Military Engagement in the Niger Delta

As shown above, the security situation worsened in the Niger Delta through increasing militancy. The central question of this chapter is how this trend affected the military. This section thus examines the involvement of the military in domestic security enforcement and shows that the armed forces play a significant role in Niger Delta affairs due to escalated security threats. Especially since the emergence of MEND, all branches of the military have been deployed in the Niger Delta and entrenched their position by a differentiation and specialization of their engagement. Before examining the actual involvement in domestic security affairs, we must take a look at the role of the military mandated by the constitution, as this lays the groundwork for the legal use of the military.

The role of the Nigerian Army is described in Section 217 of the 1999 constitution. It shall:

(a) Defend[. . .] Nigeria from external aggression; (b) Maintain[. . .] its territorial integrity and secure[. . .] its borders from violation

on land, sea, or air; (c) Suppress[. . .] insurrection and act[. . .] in aid of civil authorities to restore order

when called upon to do so by the President, but subject to such conditions as may be prescribed by an Act of the National Assembly

(d) Perform[. . .] such other functions as may be prescribed by an Act of the National Assembly. 21

While subsection (a) and (b) describe the traditional role of the military as the state’s institution to defend the country against external threats, section (c) contains the groundwork for the domestic use of the military in the Niger Delta. In respect to military reform, the ideal situation would be a military only used against external threats, while the police enforce internal security. However, confronting a major internal security threat may make it necessary to entrust the military with domestic security tasks, but the competences and assignments for the military should be clearly defined (Organization for Economic Cooperation & Development, 2007 , p. 124). As the Nigerian constitution generally permits the use of military force against insurgencies, I will now turn to the question as to how the Niger Delta rebellion involved the military in domestic security matters.

At the beginning of the period under study, the government employed the paramilitary Mobile Police (MPOL) to suppress early resistance in the Niger Delta. When the Shell Petroleum Development Company (SPDC) became the target of the first major incidence of violence in October 1990, the oil company called for the MPOL. The latter dissolved the protest and raided the town of Umuechem (River State) from where most of the Youth protesters came. During the operation, 80 villagers died and almost 500 houses were destroyed (Human Rights Watch, 1999 , p. 112).

210 C.A. Lutz

In response to the growing tensions with the Ogoni, Shell decided in 1993 to withdraw oil operations from Ogoni land and published a report, stating a financial loss of 200 million US$ and calling for immediate action (International Crisis Group, 2008 , p. 3). With the withdrawal from oil operations in the Ogoniland, the military was brought in to enforce internal security. Three months after publicizing the economic costs of the Ogoni crisis, the police chief of River State called for “the Nigerian Army, the Nigerian Air Force, the Nigerian Navy and the Nigerian Police [. . .] [to] restore and maintain law and order in Ogoni land” (cited in International Crisis Group, 2008 , p. 3). The later commander of the Internal Security Task Force (ISTF), Major Paul Okuntimo, wrote an internal memo to the River State government, concluding that “Shell operations [are] still impossible unless ruthless military operations are undertaken for smooth economic activities to commence” and recommended “wasting operations coupled with psychological tactics of displace- ment/wasting” (Unrepresented Nations & Peoples Organization, 1995 , p. 17).

From May 1994 onward, the newly created ISTF launched a large-scale offensive and raided Ogoni villages systematically. The ISTF was essentially composed of army soldiers and it replaced and absorbed the paramilitary Mobile Police (MPOL). In the first days 18 villages were attacked, looted and pillaged. Several residents lost their lives, women were raped and hundreds of Ogoni Youths were detained and tortured (Unrepresented Nations & Peoples Organization, 1995 , p. 25 f.). The ISTF was withdrawn to the barracks in September 1998 and military camps within Ogoniland were disbanded (Human Rights Watch, 1999 , p. 117). Thus it appeared as if the democratization process would bring a clear division between internal security enforcement, provided by the police, and external defence by the military as suggested by Western blueprints of security sector reform.

