The Structure of Scenarios

2. The Structure of Scenarios

Since scenarios are clusters of information, which have significance for both exegesis and translation, it is important to understand how they are structured. This chapter investigates the structure of scenarios in detail. I summarize Lakoff’s principles for structuring scenarios, and combine data from various sources to propose typical contents of scenarios for different semantic categories. I also document how, given this structure, the title of a scenario can be used to refer to the whole scenario, and I give examples from New Testament Greek to show how scenario structure links vocabulary as well as concepts.

2.1. Scenarios are organized chunks of information

Scenarios can be envisaged as groups of linked information stored in chunks in the brain. The chunking of information into “units” plays an essential part in cognition, memory, communication, and comprehension van Dijk 1977a :159: [A frame i.e., scenario] denotes a conceptual structure in semantic memory and represents a part of our knowledge of the world. In this respect a frame is an ORGANIZATIONAL PRINCIPLE , relating a number of concepts which by CONVENTION and EXPERIENCE somehow form a ‘unit’ which may be actualized in various cognitive tasks, such as language production and comprehension, perception, action, and problem solving.

2.1.1. The principles by which scenarios are structured

Lakoff 1987 :284 details the principles underlying scenario structure, calling them Idealized Cognitive Models ICM s. He lists five basic types: a image-schematic; b propositional; c metaphoric; d metonymic; e symbolic I will list and comment on Lakoff’s observations.

2.1.1.1. Image-schematic

ICM s Lakoff 1987 :271, commenting on Johnson 1987 , states that our concepts and conceptual structures are based on our bodily experiences: One of Mark Johnson’s basic insights is that experience is structured in a significant way prior to, and independent of, any concepts … [Johnson] makes an overwhelming case for the embodiment of certain kinesthetic image schemas. Take, for example, a container schema—a schema consisting of a boundary distinguishing an interior from an exterior. The CONTAINER schema defines the most basic distinction between IN and OUT. We understand our own bodies as containers—perhaps the most basic things we do are ingest and excrete, take air into our lungs and breathe it out. But our understanding of our own bodies as containers seems small compared with all the daily experiences we understand in CONTAINER terms …. Lakoff 1987 :272–275 lists several types of image-schematic ICM s, each based on our bodily experience, together with their structural elements: The CONTAINER schema Bodily experience: We experience our bodies as containers and as things in containers e.g. rooms Structural elements: INTERIOR, BOUNDARY, EXTERIOR 2. The Structure of Scenarios 19 The PART-WHOLE schema Bodily experience: We experience our bodies as WHOLES with PARTS in a set relationship Structural elements: WHOLE, PARTS, CONFIGURATION The LINK schema Bodily experience: We are first linked to mother by the umbilical cord, as children we hold on to parents and things. Structural elements: Two entities, A and B, and LINK The CENTER-PERIPHERY schema Bodily experience: We experience our bodies as having centers the trunk and internal organs and peripheries fingers, toes, hair Structural elements: ENTITY, CENTER, PERIPHERY The SOURCE-PATH-GOAL schema Bodily experience: Going somewhere Structural elements: SOURCE, DESTINATION, PATH, DIRECTION Also UP-DOWN, FRONT-BACK, LINEAR ORDER schemas etc. I accept Lakoff’s Spatialization of Form hypothesis, that our mental conceptual structures are based on our physical experiences. As Lakoff 1987 :283 argues, these image-schematic ICM s are essential for structuring scenarios: - Categories in general are understood in terms of CONTAINER schemas. - Hierarchical structure is understood in terms of PART-WHOLE schemas and UP-DOWN schemas. - Relational structure is understood in terms of LINK schemas. - Radial structure in categories is understood in terms of CENTER-PERIPHERY schemas. - Foreground-background structure is understood in terms of FRONT-BACK schemas. - Linear quantity scales are understood in terms of UP - DOWN schemas and LINEAR ORDER schemas. By linking mental structuring to man’s physical body, Lakoff’s theory provides a basis for believing that all humans use the same structures in conceptualizing. In other words, although the contents of individual scenarios are language- and culture-specific, the structural patterns of scenarios and the way they are linked are universal.

2.1.1.2. Propositional

ICM s Lakoff 1987 :284 cites five common types: a the proposition; b the scenario sometimes called a “script”; c the feature bundle; d the taxonomy; e the radial category. Lakoff 1987 :285 defines subsection a the proposition as follows: A simple proposition consists of an ontology of elements the “arguments” and a basic predicate that holds of those arguments … In addition, certain semantic relations may hold among the arguments: there may be an agent, a patient, an experiencer, an instrument, a location, etc. Semantic relations are represented structurally by link schema, and the kinds of schemas are represented by assignments of links to categories of relations e.g., the agent category. Lakoff’s proposition schema underlies the structure of an “event” scenario. Lakoff 1987 :285–286 defines subsection b the scenario or script as follows: A scenario consists fundamentally of the following ontology: an initial state; a sequence of events, and a final state. In other words, the scenario is structured by a SOURCE-PATH-GOAL 20 Section 1. Scenarios schema in the time domain, where - the initial state = the source - the final state = the destination - the events = locations in the path and the path stretches through time. The scenario is a WHOLE and each of these elements is a PART . Lakoff 1987 :286 also states: The scenario ontology also consists typically of people, things, properties, relations and propositions. In addition there are typically relations of certain kinds holding among the elements of the ontology: causal relations, identity relations, etc. These are represented structurally by link schemas, each of which is characterized as to the kind of relation it represents. Scenarios also have a purpose structure, which specifies the purposes of people in the scenario. This ICM provides the structure of the script-type scenario, as a series of “event” scenarios, including not only participants, but also causal and purpose relations. Lakoff 1987 :286 defines subsection c the feature bundle as follows: A feature bundle is a collection of properties … Structurally, the bundle is characterized by a CONTAINER schema, where the properties are inside the container. Classical categories can be represented by feature bundles. The feature bundle structure is typical of “thing” scenarios. It refers to the patterning where a group of different features such as attributes, part-whole relationships, associated events are strongly linked together. This linking could be classical, defined by necessary and sufficient features as in a scientific “expert” definition, or it could be experiential, and fuzzy, formed by natural experiences. Lakoff 1987 :287 defines subsection d the taxonomy as follows: The elements in the ontology of the taxonomic model are all categories. Each category is represented structurally by a CONTAINER schema. The hierarchy is represented structurally by PART-WHOLE and UP-DOWN schemas. Each higher-order category is a whole, with the immediately lower categories being its parts. This kind of propositional ICM models a way in which scenarios can be linked, i.e. specific-generic and part-whole links of this study. Taxonomy does not presume “scientific” definitions such as “a fruit is a fleshy part of a plant containing seeds” by which tomatoes are fruits. In everyday life, most British people categorize tomatoes with vegetables because they generally share the same attributes, function the same way, and are connected with the same activities and locations, e.g. eaten in sandwiches, kept in the fridge. These experiential categories have “fuzzy boundaries” as Lakoff 1987 :287–288 explains: In classical categories, the boundary is sharp and does not have any internal structure. But in graded categories, the boundary is fuzzy; it is given a “width,” defined by a linear scale of values between 0 and 1, with 1 at the interior and 0 at the exterior. Elements are not merely in the interior or exterior, but may be located in the fuzzy boundary area, at some point along the scale between 0 and 1. That point defines the degree of membership of the given element. In categories with fuzzy boundaries one can qualify membership, e.g. “A chaise longue is like a cross between a chair and a sofa.” Lakoff 1987 :287 defines subsection e the radial category as follows: 2. The Structure of Scenarios 21 Like other categories, a radial category is represented structurally as a container, and its subcategories are containers inside it. What distinguishes it is that it is structured by the CENTRE - PERIPHERY schema. One subcategory is the center; the other subcategories are linked to the center by various types of links. Noncentral categories may be “subcenters,” that is, they may have further center-periphery structures imposed on them. This radial category shows that some categories or concepts are not simple but are like wheels with one complex hub and numerous spokes attached. Lakoff 1987 :91 gives “mother” as an example of a radial category, stating: The central case, where all the models converge, includes a mother who is and has always been a female, and who gave birth to the child, supplied her half of the child’s genes, nurtured the child, is married to the father, is one generation older than the child, and is the child’s legal guardian. He then lists stepmother, adoptive mother, surrogate mother, etc. and says: “These subcategories of mother are all understood as deviations from the central case.” The central case has a feature bundle connected to it, but each other case is linked to only part of that feature bundle. Lakoff’s ICM s are not so much types of scenario as ways of structuring information within scenarios. For example “cat” is the title of a scenario, which links • to propositions e.g. “Cats purr” • to scripts e.g. “When you stroke cats, they purr” • to attributes e.g. “furry” • to feature bundles e.g. all the attributes which together make cats “feline”, including body shape, whiskers, tail, face shape, grace of movement, and • to categories and hierarchies e.g. “Tigers and leopards are types of cat,” “Cats are animals”.

