The existence of conservation group is associated with the low frequency of poison fishing. The relationship between both variables is negative, with
Spearman’s correlation of 0.228 p 0.05. Figure 29 illustrates this situation. Barrang Caddi that had frequent poison fishing has had low percentage of
responses that the conservation group was active.
20 40
60 80
100
Tarupa Rajuni Kecil
Rajuni Besar Barrang Caddi
Kapoposang
Island P
e rc
e nt
a ge
of r
e s
pons e
Frequent poison fishing Conservation group exist
Figure 29 Existence of local conservation group vis-à-vis frequent poison fishing. Total N = 102.
7.5 Monitoring Individual Compliance
Local rules and collective action to enforce local rules had been initiated by fishers and to some extent, improved during the period of community facilitation
by external assistance. Rules are “guides to behavior” and can only be taken into account by resource users, if these rules are monitored or enforced and
violations are sanctioned Agrawal 1994: 274. Similarly, the success of rules established depends on: ability to monitor
fisher behavior; rates of change in resource use; the level of interaction between fishers and their families; ability to exclude outsiders; and collective support for
monitoring and enforcement Grafton 2005. Monitoring is required in order to achieve credible commitment. Only when fishers are monitored by other fishers,
they oblige to conform to the agreed local rules, and then opt not to conduct any breach of rules.
Community Monitoring
Fishers and communities in the islands largely understand that destructive fishing is illegal. However, their actions are influenced by many factors, apart
from understanding the norm. When respondents were asked if fishers normally forbid destructive fishing when they find this practice on the spot, majority fishers
59 percent in all studied islands stated that they never prohibited blast or poison fishing Figure 30.
Figure 30 Fishers’ monitoring on blast or poison fishing in all islands A and
each island B. Total N = 102. Alongside formal monitoring patrols that enforced by various formal
government institutions as well as informal monitoring by fishers, the island community members were also formed monitoring system to uphold conservation
norms. They were driven by external assistance Table 55.
Table 55 Fishers’ monitoring driven by external assistance Rajuni and Tarupa Islands
Barrang Caddi Island
Kapoposang Island
Monitors Local leaders
Reef watchers Local leaders
Park ranger assistants
Monitoring intervention
period LP3M
1993 Coremap
2002-2004 PSTK UNHAS
2004 KSDA
Since 2001 Monitoring goal Blast and
poison fishing Blast and
poison fishing, community
sanctuary Community
sanctuary Blast and poison
fishing
In Rajuni and Tarupa, establishment of local monitors on ecologically- friendly resource use had been driven by external assistance. In 1993, a local
NGO named LP3M promoted the formation of conservation group whose assignments were among others to monitor the blast and poison fishing. The
B
20 40
60 80
Tarupa Rajuni Kecil
Rajuni Besar Barrang
Caddi Kapoposang
Island P
e rc
e n
ta ge
of r
e s
po ns
e
Frequent Rare
Never
A
Never 59
Rare 22
Frequent 19
monitors consisted of local leaders as well as former blast fishers. However, their actions were depended upon the presence of field facilitators.
Similarly, during Coremap project, in each island of Rajuni and Tarupa, a couple of reef watchers were appointed and received monthly remuneration from
Coremap to monitor fishing activities adjacent to island. Reef watchers were equipped with supporting facilities such as boat, camera, communication device
and operational cost. Monitoring was depended upon the operational support that financed from Coremap, and effective in between 2002-2004.
In Barrang Caddi, local monitors were formed during the facilitation of community sanctuary that assisted by UNHAS in 2003-2005. The local monitors
consisted of local leaders. No specific monitoring equipment was provided. In Kapoposang, since 2001 BKSDA have appointed two park ranger
assistants to monitor fishing activities around Kapoposang TMP. It is intended to complement the monitoring activities that supposed to enforce by park rangers.
The park ranger’s assistants were prominent leaders of the islands and received remuneration for their assignment.
