Table 1 Total net benefits and losses due to threats of coral reefs
present value; 10 discount rate; 25 year time-span; in 1000 US; per km
2
Net Benefits
to Individuals Net Losses to Society
Threat ..
Total Net Benefits
Fishery Coastal
Protection Tourism
Food Security
Bio- diversity
Others Total
Net Losses
Poison Fishing
33.3 40.2
0.0
2.6 - 435.6
n.q. n.q.
n.q.
42.8 - 475.6
Blast Fishing
14.6 86.3
8.9 - 193.0 2.9 -
481.9 n.q.
n.q. n.q.
98.1 - 761.2
Coral Mining
121.0 93.6
12.0 - 260.0
2.9 - 481.9
n.q. n.q.
67.0 175.5 -
902.5
Sediment due to
logging 98.0 81.0
- 192.0 n.q.
n.q. n.q.
273.0 Overfishing 38.5
108.9 - n.q.
n.q. n.q.
n.q. 108.9
Source: Cesar 1996. n.q. means not quantifiable.
2.2 Coral Reef Ecosystem as Common-Pool Resources
Benefits and threats to coral reef ecosystems are not exceptional, but also occur to other natural resources. An institutional perspective classified goods or
resources based on two important attribute: exclusion and substractability. Using these attributes, there are four main types of goods or resources: private, public,
toll or club goods, and common-pool resources Figure 5. Ocean and its entrenched resources such as fishery and coral reefs are categorized as
common-pool resources or commons. This resource shares two characteristics. The first characteristic relates to the cost of excluding potential users from access
to the resource. Excluding potential users is impossible or highly costly. The second is substractibility or rivalry, which means that harvest or exploitation of the
resource will subtract its amount for others to do the same.
Substractibility Low High
Difficult Public goods
Common-pool resources
Exclusion Easy
Toll goods Private goods
Figure 5 A general classification of goods.
Source: Ostrom et al. 1994.
These characteristics confront the common-pool resources with two broad problems. One is “exclusion problem” that makes the resource confronted with
the problem of undersupply. Individuals tend to extract and not willing to contribute in producing or sustaining it, or termed as free riding. Another problem
is “substractibility problem”, and consequently the resource is prone to over exploitation or destruction Berkes 2006. This situation is called “tragedy of the
commons” by Hardin 1968. However, the term “commons” used by Hardin is meanwhile widely acknowledged to describe a “tragedy of open access” Stillman
1975 in Berkes 1985; Birner and Wittmer 2003. A growing analysis on commons was evolved after this influential inquiry see Berkes 1985; Ostrom 1990; Feeny
et al. 1990. The use of common-pool resource may also present negative externalities
to those who do not benefit from such use. The benefits obtained by the appropriators may not be fitting to the social cost. Coral mining for house building
can be detrimental for coral reef’s functional use as coastal protection which may result in coastal erosion. Destruction of coral reef due to illegal fishing practices
can contribute to weakening spawning aggregation for various reef fish and biota. These two problems are identified as the “commons dilemma” Ostrom 1990. It
reflects a “social dilemma” that occurs when the short-term self-interest of individuals result in sub-optimal benefits at the aggregate of social level Rudd
2001. Olson 1965 has investigated this issue that is widely known as “the Logic of collective action”.
2.3 Institutions Governing Common-Pool Resources
