National laws and policies
181
Table 6.3: Targeted households for conditional cash transfer programme PKH, 2010–2018
Year 2007
2011 2015
2009 2013
2017 2008
2012 2016
2010 2014
2018
Source:MinistryofSocialAffairs,ProgramKeluargaHarapanPKH,www.pkh.depsos.go.id,accessed15December2010 1
2 3
4 5
6 7
Total Budget
IDR trillion
392,000
392,000 1
392,000 224,000
120,000
736,000 1.1
392,000 224,000
120,000 90,000
500,000 1,326,000
2 392,000
224,000
616,000 1.1
392,000 224,000
120,000 90,000
826,000 1.3
392,000 224,000
120,000 90,000
500,000 500,000
1,826,000 2.79
Exit 224,000
120,000 90,000
500,000 500,000
600,000 2,034,000
3.17 Exit
Exit Exit
90,000 500,000
500,000 600,000
1,690,000 2.68
Exit Exit
Exit Exit
Exit 500,000
600,000 1,100,000
1.74 Exit
Exit 120,000
90,000 500,000
500,000 600,000
1,810,000 2.82
Exit Exit
Exit Exit
500,000 500,000
600,000 1,600,000
2.53 Exit
Exit Exit
Exit Exit
Exit 600,000
600,000 0.95
described in section 6.2.3, compared to the total number of very poor households or RTSM, only
a small percentage have benefited from the PKH programme. However, the program cover rate
has increased over time Table 6.4.
The number of households receiving assistance from these programmes does not automatically
indicate the intended scope of the programme for poor households due to inaccuracies in
Table 6.4: Number of poor households and number of target and recipient households for Rice for Poor Households Raskin, unconditional and conditional cash transfers BLT and PKH, 2005–2010
2005 2006
2007 2009
2010 2008
Source:BAPPENAS,2010;BULOG,2007–2010;BPS–StatisticsIndonesia,2010 Notes:•Figuresinpercentageofpoorhouseholds;inpercentageofverypoorhouseholdsRTSM
•Cellshaded=programmenotyetnotimplemented
•TheirstBLTlasted12months20052006;fortheirstphase2005datafromPSESocialEconomicRegistration2005
wereused,whileforthenextphase2006theupdatewasbasedondataforpoorhouseholdsin2006and2007
includesverypoor,poorandnearpoor Target
Recipient Target
Recipient Target
Recipient Raskin
PKH
BLT
Poor households
8,300,000 52.56
11,109,274 70.35
15,503,295 100.00
na
15,791,884 15,800,000
82.72 16,736,411
87.62 392,000
2.05 10.07
388,000 2.03
9.96
19,100,905 18,497,302
100.00 na
726,000 3.98
na 720,000
3.89 na
18,832,053 101.81
18,497,302 100.00
18,497,302 10,830,000
69.86 13,882,731
89.55
19,100,905 100.00
na
15,503,295 19,100,000
100.00 19,131,185
100.16 626,000
3.22 15.82
700,000 3.66
17.97 19,020,763
99.58 18,768,777
98.26
19,100,905 17,484,007
100.00 na
816,000 4.72
27.60 816,000
4.67 27.27
17,484,009
targeting. Of the three programmes, the Raskin programme was the one that received the most
criticism for mis-targeting beneficiaries. Several studies, by the SMERU Research Institute and
others, have shown that the Raskin programme mis-targeted beneficiaries because targets
tended to be spread evenly among households at all levels of wealth. This can be seen by
analyzing Raskin recipients based on SUSENAS data allowing for categorization of households
182 by their expenditure quintile see Table 6.5.
As shown, the number of Raskin programme recipients in quintiles 1 and 2 – the groups with
the lowest welfare level – accounted for only about 53 per cent of all Raskin recipients in 2002
and 58 per cent in 2009, while more than 11 per cent of the richest quintile 5 households also
received Raskin in 2002, declining to 5 per cent in 2009. While the mis-targeting has apparently
persisted over the eight years as documented in Table 6.5, nevertheless, it appears that there
has been some improvement as the percentage of recipients who were from quintiles1 and 2
tended to increase, while the percentage of recipients from quintiles 4 and 5 tended to
decrease, especially after 2006.
The findings of the qualitative study in North Jakarta indicate that Raskin Rice for
Poor Households, sold at a low subsidized price is channeled by the heads of the local
neighbourhood associations known as RT and RW to all local households who are interested
in buying it. Due to the limited rations of rice compared to the number of potential buyers,
these local leaders are responsible for fair distribution of the rice among households every
two months. Each household can buy 5–15 kilograms of rice at a price of IDR2,000−2,400
per kilogram. As documented by the qualitative study in East Sumba, Raskin was distributed
every two months and the rice could be delivered to all households except those of civil
servants. Every household received 12 kilograms of rice at IDR1,600 per kilogram and was also
required to cover the delivery cost of IDR800.