Assistant park rangers and reef watchers received incentives from project’s or government to implement monitoring activities. Apart from local-level
monitoring that was dependence to external funding, there are some shortcomings faced by local monitors in implementing monitoring activities. First,
their authority to monitor and prohibit other fishers was often challenged by local fishers as well as government officers LP3M 2004. Other fishers considered
local monitors as ordinary person who were in the same social status as other fishers. Moreover, government officers regarded them as having no formal or
legal powers to enforce local rules and prohibit other fishers. Secondly, local monitors had to follow formal sanctioning process and did
not have necessary authority Table 56. They did not have authority to seize law breakers, but had to report to park rangers or formal officers when saw violation.
Thus, their effectiveness was dependent upon park rangers and formal officers. This system was not fully worked, because of several reasons: park rangers or
formal officers were not always around; park rangers did not execute reports given by local monitors; or these reports were late to act upon, while violators
were already fled.
Table 56 Authority of local monitors and park rangers in Taka Bonerate MNP
and Kapoposang TMP
Monitors Authority
Reef watchers, park rangers assistants
Monitoring; reporting to park rangers; not capable of capturing violators.
Park rangers Monitoring; capture violators; bring violators to police or judiciary.
Problem of Scale in Achieving Credible Commitment
In all common-pool resource situations, including in inshore fishery where coral reef ecosystem situated, rules on resource use can only be maintained
when resource users are confident that others follow the same rule. This is termed as the problem of credible commitment. Credible commitment is important
to enforce rules, and it can be sustained when there are mutual trust and norms of reciprocity among fishers.
Norms of reciprocity and trust can be developed through long-term engagement, such as regular communication and regular gathering in a
community setting Coleman 1990; Ostrom 1990; Putnam 1993. Trust facilitates cooperation through norms of reciprocity. In a community setting, interactions are
iterative and the capacity for reciprocity and threats can often produce conditions necessary for cooperation Runge 1992; Longo 1999. This can result in the
establishment of institutions or rules. Nevertheless, local rules on prohibition of destructive fishing that have been
promoted by local fishers are no longer in effect when the external assistance is left. One reason is because credible commitment among fishers is not
established. These rules were established by resident fishers, who interact with outside fishers who do not comply with the same rules or norms. Thus, norms of
reciprocity are hard to achieve. Credible commitment and norms of reciprocity can be delivered when there is a boundary of resource, thus resource can only
be appropriated by defined members applying and convicting to the same Ostrom 1990.
However, in all studied islands resource boundaries are indistinct and outside fishers can enter the same resource that utilized by local fishers. Outside
fishers did not comply with the same norms, therefore practiced blast and poison fishing. Therefore, it is easy to see that the actions of local fishers to conserve
and to apply environmentally friendly fishing practice were pointless, and local fishers encouraged to not complying their own-devised rules.
This is the issue of scales in community-based resource management. Rules on resource use can be applied within the community members at the local
level. However, “local rules were insufficient to protect resources that were regional in scale” Berkes 2006. This situation occurred in studied communities,
where resources are regional in scale and utilized by other fishers from other regions.
Cost of Monitoring
Monitoring entails costs – such as time and resources – which only bear to fishers or community members who monitor. Likewise, it may include social cost,
such as rejection or even violent tension from the blast or poison fishers. This tension might be developed into discredit or threats against those who monitor
and forbid the practice. Consequently, local fishers such as reef watchers and many fishers prefer not to prohibit rather than worsening social cohesion
Coremap-LP3M 2002b; MCS 2003d. Sanction is required for rules compliance. This means that the monitors
need to devote time and resources, in order to follow a kind of sanctioning process. Because a formal sanctioning process must be followed, then local
monitors must report to officers – namely police, park rangers, or field officers babinsa or binmas – and may later become a witness. This entails another cost
for the monitors. The process of formal law enforcement against lawbreaker is cumbersome,
complex, and rarely reliable, because of some constraints, namely: 1 difficulty to obtain complete evidence in order to verdict offender; 2 rent-seeking behavior of
officers, who receive bribes from offenders by disregarding enforcement rules. Even though, informal sanctions were sometimes imposed. But blast and poison
fishing were regarded as breach of formal law; therefore sanctions must be enforced by formal law enforcement process.
