Determinants of the Voluntary Filers of XBRL 1. Financial Incentives

1129 monitoring costs DeAngelo, 1976; Carslaw, 1988; Bowen et al., 2008. And also if firms have more possibilities of information asymmetry, they have more incentive to signal. That is, they need to reduce their costs of external financing through the activities of disclosure, because the increasing explanation power of intangible factors of firm-value like as growth opportunities make the information gap between the management and outside shareholders, this gap leads to increase their costs of financing Smith and Watts, 1992; Gaver and Gaver, 1993. According to these prior studies about the relationship between a firm‘s financial status and disclosure activities, we can guess that there are positive connections of XBRL voluntary filers with their financial status. H1: There is a positive relation between the voluntary filers of XBRL and financial incentives. H1- 1μ There is a positive relation between the voluntary filers of XBRδ and firms‘ performance. H1-2: There is a positive relation between the voluntary filers of XBRL and new external financing activities.

3.1.2. Governance Structure Incentive.

Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2007 argue that sales growth, portion of inventories, big 4 auditors, and institutional shareholders have a positive correlation with an internal control deficiency report, but that firm size, and a litigious industry, show the opposite effect. Ahn et al. 2007 find that a higher share of foreign investors and a larger firm size encourage voluntary disclosure. There is another paper which studies the 1130 relationship between corporate governance and disclosure practices in Korea: Lee and Sohn 2005 find that the higher the proportion of outside directors, the more equity is held by foreign and institutional investors, the less by management, and the higher the level of disclosure. Ahn and Lee 2005 find out that minority shareholders want to get more information through public disclosure to reduce information asymmetry, but largest shareholders are not likely to prefer or don‘t need public disclosure more. More sophisticated investors with analytical skills and information capabilities have strong monitoring, and these investors encourage firms to do their disclosure activities more Pound, 1988; Jensen and Meckling, 1976. On the basis of these studies about corporate governance and voluntary disclosure, we set up our hypotheses of corporate governance incentives to adopt XBRL system voluntarily. H2: There is a positive or negative relation between the voluntary filers of XBRL and governance structure incentives. H2-1: There is a positive relation between the voluntary filers of XBRL and the proportion of foreign shareholders‘ equity. H2-2: There is a negative relation between the voluntary filers of XBRL and the proportion of major shareholders‘ equity. H2-3: There is a positive relation between the voluntary filers of XBRL and the proportion of minor shareholders‘ equity. H2-4: There is a positive relation between the voluntary filers of XBRL and the proportion of outside directors.

3.1.3. Auditing Incentive

1131 Asthana and Krishnan 2006 study whether auditnon-audit fees and information system fees affect the adoption of a new SEC rule on auditor fee disclosure. They find that the greater the non-audit fees that firms pay, the larger the firms, and the higher the possibility that they adopt the new rule and gain its benefits as it helps firms to reduce negative perceptions about non-audit services. Kim and Koh 2007 investigate the relationship between audit delay, or an abnormal audit, and earnings management. Earnings management, as measured by discretionary accruals, has a positive correlation with audit delay. XBRL voluntary filers usually prefer to good quality of auditing BIG4 auditors and BIG4 auditors usually carry out their auditing works efficiently and systemically. So they can publish the financial and auditing reports of their clients more promptly Premuroso and Bhattacharya, 2008; Ahmed, 2003. H3: There is a positive negative relation between the voluntary filers of XBRL and auditing incentives. H3-1: There is a positive relation between the voluntary filers of XBRL and audit quality. H3-2: There is a negative relation between the voluntary filers of XBRL and audit delay.

3.2. Earnings Quality

According to Carslaw 1λ88, if any firm has a higher possibility of earnings‘ management, then this possibility may give a serious problem of information asymmetry between the management and outside information users. So this information 1132 asymmetry can be a cause of increased cost of capital Bowen et al., 2008. Then, to reduce their monitoring costs, information users can require firms to do more disclosure activities. Francis et al. 2008 find out firms with a good quality of earnings show more voluntary disclosure activity than firms with a bad quality of earnings. And also the higher earnings volatility or the higher level of earnings smoothing, and the lower disclosure level or the less voluntary disclosure Yhim et al., 2003; Lapointe-Antunes et al., 2006. Gassan and Sellhon 2006 state that the early adopters of IFRS show high quality of accruals, and their earnings persistence are also high. We may therefore infer that the earnings quality of early and voluntary adopters is better than for the non- adopters. By reason of the results of above studies, we can hypothesize that there is a positive relation of XBRL voluntary filers with earnings quality measures. H4: There is a positive relation between the voluntary filers of XBRL and earnings quality. . RESEARCH METHODOLOGY On the basis of these prior studies, we divide our logistic regression model to verify the determinants of XBRL voluntary filers into 3 parts by each incentive - 1 financing incentive, 2 governance structure incentive and 3 auditing incentive. We select 16 possible factors for 3 logistic regression models, and 8 factors among them are used as independent variables for 3-incentive based models firm performance, new external financing for external financing incentive; foreignmajorminor shareholders‘