Illicit Activities and Military Professionalism

Illicit Activities and Military Professionalism

Militants in the Niger Delta are reportedly supported by security forces. An obvious example is the use of the JTF to fight along with the Niger Delta Vigilantes against

49 This Day, 21 May 2009, http://www.nigeria70.com/nigerian_news_paper/n_delta_house_a- borts_motion_on_military_action/108392 , accessed 19 February 2011.

50 Fourth Republic, 3rd National Assembly, Second Session, No. 108, 985, 21 May 2009, http:// www.speakersoffice.gov.ng/newsroom_votes.htm , accessed 19 February 2011.

51 The Nation, 22 May 2009, http://thenationonlineng.net/web2/articles/4346/1/Extend-military- operation-to-Bayelsa-Rivers-Reps-tell-YarAdua-/Page1.html , accessed 19 February 2011; Nigerian

Best Forum, 22 May 2009, http://www.nigerianbestforum.com/generaltopics/?p¼5139 , accessed 19 February 2011; Fourth Republic, 3rd National Assembly, Second Session, No. 108, 985, 21 May 2009, http://www.speakersoffice.gov.ng/newsroom_votes.htm , accessed 19 February 2011.

52 The Nation, 22 May 2009, cited above. 53 This Day, 22 May 2009, http://allafrica.com/stories/200905220003.html , accessed 19 February

10 The Niger Delta Conflict and Military Reform in Nigeria 217

the NDPVF in 2004. In this case the military directly supported a militant group in their power struggle for the leading position in the Niger Delta. As the operations were ordered by civilian authorities, in particular River State Governor Odili, these can not be considered a politically motivated interference into Niger Delta affairs by the military. But in such a situation soldiers of the JTF directly contact militants and can build up personal connections for illicit activities. A survey of militants showed that a quarter of all respondents were supported by the military in obtaining small arms (Hazen & Horner, 2007 , p. 34). Furthermore, it is very likely that the soldiers are training militants in military tactics (ibid.). In this way, the points of contact between rebels and soldiers foster the security threats which the JTF faces. This is reinforced by the sale of information about military operations to rebel leaders by security operatives. 54

The deepest involvement of the military in illegal revenue generation is its participation in oil bunkering, eroding confidence in the military. For instance, leaked U.S. cables criticize the military of benefiting financially from its presence in the Niger Delta, and accuse it of becoming dependent on illicit revenues: “[t]he military wants to remain in the Niger Delta because they profit enormously from money charged for escorting illegally bunkered crude and from money extorted in

the name of providing security on the roads”. 55 As a result of such allegations, calls to investigate the military by the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) arose (International Crisis Group, 2009 , p. 4 f.). There is evidence that the military is engaged in illegal oil bunkering, as even the Chief of Defence Staff, Air Marshal Paul Dike, deplored publicly the involvement of soldiers in bunkering. 56 Watts summarizes the multilayered structure of oil bunkering as follows:

The low level oil theft ‘(bunkering’)[sic] that is controlled by the rebels as one way of financing their struggle, is organized through a vast state-centred syndicate linking high ranking military, politicians, the security apparatuses, and the Niger Delta special military task forces, and the navy coast guard. (Watts, 2008 , p. 59)

As argued by Watts, there are two levels of involvement in oil bunkering: the actual oil theft and the broader organization of large-scale oil bunkering infrastruc- ture. On the first level, low-ranking military officers in particular are accused of supporting bunkering. They cooperate directly with militants while they are on

duty, and use their position as guards to enable them to “tip” oil installations. 57 U.S. cables compared “the relationship between the JTF and major militant groups to arrangements between rival gangs in U.S. urban areas; generally each JTF unit and militant band had its own territory in which they operated and from which they

54 Vanguard, 27 September 2008, http://www.legaloil.com/NewsItem.asp?DocumentIDX¼ 1222585000&Category¼news , accessed 19 February 2011.