Tolerance and Fairness
Tolerance towards blast or poison fishing is an important indicator influencing fishers’ actions. The level of tolerance is assessed for each island and
varied significantly with island Chi-Square test, p 0.001. Barrang Caddi had the highest level of tolerance compared with others. In contrast, high percentage
of no tolerance to blast or poison fishing presents in Rajuni Besar. Moreover, Kapoposang unanimously had no tolerance towards blast or poison fishers.
Figure 31 Level of tolerance towards blast or poison fishing; fairness to forbid;
and frequency to forbid blast or poison fishing. T
otal N = 102.
Furthermore, level of tolerance is positively associated with the prohibition of blast or poison fishing, with Spearman’s correlation coefficient is 0.243 and test
of significance p 0.05 two-tailed. Prohibition of blast or poison fishing was high in islands where there was no tolerance towards blast or poison fishers, such as
in Kapoposang and Rajuni Besar. Fairness is another consideration for fishers to forbid blast or poison
fishing. Majority of fishers 58 percent, see previous section did not prohibit bomb or poison fishing. They regarded the prohibition as not fair. The level of
fairness is positively associated with the prohibition of blast or poison fishing, with Spearman’s correlation coefficient is 0.279 and test of significance p 0.001
Level of tolerance
20 40
60 80
100
Tarupa Rajuni Kecil
Rajuni Besar Barrang
Caddi Kapoposang
Island P
er c
en tag
e of res
p ons
e
Tolerate In-betw een
Not tolerate
Fairness to forbid
20 40
60 80
100
Tarupa Rajuni Kecil Rajuni Besar
Barrang Caddi
Kapoposang Island
P er
c entage of
r e
s pons
e
Not fair In-betw een
Fair
Forbid blast or poison fishing
20 40
60 80
100
Tarupa Rajuni Kecil
Rajuni Besar Barrang Caddi
Kapoposang
Island P
er c
entage of res
pon s
e
Never Rare
Frequent Tolerate
16
In- between
24
Not tolerate
60
Not fair 58
In- between
11 Fair
31
Never 59
Rare 22
Frequent
19
two-tailed. Rajuni Besar had highest level of fairness to forbid, compared with others. It also had highest level to forbid blast or poison fishing. Similarly,
Kapoposang had high level to forbid, even though it had lower level of fairness to forbid.
Figure 31 shows that fishers generally had high no tolerance towards blast or poison fishing, but they regarded to forbid such practice was not completely
fair. Finally, their actions to forbid blast or poison fishing were lower than their level of tolerance and of fairness. However, one exception was Kapoposang,
where fishers had higher level to forbid compared to its fairness. Low level of individual monitoring by fishers and actions to forbid blast or
poison fishing shows their ignorance. Ignorance came from persistent situation where fishers felt that they did not have power or authority to do so, and their
reports to officers would be useless.
Higher Order Dilemma: Local Sanctioning
Resource users are able to resolve a common-pool resources dilemma, by making coordinated strategy to craft rules on access and use. Enforcing rules
require monitoring and sanctioning the offenders. This is a higher order dilemma that needs to be resolved by fishers, in order to maintain the operational rules
Ostrom et al. 1994. Sanctioning blast or poison fishing must follow a formal legal process.
However, as presented in the previous section, the formal sanctioning process was deficient, rarely reliable and corruptible. Offenders generally must pay a sum
of money to officers to release them from the formal legal process. Such loss must be borne by fishers, while their patrons remain free from legal prosecution.