2.1.1.3. Metaphoric

ICM s Lakoff 1987 :288 defines the mental processes involved in the use of metaphorical language: A metaphoric mapping involves a source domain and a target domain. The source domain is assumed to be structured by a propositional or image-schematic model. The mapping is typically partial; it maps the structure of the ICM in the source domain onto a corresponding structure in the target domain. As we mentioned above, the source and target domains are represented structurally by CONTAINER schemas, and the mapping is represented by a SOURCE-PATH- GOAL schema. This metaphorical ICM allows scenarios in one domain to be linked to scenarios in another domain. This mapping is typically partial, so not every element of the one scenario corresponds metaphorically to an element in the other scenario. Also mapping is done at the level of a structure not an individual isolated concept, so metaphors usually occur in groups see Lakoff and Johnson 1980 . Metaphorical linking between scenarios allows for a whole series of related metaphorical expressions, and for the natural expansion of known metaphors. A biblical example is the metaphorical link between the shepherd and spiritual leader scenarios. Since each of these scenarios is linked to events and other participants, many metaphors operate along the same link, e.g. sheepflock means peopledisciples, feedpasture means 22 Section 1. Scenarios care forteach. These standard metaphors can also be expanded by the linked scenarios to include • fold means fellowshipcommunity of believers • thievesrobbers means false teachers, and • wolves means people who harm the believers, etc.

2.1.1.4. Metonymic

ICM s Lakoff 1987 :288 defines metonymic ICM s as follows: A metonymic mapping occurs within a single conceptual domain which is structured by an ICM . Given two elements, A and B, in the ICM, A may “stand-for” B. The “stands-for” relation is represented structurally by a SOURCE-PATH-GOAL schema. Lakoff 1987 :511 points out that metonyms, like metaphors, are usually not isolated phenomena, but group according to a generic organizational principle. For example: THE THING PERCEIVED STANDS FOR THE PERCEPT Among the percepts are sounds, smells, pains, etc., while the things perceived are entities that give rise to the percepts like alarm clocks, chemical factories, injured knees, etc. This metonymy shows up in the synonymy of sentences like - There goes the beep. - There goes the alarm clock. Similarly, Matthew 13:16 “Blessed are your eyes because they see, and your ears because they hear” contains the metonymic ICM : “ THE ORGAN OF PERCEPTION STANDS FOR THE PERCEIVER IN RELATION TO THAT ACT OF PERCEPTION. ” “Organs of perception” includes eyes, ears, noses, etc., and “acts of perception” includes events such as see, hear, smell. This metonymy shows up in the synonymy of sentences like: Blessed are you because you see. Blessed are your eyes because they see.

2.1.1.5. Symbolic

ICM s Lakoff 1987 :289 defines symbolic ICM s as follows: Purely conceptual ICM s can be characterized independently of the words and morphemes of particular languages. When linguistic elements are associated with conceptual elements in ICM s, the result is what we shall call a symbolic ICM. So symbolic ICM s relate lexical items, grammatical categories, and grammatical constructions to concepts, semantic categories, and propositions. In this way scenarios structure not only our mental processes, but also the language by which we express ourselves. Lakoff 1987 :289 further states: As Fillmore has established in his papers on frame semantics Fillmore 1975a , 1976a , 1978 , 1982a , 1982b , and 1985 the meanings of lexical items - words and morphemes - are characterized in terms of cognitive models. The meaning of each lexical item is represented as an element in an ICM. The ICM as a whole is taken as the background against which the word is defined. So a concept gets its meaning by its relationship to a scenario, and words are associated with concepts by means of symbolic ICM s. Thus a lexical item in a given language, by association with one element of a scenario, is connected to the whole network of struc- 2. The Structure of Scenarios 23 tural links within that scenario, and to links between that scenario and other scenarios. In this way the scenario is “the background against which that word is defined”. Grammatical categories are also structured by ICM s Lakoff 1987 :289–290: The traditional definition of the grammatical category noun as the name of a person, place, or thing is not that far off. The best examples of nouns are words for basic-level physical objects. Noun is a radial category. Its central subcategory consists of names for physical entities - people, places, things. Those are the prototypical nouns. There are of course noncentral nouns: abstract nouns like strength, and strange nouns that occur only in idioms like umbrage in take umbrage at. Verb is also a radial category with basic-level physical actions as central members e.g. run, hit, give, etc.. Thus, although grammatical categories as a whole cannot be given strict classical definitions in semantic terms, their central subcategories can be defined in just that way. The remaining members of each grammatical category can then be motivated by their relationships to the central members. This explains why grammatical categories frequently match semantic categories i.e. nouns for “things”, verbs for “events”, adjectives and adverbs for “attributes”, and prepositions and conjunctions for “relations”, and yet there is skewing both within a given language, and between languages. This fact is extremely significant for translation. Since translation is about commu- nicating meaning semantically based then the mismatch of semantic categories and grammatical categories, both within languages and between languages, will mean that the grammatical category will sometimes need to be changed. In some cases the source language will be skewed in a way that is unnatural for the target language, e.g. the use of an abstract noun μετάνοια ‘repentance’ in New Testament Greek for an “event” concept such as “repent”. In other cases the target language will be skewed in a way that is different from the source language, e.g. the use of an abstract noun “beginning” in the Parkari language for an “event” concept “begin”. To communicate clearly and naturally, a translation needs to observe the language-specific relationship between grammar and semantics in the target language, rather than try to preserve the specific grammatical form of the source text. Syntactic structure is also characterized in terms of ICM s Lakoff 1987 :290: - Hierarchical syntactic structure i.e., constituent structure is characterized by PART-WHOLE schemas; The mother node is the whole and the daughters are the parts. - Head-and-modifier structures are characterized by CENTER-PERIPHERY schemas. - Grammatical relations and co-reference relations are represented structurally by LINK schemas. - Syntactic “distance” is characterized by LINEAR SCALE schemas. - Syntactic categories, like other categories, are characterized by CONTAINER schemas. The general principle of a relationship between grammatical constructions and ICM s is significant for the topic of this study. The fact that “Grammatical relations and coreference relations are represented structurally by LINK schemas” is vital for explaining how the relationships within and between scenarios are mirrored by certain grammatical constructions in Greek and Parkari, specifically a correlation between certain constructions and whether the scenarios they relate to are open or closed. 24 Section 1. Scenarios