55 Cited in Vanguard, 13 April 2011, http://www.vanguardngr.com/2011/04/politicians-military- behind-oil-thefts-wikileaks/ , accessed 10 February 2012.

56 Vanguard, 27 September 2008, cited above. 57 The Tide, 26 January 2010, http://www.thetidenewsonline.com/?p¼8476 , accessed 19 February

218 C.A. Lutz derived their illicit incomes” 58 and traces this back to the fact that “[p]rofits from

illegal bunkering became high enough in the last several years to enable both JTF members and ‘militants’ to profit and co-exist without seriously interfering with each other’s activities. Fighting only erupted when disputes arose about

boundaries”. 59 Even more important are the higher ranks, as they organize and cover large-scale theft. Security operatives confirm the involvement of retired generals in bunkering. They claim that they were given the order by high-ranking

military officers not to intercept or even release already arrested vessels. 60 The connections between armed forces personnel and oil bunkering syndicates thus directly undermine effective law enforcement.

With regard to the control of the military a very crucial question is whether individual military officers are engaged in oil bunkering for personal gain or whether the military as an institution creates significant extra-budgetary revenues beyond civilian oversight (Hendrickson & Ball, 2002 , p. 1). Lewis characterizes the nature of Nigerian rent allocation and oil-related corruption as “fragmented, com- petitive and anarchic” (Lewis, 2007 , p. 285), resulting in fewer reinvestments of

illicit profits within Nigeria. 61 Therefore, it is alleged here that the participation in bunkering directly serves the individual officers and is not channelled significantly into institutional off-budgets. Data on the use of oil bunkering profits are very rare due to the clandestine nature of these activities (Hendrickson & Ball, 2002 , p. 2). As

a result, this claim can only be illustrated by interpretations of single reports and remains somewhat speculative. However, reports by residents accuse soldiers of profiting from their duty in the Niger Delta due to their oil bunkering activities (Davis et al., 2006 , p. 4). 62 For the higher ranked generals the issue is more complex. On the one hand, there is an incentive to resort to oil bunkering in an attempt to supplement the inadequate

defence budget for the acquisition of badly needed equipment. 63 Furthermore, high- ranking officers are afraid of being transferred out of the Niger Delta if they do not support bunkering (Davis et al., 2006 , p. 4). On the other hand, two circumstances make a large-scale generation of extra-budgetary income unlikely. First, it is predominantly retired generals that are directly engaged in oil bunkering. As they

58 Reuters, 7 September 2011, http://af.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idAFTRE78659720110 907?sp¼true , accessed 10 February 2012.

59 Ibid. 60 Vanguard, 27 March 2009, http://www.legaloil.com/NewsItem.asp?DocumentIDX¼ 1238832400&Category¼news , accessed 19 February 2011. A Militant leader stated also that

even an active general controls vessels for oil bunkering. 61 Lewis contrasts this against the more domestic value-creating use of corruption money in

Indonesia (Ibid., p. 284). 62 Integrated Regional Information Networks (INRI), 17 November 2008, http://www.irinnews.

org/report.aspx?reportid¼60373 , accessed 19 February 2011; Vanguard, 19 September 2011, http://www.vanguardngr.com/2011/09/jtf-gunboats-raise-tension-in-bayelsa/ , accessed 10 Febru- ary 2012.

63 Vanguard, 24 January 2006, http://www.legaloil.com/NewsItem.asp?DocumentIDX¼

10 The Niger Delta Conflict and Military Reform in Nigeria 219

have resigned from duty, they are no longer part of the military as an institution and therefore will hardly create revenues for the military establishment. Second, confrontations between retired military officers and the JTF commanders confirm the impression that personal interests are stronger incentives for oil bunkering than

attempts to create significant extra-budgetary revenues. 64 Nonetheless, it cannot be ruled out that high-ranking officers build up secret accounts for the military as an institution, as relations to oil bunkering syndicates are sometimes institutionalized in contractual form (Asuni, 2009b , p. 14).