5
As consequences, fishers and fisher communities had a tendency to disagree the sanctioning process that performed by formal institution, because it burdened
fishers, and in contrast, law enforcement was not achieved while other offenders were not punished and illegal fishing was persistent Figure 32.
Local or informal sanction that performed by fisher communities or villagers were applied irregularly, as already shown in the previous section that analyze
fishers’ collective action see Table 54. These sanctions could be performed by fishers and villagers when there was support from other stakeholders apart from
them. Supports from other stakeholders had provided fisher communities an
5
Discussion with Syaiful Arif, Secretary of Bappeda District Selayar and former head of MCS in Coremap I District Selayar, September 2005.
authority assurance to enforce rules and sanction rule breakers. These stakeholders included field facilitators from NGO or university and local officers.
Similarly important was that the majority of island residents supported such collective action and sanctioning offenders.
Figure 32 Level of tolerance towards blast or poison fishing; and agree on
sanction destructive fishing. T
otal N = 101.
In short, informal sanctions in most islands were not regularly applied. There were a number of impediments. First, the authority of local fishers or
village in devising and enforcing sanctions were commonly challenged by officers or competing fishers. Formal officers normally viewed that any enforcement
should be based on formal written laws, therefore informal unwritten rules were contested.
Secondly, local leaders, such as village chief, village staff, and traditional leaders, were reluctant to impose local sanction, because they were afraid to
bring up tensions among community members and receive intimidations from the rule breakers. Moreover, they were reluctant to sanction to offenders who were
resident fishers and relatives. Thirdly, villagers had been for decades dependent to formal law
enforcement and local officers such as binsa or binmas to resolve conflicts arising in the village. Thus, village government regarded that they were
Agree on sanction
20 40
60 80
100
Tarupa Rajuni Kecil
Rajuni Besar Barrang
Caddi Kapoposang
Island P
e rc
entag e of r
e s
p ons
e
Not agree In-betw een
Agree
Level of tolerance
20 40
60 80
100
Tarupa Rajuni Kecil
Rajuni Besar Barrang
Caddi Kapoposang
Island P
e rc
entag e of r
e s
p ons
e
Tolerate In-betw een
Not tolerate Not
tolerate 60
In- between
24
Tolerate 16
Agree 55
In- between
24 Not
agree 21
powerless to sanction, coupled with low institutional capacity of village government.
Finally, laws at higher level such as district or provincial, that support or promote local-level governance, including on devising rules and imposing
sanctions, did not exist.
6
Therefore, village government did not have any written law supporting to their action.
7.6 Problem of Institution Supply: Why Local Institution Does Not Last
Longer?
The previous analysis clarifies that informal rules and individual monitoring are yet to achieve in these communities. Stable institutions governing coral reef
use were not established in these islands. The establishment of informal rule or institution is promoted by outside actors, and not sustained for a long term. They
were in place only when the external assistance was present. Therefore, it raises a question on institution supply at the community level.
In the following, this situation is clarified by the fact that factors significant in establishing institution to govern a common-pool resource, are not provided
Ostrom 1990.
Discount Rate: Fishers’ Perception on Future Resource Stock
It is important to notice how fishers perceive future resource stock, i.e. coral reefs and fish stock Ostrom 1990:34. Resource users tend to take benefits from
resources at present time, and care less for the future. When discount rate is high, users have normally less consideration on future benefit. The level of
discount rate of resource users depend on the resource characteristics utilized or accessed by fishers. In the fisher communities studied, fishing grounds are
indefinite and vast, due to the quasi open access characteristics of the resource, except on locations where fishing rights prevail. Mobile fishers can go to different
fishing grounds where the former ones are no longer rewarding. It means the discount rate is high.
