Lessons Learned
Lessons Learned
The analysis of these five areas leads to a rather ambiguous assessment of demo- cratic and civilian control of the military in Indonesia and even a more negative assessment in Nigeria. Six major lessons learned can be drawn from the two case studies.
The first lesson learned is that the basic first-generation security sector reform (setting up appropriate institutions, enacting legal framework) has not been completed in Indonesia and even to a lesser extent in Nigeria. With regards to Nigeria, various crucial laws have not been enacted that would have regulated domestic military deployments, the use of the military in emergency situations, as well as the role of the military in national development. In Indonesia, first- generation SSR is more or less completed with the exception of four issues:
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off-budget funding of the military, territorial command structure of the military and military justice reform and the continued gray zone of the role of the military vis-a`-vis the police in domestic security. From these two case studies, we can learn that the completion of first-generation reform cannot be taken for granted. Years after regime change there is still unfinished business in the regulatory framework of the military. The danger of an incomplete first-generation reform is that second- generation reform cannot be fully implemented, which further protracts democratic consolidation processes.
A second lesson learned is that while the danger of a military coup is perhaps not eminent in Indonesia and Nigeria, incomplete or delayed SSR leads to numerous opportunities for the military to interfere with democratic decision-making in both formal and informal ways. In the case of Indonesia, the chief of the armed forces (like the police and state intelligence) still has a formal seat in the cabinet, which dilutes the lines of command between the chief of the staff of the armed forces and the minister of defense. Moreover, it erodes the concept of political responsibility of the minister of defense towards parliament and the president. Second, in both countries prominent retired military generals play or have played a prominent role politics after regime change. They occupy very senior political positions up to the level of head of state and the speaker of the Senate. While they are no longer in uniform, they are still inextricably part of the military’s old-boys network leading to informal communicative links between politicians and the military outside the scope of public accountability.
A third lesson that can be drawn from both countries is that civil society, the executive and parliament have not closely supervised and regulated the reform of the military. For example, the adoption of the national defense concept and the military reorganization in Nigeria have been more or less conducted without close executive oversight and certainly little to no parliamentary oversight. In Indonesia, the laws and decrees that outlined military reform were rather vague and did not establish civilian oversight of the reform processes. Greater civilian supervision would have lead to clearer objectives, conditions and timetables. Instead, as a consequence, the military is in the position to alter, delay or even halt reform processes.
A fourth lesson learned from the analysis of civilian and democratic control of the five areas above is that, while civilian executive control does exist, in most cases democratic control by parliament or civil society is either lacking or incomplete. This was particularly the case in Nigeria, where the parliament adopted hardly any laws that would have regulated the conduct, policy and supervision of the military. Equally, civil society played a minor role in military reform in Nigeria, with the state defense research and education institutions dominating the field. More so in Nigeria than in Indonesia, the military is an exclusive tool of the executive over which the parliament has little to no oversight, e.g. domestic military deployments in Nigeria. The danger is that without a system of checks and balances, the military might become a tool of the party in government and be deployed in internal conflict without sufficient public debate.
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A fifth lesion is that power struggles among civilian elites such as in Indonesia in 1999–2001 and in Nigeria in 2002 may markedly strengthen the stature of the military. In fact, in both cases, during civilian conflict the president and political parties in the legislature, the military used its umpire function and involvement in these struggles to stop or dilute SSR process that would have strengthen democratic and civilian control.
A sixth lesson learned is that the military profits from internal conflict and protracted violence either on the level of individual officers (in Nigeria) or on the level of the military as an institution (in Indonesia). The conduct of illicit commer- cial profiting from conflict and domestic violence constitutes a grave danger to the further stability of the two young democracies. Indeed, a military that plays a role in perpetuating conflict erodes the legitimacy of not only the military itself but also of the civilian authorities under whose name the military is acting.
A seventh lesson learned is that culture matters. With regard to the military organization, we have observed that it can take a long time before the military officers, who are trained and indoctrinated by the military academies of the former regime, are entirely phased out. Ancien regime norms and values include the belief that soldiers are superior to civilians, that the military is the only institution that can lead the nation and that the military should be active in economic and national development. As long as officers instilled with these values occupy key decision- making positions, it will be difficult, if not impossible, to instil respect for democracy within military circles. Alternately, culture also matters among politicians. In partic- ular in Nigeria, various key politicians have publicly stated that military officers have superior qualities compared with civilian authorities and that the military should return to politics. These types of norms and values within political circles obstruct the establishment of civilian supremacy. If this culture persists in both military and political circles, these are clear signs that second-generation SSR has failed.
These lessons learned lead to the conclusion that incomplete or stalled SSR processes give the military the opportunity to interfere with democratic decision- making processes and to continue to act with impunity and to conduct illicit commercial activities. This is dangerous for any young democracy, as it will erode the trust of people in both civilian and military authorities. Moreover, it shows that the avoidance of military coups is not sufficient to keep the military out of politics. The analyses have shown that the military has formal and informal ways to interfere with democratic decision-making processes in the area of internal security, external security and military organization. Therefore, it is vital that stalled security sector reform processes are reinvigorated.