25
Despite this declining trend, the situation that still almost half of the women marry before age 18 reflects their vulnerable position in Afghanistan.
Figure 3.6: Females aged 15 to 49, by current age group, and by age at first marriage in percentages
3.4.3 The marriage age gap
Social change is also observed in terms of the age difference between spouses. A large spousal age difference often indicates a significant power imbalance in marriage and with regard to decision making in
reproductive health, spending money and various household matters see also section 11.5 of this report. Overall, the age gap between Afghan husbands and wives is 6.1 years, but over time, this gap has become
reduced. Whereas on average for women of more than 40 years old, the age of the husband is more than 7 years higher, this age difference consistently declines with the successive younger age cohorts: around 6.4
years for women aged 30-39 and 4.6 years for those aged 15-29.
Figure 3.7
shows that the share of couples with relatively small spousal age differences less than four years has dramatically increased for each
younger ten-year age group of women from 24 percent among women aged 60 and over to 62 percent of those under 20. At the same time, the shares of couples with large 10-19 years and very large 20 years
or more age differences has similarly decreased from 36 percent in the age group 50-69 to 8 percent in the youngest category.
Deviating from this general pattern is the finding that in the oldest age group 70 and over, a relatively large share of women
– 10 percent – has younger husbands. This phenomenon can be explained by the high rate of male remarriage after widowhood and also the incidence of levirate marriage, a practice especially
prevalent in the Pashtun population, whereby a widow is required to marry a – possibly younger – relative
of her late husband.
10 20
30 40
50 60
70 80
90 100
15 16
17 18
19 20
21 22
23 24
25 P
er ce
n tag
e m
ar ried
Age at first marriage 15-19
20-24 25-29
30-34 35-39
40-44 45-49
26
Figure 3.7: Ever-married females, by current age, and by relative age of husband in percentages
3.4.4 Polygamy
Another marriage custom that creates inequality between spouses is the existence of polygamy. The International Convenant on Civil and Political Rights, which was ratified by the Government of Afghanistan
in 1983, calls on measures to abolish the practice of polygamy, as this implies discrimination against women and violates their dignity CCPR, Human Rights Committee 2000 see also section 11.2.4 in the chapter
on gender analysis. Polygamy also aggravates the imbalance in marriage, as it tends to increase the age gap between husbands and wives. The age difference between polygamous spouses is almost double that
of monogamous spouses: 11.8 against 6.1 years. The ALCS 2013-14 data suggest that 7.9 percent of married women live in a polygamous marriage. This
represents 388 thousand women, the large majority of whom live with one co-wife. The highest proportions of polygamous women are found in the age range between 30 and 70 years old
Figure 3.8
, typically around 10 percent. It is unclear to what extent the low proportions among women under 30 are the result of
a decline in the practice of polygamy or of the short duration of being at risk of entering a polygamous marriage.
1 3
4 4
3 4
10 62
56 41
33 28
24 25
29 29
34 33
33 36
37 7
10 17
23 28
28 27
1 2
5 7
8 8
1
10 20
30 40
50 60
70 80
90 100
10-19 20-29
30-39 40-49
50-59 60-69
70+ P
er ce
n tag
e
Current age of wife Younger
0-4 years older 5-9 years older
10-19 years older 20 or more years older
27
Figure 3.8: Percentage of married women in a polygamous marriage, by age
3.2 4.5
10.5 10.3
9.4 11.0
8.5 7.9
2 4
6 8
10 12
10-19 20-29
30-39 40-49
50-59 60-69
70-79 80-89
P er
ce n
tag e
Age
28
4 MIGRATION
Summary . Until the overturn of the Taliban regime the complex migration situation of Afghanistan has
been dominated by displacement flows – either within Afghanistan or across borders. The year 2002
marked the start of a ten-year period in which return from displacement was the main motive for migration: in this period 39 percent of internal migrants and even 82 percent of immigrants moved for this reason.
Overall, Kabul was the destination of half of the internal migrants almost 500 thousand people in the ten years after 2002. In international perspective, Pakistan was the country where most immigrants
– 63 percent
– came from and Kabul was by far the most important destination province, accommodating almost half the immigrant stock: 45 percent almost 600 thousand people of all immigrants since 2002.
In more recent years, the migration patterns have changed substantially. Afghanistan has turned again from a net immigration country to a net emigration country. The ALCS information suggests that in recent
years emigration is larger than immigration by more than 100 thousand persons per year. This would imply a negative annual migration rate of 0.4 percent. Return from displacement is reduced to a minor reason
for internal migration in the period 2012 to 2014 and for immigrants this reason is reduced to only 39 percent. With the returnee flows going down, labour migration becomes a leading motive for migration,
and is by far the most important reason for emigration. Kabul remains the most important destination for internal migrants, but the proportion of 25 percent moving there is only half of that going to Kabul in the
ten years before 2012. This may be related to the deteriorating employment situation in the capital. In international migration, Iran has taken over the leading position from Pakistan, both as destination country
for emigrants 61 percent and as origin country for immigrants 63 percent. The Gulf states gain a prominent place, as they generated 7 percent of immigrants into Afghanistan between 2012 and 2014, and
received 18 percent of emigrants in the last year before the survey.
Kabul and its immediately surrounding provinces form the main internal migration system in the country, with Kabul acting as a strong gravitation centre for migrants from particularly Parwan, Panshjer and
Wardak. Close to half of all migrations within Afghanistan happen in this area. In absolute numbers, Kabul has by far the largest overall net gain due to migration, adding close to 900 thousand people to its
population. Also Balkh, Herat and Nangarhar have substantial net migration gains of around 100 thousand persons each. On the other hand, Laghman and Wardak are the provinces with the largest net population
loss due to migration, losing well over 100 thousand persons each. In relative terms Kabul and Nimroz are the provinces with the largest population gain, each increasing with around one quarter due to migration.
Pansjher is the province that lost relatively most population: it would have had 28 percent more population without migration. Internal migration and immigration are strongly directed toward urban areas.
Compared to an urban proportion of 24 percent in the total population, 50 percent of the immigrants live in urban areas, 82 percent of internal life-time migrants and 67 percent of recent migrants.
The survey also indicated that for Afghans migration is more often a family event than an individual act. Family migration usually occurs when returning for displacement, but apparently families also often move
together if one or some household members seek employment elsewhere. The exception is emigration, which almost exclusively consists of adult working-age males.
The living conditions of persons and households that returned from displacement seem to be somewhat better than those of non-returnees. Literacy among returnees is significantly higher, as is the proportion
with completed secondary and tertiary education. Also labour force participation is higher among returnees, although the rate of returnee women that is gainfully employed is somewhat lower. Housing
quality and access to improved water and sanitation is also better for returnee households than for non- returnee households.
29
4.1 Introduction