Q1 – poorest Q 2
Q 3 Q 4
Q 5 – richest Total
29.11 23.66
19.63 16.37
11.22 100.00
29.04 23.48
19.83 16.36
11.29 100.00
28.47 23.37
20.03 16.60
11.53 100.00
30.62 27.20
22.03 14.80
5.36 100.00
28.19 23.38
19.88 16.74
11.81 100.00
31.92 27.66
21.89 13.79
4.74 100.00
29.19 24.01
19.84 16.06
10.90 100.00
30.89 27.24
21.89 14.89
5.09 100.00
Table 6.5: Distribution of Rice for Poor Households Raskin recipients by household wealth quintile, 2002–2009
Quintile 2002
2006 2004
2008 2003
2007 2005
2009
Source:2002–2009SUSENAS
Meanwhile, some research results show that targeting of beneficiaries for the BLT and PKH
cash transfer programmes was better than that of the Raskin programme. Both programmes
use more specific methods of selecting target households. Target households cannot be
replaced by others because each household is listed in data at the central level and when the
funds are distributed via the post office they can only be collected by thespecified households.
However, based on several studies there were still some instances of mis-targeting. For
example, there were reports of some households that were categorized as more wealthy but
received BLT and other households who did not qualify for PKH but still received the cash.
However, the most prominent issue for both of these programmes was under-coverage.
There were many poor households, with similar socio-economic conditions to transfer recipients,
but which did not receive either BLT or PKH payments.
Based on SUSENAS data on wealth quintiles, the target accuracy of BLT 20052006 tended to be
better than the Raskin programme, although this assistance was also received by households in all
wealth quintiles. The BLT programme recipients from the lowest welfare group quintiles 1 and 2
accounted for 65.82 per cent of all BLT recipients, while households in the highest welfare groups
quintiles 4 and 5 made up 13.86 per cent of beneficiaries Table 6.6. On comparison with
the results of several studies, these differences appear to be the result of data limitations. The
SUSENAS data, which is intended to represent
183
Table 6.6: Distribution of recipients of unconditional cash transfers BLT 20052006 based on 2007 data on
household wealth quintile
Quintile 2007
Source:SUSENAS2007
government or non-government institutions, and 26.66 per cent of women aged 15 years and
above were covered by health insurance see Table 6.7. The coverage of the programmes
was quite good from the perspective that they reached a significant proportion of older
people, households with large numbers of members and high dependency ratios, women
with lower educational backgrounds, female- headed households, women and households
in the lower welfare quintiles, households with children working, households without adults of
prime working age, and households caring for a childchildren with a disability. As discussed in
Chapter 3 of this report, these programmes have helped to improve children’s well-being but there
is still room for improvement, particularly in some aspects of implementation.
However, the proportion of children covered by the three major government programmes
– health insurance for the poor, rice for the poor, and scholarships – have been declining
from 2003 to 2009. The decline in the coverage of children under the health insurance for
the poor Jamkesmas and rice for the poor Raskin programmes which target households
rather than individuals could be due to the decreasing quota of beneficiaries corresponding
to the declining national levels of poverty. Meanwhile the proportion of children receiving
assistance from the scholarship programme declined significantly because in 2005 the
central government replaced the scholarship programme for primary and junior secondary
students with BOS, a general subsidy provided to schools rather than to students see also
Chapter 4.
The Raskin, PKH, and BLT programmes are income support programmes targeted at poor
households. Through the Raskin programme, recipient households who received a full 15
kilogram ration of rice per month at IDR1,600 per kilogram while the market price of rice was
IDR6,000 per kilogram are thus saving IDR66,000 per month. In reality, some recipient households
only receive 5 kilograms because the Raskin rice was shared equally to all households in
the villageprecinct, rather than reserved for the targeted households as intended, and also
the sale price is actually IDR2,000 per kilogram Indonesia as a whole, covered all provinces
and districts but only sampled a total of 64,800 households in 2009. On the other hand, other
more in-depth research efforts only covered a limited number of areas.
In North Jakarta, as documented by the qualitative study conducted for this report, the
BLT unconditional cash transfers were only enjoyed by households who had identification
cards KTP and family cards KK identifying them as residents of Jakarta. Many households
were thus ineligible, despite socio-economic conditions that met the requirements. Meanwhile
in East Sumba, BLT was received by more than 70 per cent of households in both village studies.
Just like the BLT programme, the PKH programme recipients in North Jakarta were
also required to have KTP and KK showing official residence status in Jakarta. The study
respondents felt that the number of PKH recipient households was very limited because
the programme only accepted RTSM very poor households that met the requirements of
the programme. The PKH programme was not implemented in East Sumba as this district had
not been selected for the pilot programme.