Nevertheless, a different situation is shown in Kapoposang. It is located in a marine tourism park, where resource is wealthy and abundant; but resident
fishers are considering low discount rate to its surrounding marine area. It is because of the characteristics of resource users of this island, who are traditional
6
Discussion with Dr. Marjani Sultan, Head of Fishery and Marine Affairs Office, District Selayar, September 2005.
and use hand line or nets for fishing. They usually fish adjacent to the island thus are keen to protect it against outsiders, especially blast and poison fishing.
In addition, there exists uncertainty regarding the relationship between resource stock and the way resources are used. Benefits of monitoring and
prohibiting destructive fishing are unknowledgeable by most fishers, who assert that resource stocks is not affected by blast or poison fishing.
7
Fishers’ perception on the impact of external assistance on the conditions of coral reefs and fish size is an important indicator influencing fishers’ actions.
The impact of external assistance on the conditions of coral reefs and fish size were assessed for each island and varied significantly with island Chi-Square
test, p 0.001. Furthermore, the impact of external assistance on the conditions of coral
reefs and fish size were negatively associated with the frequency of poison fishing, with Spearman’s correlation coefficient is -0.251 p 0.05 two-tailed and
-0.408 p 0.001 two-tailed respectively. It shows that islands with high frequency of poison fishing such as Barrang Caddi, Rajuni Kecil and Tarupa
viewed that the condition of coral reefs were not changed subsequent to the presence of external assistance Figure 33. Correspondingly, Tarupa and
Barrang Caddi perceived that there is no change in size of fish. These islands had prevalent destructive fishing than others. Fishing patrons in Barrang Caddi
believe that poison fishing is not detriment to coral reefs or fisher’s harvest. These islands had low crisis perception of resources, which were in
contrast with Kapoposang that viewed that coral reefs condition worsened. Likewise, Kapoposang, Rajuni Kecil and Rajuni Besar perceived that the size of
fish caught have increasingly been smaller or worsened in the last five years.
7
Some poison or blast fishers or patrons had not been agreed to propositions judged by incoming researchers who asserted that blast and poison fishing were detrimental to coral
reefs. Their experiences suggested a different story. Fishing grounds blasted by bomb fishing would in some months later be productive with fishes.
Figure 33 Poison fishing; benefit to coral reef condition; benefit to size of fish.
Total N = 102.
Interests among Community-level Decision Makers
Interests among decision makers to devise rules or institutions in the community level are important, especially on rules regarding prohibiting
destructive fishing. Their interests can be assessed through types of fishing gears utilized and the extent of the vertical bonding social capital patron-client
relationship and the vertical bridging social capital of fish trading on blast or
Poison fishing
20 40
60 80
100
Tarupa Rajuni Kecil
Rajuni Besar Barrang
Caddi Kapoposang
Island P
e rc
e ntag
e of r es
po ns
e
Never Rare
Frequent
Benefit to coral reef condition
20 40
60 80
100
Tarupa Rajuni Kecil
Rajuni Besar Barrang
Caddi Kapoposang
Island P
e rc
e ntag
e of r es
po ns
e
Worse No change
Better
Benefit to size of fish
20 40
60 80
100
Tarupa Rajuni Kecil
Rajuni Besar Barrang
Caddi Kapoposang
Island P
e rc
e ntag
e of r es
po ns
e
Worst Worse
No change
poison fishing Table 57. The competing interests of distinctive networks within a fishing village are already analyzed in Chapter 6.
Fishers in Kapoposang are generally traditional and using hand line or nets for fishing. Thus, they have similar interest to devise and sustain a rule to
prohibiting destructive fishing similar findings, see Jufri 2006. Conversely, one part of fishers in Barrang Caddi and Tarupa use blast or poison fishing, while
another part does not.
8
Fishing activities are supported by patrons who provide physical and financial capital. These patrons are mostly leaders in the community
and affect a decision-making process. Therefore, an establishment of institution of prohibiting blast and poison fishing in these islands faces immense constraint.
