Reforming Policy and Budgetary Practices

Reforming Policy and Budgetary Practices

Except for persistent admonitions of the military by government representatives to stay politically neutral, recognize civilian supremacy and re-professionalize, few serious additional initiatives to develop a new policy framework for military reform were taken. One of them was the formation of a Military Transformation Commit- tee in 2006 which was tasked with “change[ing] the mindset, capabilities, effec- tiveness, efficiency, training education, leadership and tradition of the military

personnel.” 56 However, the committee is an initiative of the military which has proved once more that it continues to consider reform as an exclusively internal affair. Neither legislators nor scholars, and even less civil society or media representatives, were invited to contribute to the work of this committee.

It is thus hardly surprising that the National Defense Policy published by the government in 2006 was also drafted by the Ministry of Defense and Military Headquarters and passed without serious deliberation in the National Assembly. 57 Instead of establishing clear boundaries for military functions beyond defense, this policy document opened the floodgates for new military intrusions into Nigerian politics by stating: “The involvement of the military in the executive functions of government need not to be limited to membership of . . .. defense/security bodies. Therefore, the expertise available in the military shall be harnessed in those areas that both the Executive and the National Assembly consider desirable” (Federal Government of Nigeria, 2006 , p. 53).

Moreover, the legal and social protection of soldiers is especially dismal. Soldiers are retired if they do not pass promotion exams, on disciplinary grounds without being cashiered, when the armed forces decide that the services of an officer are no longer required, for medical reasons or if they have merely been bypassed in the promotion process by junior officers (Yesufu, 2005 , pp. 53, 54). But while prematurely retired senior officers usually settle in private business, lower ranking officers often end up stranded in unemployment. This is due to the fact that the lack of proper record keeping has led to gross mismanagement of the pension scheme, leaving thousands of retired military personnel without income. The National Assembly has responded to the problem, which in some cases led to violent protests of the retirees, by passing resolutions calling on the government for a quick settlement of the problem. The ombudsman functions assumed by the National Assembly obviously show how dysfunctional the military justice and welfare systems are and how weak the accountability of the military institution is even towards its own personnel.

With only 1% of the GDP, the Nigerian defense budget is absolutely inadequate for supporting the current troop strength and military reforms aiming at arms modernization and force projection (Fayemi & Olonisakin, 2008 , p. 253).

56 Tell, May 2007 Supplement, p. 18 and authors’ interview, 2 September 2008. 57 Authors’ interview, 5 March 2009.

3 Taking Stock of Military Reform in Nigeria 73

Moreover, Nigeria’s auditing laws are outdated and the Auditor-General is a political appointee of the president lacking autonomy in his judgments. President Obasanjo’s decision not to reappoint an auditor-general critical of government spending practices in February 2003 was precedent-setting in this regard (Oyewo, 2004 , p. 117). Moreover, the auditing reports are usually delayed by two or more years after the end of the respective fiscal year (Omitoogun & Hutchful, 2006 , p. 162–168), while military spending from extra-budgetary sources and secret funds is not included in the auditing reports. This issue is very critical given the fact that

only 30–50% of the approved budget is actually implemented. 58 One can imagine why very little government funding reaches the grassroots level and why complaints about the poor state of military barracks and living conditions of ordinary soldiers outside the big cities persist (Fayemi, 2002a , p. 115; Omitoogun,

2003 , p. 86). 59 While the Nigerian military has few formal business interests, retired military officers are entrenched in many business sectors and illicit income generation through oil bunkering and other forms of racketeering constitute a major

problem 60 (see also the contribution of Christian Lutz in this volume). Whereas the reform and transfer of formal military business to the government is not a sensitive issue in the reform agenda in Nigeria, the black hole of the military’s criminal economy is severe and removed from any civilian control.

Procurement is still very much a military affair. Purchases of military hardware are largely controlled by the service chiefs and to a lesser extent by the Chief of Defense Staff and the Defense Ministry. The changes in procurement under the democratic regime are thus merely procedural. Until publication of a National Defense Policy in 2006, the legislature, media, scholars and the public virtually lacked criteria to evaluate the envisioned purchases (Omitoogun, 2006 ; Yoroms, 2005 ). In the Obasanjo era, military equipment (especially for peacekeeping missions) was often financed with the support of the presidency via an executive order from extra- budgetary sources (Omitoogun, 2006 , pp. 86, 258).

In 2001, the Federal Government issued New Policy Guidelines for procurement and award of contracts within Government Ministries/Parastatals (Circular F. 15775/2001) that formally introduced a due process mechanism 61 (Budget Moni- toring and Price Intelligence Unit/BMPIU) in an attempt to curtail rampant pro- curement corruption. Yet the result of this precautionary measure not only prolonged the purchase of any equipment including military hardware, but by shifting opportunities for side payments to those certifying “due process,” it also

58 Authors’ interviews, 10 March 2009 and The Punch, 27 December 2004, p. 20. 59 For the recurring theme of dilapidated barracks, see Tell, 14 May 2001, p. 29 and 21 January

2002, pp. 28–31; Newswatch, 10 June 2002, pp. 48–56; This Day, 3 June 2006; Nigerian Tribune, 20 August 2008, p. 30; Defence Newsletter, June–September 2000, p. 50–51. 60 Author interview, 29 August 2008; Tell, 21 April 2008. See also Okonta ( 2005 , p. 204).

61 For a description of the due process mechanism, see Yoroms ( 2005 , p. 187) and Omitoogun and Oduntan ( 2006 , pp. 164, 177).

74 M.-G. Manea and J. R€uland created a new layer of corruption (Yoroms, 2005 , p. 198). It also did little to restrain

the brokers, who often happen to be persons with a military background. 62