2.1.1.6. The Central

ICM : An experiential Gestalt Lakoff 1987 :490–491 makes a further point about ICM s which is significant for this study: It is one of the principal findings of prototype theory that certain clusters of conditions are more basic to human experience than other clusters and also more basic than individual conditions in the cluster. Lakoff and Johnson 1980 refer to such a cluster as an experiential gestalt. Such a gestalt is often representable by an ICM . It should be borne in mind that in such cases the entire ICM is understood as being psychologically simpler than its parts - hence the term gestalt. Lakoff’s example 1987 :490–491 of an experiential gestalt is the ICM for “pointing out” which consists of some 20 interrelated elements. Although all humans we presume point things out, the contents of this ICM are culture-specific, e.g. Westerners tend to point with the index finger of their right hand, but in Parkari culture you point by raising your chin in the relevant direction. Lakoff’s key point is that gestalts are experiential, and although human experiences are very similar when they relate to the physical nature of our bodies and environment, our experiences may differ greatly when they relate to our specific environment and culture. So as we look at the typical contents of scenarios, let us not forget that scenarios are language- and culture-specific, and what in one language and culture is a gestalt may not even exist in another culture as a gestalt at all, since it may have no experiential significance.

2.1.2. The content of scenarios

Scenarios contain all the information related to a given concept. Sperber and Wilson 1986 :86 list three types of information—logical, encyclopaedic, and lexical—which are linked to any given concept and stored in the brain at a “conceptual address”: The information that may be stored in memory at a certain conceptual address falls into three distinct types: logical, encyclopaedic and lexical. The logical entry for a concept consists of a set of deductive rules which apply to logical forms of which that concept is a constituent. The encyclopaedic entry contains information about the extension andor denotation of the concept: that is about the objects, events andor properties which instantiate it. The lexical entry contains information about the natural-language counterpart of the concept or phrase of natural language which expresses it. On this approach a conceptual address is thus a point of access to the logical, encyclopaedic and linguistic information which may be needed in the processing of logical forms containing this address. The lexical entry includes what I refer to as the “title” of a scenario, i.e. the word or phrase in a given language related to the concept in focus. According to Sperber and Wilson 1986 :90 it also contains “information about its syntactic category membership and co-occurrence possibilities, phonological structure and so on”. The encyclopaedic entry forms the main bulk of the scenario’s contents, as Sperber and Wilson 1986 :87 note: … various models have been proposed to describe what we are calling encyclopaedic entries. These models are intended to answer questions about the structure of the entries, the relations between the various kinds of assumption contained in them, and the relations among the entries themselves. Many of the models that have been proposed incorporate such notions as schema, frame, prototype or script. 2. The Structure of Scenarios 25 The logical entry I do not regard as a separate category per se, but rather as part of the encyclopaedic entry, consisting not of “real” logical connections, but rather a cataloguing of experiences which are perceived as related. For example, “If I break a mirror then I will have seven years bad luck” would be in the same “logical” form as “If I walk off a cliff, then I will fall”. Sperber and Wilson 1986 :94–95 regard the logical entry as essential for deducing implicatures, by being linked to a “deductive device”: The device we envisage is an automaton with a memory and the ability to read, write and erase logical forms, compare their formal properties, store them in memory, and access the deductive rules contained in the logical entries for concepts. Deductions proceed as follows. A set of assumptions which will constitute the axioms, or initial theses, of the deduction are placed in the memory of the device. It reads each of these assumptions, accesses the logical entries of each of its constituent concepts, applies any rule whose structural description is satisfied by that assumption, and writes the resulting assumption down in its memory as a derived thesis. Where a rule provides descriptions of two input assumptions, the device checks to see whether it has in memory an appropriate pair of assumptions; if so, it writes the output assumption down in its memory as a derived thesis. The process applies to all initial and derived theses until no further deductions are possible. I propose that these theses, which Sperber and Wilson see as logically formulated by the deductive device are, in fact, formulated as a consequence of real life first or second hand experience, and are not necessarily logical, but simply perceived personally as such perhaps under the influence of cultural norms. So at the time of making implicatures, the brain is not normally formulating logical theses, or even accessing preformulated logical theses, but rather accessing existing theses which consist of concepts already linked in mental scenarios by our structuring of previous experience. How then is our experience structured? A newborn baby instinctively cries when hungry. Normally his mother will then come and put him to the breast. His innate suckling reflex means he will suck at the nipple and normally he will get milk. The child’s crying and sucking are instinctive, but through repeated experiences he learns a connection between his • crying and his mother’s arrival • sucking and his getting milk, and • drinking milk and his feeling comfortable. These mental connections are the beginning of the experiential links which form complex scenarios in the mind. The closer these events cluster together in time, the more they will seem to be connected as cause and effect. The more frequently they co-occur, the more prototypical the relationship between them will become. This same chain of cause and effect, learned as a baby, enables adults to make sense of a mother saying “The baby’s crying. Heat up some milk, will you?” The hearer does not connect these two sentences by a series of logical deductions or inferences, such as “The baby’s crying, therefore, it is probably hungry. If it is hungry, it needs feeding. Milk is an appropriate food for a baby. The baby’s mother is not breastfeeding, otherwise she would give the child breast milk. The baby must, therefore, be given bottled milk. The milk is kept in the fridge and will be cold. Cold milk is not good for a baby. The milk should, therefore, be heated.” Rather, the two sentences fit experientially into a single 26 Section 1. Scenarios scenario, where the heating of milk for a baby’s bottle is a prototypical occurrence in the context of a baby crying.

