetched, stupid, and arbitrary, e.g. “A frog met a witch. They went to the moon, and got eaten by an angel.” Moreover, it is hard to comprehend since the purpose of actions is not clear, and hard to remember since the story cannot be grouped with similar, already memorized, and organized experiences. This so-called story violates the basic principles we expect of behaviour, i.e. that it has motive, and conforms to the physical constraints of the natural world. As Goffman 1975 :23 states: The assumption is … that although natural events occur without intelligent intervention, intelligent doings cannot be accomplished without entrance into the natural order. Thus any segment of a socially guided doing can be partly analyzed within a natural schema. A good story takes place against the background of a prototypical script, but adds detail and unexpectedness. The scenario provides as it were a row of pegs to hang the story on. Thus the new can be interpreted against the background of the old. This enables the audience to cope with the information flow at a manageable rate, since much of it is predictable. It alerts the audience to important facts, since they are in contraexpectation to the prerecorded script in the scenario which is being played back, as it were, fractionally ahead of the unfolding story. It enables the audience to supply implicit events, and implicit reasons, intentions, etc. by interpreting the explicit information in the text through the cultural grid of shared mental scenarios. Because a story includes many sets of familiar scripts, every detail need not be held in memory but the story line can be remembered as a series of familiar “chunks” the scenario-based scripts with a few key variations.

4.3.2. Scenarios cue characters’ intentions and expected action

Storylines especially focus on the characters’ intentions and their actions to achieve their goals. Goffman 1975 :21–22, a social psychologist, acknowledges the role of “social frameworks” or scenarios in evaluating intentions and actions: Social frameworks … provide background understanding for events that incorporate the will, aim, and controlling effort of an intelligence, a live agency, the chief one being the human being … motive and intent are involved, and their imputation helps select which of the various social frameworks of understanding is to be applied. Correctly identifying appropriate scenarios for each character helps the audience determine their intentions, understand the motivation behind their actions, and predict what is likely to happen in a discourse, e.g. Acts 12:19 “Herod, having sought him [Peter] and not having found [him], having interrogated the guards ordered [them] to be led away.” Knowing Herod is a callous ruler, and Peter an escaped prisoner, helps identify Herod’s likely actions, and hence his purpose in having the guards “led away” viz., for execution. Unless we understand characters’ motivations using appropriate scenarios, the discourse seems arbitrary, so is hard to comprehend and recall. 4. Scenarios and Discourse 83 Although I focus here on the expected actions of narrative characters, the same principle applies to other genres. For example, the Galatians’ assessment of Paul’s character would affect their assessment of his intentions, and on the basis of their expectations, they would interpret “O foolish Galatians” Galatians 3:1 as expressing either disdain or concern.

4.3.3. Scenarios contain social stereotypes and cue contraexpectation

We have already seen that scenarios of classes of people frequently contain social stereotypes. When such people are characters in a narrative, there is the expectation that they will behave according to their stereotypical character. Lakoff 1987 :85 says that “social stereotypes are commonly used to characterize cultural expectations”. But, because this is only a “stereotype” the character is free to conform or not conform to the stereotype. Acceptance of the stereotype is expected, and deviance from the stereotype is the basis of contraexpectation. The use of explicit contraexpectation markers such as “but” in English is a signal that stereotypical expectations are being broken, e.g. in the parable of the Pharisee and the tax collector, Luke 18:14: κατέβη οὗτος δεδικαιωμένος εἰς τὸν οἶκον αὐτοῦ παρ᾽ ἐκεῖνον· went-away this[one] being-made-right to the house of-him rather-than that[one] Here παρά is a contraexpectation marking, stressing “the tax-collector was justified, rather than the Pharisee, whom you would have expected”. Stereotypical expectations are particularly important in parables. For example, in the Good Samaritan, Luke 10:25–37, the Priest and Levite’s motive for avoiding the half- dead victim is to avoid possible ritual pollution Caird 1963 :148–149; Karris 1994 , in the place cited. Note the parable’s characters are social stereotypes: • Priest: the kind of Jew most concerned with ritual purity not allowed to touch a corpse except of a close relative Leviticus 21:1–3. • Levite: the kind of Jew next most concerned with ritual purity impure for a week if he touches a corpse Numbers 19:11. • Half-dead man: potentially the most ritually impure Jew, a corpse. • Samaritan: one of the most ritually impure ethnic groups. Although some major commentaries do not even mention this theme of ritual impu- rity e.g. Geldenhuys 1977 , the ritual-purity exegesis is confirmed by its direct relevance to all the parable’s characters. Moreover, ritual purity was of immense cultural signifi- cance for first-century Palestinian Jews, as amply demonstrated by the New Testament texts themselves, thus providing the social context in which this parable should be understood Neyrey 1991a :274–289, specifically 287. Understanding this motive is vital for understanding the original thrust of the parable, and its link not simply with the question “Who is my neighbour?” i.e. fellow Jew, or ritually impure gentiles too?, but also with the command “Love your neighbour as yourself”. The command to love overrides the ritual-purity laws. 84 Section 1. Scenarios As Schank and Abelson 1977 :154 say: If a reader doesn’t know or can’t figure out why a character is doing what he is doing, he will have a hard time understanding what he is reading.