On the other hand, the number of fishers using blast or poison fishing in Rajuni Besar is minimal. Thus, conservation rules were quite strongly maintained during
the period of external assistance.
Table 57 Characteristics of resource use
Characteristics Tarupa Rajuni
Kecil Rajuni
Besar Barrang
Caddi Kapoposang
Fishing gears Most use
blast or poison
fishing, some hand
line and nets
Some use
poison fishing
Largely hand line
and nets, some
poison fishing
Half poison fishing, half
hand line Majority hand
line and nets
Vertical bonding social capital
Medium Low
Low High
Medium Bridging social
capital of fish trading on blast
or poison fishing
Yes Yes Yes
but limited
Yes No
Leadership had also been important in building and maintaining rules and institutions. It is argued that “leadership is important in governance network, i.e.
building trust, managing conflict, linking actors, initiating partnership among actor groups” Folke et al. 2005. Similarly, participants with substantial leadership are
important to promote institution for long-endure self-governance of common-pool resources Ostrom 1990.
8
It is based on discussion with Syaiful Arif, Secretary of Bappeda District Selayar and former head of MCS in Coremap I District Selayar, September 2005, who said that,
“fishers in Taka Bonerate MNP had already been diverged into two competing interests. Some percentage of fishers preferred to use blast or poison fishing, whereas another part
of fishers opposed. Thus, a fishers-based surveillance was difficult to achieve.”
The empirical study shows that local leaders in Rajuni Besar and Kapoposang had been involved and strongly supported conservation efforts.
Likewise, there were no patrons in Kapoposang who promote blast or poison fishing.
Nevertheless, due to their economic prominence at the local level, fishing patrons were positioned as leaders by villagers and fishers. Some of them
directly influenced the fishing gears to use by fishers. In Tarupa and Barrang Caddi fishing patrons had supported blast and poison practice, even though there
were other local leaders who supported conservation norm and prohibited blast and poison fishers. These dissimilar interests had been constraining the
establishment of sustained informal institution.
Policy Impediments
Apart from low institutional capability of local fishers and village government in governing coral reefs resource use as analyzed above, the national and
regional policy on fishery had been not supportive to local level collective action, especially related with collective-choice level and constitutional level.
Fishers’ rules have been acknowledged at the operational level, even though its implementation repeatedly faced challenges. Nevertheless, the
collective-choice level that specifying who may participate in changing operational rules and the level of agreement required for their change Schlager
and Ostrom 1992: 250 is unclear. The external assistance in fishing villages had improved fishers capability
to devise rules, which is considered as actions at the collective-choice level. However, there were mixed responses by government officers regarding fishers’
authority to devise and enforce local rules. Field facilitators and some government officers might support this effort, but it was not rare that government
officers and law enforcers might reject or question fishers’ authority. The collective-choice level of action is decided on the constitutional level in the form
of written rules and law that issued by government. The operational level of action that commonly implemented by local fishers
is not adequate to resolve dilemmas associated with coral reef resource use. Fishing grounds where coral reefs are situated are accessed and utilized by
outside fishers. Thus, these resources are regional in nature. In contrast, rules that devised and enforced by resident fishers are at local level. Therefore, any
efforts by local fishers to comply with their own-devised rules were often futile, as
outside fishers do fishing practices that were defiant to local rules. This is an issue of scale that commonly countered by a community-based management
Berkes 2006. Another impediment to fishers’ collective action is corruption and rent
seeking behavior of officers that work at the local level and have interactions with fishers. This is the limitation of external enforcers that entail high enforcement
costs. In the situation of limited government finance to facilitate monitoring activities, thus this policy tends to opening the opportunity of moral hazard to
enforcers as well as resource users Nugroho 2003: 109. The differing actions and prescriptions by officers who interact with local fishers and leaders had often
been confusing to fishers and impeded their collective action on coral reef resource use.
7.7 Social Capital, Local Rules and Destructive Fishing