2.1.3. Scenario contents for things, events, attributes, and relations

One way of classifying concepts is by their conceptual nature. In this fourfold classification, every concept is either a “thing”, an “event”, an “attribute”, or a “relation”. In this section, the content of a scenario refers to the organized array of interlinked slots, labelled according to conceptual roles and relationships, which would prototypically occur in the scenario of a particular type of concept. The individual items which fill those slots, however, are language- and culture-specific. The scenario contents listed below are mainly extrapolations from Wierzbicka and Beekman, with some elements from Lakoff and Johnson 1980 . Wierzbicka 1988 , contributing to theoretical linguistics, catalogues the kind of semantic information which is in real life connected with a given word. Beekman 1966 , as a practical aid to language learning, lists questions for investigating the meaning of a concept. His methodology enables a foreigner to build a second language scenario system, as opposed to simply learning second language vocabulary in isolation.

2.1.3.1. “Thing” scenario

A scenario for a “thing” would typically include: TITLE : the “thing” GENERIC CATEGORY PART-WHOLE RELATIONS LOCATION ORIGIN SIZE APPEARANCE BEHAVIOUR if animate RELATION TO PEOPLE if animate PEOPLE’S RELATION TO IT e.g. how used One subtype of “thing” scenario is a “scene” scenario, focusing on prototypical spatial orientation between “things”. Howard 1987 :45 quotes Mandler 1984 : Scene schemata pertain to the arrangement of objects in space. They encapsulate our knowledge that objects should be arranged in certain ways. Examples are the face and body schemata … We expect their parts to be in certain places. We expect parts of the landscape schemata, such as rivers, mountains, lakes and the sky to be arranged in a certain way. Another subtype of “thing” scenario is a “person” scenario, which includes social stereotypes and is used as a basis for predicting likely action Howard 1987 :47: We use schemata to understand and predict the behaviour of others Anderson 1980; Hastie 1981 . Probably we all develop a general person schema, which includes slots for motivations, interests, personality traits, etc. … There are also many more specific person schemas … The third type is for various social, ethnic and occupational groups. There might be a schema for librarians and one for bricklayers. The features of the librarian schema might be: female, quiet, orderly, etc.; those for the bricklayer might include features such as male, strong, a beer drinker, etc. 2. The Structure of Scenarios 27

2.1.3.2. “Event” scenario

A scenario for an “event” would typically include: TITLE: the “event” PARTICIPANTS Agent Goal Benefactive Instrument typically grammatical subject typically grammatical direct object typically grammatical indirect object GENERIC CATEGORY: CIRCUMSTANCES adjuncts or circumstantial complements including: means, manner, occasion: related to attributes such as temporal, spatial, intensity, appraisive or evaluative, manner PART-WHOLE RELATIONS: PARTS: discrete elements of the “event” STAGES arranged in linear time order Precondition Beginning Middle End Final state CAUSATION Beginning and middle enable end Middle and end cause final state PURPOSE Goal: final state include: purpose, motive, intention, reason, occasion, grounds, cause or condition Plan: meet precondition, perform beginning and middle The participants in an event scenario are labelled in terms of their semantic role, not the way they are grammaticalized. Although semantic roles are intended to be language independent, Palmer 1994 :5 points out that “they cannot be defined in any precise way” and “there is, in principle, no limit to the number of possible roles”. This is because the semantic roles are conceptual categorizations of the multiplicity of real life relationships between participants in events. Palmer also argues that semantic roles are “often partly based on the grammatical distinctions noted in languages” and thus not “truly notional”. However, according to scenario theory, grammatical distinctions reflect notional and conceptual distinctions, and since real life relationships are not discrete and clear cut, semantic roles similarly have “fuzzy borders” and are, as with all scenario contents, based on a culturally conditioned categorization of experiences. Different theorists not only identify different numbers of semantic roles, but also use different terminology, for example: • Fillmore 1971 :376 • Andrews 1985 :69–71 • Radford 1988 :373 • Halliday 1994 :109, 144 28 Section 1. Scenarios This study uses the terms Agent, Goal, Instrument, Experiencer, and Benefactive to refer to the core semantic roles listed below. The terminology used by others is shown for comparison: Semantic role Agent Goal Instrument Experiencer Benefactive Prototypically: Animate doer Affected by doer Used by doer Affected, no doer Benefits from event Example: She sang. He was hanged. Eat with a fork. I am hungry. Presented to mum. Fillmore 1971 Agent Object Instrument Experiencer Andrews 1985 Agent Patient Instrumental Experiencer Recipient Radford 1998 Agent Actor Theme Patient Instrument Experiencer Benefactive Halliday 1994 Actor Goal Senser Beneficiary Prototypical sequences of “event” scenarios are linked together as scripts. Story schemata are generalized macro-scripts, which include such slots as setting, main characters, and episodes. Howard 1987 :48 elaborates: One hypothesized schema was proposed by Mandler 1984 . It has slots that relate to each other in certain ways. First of all there is a setting, which may introduce the time and place and the main characters. Secondly, the story has one or more distinct episodes, each of which has a beginning, a development, and an ending. Each episode is usually organized around a goal. The hero has an aim which he tries to achieve, and the ending describes his success or failure. The story schema provides a generic framework on which people hang the specific events of a given story. This hypothesis is supported by experimental evidence Howard 1987 :49: Thorndyke and Yekovich 1980 summarize some lines of evidence. Firstly people tend to recall only part of a given story, but it is the same part. Secondly, people tend to reconstruct very poorly written stories, distort them to bring them into line with their schema. Thus people who read a scrambled story tend to recall it in a form that fits the schema. Thirdly, the more explicit the temporal, causal and intentional relations between events in the story, the more comprehensible people find it. The story schema usually includes all types of scenario, and is operative at the highest level. As Howard 1987 :50 points out, other types of text have their own schemas and their own structures, which affect the interpretation of texts, since they form the basis of the expected contents and their order within the text.

2.1.3.3. “Attribute” scenario

A scenario for an “attribute” would typically consist of multiple links to “things” and “events” where the attribute is prototypically significant, and to other attributes which share components of meaning, are on the same scale including homonyms and antonyms, or prototypically co-occur.