4.3.4. Scenarios affect both predictability and perception

Scenarios affect perception. People often perceive what corresponds to their mental model, i.e. their existing scenarios, rather than reality itself. Bruner 1986 :47 cites a card recognition experiment, where perception was “regularized” to fit expectation: The displays consisted of both normal playing cards, and ones in which colour and suit were reversed - a red six of clubs, for example. The reversed cards as one would expect, took much longer to recognize. But more interestingly, our subjects went to extraordinary length to “regularize” the reversed cards to make them conform to their canonical pattern. I recall one reporting that red six of clubs was indeed a six of clubs, but that the illumination inside the tachistoscope was rather pinkish In fact, what human perceivers do is to take whatever scraps they can extract from the stimulus input, and if these conform to expectancy, to read the rest from the model in their head. A personal experience of this tendency to “regularize” input, occurred in testing the Parkari translation of the Golden Rule: “Do unto others as you would have them do to you” Luke 6:31. The translation team read this saying of Jesus to ordinary Parkaris, then asked them how, according to Jesus’s teaching, they should treat someone who mistreated them. They invariably replied “Mistreat them back”. Although the text said “Do unto others as you would have them do to you”, the hearers’ preexisting mental scenarios had the strong expectation of “Do unto others as they do to you”. What was actually heard was “corrected” to fit in with what was expected to be heard. As Bruner 1986 :47 says: perception is to some unspecifiable degree an instrument of the world as we have structured it by our expectancies. Moreover, it is characteristic of complex perceptual processes that they tend where possible to assimilate whatever is seen and heard to what is expected. Thus, Luke 6:31 begins in Parkari: “My meaning is this, do not treat people badly as they treat you badly”, explicitly denying the audience’s expectation, before introducing the Golden Rule. It is vital, then, that translations clearly establish appropriate scenarios to avoid initial misperceptions, since once misunderstanding has occurred, it is hard to alter it. Experiments by Bruner and Potter 1964 confirm this Howard 1987 :39: Subjects were shown slides of some object that was greatly out of focus. The slides were slowly focused, and at various points each subject had to guess what object was depicted. Those who had to guess, still inaccurately identified the object long after subjects who began with clearer slides had got it right. Evidently, they had, at the early stage, become committed to one schema and were loath to give it up.

4.3.5. Scenarios guide expectation and flag the unexpected as significant

We have seen above that scenarios, by providing prototypical patterns, participants, events, and relationships, enable the audience not only to interpret what is explicit in a text and fill in what is implicit, but also to recognize what in the text is expected, and what is contrary to expectation. 4. Scenarios and Discourse 85 The pattern of expectation and contraexpectation crucially affects our ability to follow a discourse successfully. Our very neurological system is made to be extra- ordinarily responsive to contraexpectation, i.e. surprise. Bruner 1986 :46 states: Our central nervous system seems to have evolved in a way that specializes our senses to deal differently with expected and with unexpected versions of the world. Unexpected versions unexpected in the sense that such versions violate the neural “models of the world” stored in the brain most often alert the cerebral cortex through discharge of impulses in the so-called ascending reticular system, a tangled skein of fibers that runs in parallel with orderly sensory nerves, both working their way upstream to the upper brain. This presupposes that we as it were “look ahead” in the scenarios stored in our brains before we actually perceive new information through our senses, otherwise contraexpec- tation could not occur. Bruner 1986 :46 describes the process as follows: Better to say that the nervous system stores models of the world that, so to speak, spin a little faster than the world goes. If what impinges on us conforms to expectancy, to the predicted state of the model, we may let our attention flag a little, look elsewhere, even go to sleep. Let input violate expectancy, and the system is put on alert. Any input, then must be conceived of as made up not only of environmentally produced stimulation but also of accompanying markings of its conformity with or discrepance from what the nervous system is expecting. What we perceive, then, is always compared with what is expected, i.e. what is already stored in our mental scenarios, and the mind marks conformity and discrepance between the new current input and the old existing scenarios. This is enormously significant when it comes to our ability to process information. The more predictable the information, the quicker we can process it. Too much unpredictable information means we lose the thread. Unexpected information must be consciously remembered.

