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description of the lifeworld as expressed in symbolic form” van Manen, 1990, 25.
d. Important Concepts in Phenomenology
The following elaboration was definitions of several important concepts in phenomenology. It includes the definition of consciousness, act, perception,
intentional experience, intersubjective validity, reduction, lived experience, meaning, empathy, reflection, and theme.
1 Consciousness
Consciousness refers to intentionality through inner perception, which is different from external perceptionphysical phenomena directed toward objects
Brentano, 1973, as paraphrased by Moustakas, 1994. Brentano argues that the object must first exist before it is innerly percepted Moustakas. Thus both the
object and the perception and the object must exist in the consciousness Brentano, 1973, as paraphrased by Moustakas.
Different from Brentano, Husserl argues that the object does not have to exist and can “emerge in our consciousness in an empty manner” Moustakas, 1994,
50. „We‟ fill the object until it reaches the sense of wholeness meaning through experience and reflective process of looking consider and looking again
reconsider Moustakas.
2 Act
Husserl 1970 uses the word „act‟ to refer to experience of meaning Moustakas, 1994. According to Husserl, it has two sides. They are quality and
matter. Quality is judgment, perception, and memory while matter is direction to the object, features and properties of an object.
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Still according to Husserl, act belongs to “intentional
experience
, not mental activities” Moustakas, 52. Act can be full or empty. It is full when it is “validly
posited” Moustakas, 52. By reflecting on act, we are moving toward the meaning of experience.
3 Perception
Moustakas states “in phenomenology, perception is regarded as the primary source of knowledge” 1994, 52. It is made of intentions which are combined
with sensations. With perception, the object “appears under a multiplicity of varying aspects which are not only compatible with but also fit into on
e another” Gurwitsch, 1966, 122, as paraphrased by Moustakas, 1994,
53. “New perceptions always hold the possibility of contributing knowledge regarding any
object” Gurwitsch, 1966, 335, as paraphrased by Moustakas, 1994, 53. Husserl calls “the perceptions that emerge from angels of looking” as horizons
as paraphrased by Moustakas, 1994, 53. Horizons add “something important to
the experience” Moustakas, 53. Meaning is not static. The horizon keeps multiplying and adding new perspectives to the meaning Moustakas.
When we do perception, past meanings might be awaken and contribute to the new meaning of the present Moustakas, 1994. Perception enables
“us to express singular judgments that eventuate in universal
judgment” Kockelmans, 1967, 27, as paraphrased by Moustakas, 54.
4 Intentional Experience
Intentional experience is the relationship between the real content the appearances of the object intended and the ideal content memory, image, and
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