National laws and policies

181 Table 6.3: Targeted households for conditional cash transfer programme PKH, 2010–2018 Year 2007 2011 2015 2009 2013 2017 2008 2012 2016 2010 2014 2018 Source:฀Ministry฀of฀Social฀Affairs,฀Program฀Keluarga฀Harapan฀PKH,฀www.pkh.depsos.go.id,฀accessed15฀December฀2010 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Total Budget IDR trillion 392,000 392,000 1 392,000 224,000 120,000 736,000 1.1 392,000 224,000 120,000 90,000 500,000 1,326,000 2 392,000 224,000 616,000 1.1 392,000 224,000 120,000 90,000 826,000 1.3 392,000 224,000 120,000 90,000 500,000 500,000 1,826,000 2.79 Exit 224,000 120,000 90,000 500,000 500,000 600,000 2,034,000 3.17 Exit Exit Exit 90,000 500,000 500,000 600,000 1,690,000 2.68 Exit Exit Exit Exit Exit 500,000 600,000 1,100,000 1.74 Exit Exit 120,000 90,000 500,000 500,000 600,000 1,810,000 2.82 Exit Exit Exit Exit 500,000 500,000 600,000 1,600,000 2.53 Exit Exit Exit Exit Exit Exit 600,000 600,000 0.95 described in section 6.2.3, compared to the total number of very poor households or RTSM, only a small percentage have benefited from the PKH programme. However, the program cover rate has increased over time Table 6.4. The number of households receiving assistance from these programmes does not automatically indicate the intended scope of the programme for poor households due to inaccuracies in Table 6.4: Number of poor households and number of target and recipient households for Rice for Poor Households Raskin, unconditional and conditional cash transfers BLT and PKH, 2005–2010 2005 2006 2007 2009 2010 2008 Source:฀BAPPENAS,฀2010;฀BULOG,฀2007–2010;฀BPS฀–฀Statistics฀Indonesia,฀2010 Notes฀:฀•฀Figures฀in฀฀percentage฀of฀poor฀households;฀in฀฀percentage฀of฀very฀poor฀households฀RTSM฀ ฀ •฀Cell฀shaded฀=฀programme฀not฀yet฀฀not฀implemented ฀ •฀The฀irst฀BLT฀lasted฀12฀months฀20052006;฀for฀the฀irst฀phase฀2005฀data฀from฀PSE฀Social฀Economic฀Registration฀2005฀฀฀ ฀฀฀฀฀฀฀฀ ฀฀฀were฀used,฀while฀for฀the฀next฀phase฀2006฀the฀update฀was฀based฀on฀data฀for฀poor฀households฀in฀2006฀and฀2007 ฀ includes฀very฀poor,฀poor฀and฀near฀poor Target Recipient Target Recipient Target Recipient Raskin PKH BLT Poor households 8,300,000 52.56 11,109,274 70.35 15,503,295 100.00 na 15,791,884 15,800,000 82.72 16,736,411 87.62 392,000 2.05 10.07 388,000 2.03 9.96 19,100,905 18,497,302 100.00 na 726,000 3.98 na 720,000 3.89 na 18,832,053 101.81 18,497,302 100.00 18,497,302 10,830,000 69.86 13,882,731 89.55 19,100,905 100.00 na 15,503,295 19,100,000 100.00 19,131,185 100.16 626,000 3.22 15.82 700,000 3.66 17.97 19,020,763 99.58 18,768,777 98.26 19,100,905 17,484,007 100.00 na 816,000 4.72 27.60 816,000 4.67 27.27 17,484,009 targeting. Of the three programmes, the Raskin programme was the one that received the most criticism for mis-targeting beneficiaries. Several studies, by the SMERU Research Institute and others, have shown that the Raskin programme mis-targeted beneficiaries because targets tended to be spread evenly among households at all levels of wealth. This can be seen by analyzing Raskin recipients based on SUSENAS data allowing for categorization of households 182 by their expenditure quintile see Table 6.5. As shown, the number of Raskin programme recipients in quintiles 1 and 2 – the groups with the lowest welfare level – accounted for only about 53 per cent of all Raskin recipients in 2002 and 58 per cent in 2009, while more than 11 per cent of the richest quintile 5 households also received Raskin in 2002, declining to 5 per cent in 2009. While the mis-targeting has apparently persisted over the eight years as documented in Table 6.5, nevertheless, it appears that there has been some improvement as the percentage of recipients who were from quintiles1 and 2 tended to increase, while the percentage of recipients from quintiles 4 and 5 tended to decrease, especially after 2006. The findings of the qualitative study in North Jakarta indicate that Raskin Rice for Poor Households, sold at a low subsidized price is channeled by the heads of the local neighbourhood associations known as RT and RW to all local households who are interested in buying it. Due to the limited