Challenges and the Limits of Civil Society Actors

Challenges and the Limits of Civil Society Actors

Active participation by civil society actors is not without challenges, including the challenge to cope with its own limitations. The first of such challenges is the continued resistance and opposition from conservative elements within some military quarters against the involvement of non-state civilian actors in military reform. These conservative military officers argued that due to the military’s expertise and experience in defense matters, it should be given the autonomy to carry out and supervise its own reform without any interference from the civilian. Moreover, they also accused civil society actors of advancing the agendas of

7 Edy Prasetyono, quoted in Haseman and Lachica ( 2005 :65). 8 Rizal Sukma, Edy Prasetyono, and Kusnanto Anggoro had been regular lecturers at various

Military Command and Staff Colleges long before the democratization took place. Hari Prihatono is a gifted “lobbyist” who managed to forge a close relationship with top military officers and received their trust. Andi Widjajanto is the son of the late Maj. Gen. Theo Syafei, a close confidant of President Megawati Sukarnoputri. Through these networking activities ProPatria WG managed to convince top military leaders of its genuine intention to work towards the creation of better and more professional armed forces.

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foreign interests, mainly the West, in undermining and controlling Indonesia by separating the military from the people. ProPatria’s SSR programs, for example, were seen as an attempt to undermine the military’s role and credibility in the eyes

of the international community and the Indonesian public. 9 Being charged as an extension of foreign interest constituted the most difficult challenge facing ProPatria WG in the early years of the Reform Era.

The second challenge stems from the nature of democratic transition that, as discussed earlier, allowed the creation of bargaining space between the military and the new civilian political forces. The civilian power elites are still worried about the influential position of the military in politics, and still perceive the TNI as a formidable political force. Moreover, the highly competitive political system, characterized by intense political struggle among major political groups, preserves the space for the military to retain political significance and influence. For example, many political parties and civilian leaders still seek support from the military in the competition against their opponents. Even though civilian political forces are now relatively free from military intervention, they have been reluctant to initiate policy measures that might harm military interests. In other words, a fractured civilian elite complicates the reform process. The willingness to compromise is still great enough that some drastic measures needed to push for further reform have often been delayed. Fragmented and weak civilian elites have to a degree preserved the space for the military to retain its influence in shaping the direction and determining the pace of reform.

Third, until very recently, the residual influence of the military in politics has also been sustained by rampant security problems in post-authoritarian Indonesia. The most difficult issues for the civilian government to handle were the outbreak of communal violence and the threat of separatism. The ability of the state to address these problems has been severely hampered by the lack of professionalism within the police force. With such internal security problems, it has been difficult for the civilian government to prevent the military from playing an internal security role (Mietzner, 2006 , p. 38). Since the end of 2002, the threat of terrorism has also aggravated the challenge of keeping the military from exercising internal security functions. Cur- rently, both the Parliament and the government agree with the military that it needs to

be involved in the efforts to combat terrorism. Civil society organizations, while insisting that such a role for the military would require specific regulations, are concerned about possible abuses of power by the military. 10

The fourth challenge is the lack of defense expertise among the civilians. As most Indonesian civilian elites are only familiar with the political role of the military, the focus of attention has been mostly on the issue of the military and politics. Meanwhile, effective control of the military also requires concrete

9 This accusation was based on the fact that most of the funding for ProPatria activities came from foreign donors, such as USAID and DFID.

10 The Jakarta Globe, 1 September 2009, accessed online http://www.thejakartaglobe.com/home/ indonesia-to-form-agency-to-oversee-arms-trade/327485 on 2 July 2012.

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measures on defense reform. Eradicating the political role of the military constitutes only half of the required military reform. Reforming defense policies and posture, doctrines, and education should also form an inalienable part of military reform. In this context, it is not easy to convince the military to subscribe to the principle of civilian supremacy if they perceive that the civilians have no adequate knowledge and expertise about defense issues. The repertoire of expertise within even ProPatria WG is limited. Of all members of the Working Group, only two – Andi Widjajanto and Riefqi Muna – are professionally trained in defense

studies. 11 While the government began to take necessary measures to address this problem, such as through the establishment of an Indonesian Defense University in 2008, there is still the need for Indonesia to expand its civilian defense community.

Fifth, there is a difficulty in sustaining constant public pressure and support for further reform. The ability of civil society, academics, and reform-minded members of the parliament to sustain such pressure is limited. They are often distracted by other equally important issues. The absence of critical mass that could act as a catalyst for change within the wider society also serves as a challenge to civilian military reformers advancing their agenda further. Indeed, the military reform in Indonesia has since 2004 proceeded at a much slower pace. The repeated calls by civil society actors for further and faster reform have largely been ignored. As of 2011, the state of military reform in Indonesia is not much different from where it was in 2004. While the military has largely maintained its commitment to stay out of politics, it continues to play an influential role in defense and security policy-making. Moreover, despite various attempts by the government to place the military under the Ministry of Defense, the move continues to be resisted by military leaders. The Indonesian military continues to report directly to the President.

These limitations explain the failures of ProPatria WG in several key areas of military reform despite its efforts to address them. The first is the failure to address the problem of impunity manifested in the inability (or unwillingness) of the civilian government to bring justice to military officers involved in the violation of human rights in the past. The government and the military have resisted the attempt by Parliament to reform the military justice system. Second, ProPatria WG has not been able to persuade the government and the military to change the way the military is deployed. The territorial command system (KOTER), in which military units are deployed in tandem with civilian administrative units from province down to village level, remains intact. Third, ProPatria WG has not been able to encourage the government to change the way it formulates national defense policy and strategy. Even though the authority to formulate defense policy now officially rests with the Ministry of Defense, in reality the military still plays a dominant role in this area. Indeed, all these failures remain high on the agenda for the next stage of military reform for Indonesia.

11 Andi Widjajanto received his Master’s degree at the National Defense University in Washington D.C., while Riefqi Muna holds a Ph.D. degree in defense studies from the Cranfield University in

the United Kingdom. Few others are trained in Law or Sociology. The majority of members of the

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