Democratic Control Beyond the Executive

Even after returning to the barracks in 1999, the Nigerian armed forces stubbornly evaded democratic control by hiding behind a veil of secrecy. Without access to information, parliament, the media and civil society were effectively emasculated as agents of control. A Freedom of Information Act with teeth could have ended this virtual insulation of the military and, indeed, such a bill was tabled by the first House of Representatives as early as 1999, but for more than a decade was caught in the legislative mills. In 2007, when the House of Representatives and the Senate ultimately passed the bill, President Obasanjo refused to sign it into law within the

due time of 30 days, citing security reasons. 44 Re-introduced in the subsequent 2007–2011 legislative term, the bill was passed by the House, but eventually became stranded in a sceptical Senate. 45 Not before early 2011 did the House and the Senate agree on a joint version of the bill which was finally signed into law by

42 Authors’ interview, 11 September 2008. 43 Leadership, 25 February 2009, p. 35; Daily Independence, 25 February 2009, p. 1. However,

by the time this volume goes to print, this bill has not yet been enacted. 44 The Guardian, 20 April 2007, p. 1; This Day, 14 September 2008, p. 115.

45 The Guardian, 3 March 2005, pp. 18–19, 18 November 2008; The Punch, 16 November 2006, p. 7; 17 November 2006, p. 7, 18 November 2006, p. 10, 30 April 2008; Leadership, 4 June 2008

70 M.-G. Manea and J. R€uland President Goodluck Jonathan in May 2011. 46 Most observers welcomed the law as

an important step towards greater transparency and good governance in Nigeria. Interestingly, however, the law’s adherents were more interested in tackling Nigeria’s rampant corruption than curtailing the influence of the military. It thus did not cause major concern that defense and security matters were exempted from the act. As yet, the act has not been tested; it remains to be seen whether it meets the high expectations associated with it. 47

Also, the development of a defense epistemic community with watchdog functions did not flourish in Nigeria. It was hampered by the tight grip over such expert and scholarly networks exerted by a limited number of Nigerian military academic institutions such as the National Defense College, the Military Academy in Kaduna and the National Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies in Kuru. Protective of military interests, they were lacklustre in their contribution to the military’s socialization in a new professional culture conducive to democratic control. These epistemic stakeholders have mainly controlled the discursive pro- duction of knowledge on the military until today. In addition, a culture of secrecy surrounding all military matters had been perpetuated by all stakeholders – executive, legislature, military – while civil society actors and scholars had failed to challenge it effectively.

Under such adverse conditions for civilian control other than by the executive, the Nigerian National Assembly too, could not become a hub of knowledge, expertise, political will and a catalyst mobilizing societal forces in order to advance military reform beyond the parameters set by the executive (on the role of the Nigerian legislature in military reform, see also the contribution of Emmanuel Remi Aiyede in this volume). Parliamentary oversight in Nigeria is ridden with problems which are definitely not a question of either lack of constitutional powers or resource shortages as in many other developing countries. Despite a fierce dispute with President Obasanjo the National Assembly defended its right to prepare its budget. Moreover, the Nigerian National Assembly is funded lavishly,

receiving approximately US$741 million in 2009, 48 a five-to-seven fold increase since 2000 (Aiyede, 2005a , p. 79). While this seems to suggest that the National Assembly has abundant resources to build up a well-functioning parliamentary

support infrastructure, numerous accounts show that over 80% 49 of its budget is allocated for personal emoluments of the legislators. 50

The Lawmaker, Vol. 9, No. 193, 2nd Half June 2008, p. 23; Legislative Digest, Vol. 2, No. 1, July 2008, p. 14; This Day, 14 September 2008, p. 115; Vanguard, 15 September 2008, p. 14.

46 http://www.freedominfo.org/2011/06/nigerian-president-signs-freedom-of-information-bill/ (accessed 23 February 2012).

47 The Guardian, 13 February 2012. 48 Tell, 25 January 2008, pp. 52–53. 49 The Lawmaker, Vol. 9, No. 192, 1st Half June 2008, p. 13. 50 While the figures of the individual reports differ slightly, the relatively minor differences

suggest that the reports about the income of legislators are credible. See Tell, 13 May 2002, p. 28.

3 Taking Stock of Military Reform in Nigeria 71

Defense-related committees spent most of their time on budget scrutiny. Bud- getary data is often either kept secret from the public or disclosed very late in order to hamper any serious scrutiny by the National Assembly (Hettmann & Mohammed, 2005 , p. 23). In many cases budgetary items are not thoroughly explained (Omitoogun & Hutchful, 2006 , p. 175). Even less is the legislature able to control actual defense spending. Yoroms, for instance, concludes that the “defense budget since 1999 has been approved without serious and critical oversight” (Yoroms, 2005 , p. 192) and Omitoogun rates Nigeria as one of five African countries with low adherence to good budgetary practices (Omitoogun, 2006 ,

p. 258). 51 Only in 2009 did the House Committee on Defense depart from its previous docile behavior with its decision to return the entire 2009 budget proposal for defense to the Ministry of Defense for revision and re-submission due to the careless and incomplete way in which data was compiled by the Ministry. 52

The National Assembly’s investigatory drive is not performing any better either. This is illustrated by the findings of investigations into troop deployment in conflict zones that led to military abuses in Odi village (Bayelsa State) in November 1999 and Zaki Biam (Benue State) in October 2001. Both were neither discussed in the plenary nor made public. The legislature’s investigation was devoid of any impact (Clapham, Herbst, & Mills, 2006 , p. 78) apart from the attempt to instrumentalize these incidents in the House’s impeachment bid against President Obasanjo in August 2002.

Also unquestioned by the parliament was the practice of the president to appoint the service chiefs without consulting the National Assembly. Legislators ignored this right granted by Article 20 of the Military Act (Garba, 2008 ) until a Lagos- based lawyer defending an offended officer publicized the issue in August 2008. 53 More surprising, however, are occasional media statements by legislators inviting the military to take over in times of crisis such as Senator Waku’s call in a

public interview 54 or openly praising the military’s superiority, such as Senate President David Mark who was quoted as saying that “only soldiers have the

discipline to nurture the nation’s fledgling democracy. The core civilians are lazy and dull. An army sergeant is more intelligent than a university graduate” (Amaike, 2007 , p. 192). 55

51 The other countries Omitoogon names are Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Mali (Omitoogon, 2006 , p. 258.).

52 Daily Independent, http://www.independentonline.com , downloaded at 12 December 2009. 53 The Guardian, 9 June 2008. 54 Federal Republic of Nigeria, House of Representatives, Federal Republic of Nigeria. Votes and

Proceedings, Fourth Assembly, 3rd June, 1999 – 8th June, 2000, Tuesday, 1 February 2000; 4. Matter of Urgent Public Importance. Call for Military Intervention, p. 296.

55 See also Tell, 25 June 2007, pp. 43–45. In another instance, Mark was quoted as saying that “If I have my way, I will say whoever does not have military background should not be made president”

(Amaike, 2007 , p. 192).

72 M.-G. Manea and J. R€uland

Democratic Control Beyond the Executive