2.1.3.4. “Relation” scenario

A “relation” concept is not so much the core of a scenario, but refers rather to the type of link between “things”, “events”, or “attributes”. As such “relations” may be encoded linguistically not only by lexical items such as prepositions, but also by grammatical marking such as case, person, tense, aspect, voice and by syntactical marking such as word order. 2. The Structure of Scenarios 29 See also • Appendix A . The Content of Scenarios for Different Types of Concept • Appendix B . Greek “Relation” Words and Other Relationship Markers

2.1.4. Links between items in scenarios and between scenarios

Representations of scenarios usually involve concepts being conceived of as nodes, and relationships being conceived of as labelled links, such as • “is a” linking specific “thing” to generic “thing” • “has a” linking whole “thing” to part “thing” • “is” linking “thing” to “attribute”, and • “can” linking “thing” to “event”. Likewise, whole scenarios can be linked to other scenarios, by such links as cause and effect, or literal-metaphorical. If nodes represent concepts for “things”, “events”, and “attributes”, and links represent “relations”, then many relational links can be formed “implicitly”. For example, all concepts which link to the same node by a specific-generic link are implicitly linked to one another by a specific-specific link. Similarly, all concepts which link to the same node by a part-whole link are implicitly linked to one another by a part-part link. The general principle is that all concepts which link to the same node by the same type of link are implicitly linked to one another by a similarity link. One argument for postulating links between concepts and between scenarios is that storage space in the brain can be minimized, since information can be stored at the highest node to which it applies, and be accessible to all levels below that node. For example, “breathes oxygen” can be attached to the node “animate” rather than being a separate entry at the node for every single animate being. The corollary of this is that retrieval time is greater, since it involves searching for information at higher levels. This postulation has been confirmed as a general principle by experimental results involving reaction times Collins and Quillian 1969 . Assuming, then, that there are indeed mental links between concepts, I postulate the following types of links based on the contents of the different types of scenario proposed above, giving examples of related grammar or vocabulary, and with explanations in brackets. • Relational links between items in “thing” scenarios Linking “thing” to “thing” Specific-generic link e.g. “of”, “sort of”, “kind of” Specific-specific link e.g. “both are kinds of” Similarity link e.g. “like”, “similar” Part-whole link e.g. “part of” Part-part link e.g. “together with” Locative link e.g. “in”, “on”, “under”, etc. Origin link e.g. “from” Reciprocity link links “thing” to “thing” via participant links, e.g. “buyer” links to “seller” 30 Section 1. Scenarios Linking “thing” to “attribute” Attribute link e.g. “fire” links to “hot” Linking “thing” to “event” Participant-event links Agent link e.g. subject, English preverbal position cf., Greek nominative case Goal link e.g. direct object, English postverbal position cf., Greek accusative case Benefactive link e.g. “to” or “for” cf., Greek dative case Instrument link e.g. “with” cf., Greek dative case, ἐν • Relational links between items in “event” scenarios Linking “event” to “event” Reciprocity link links “event” to “event” via the participant links, e.g. “buy” links to “sell” Specific-generic link e.g. “of”, “sort of”, “kind of” Specific-specific link e.g. “both are kinds of” Similarity link e.g. “like”, “similar” Means link e.g. “by”, “through” Manner link e.g. “talk” links to “whisper” Occasion link event 1 is the occasion for event 2 Part-whole link event 1 is a part of event 2 Part-part link events 1 and 2 are parts of event 3 e.g. “aim” links to “load” as parts of “shoot” Sequence link e.g. “first”, “next”, “finally” events 1 and 2 are sequential e.g. “load”, “aim” Stage link e.g. “first”, “next”, “finally” part-part link plus sequence link e.g. “load”, “aim” Next-stage link e.g. “next” part-part link plus adjoining in sequence link Causal link e.g. “because” special kind of sequence link, tagged for cause Purpose link e.g. “in order to”, “so that” special kind of sequence link, tagged for purpose Linking “event” to “thing” Event-participant links: Agent link e.g. subject, English preverbal position cf., Greek nominative case Goal link e.g. direct object, English postverbal position cf., Greek accusative case Benefactive link e.g. “to” or “for” cf., Greek dative case Instrument link e.g. “with” cf., Greek dative case, ἐν Locative link e.g. “at”, “beside” Temporal link e.g. “at”, “in” Linking “event” to “attribute” Attribute links e.g. “burn” links to “brightly” • Relational links between items in “attribute” scenarios Linking “attribute” to “attribute” Gradation link e.g. “cold”, “cool”, “lukewarm”, “warm”, “hot” Contradictory link e.g. “big”, “small” 2. The Structure of Scenarios 31 • Relational links between items in “relation” scenarios Linking “relation” to “relation” Contradictory link e.g. “up”, “down” • The co-occurrence link The co-occurrence link typically occurs between “things”, but also may occur between “events”, “attributes”, and “relations”. It links items that prototypically co- occur without there being a specific semantic relationship between them. • The metaphorical link The metaphorical link typically links complete scenarios, including both the core and its prototypical links, and thus includes all the things, events, attributes, and relations contained therein. It is the basis for similes, metaphors, and idioms. • The metonymic link The metonymic link can apply to all types of scenario, thing, event, attribute, and relation, whenever part of the scenario stands for the whole. • The synonymy link The synonymy link also applies to all types of scenario, thing, event, attribute, and relation. It occurs where more than one word can be applied to the same concept. See also: Appendix C . English and Greek Examples of Relational Links