However, with the escalation of violence between the NDPVF and the NDV after the 2003 elections, the situation changed because of the heightened security threat. The Police were not able to fight the well equipped rebels effectively and could not assure the security of the local population (Human Rights Watch, 2005 , p. 17). In May 2004, River State Governor Odili launched an offensive against Asari, using police and military personnel. But the NDPVF defended itself so effectively that they took the fight to the River State capital Port Hartcourt, sending alarming signals to the oil industry (Statfor, 2009 , p. 2). This forced Odili to call for military support from Abuja. In September 2004, President Gen. Obasanjo mobilized the Joint Task Force (JTF), also known as Operation Restore Hope, to fight the NDPVF. The JTF is, similar to the former ISTF, an amalgam of the Armed Forces, the police and the State Security Service. It was set up as a reaction to the

growing unrest in the delta in 2003 and 2004. 22 The force undertook air strikes against several villages, which were presumed to be rebel camps (Human Rights Watch, 2005 , p. 19). After the ceasefire between the two vigilante groups, the JTF was not disbanded, but as a result of the formation of MEND instead increased its engagement in the Niger Delta.

22 This Day, 24 December 2010, http://www.thisdaylive.com/articles/understanding-the-joint-

10 The Niger Delta Conflict and Military Reform in Nigeria 211

As previously mentioned, MEND intensified attacks on oil installations, and it destroyed pipelines instead of simply manipulating them. Guarding oil installations and ensuring oil operations thus became a major justification for the JTF in the

Niger Delta. 23 This is expressed literally in the reorganization of the Task Force in January 2012, when its codename was changed from Operation “Restore Hope” to

“Pulo Shield”, “pulo” being an Ijaw word for oil. 24 While protecting oil installations, soldiers clashed regularly with militants. Furthermore the JTF also

carried out attacks against militants’ camps and on illegal oil refineries, destroying over 600 of the latter in 2009 and about 500 refineries in a single operation in March

2011. 25 In summer 2009, the Niger Delta Conflict reached its climax and escalated in a dramatic civil war-like situation. Large-scale military attacks on rebel camps in Delta State started on 13 May 2009, and led to a sealing of the area. The military used gunboats, helicopter gun ships and deployed 3,000 ground troops. 26 Thousands of residents fled because of the clashes between the military and the

rebels. 27 In the following weeks, troops successively attacked villages in River and Delta States till the end of June 2009. Reports on the fighting differed widely, as the region was completely sealed off for observers. While the military announced that there were no civilian casualties, a spokesman of the Ijaw National Congress reported thousands of deaths. 28

A prominent justification for the raid in 2009 was the attempt to free hostages held by militants, but even before this the military was strongly involved in chasing kidnappers. At the height of the kidnapping wave in August 2006, Obasanjo instructed the security forces to answer “force with force” and ordered a crackdown

on hostage takers. 29 Only a few days later, soldiers burned down a village in order to take revenge for the death of one of their men. After the abduction of 15 children in Aba, Abia, President Goodluck Jonathan deployed the JTF to the city in order to track down the kidnapping gangs in October 2010. The fighting resulted in an official death toll of 172 alleged kidnappers and over 200 arrests. The following

23 ibid. 24 This Day, 12 January 2012, http://www.thisdaylive.com/articles/jtf-in-niger-delta-restructured/

106882/ , accessed 10 February 2012. 25 The Punch, 16 December 2009, http://www.legaloil.com/NewsItem.asp?DocumentIDX¼

1262255331&Category¼news , accessed 19 February 2011; Agence France Press, 7 March 2011,

http://www.legaloil.com/NewsItem.asp?DocumentIDX¼1299577453&Category¼news , accessed 10 February 2012. 26 The Punch, 16 May 2009, http://www.legaloil.com/NewsItem.asp?DocumentIDX¼

1242461086&Category¼news , accessed 19 February 2011. 27 BBC News, 19 May 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/8062315.stm , accessed 19 February

2011. 28 Stakeholder Democracy Network, Newswire May 2009, pp. 1 f.; BBC News, 18 May 2009,

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/8054585.stm , accessed 19 February 2011. 29 Integrated Regional Information Networks (INRI), 16 August 2006, http://www.irinnews.org/

report.aspx?reportid¼60373 , accessed 19 February 2011 .

