outside fishers do fishing practices that were defiant to local rules. This is an issue of scale that commonly countered by a community-based management
Berkes 2006. Another impediment to fishers’ collective action is corruption and rent
seeking behavior of officers that work at the local level and have interactions with fishers. This is the limitation of external enforcers that entail high enforcement
costs. In the situation of limited government finance to facilitate monitoring activities, thus this policy tends to opening the opportunity of moral hazard to
enforcers as well as resource users Nugroho 2003: 109. The differing actions and prescriptions by officers who interact with local fishers and leaders had often
been confusing to fishers and impeded their collective action on coral reef resource use.
7.7 Social Capital, Local Rules and Destructive Fishing
The relationships between various variables related with social capital, local rules and destructive fishing are explained by quantitative statistical analysis and
institutional analysis, in the following.
Analysis of Logistic Regression
A quantitative analysis with logistic regression can assist in formulating a model for resource use, especially destructive fishing. The indicators of social
capital are entered as independent variables, while index of bomb and poison fishing are dependent variables. The statistical test of the model is assessed
using Nagelkerke R Square and Hosmer-Lemeshow goodness-of-fit statistic that have p-value 0.05.
Various combinations of independent and dependent variables were tested, and finally, a couple of models were produced. First was for data collected in
2004, and second for 2005. First, using data collected in 2004, a model of destructive fishing df is
explained by the network of source of capital capnet and fisher’s age age. df =
-1.74 + 1.74 capnet
- 0.64 age 8
0.050 0.000
0.000 Both variables, networks of source of capital and fisher’s age, describe 19
percent for the model. The Hosmer-Lemeshow goodness-of-fit generates test of significance p 0.05. This model explains that destructive fishing is associated
with vertical bonding social capital or bridging social capital in fishing trading and
financing, as analyzed in Chapter 6. Moreover, it explains that the practice is associated with younger age of fishers, which conforms the actual reality in the
field. Secondly, using data collected in 2005, fishing using bomb bomb can be
explained by three variables, namely level of community trust trust, level of fairness in prohibiting destructive fishing fair, and level of tolerance toward
destructive fishing toler. bomb =
5.19 - 2.26 trust
+ 2.10 fair - 2.03 toler 9 0.059
0.006 0.006 0.026 These three independent variables describe 44.2 percent for the model.
The Hosmer-Lemeshow goodness-of-fit generates test of significance p 0.05. This model shows that bomb fishing is explained by low level of community trust.
In contrast, bomb fishing is explained by low level of tolerance towards destructive fishing. Level of fairness to forbid blast or poison fishing is positively
associated with bomb fishing. This means that even though fishers perceived that it was fair to forbid blast fishing and not tolerated destructive fishing, however, it
has no or little impact on the frequency of bomb fishing. Rules enforcement, either by formal or informal ones, has more influence on the way resource is
used.
Formal Rules, Local Rules and Destructive Fishing
This chapter focuses on the institutional analysis of local rules addressing coral reef management. Subsequent to external assistance, community capacity
and social networks of bonding, bridging and linking social capital in relation to resource use and coral reef management have been advanced. However, local
rules on prohibition of destructive fishing that had been promoted by local fishers are no longer in effect when the external assistance left. The impact of decreased
local enforcement rules could be seen from the increase of bomb and poison fishing that occurred in Tarupa and Rajuni Kecil between 2004 and 2005.
Likewise, Rajuni Besar in 2004 had no bomb and poison fishing, but proliferated in 2005 Table 58.
Table 58 Resource use and institutions governing resource use
Tarupa Rajuni Kecil
Rajuni Besar Barrang Caddi
Kapoposang External assistance:
External assistance: External assistance:
External assistance: External assistance:
With
1
Without
2
With
1
Without
2
With
1
Without
2
With
1
Without
2
With
1
Without
2
Resource use
Destructive fishing
High, but restricted
High, not restricted
Low High, not
restricted Low
Emerging High, not
restricted High, not
restricted None or
low None or
low
Institutions governing
resource use
Local institution
3
Weak local rule on DF
prohibition These rules
are no longer in
effect Local rule
on DF prohibition
sanction, pledge
These rules are no
longer in effect
Local rule on DF
prohibition sanction,
pledge These rules
are no longer in
effect Prohibition
of DF in sanctuary
Rule is no longer in
effect Local rule
on DF prohibition
Local rule on DF
prohibition
Formal institutional
arrangement Marine national park
Marine national park Marine national park
Tourism national park Formal
monitoring Park rangers
Park rangers Park rangers
Water police Water police, park
rangers, park ranger assistants
Distance from formal
institution’s office
6 hours 6 hours
6 hours 1 hour
2-6 hours
Note:
1
Data year 2004.
2
Data year 2005.
3
Local institution includes local rules and sanctions. DF means destructive fishing, i.e., blast or poison fishing.
Informal sanctions in most islands were not regularly applied. Sanctions against blast or poison fishers were imposed when there are linkages with the
external assistance. Local rules were not sustained because of fisher’s low discount rate towards future stock, competing interests among community-level,
and policy supportive to the formulation and implementation of local rules. Likewise, local rules face the problem of scale in achieving credible commitment.
Rules that devised and enforced by resident fishers are at local level, whereas fishing grounds where coral reefs are situated, are regional in scale, because
they are accessed and utilized by outside fishers. Finally, the influence of formal law enforcement institutions towards
enhancing local level collective action to forbid destructive fishing and reducing the destructive fishing, had been mixed. During stringent patrols, blast or poison
fishing was suppressed. However, high management cost, lack of ability to prevent free rider, deficiency to sanction, and decreased trust to law enforcement
had shrunk the performance of this approach. The empirical findings show that where the community capacity and
institution are weak, destructive fishing are proliferated, because social norms are not sufficiently strong to prevent widespread individual opportunism. On the other
hand, the formal institutional capacity is also low, due to deficiency to sanction and high management cost of external patrols.
Chapter 8 Rules, Rule Making and Rule Breaking:
