Descriptive Statistic The analysis of Turkish investment incentives i. Gini coefficient

1370 average large shareholder ownership 38.24 and average total asset 8.655 of all industries. Furthermore, the average value of competition for this industry 0.6155 is higher compared to average value of competition for all the industries 0.5196. Table 4.2 Descriptive Statistic of Data Distribution for the Companies in 2006 N Range Minimu m Maximu m Mean Std. Deviatio n Variance Disc 101 .7481 .2283 .9764 .562408 .147889 1 .022 TA 101 5.0937 5.2434 10.3371 8.651523 .898684 1 .808 C 101 .8273 .0043 .8316 .582347 .209692 .044 O 101 .91 .09 1.00 .3791 .25260 .064 Table 4.3 Descriptive Statistic on Distribution Data for Industries in 2006 N Range Minimu m Maximu m Mean Std. Deviation Variance DISC 23 .4307 .3307 .7614 .546826 .0985750 .010 O 23 .65 .18 .83 .3824 .18259 .033 TA 23 2.8500 7.0521 9.9021 8.65524 8 .6369608 .406 C 23 .8273 .0043 .8316 .519600 .2176460 .047 On the other hand, the industry with SIC 313 steel works, blast furnaces and rolling and finishing has the lowest disclosure level. This industry has the average ownership of large shareholder 25.9 which is relatively lower than the average ownership of large shareholder in all industries 38.24. The total assets of this industry 1371 are 7.9741 and the competition is 0.4297. that are relatively lower than the average total assets 8.655 and competition 0.5196 of all industries. Table 4.4 Data Distribution of the Industries in 2006 SIC Average of Disc Average of O Average of TA Average of C Companies Total 204 0.6689 42.30 9.0911 0.6036 4 208 0.6315 69.11 8.7039 0.6071 4 209 0.4472 27.66 8.7748 0.1306 5 211 0.5433 64.22 9.7421 0.5072 3 228 0.6066 35.93 7.8931 0.5749 6 229 0.5870 26.86 8.8506 0.7832 7 232 0.6378 18.16 8.9626 0.4305 3 243 0.6000 30.30 8.8146 0.6773 4 262 0.4725 61.04 7.8343 0.0043 2 267 0.5514 18.57 9.2034 0.6489 3 283 0.6424 60.09 8.7140 0.7165 9 284 0.4843 40.77 8.1103 0.1735 4 289 0.5121 30.32 8.5609 0.6971 9 301 0.4882 30.13 9.2254 0.3667 3 308 0.5173 30.38 8.3347 0.7712 9 314 0.4370 32.48 8.2989 0.5489 2 324 0.7614 56.07 9.9021 0.6155 3 325 0.5459 20.24 9.0305 0.3269 3 331 0.3307 25.99 7.9741 0.4297 2 335 0.6308 20.81 8.7574 0.8316 7 341 0.4016 33.75 8.2897 0.3578 2 349 0.4751 21.73 7.0521 0.4579 3 371 0.6040 82.68 8.9501 0.6899 4 1372 Based on result of descriptive statistics above, we conclude that disclosure level tends to increase along with ownership of large shareholders, total assets and competition level.

4.3. Analysis of Correlation among Variables

The results of correlation tests are consistent with the expectation, i.e., total assets and competition correlate positively with disclosure level at significant level of 1 while large shareholders ownership correlates positively with disclosure level at significant level 5 . Tabel 4.5 The Pearson Correlation Test among Variables Co rrelati on s 1. 000 .200 .260 .292 .200 1. 000 .044 .007 .260 .044 1. 000 .101 .292 .007 .101 1. 000 . .023 .004 .002 .023 . .331 .471 .004 .331 . .158 .002 .471 .158 . 101 101 101 101 101 101 101 101 101 101 101 101 101 101 101 101 Disc O TA C Disc O TA C Disc O TA C Pears on C orrelation Sig. 1-t ailed N Disc O TA C

4.4. Regression Analysis

OLS regression is conducted after validity check that assumption of OLS regression is fulfilled. As shown in table 4.6, the regression has R 2 30, meaning that the internal factors ownership of large shareholder and total asset and the external factor competition can explain 30 variation of company disclosure level. Model Summary b .549 a .302 .280 .1154597 Model 1 R R Square Adjust ed R Square Std. Error of the Estimate Predic tors : Const ant, TA, O, C a. Dependent Variable: Disc b. 1373 Coefficients a .090 .135 .670 .505 -.178 .359 .110 .054 .188 2.033 .045 .003 .217 .037 .015 .225 2.422 .017 .007 .067 .189 .065 .268 2.891 .005 .059 .319 Constant O TA C Model 1 B Std. Error Uns tandardized Coeff icients Beta Standardized Coeff icients t Sig. Lower Bound Upper Bound 95 C onf idenc e Interv al f or B Dependent Variable: Disc a. The coefficient of ownership structure is 0.110 and significant level at 5 . So, this study finds that there is a positive relationship between ownership of large shareholders and level disclosure. This finding supports the assertion that greater ownership of large shareholders will enforce management to implement high disclosure policy in order to assure management act in the best interest of shareholder. This study finds that the coefficient of total asset is positive 2.422 and significant at the 5 level p-value = 0.017. Therefore, the result proves that larger asset will enforce firms to increase their disclosure level. This finding supports the argument that: 1 potential loss caused by agency problem is higher for company with large assets Foster 1986; McKinnon and Dalimunthe 1993; Bradbury 1992; and Berger and Hann 2002 ; β increasing transparency of large total assets will show company‘s good reputation. Furthermore, company will get easier access to external financing Sengupta, 1998. The coefficient of competition is positive 2.891 and significant at the 1 level 0.005. Thus, higher competition encourages the company to increase their disclosure. This finding supports the argument that companies in a highly competitive environment will have a greater incentive to disclose because the potential loss of market share is relatively lower than low competitive environment. Releasing additional information is beneficial to the company because it could reduce asymmetric information between management and the shareholders Hayes and Lundholm 1996; Harris 1998; Botosan and Stanford 2005, Harris 1998; Botosan and Stanford 2005.