2.1.5. Proposed nature of information storage and linking

This study proposes that scenarios are mental structures involving multiple nodes and complex interlinking, where links can be • strong or weak prototypicality • formed and modified by experience cultural and experiential, and • hierarchically arranged specific-generic and part-whole links. Neurological research concerning memory gives supportive evidence for interlinked mental structures. Penfield’s neurological research 1975 :21–27 is described by Verny and Kelly 1982 , 1991 :55: By applying a special electrical prober to the surface of the brain, Dr. Penfield was actually able to make a patient emotionally re-experience a situation or event he or she had long forgotten. Each patient, Dr. Penfield wrote in his report on the experiments, ‘does not just remember exact photographic or phonographic reproductions of past scenes and events … he feels again the emotions which the situation actually produced in him … what [he] saw and heard and felt and understood.’ This neurological experiment into the processes of memory shows that not only are sights and sounds stored in the brain, but also feelings and understandings. Moreover, they are stored in or linked to the same place in the brain, since they can be accessed by stimula- tion of a particular physical part of the brain. 32 Section 1. Scenarios Schank and Abelson 1977 :17 argue that we categorize experiences into some sort of stereotypes in memory: The form of memory organization upon which our arguments are based is the notion of episodic memory. An episodic view of memory claims that memory is organized around personal experiences or episodes, rather than around abstract semantic categories. If memory is organized around personal experiences then one of the principle components of memory must be a pro- cedure for recognizing repeated or similar sequences. When a standard repeated sequence is recognized it is helpful in ‘filling in the blanks’ in understanding. Furthermore much of the language generation of people can be explained in this stereotyped way. Schank and Abelson 1977 :19 believe that memory is primarily organized along a time line: The overall organization of memory is a sequence of episodes organized roughly along the time line of one’s life. However, Schank and Abelson 1977 :227 also argue that information is also structured by connecting patterns of similar events: To summarize; the pattern of learning would seem to be that first, definitions of objects are learned as episodes. Then scripts are learned to connect events. Finally, scripts are organized by goal structures that are used to make sense of the need for them. This implies, firstly, that the content of any given scenario is immense, and secondly, that the physical nature of storing the information in a scenario as a chunk must be primarily by linking information, rather than by copying the same information numerous times and storing it in many different places. Consequently, when the content of any scenario is updated by adding new information, then that new information is readily available in other scenarios which include that item, via existing links between the scenarios. Similarly, this implies that a scenario may be updated without adding new information, but by simply adding new linkages. Since both scenarios and their links are formed experientially, when a person experiences something whether personally or by hearing or reading then they attempt to equate it with an existing scenario. If there is no such scenario already stored in the brain, then they create a new scenario, and link it to existing scenarios in whatever ways are applicable. Likewise, when a person first experiences concepts as linked, then they link the relevant scenarios in the brain. If there is already a linkage, then they strengthen that linkage. Experimental evidence using a PET positron emission tomography scan shows that repeated linking results in more efficient processing. Richard Haier of the Brain Imaging Center, University of California, argues that mental efficiency in performing tasks is achieved by “neural pruning”, which appears to be the establishment of meaningful linkages between neurons in the brain Begley 1992 :47: At birth a baby’s brain is a rat’s nest of jumbled neurons. It uses up more and more glucose until the child is about five, when the brain is roughly twice as active as an adult’s. Then glucose use and the number of circuits plummet until the early teens. This is called neural pruning, and Haier speculates it’s the key to neural efficiency. More intel- ligent people become like that by more pruning, which leaves remaining circuits much more efficient. These theories raise the question of brain capacity. How can all this information not only be stored in the brain, but organized in chunks, and cross-referenced in such a way 2. The Structure of Scenarios 33 that the same information can be accessed in a vast range of different ways, some semantic, some lexical, some phonetic? Begley 1992 :44 remarks that the human brain is admirably designed for such a complex task: With 100 billion cells or neurons, each sprouting about 1,000 sylph-like fingers to reach out and touch another, “the brain is the last and grandest biological frontier”, says geneticist James Watson, co-discoverer of the double helix in DNA. In a new book, Discovering the Brain, Watson calls this organ “the most complex thing we have yet discovered in our universe”. Regarding specific-generic hierarchy, Howard 1987 :79 quotes experimental evidence suggesting that information is stored at the highest relevant level of the hierarchy: It should take longer to verify questions that require traversing several links. Verifying ‘A robin is a bird’ or ‘A bird has feathers’ should be a quick process, because only one link needs to be traversed. But, to verify ‘A robin is an animal’ or ‘A canary has skin’ should take longer, because more than one link must be traversed. Collins and Quillian [ 1969 ] tested this hypothesis in a reaction time study with people and it was indeed verified. The more links traversed, the longer the sentence took to confirm. However, this experimental evidence can be interpreted in other ways, as Howard 1987 :79, referring to Conrad 1972 , points out: the experiment that found an effect of the number of links traversed on reaction time taken to verify the statements was criticized for confounding link number with associative frequency. When associative strength differences are eliminated, the link number effect vanishes. “Associative frequency” means that concepts which are associated experientially are linked in the brain, and the more frequent the experiential co-occurrence, the stronger the mental link. Thus, the level where information is stored may not be the highest level possible, indeed information may not even be stored at only one level. Rather, information may be stored, or most “strongly” stored, at the level where it is most commonly encountered and, therefore, most useful. Howard 1987 :80 points out: the assumption of complete cognitive economy was questioned. While a computer with limited storage space might need such a feature, people do not need complete economy. We often need to store information at particular levels of abstraction to make speedy decisions … It is likely then that we store features where they are convenient or used often Lachman and Lachman, 1979 . Further, Rosch 1978 argues that such property values are often stored at the basic-level rather than at more abstract ones. Sanford and Garrod 1981 :25, on the basis of controlled experiments recording the time taken to verify certain propositions, come to the same conclusion: The picture which emerges, therefore, is one in which properties are stored directly at a node referring to the object or some general set of that object if the object and those properties are often encountered together, but in which novel combinations can only be verified by inference. Although models of mental systems generally use nodes and links to diagram the system, linguistic theorists usually make no specific claims as to how information is physically stored and retrieved, but merely state that models based on scenario structures illustrate diagrammatically aspects of memory and language which can be experimentally proven. Howard 1987 :79 states: 34 Section 1. Scenarios it should be noted that the networks [of scenario structures diagrammed] are just representations of semantic memory parts. It cannot be said that there are actually neural systems that correspond to nodes and pointers. However, Professor Gerald Edelman, Director of the Neurosciences Institute, California, and Nobel Prize winner for Medicine and Physiology in 1972, explicitly links co-occurring cognition in real life experience to the building of neural networks. On “Melvyn Bragg-In Our Time” Radio 4, 2962000 he summarized it thus: “Neurons that fire together, wire together.”

2.2. Scenario titles are linked to the whole scenario

The title of a scenario is linked to the whole scenario. Consequently, a scenario title can be used as a shorthand way to refer to all the items within that scenario. An example of the relationship between the title of a scenario and its discrete elements comes from van Dijk 1977a :151: [32] A man in a fast car stopped before the bank. He quickly got out and ran into the bank. He drew a pistol and shouted to the cashier to hand him the money in her desk… The hold-up did not last longer than three minutes. The definite article in the last sentence can only be explained if we assume that the previous passage contains an argument or predicate which is co-referential with respect to the same event as the word hold-up. Here a selection of the key stages of the hold-up scenario are referred to anaphorically by the scenario title. It is these scenario titles which we remember when we hear a story, rather than every single specific detail, and the title acts as a reminder for the whole event Schank and Abelson 1977 :167: For the purposes of what is remembered, we are claiming the following: The macro-events are remembered primarily; the micro-events are remembered after enough time equally poorly whether they were inferred and filled into the causal chain, or explicitly stated. This is because when an event is script-based, the actual event can be forgotten. What needs to be remembered is a pointer to the script that defined that event. This pointer is the macro-event itself. As Schank and Abelson point out, the title is often the main event of a script, e.g. “playing golf” is the title of a scenario whose script includes going to the golf course, carrying balls and clubs, etc. but playing golf is also the main event within that scenario. In contrast, sometimes the title refers to the sum of the script events not to any individual most important event within it, e.g. for British people “make tea” opens a scenario including boiling water, putting tea leaves in a teapot, adding water, leaving it to brew, etc. but no one event can be singled out as “making tea”. For “thing” words, the scenario title will be the name of the object, and likewise for “attribute” words the scenario title will be the name of that attribute. The title of a “thing” scenario may also refer not simply to the “thing” itself but also to the event or script of events associated with it, as noted by Schank and Abelson 1977 :47: 12 John took a bus to New York. In New York he went to a museum. Then he took a train home. 2. The Structure of Scenarios 35 In this example the names of scripts are mentioned and it is presumed that each script proceeded normally … Here we have the three explicitly stated scripts, BUS, MUSEUM-GOING, and TRAIN. Schank and Abelson call such a scenario title a “script name” and use the sign to mark it. This allows a distinction between BUS as the title of a “thing” scenario including size, shape, purpose, number of wheels, etc., and BUS as the title of a script-type scenario including wait at bus stop, get on, buy ticket, sit down, etc.. Whether a word refers to a single concept or to the scenario related to that concept depends on the function of that word in the discourse. A single concept within one scenario may also be the title of its own scenario. Howard 1987 :33, referring to Markman 1983 , comments: Schemata are often organized into partonomies, each schema being part of one and itself composed of schemata … Consider the human body schema. It consists of such parts as face, arms, legs, and trunk. Each can be considered a schema, as described before with face. These each bear a part-whole relation to a more inclusive schema. They are part of it, just as a given tree is part of a forest. Thus “face” can refer both to a single concept in the “human body” scenario, and to the whole “face” scenario of which it is a title, including all its discrete elements such as nose, eyes, ears, etc.