4.3.6. Scenarios determine relevance and guide memory

Scenarios also determine what information we assess as significant, and what as insignificant and not worth remembering. Howard 1987 :37 cites experimental evidence showing that we choose which facts to remember and which to forget, or not actively remember depending on their relevance within the scenario we have in mind: Schemata filter out data. We can only absorb a limited amount of information and need some way to extract what is most important for our purposes. Pichert and Anderson 1977 demonstrated this effect of a schema. Students read a single passage describing a house from either the perspective of a burglar, or of a housebuyer. The perspective taken affected what was recalled from the passage, evidently because it directed attention to different data. A burglar is likely to notice such things as the number of locks there are … A buyer may be more concerned with the number of rooms …. The scenario selected by the audience or reader affects not only which facts they remember, but also what interpretation they put on those facts, which may even skew the facts remembered. Howard 1987 :44 gives evidence of this: Schemata affect recall of meaningful material in two major ways Rumelhart 1980 . Firstly a schema can affect the form of what we acquire. We tend to remember our instantiated schema of some event rather than the event itself. We take in data relevant to our schema, recall that data and forget the extraneous matter. … Secondly schemata are used to reconstruct the original interpretation of an event from fragments in memory. … Carmichael et al. 1932 showed subjects a variety of figures. One, for example, was a pair of circles connected with a line. One group was told that it was a pair of eyeglasses and another that it was a dumb-bell. Later they drew the figures from memory. Those given the eyeglass label tended to draw eyeglasses and those given the dumb-bell label drew dumb-bells. 86 Section 1. Scenarios Again, the importance of this fact for translation is that the correct i.e. author’s intended scenario must be clear early in the episode, and if necessary made explicit, otherwise the explicit information will be sifted and evaluated according to the wrong scenario. This will mean that the audience misinterpret what is significant and what insignificant.

4.3.7. Scenarios facilitate memory by providing expectations

There is a limit to the amount of unexpected information we can actually process at any one time Bruner 1986 :46–47: Thresholds, the amount of time and input necessary for seeing or recognizing an object or event, are closely governed by expectancy. The more expected an event, the more easily it is seen or heard. There is a limit on the amount the system can take in - its channel capacity, said to be 7 + 2 slots, the Magic Number. You can get a lot of expected information into seven slots, but much less unexpected information. The more unexpected the information, the more processing space it takes up. The significance of this to discourse is immense. If a discourse contains material which is unexpected, i.e. different to our own culturally determined mental scenarios, that material will take longer to process. If there are too many such elements, i.e. if the infor- mational load exceeds 7 + 2 distinct elements at any one time, then we get information overload, causing inability to follow the text. When the audience shares the mental scenarios of the speaker, then the speaker’s information can be communicated in chunks, i.e. a whole scenario, including precon- ditions, stages, purpose, participants, etc., can be communicated as one unit. Similarly, the following events, if they are in line with the chain of expectation that scenario has established, take very little processing effort. Even if they are not in line with expecta- tions, they are frequently not random, but a specific instance within a pattern of possible deviations e.g. Luke 8:43, “she had spent all she had on doctors, but no one had been able to cure her”. Random details are harder to remember than details which can be understood in term of existing scenarios, as experiments confirm Howard 1987 :45: Having well-developed schemata for a domain allows one to take in and recall much more information. A good example is chess. … De Groot 1965 showed novices and experts various chess positions for a few seconds and asked them to reproduce each position from memory, experts were better at recalling them, usually making few errors. Then random piece placements were tried - positions that would never occur in a real game and that the experts’ schemata would be of no use in recalling. The expertnovice difference disappeared. Take a literal translation of Scripture. If the current audience does not share the mental scenarios of the original author and audience, they lack the relevant framework on which to peg the text. Literal translations, by leaving implicit what the source text left implicit, omit information which was available from the source scenario and which is necessary for understanding the following events. This means that a chain of expectation is not established, so keeping track of what occurs takes huge processing effort. Nothing is in line with expectations, so appears random. Information overload, caused by too many unpredictable items at once 7 + 2, may lead to lack of comprehension. So, in translation, when the audience does not share the mental scenarios of the original author, specific elements of the scenario, including preconditions, stages, pur- 4. Scenarios and Discourse 87 pose, participants, etc., may need to be communicated explicitly. Although this naturally increases the number of discrete elements to process, it has the benefit of slowing down the information rate, since each new element requires time to say or read, allowing time to process. Moreover, by explicitly linking elements they can be remembered as single chunks. Such clearly identified scenarios give high predictability, allowing efficient processing and better memorization.

4.4. Chapter summary

Scenarios, as cognitive units in memory, also function as semantic units allowing the audience to divide a discourse into scenario chunks, thus facilitating comprehension, memory storage, and recall. Since scenarios affect both grammar and lexicon, these semantic chunks are marked by lexical and grammatical patterning, such as the cluster of a Main Verb and Participles in New Testament Greek belonging together in a single scenario. Scenarios provide the cognitive framework for tracking participants, identifying lexical cohesion, disambiguating reference, and interpreting idioms and metaphors. Scenarios also enable the audience to perceive semantic coherence in the text, even when semantic relations are not explicitly marked, by assuming the prototypical relationships from the relevant scenario. Consequently, scenario mismatch between author and audience reduces the semantic coherence of a discourse. Scenarios also act as a backdrop to a text, providing information as to what is expected in the development of the discourse. Predictability means the audience does not have to forge new connections between events in the story as it develops, but simply has to hang this information as expected onto the prelabelled pegs of the scenario, occasion- ally noting an item which is unexpected. Since the story unfolds in the light of expected norms, it is easy to spot unexpected and thus significant events, and to memorize the story in scenario chunks, also related prototypically, plus significant deviations. Translations need to cue scenarios effectively in order to give the new target audience the same ability to process and memorize events as the original audience had. Section 2. Scenarios and New Testament Greek 89

5. Greek Verb Phrases and Scenarios