rations of rice compared to the number of potential buyers, these local leaders are responsible for fair distribution of the rice among households every two months. Each household can buy 5–15 kilograms of rice at a price of IDR2,000−2,400 per kilogram. As documented by the qualitative study in East Sumba, Raskin was distributed every two months and the rice could be delivered to all households except those of civil servants. Every household received 12 kilograms of rice at IDR1,600 per kilogram and was also required to cover the delivery cost of IDR800. Q1 – poorest Q 2 Q 3 Q 4 Q 5 – richest Total 29.11 23.66 19.63 16.37 11.22 100.00 29.04 23.48 19.83 16.36 11.29 100.00 28.47 23.37 20.03 16.60 11.53 100.00 30.62 27.20 22.03 14.80 5.36 100.00 28.19 23.38 19.88 16.74 11.81 100.00 31.92 27.66 21.89 13.79 4.74 100.00 29.19 24.01 19.84 16.06 10.90 100.00 30.89 27.24 21.89 14.89 5.09 100.00 Table 6.5: Distribution of Rice for Poor Households Raskin recipients by household wealth quintile, 2002–2009 Quintile 2002 2006 2004 2008 2003 2007 2005 2009 Source:฀2002–2009฀SUSENAS Meanwhile, some research results show that targeting of beneficiaries for the BLT and PKH cash transfer programmes was better than that of the Raskin programme. Both programmes use more specific methods of selecting target households. Target households cannot be replaced by others because each household is listed in data at the central level and when the funds are distributed via the post office they can only be collected by thespecified households. However, based on several studies there were still some instances of mis-targeting. For example, there were reports of some households that were categorized as more wealthy but received BLT and other households who did not qualify for PKH but still received the cash. However, the most prominent issue for both of these programmes was under-coverage. There were many poor households, with similar socio-economic conditions to transfer recipients, but which did not receive either BLT or PKH payments. Based on SUSENAS data on wealth quintiles, the target accuracy of BLT 20052006 tended to be better than the Raskin programme, although this assistance was also received by households in all wealth quintiles. The BLT programme recipients from the lowest welfare group quintiles 1 and 2 accounted for 65.82 per cent of all BLT recipients, while households in the highest welfare groups quintiles 4 and 5 made up 13.86 per cent of beneficiaries Table 6.6. On comparison with the results of several studies, these differences appear to be the result of data limitations. The SUSENAS data, which is intended to represent 183 Table 6.6: Distribution of recipients of unconditional cash transfers BLT 20052006 based on 2007 data on household wealth quintile Quintile 2007 Source:฀SUSENAS฀2007 government or non-government institutions, and 26.66 per cent of women aged 15 years and above were covered by health insurance see Table 6.7. The coverage of the programmes was quite good from the perspective that they reached a significant proportion of older people, households with large numbers of members and high dependency ratios, women with lower educational backgrounds, female- headed households, women and households in the lower welfare quintiles, households with children working, households without adults of prime working age, and households caring for a childchildren with a disability. As discussed in Chapter 3 of this report, these programmes have helped to improve children’s well-being but there is still room for improvement, particularly in some aspects of implementation. However, the proportion of children covered by the three major government programmes – health insurance for the poor, rice for the poor, and scholarships – have been declining from 2003 to 2009. The decline in the coverage of children under the health insurance for the poor Jamkesmas and rice for the poor Raskin programmes which target households rather than individuals could be due to the decreasing quota of beneficiaries corresponding to the declining national levels of poverty. Meanwhile the proportion of children receiving assistance