2.3. Scenarios link vocabulary as well as concepts

Since concepts are linked within scenarios, vocabulary referring to those concepts is also linked. The relationship between lexicon and scenarios is addressed by van Dijk 1977a :160: For a linguist it might be tempting to ask how such frames differ from the conceptual knowledge of a LEXICON of the language, a question which for the psychologist is less relevant since there seems no cognitivebehavioural difference between knowledge of the language and knowledge of the world. It might be proposed, though, that the top-level, essential information of frames, is the conceptual information associated with the lexically expressed concepts of a language. Howard 1987 :17 defines the relationship between words and concepts as follows: Words are labels for concepts and a word’s meaning is the attached concept. Thus a word is distinct from a concept.

2.3.1. Types of lexical links within scenarios

Scenario structure produces these common types of lexical link, shown here with New Testament Greek examples.

2.3.1.1. Same set links, i.e. specific-specific links

The specific-generic link in scenario structure, by connecting hyponyms e.g. roses and daffodils to a single superordinate node e.g. flower, automatically produces cohyponyms which belong to the same set. These are at the same level of hierarchy, of the same grammatical class, and in the same generic class. Thus same set links are formed automatically between items which have specific-generic links to the same node, e.g. Luke 6:13–14: 36 Section 1. Scenarios Cohyponyms Σίμων Simon νδρέας Andrew These both link to the same generic node: Superordinate ἀπόστολος apostle

2.3.1.2. Generic-specific links

Generic-specific links in the scenario create hierarchical lexical links, e.g. Luke 6:13–15: Generic Person Specific type of “person”: μαθητής disciple 6:13 Specific type of “disciple”: ἀπόστολος apostle 6:13 Specific type of “apostle”: άκωβος James 6:14 Specific type of “James”: άκωβος λφαίου James son of Alphaeus 6:15 All words in generic-specific relation belong to the same lexical class. Lexical items related by generic-specific links are often used in reiteration to achieve coreference. Kinds of reiteration include: repetition, synonym, superordinate, and general word Baker 1992 :203, acronyms and naming Jordan 1992 :188. For example, reiteration of “apostles” Luke 6:13: Repetition: ἀπόστολος apostle 9:10 Synonym: οἱ δώδεκα the twelve 8:1 same scenario, difference lexical item Superordinate: μαθητής disciple 6:13 superordinate General word: πτωχός poor 6:20 attribute Proper name: Σίμων Simon 6:14 hyponym

2.3.1.3. Part-whole links

Part-whole semantic links within one scenario produce lexically linked vocabulary of the same lexical class, for example: Whole Parts Thing: δένδρον ‘tree’ ῥίζα ‘root’, καρπός ‘fruit’ Luke 3:9 Event: ἅπτομαι ‘touch’ ἐκτείνω ‘stretch hand’ Luke 5:13 Attribute: χρηστός ‘kind’ εὔσπλαγχνος ‘tender hearted’, χαριζόμενος ‘forgiving’ Eph. 4:32

2.3.1.4. Participant-event links

Vocabulary for participants and events belong in the same scenario, and produce lexical collocations, e.g. Luke 11:13: Event: δίδωμι give Agent: πατήρ Father God Goalpatient: πνεῦμα ἅγιον Holy Spirit Benefactive: οἱ αἰτοῦντες people asking 2. The Structure of Scenarios 37

2.3.1.5. Location-event links

Vocabulary for certain locations links with the events that occur there, producing lexical collocations, e.g. Luke 4:16: Location: συναγωγή synagogue Event: ἀναγινώσκω read Agent: ησοῦς Jesus 4:14 Goalpatient: βιβλίον scroll Scripture Benefactive: πάντες everyone 4:20

2.3.1.6. Conjoined scenario links

Vocabulary may belong in the same scenario, even where that vocabulary does not belong to the same domain. For example, for first-century Palestinian Jews, leper, clean, far off, touch, priest, and laws of Moses belong to one scenario “leprosy”. This is because leprosy is part of a script-type scenario which reads something like: Cause: leprosy Effect: ritual impurity, untouchability Cure: divine intervention Verification: examination by priest in Jerusalem Result: make offering to God Thus, all the vocabulary of Luke 5:12–14 can be linked to this one leprosy scenario, even though most of it is directly linked to ritual impurity not to disease.

2.3.1.7. Metaphorical links

The metaphorical link of scenario structure explains lexical links between metaphorical and nonmetaphorical language. Metaphorical links are often different from culture to culture. For example, the Urdu word for owl ʊl:u is used as an insult meaning ‘stupid person’. In English, owl can be linked either with stupidity or with wisdom e.g. The Wordsworth Concise English Dictionary Davidson, Seaton, and Simpson 1994 definition of owl includes “a dullard”, whereas the Concise Oxford Dictionary Soanes and Stevenson 2006 definition includes “a person compared to an owl, esp. in looking solemn or wise”. However, in first-century Greek culture the owl was only seen as wise. So calling Billy Bunter “a fat owl”, if translated literally into New Testament Greek, would have probably been understood metaphorically, but misunderstood as meaning wise. Similarly, in line with Old Testament usage, sheep is linked in New Testament Greek with religious follower, and shepherd with religious leader and protector, as in John 21:15, where Jesus says to Peter “Feed my lambs.” In cultures where sheep and shepherd are not used metaphorically in a religious context, and where most people keep sheep for milk, this would be understood literally.