212 C.A. Lutz

weeks the JTF was further prosecuting kidnappers in the Delta, raising the number of arrests to 450. 30

The Navy has also been involved in the Niger Delta conflict due to the geo- graphical conditions in the delta, which is mainly covered by swamps and creeks. The Navy’s vanguard position in securing Nigeria’s waters is challenged by the Maritime Security Agency Bill which, despite strong opposition, passed second

reading of the Senate in December 2011. 31 The bill proposes that the new agency should “provide clear direction and leadership in the establishment of a platform for

national maritime security [. . .]” 32 and would thus overlap with the Navy’s responsibilities. But up to now, the Navy has been the most important institution

to confront MEND. With the rise of MEND the tasks for the Navy have broadened, as MEND also conducted maritime operations. In the Armed Forces Act of 1993,

the Navy is explicitly charged to fight oil bunkering. 33 Since February 2001, the Navy has been involved in operations against oil bunkering, escorting oil tankers and checking vessels for illegal cargo (Davis et al., 2006 , p. 11). With the deteriorated maritime security situation caused by MEND, especially offshore kidnappings, the Navy faced new challenges. The Navy’s adjustment strategy to the new situation focused primarily on increasing effectiveness, especially by

addressing equipment deficits (Asuni, 2009a , p. 9) 34 and forming Special Forces. Since 2005, the Navy has been equipped with additional combat vessels and surveillance helicopters (Davis et al., 2006 , p. 14). 35 In order to further improve the military’s ability to confront militants, a special unit, the Nigerian Navy Special Boat Service (NNSBS), was established. The new special force was designed on the model of the US Navy Seals and similar Special Forces. The Navy stated that the specialization within the Nigerian Navy became necessary because of the incessant

attacks on oil facilities. 36 Yet, the JTF was increasingly confronted with claims of human rights abuses and reports of extrajudicial killings. For example, the

30 Vanguard, 26 November 2010, http://www.vanguardngr.com/2010/11/jtf-arrests-450- suspected-kidnappers-in-s-east-army-chief/ , accessed 19 February 2011; Leadership, 13 October

2010, http://allafrica.com/stories/201010130500.html , accessed 19 February 2011. 31 Vanguard, 11 December 2011, http://www.vanguardngr.com/2011/12/maritime-security-

agency-bill-passes-second-reading-at-senate/ , accessed 10 February 2012. 32 Maritime Security Agency (Establishment, ect.) Bill 2011, Part II, Section 3 (a), www.nass.gov.

ng/nass/legislation.php?id¼1218 , accessed 10 February 2012. 33 Armed Forces Act, Decree No 105 of 1993, } 4,(a),i.

34 Vanguard, 24 January 2006, http://www.legaloil.com/NewsItem.asp?DocumentIDX¼ 1138919228&Category¼news , accessed 19 February 2011.

35 Vanguard, 25 January 2009, http://www.legaloil.com/NewsItem.asp?DocumentIDX¼ 1232956444&Category¼news , accessed 19 February 2011; Vanguard, 16 November 2011,

http://www.vanguardngr.com/2011/11/navy-acquires-6-gun-boats-for-n-delta-creeks/ , accessed 10 February 2012; Vanguard, 14 December 2011, http://www.vanguardngr.com/2011/12/ nns-thunder-arrives-soon/ , accessed 10 February 2012. 36 Daily Sun, 25 December 2009, http://www.sunnewsonline.com/webpages/features/featurettes/

2009/dec/25/Featurettes-25-12-2009-002.htm , accessed 19 February 2011.

10 The Niger Delta Conflict and Military Reform in Nigeria 213

Maritime Workers Union of Nigeria accused the JTF of killing 90 unarmed civilians and of destroying over 300 boats of members of the union in 2008 alone (International Crisis Group, 2009 , p. 4).

Military Engagement in the Niger Delta