from the scholarship programme declined significantly because in 2005 the central government replaced the scholarship programme for primary and junior secondary students with BOS, a general subsidy provided to schools rather than to students see also Chapter 4. The Raskin, PKH, and BLT programmes are income support programmes targeted at poor households. Through the Raskin programme, recipient households who received a full 15 kilogram ration of rice per month at IDR1,600 per kilogram while the market price of rice was IDR6,000 per kilogram are thus saving IDR66,000 per month. In reality, some recipient households only receive 5 kilograms because the Raskin rice was shared equally to all households in the villageprecinct, rather than reserved for the targeted households as intended, and also the sale price is actually IDR2,000 per kilogram Indonesia as a whole, covered all provinces and districts but only sampled a total of 64,800 households in 2009. On the other hand, other more in-depth research efforts only covered a limited number of areas. In North Jakarta, as documented by the qualitative study conducted for this report, the BLT unconditional cash transfers were only enjoyed by households who had identification cards KTP and family cards KK identifying them as residents of Jakarta. Many households were thus ineligible, despite socio-economic conditions that met the requirements. Meanwhile in East Sumba, BLT was received by more than 70 per cent of households in both village studies. Just like the BLT programme, the PKH programme recipients in North Jakarta were also required to have KTP and KK showing official residence status in Jakarta. The study respondents felt that the number of PKH recipient households was very limited because the programme only accepted RTSM very poor households that met the requirements of the programme. The PKH programme was not implemented in East Sumba as this district had not been selected for the pilot programme.

6.3 Benefits of social protection programmes for households and

children In 2009, more than half 58.23 per cent of households throughout Indonesia received some form of social assistance from either Q1 – poorest Q 2 Q 3 Q 4 Q 5 – richest Total 37.79 28.03 19.51 10.09 3.77 100.00 184 due to additional transportation costs from distribution points, in which case they are saving just IDR20,000 per month off the market price. Through the BLT and PKH programmes, targeted households received additional income directly, consisting of IDR100,000 per month from the BLT programme and IDR600,000–IDR2,200,000 per year from the PKH programme. Individual dimension Household dimension Sex and Age Age group 1 0–14 Age group 2 15–24 Age group 3 25–44 Age group 4 45–64 Age group 5 65+ Male 60.04 55.34 55.42 60.03 68.72 Female 60.26 58 55.53 57.14 64.68 Household Size Less than 3 3–4 members 5–6 members 7+ Women’s Education None Primary Secondary+ Gender of the Head of the Household Male Female Wealth Index Quintiles Q1 poorest Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 richest Work not mutually exclusive categories Both parents working None of the parents working No adult in primary working age 18–54 At least one child under 15 working Illness and Disability in the Household Childchildren with disability High dependency ratio 4+ children per adult Elder 70+ person in household Residence Urban Rural Total incidence 58.23 Table 6.7: Coverage by any form of social protection programme by household characteristics, 2009 Indonesia of Households covered by any form of social protection social insurance andor cash transfers, in-kind transfers from public authorities, employers or charities Source:฀Estimated฀using฀data฀from฀the฀2009฀SUSENAS 58.2 57.66 57.99 61 79.07 70.45 36.54 57.46 65.37 87.25 76.81 64.19 44.41 18.49 60.3 45.13 70.11 66.74 69.36 62.9 66.22 43.06 72.43 If the recipient households were targeted correctly, the three programmes should be received by the same groups of households. Households with the lowest welfare levels or very poor households who meet the requirements of the PKH programme will receive assistance from the PKH, BLT and Raskin