2.3.1.8. Other collocational links

The above list of links which connect vocabulary within scenarios is representative, not exhaustive. All vocabulary which refers to linked concepts within the same scenario, 38 Section 1. Scenarios whatever the type of semantic link, is lexically linked. As such it will collocate naturally in text, since episodes or stretches of text usually have a single scenario as their backdrop. The complexity of scenario structure is inevitable since scenarios are constructed mental representations of reality. Hence the lexical networks organised by scenario structure are also extremely complex and research into this area is ongoing, as noted by Pike 1992 :235: Longacre 1983 :174 has at least forty-eight different classes listed in his scheme of case frames for verbs. Semantic inventories in Grimes 1986 are especially relevant to referential classes and an interlocking network of lexical systems. The lexical decomposition of Dowty 1979 , also adopted by Foley and Van Valin 1984 , would be another fruitful entry to the understanding of this very intricate area of study. See also: Appendix D . Greek Evidence that Words are Linked by Scenarios

2.3.2. Scenarios, lexical fields, and sense relations

Scenario theory explains a broader set of lexical relationships than other theories, including those relationships as a part of scenario structure.

2.3.2.1. Lexical fields

Some early lexicologists, such as Trier 1934 , looked at “semantic fields” paradigmatically in terms of interrelated but contrastive words Lyons 1977 :252: Trier looks upon the vocabulary of a language as an integrated system of lexemes interrelated in sense. The system is in constant flux … Any broadening in the sense of one lexeme involves a corresponding narrowing in the sense of one or more of its neighbours. This vocabulary would typically be linked in scenarios by specific-generic or part-whole- links to the same superordinate node. Others, such as Porzig 1950 :68, viewed “semantic fields” syntagmatically, focussing on the “essential meaning relationship” between certain pairs of words, as quoted by Lyons 1977 :261: What does one bite with? With the teeth, of course. What does one lick with? With the tongue, obviously. What is it that barks? A dog. What does one fell? Trees. What is it that is blond? Human hair. The fact that is here illustrated by means of a few examples is so banal that we are inclined to overlook it and above all to underestimate its importance. This vocabulary would be linked in scenarios by participant-event links, although scenarios would include prototypical participants as well as “essential” ones. Lyons 1977 :268 incorporates both ideas: Lexemes and other units that are semantically related, whether paradigmatically or syntagmatically, within a given language-system can be said to belong to, or be members of, the same semantic field; and a field whose members are lexemes is a lexical field. A lexical field is therefore a paradigmatically and syntagmatically structured subset of the vocabulary. This definition of lexical field still only includes vocabulary from a limited part of the semantic range of a scenario. It lacks vocabulary for elements such as prototypical locations, time sequence, intention, and cause-effect relationships which are included in script-type scenarios. 2. The Structure of Scenarios 39

2.3.2.2. Scenarios and sense relations

Similarly, the various types of semantic relationship between words, known as sense relations Lyons 1977 :270–335, are included within the structure of scenarios, being defined as links. Opposition and contrast, known commonly as antonymy, is based on “dichotomy” Lyons 1977 :271: … dictionaries will classify as antonyms pairs of lexemes which, as we shall see, are related in a variety of ways ‘high’:‘low’, ‘buy’:‘sell’, ‘male’:‘female’, ‘arrive’:‘depart’, ‘left’:‘right’, ‘front’:‘back’ etc.. What all these examples have in common, it should be noticed, is their dependence upon dichotomization … binary opposition is one of the most important principles governing the structure of languages; and the most evident manifestation of this principle, as far as the vocabulary is concerned, is antonymy. Since dichotomy causes divergence, antonyms play a major role within scenarios, predicting different results, belonging in different stages, or even relating to different subscenarios. For example, the highlow dichotomy contradiction link may well affect the outcome of a participant’s action, e.g. a person may die falling from a high place, but not from a low place. “Arriving” would be at the beginning of a “visit” scenario, “departing” would be at the end. “Buy” and “sell” belong to the same event scenario, with the same participants, but lexicalize the viewpoint of a different participant with different agendas, sellers being typically professionals, whereas buyers are typically ordinary people with specific needs. Whether a participant is “male” or “female” different attribute links, and part-whole links, but same specific-generic link to human may well affect expectations of their actions, e.g. if someone attacks, a stereotypical male would fight back, and a stereotypical woman would scream or run. Hyponomy is marked by the specific-generic link. Note that co-hyponyms have the same specific-generic links, but different metaphorical links. For example, in the sentence “I saw some … at the farm” cows, pigs, or animals could fill the same slot. But usually in metaphors, neither different hyponyms, nor superordinates, can fill the same slot, for example: • “She is so spiteful, she is an absolute cow.” • “She is so greedy, she is an absolute pig.” • “She is so vicious, she is an absolute animal.” Part-whole relations reflect the part-whole link between scenarios. Lyons 1977 :312–313 notes that the principles involved in making cut-off points in part-whole chaining are unclear. He gives examples such as “the handle of the door”, “the door of the house”, but not “the handle of the house”, contrasted with “the cuff of the sleeve”, “the sleeve of the jacket”, and “the cuff of the jacket”. In terms of scenario structure, “handle” has a part-whole link to the “door” scenario, but only links to the “house” scenario via the node of “door”, whereas “cuff” is linked directly by a part-whole link to both the “sleeve” and “jacket” scenarios. These links are formed by experiencing the entities as related. Scenarios also include the information identified by componential analysis, which defines the sense of words by the combination of one or more “sense-components”, e.g. “man” combines the sense-components “male”, “adult”, and “human”. In this example, 40 Section 1. Scenarios scenario structure would encode the data by a combination of generic-specific and attribute links. Componential analysis fails to account for certain aspects of language use, e.g. in English “X is now a woman” does not imply “X is no longer a girl” Lyons 1997 :334. Scenario theory, however, allows for “components of meaning” as prototypical rather than necessarily making a discrete cut-off point between lexical items.

2.4. Chapter summary

Scenarios are structured by concepts which are themselves metaphorical, based on bodily experience, such as “container” and “link”. Scenarios • store information in chunks • have metonymic and hierarchical networks • link related concepts • have prototypical categories with fuzzy boundaries, and • encode directionality of space, time, and intention. Concepts within scenarios are also linked to lexicon and grammar. Scenarios for different types of semantic class are structured differently, but all involve linking concepts according to experiential frequency and relevance. Scenario theory is supported by psychological and neurological research. Scenario structure means that the “title” of a scenario, i.e. the lexical item connected to a given concept, can be used to refer to the whole cluster of semantically interrelated concepts which are linked to that conceptual node. Since the lexicon of a given language is linked to concepts which are themselves interlinked with other concepts in scenarios, scenarios link lexical items as well as concepts. 41