Military Reforms Under Executive Dominance (1999–2001)

Obasanjo’s election was acceptable to both the armed forces due to his military past and the pro-democracy forces given his known stance for political liberalization and for opposing the Abacha regime (Ihonvbere & Shaw 1998 , p. xxxiv). As a Yoruba (representing the south western region of Nigeria), his election also eased persistent ethnic tensions reminiscent of the annulment of the 12 June 1993 elections that would have led for the first time in Nigeria’s post-colonial history to the instalment of a president from this ethnic group (Amaike, 2007 , p. 183). The moment of power handover to President Obasanjo conveyed the political message that the military era was over while, at the same time, it marked the entry into a phase of executive hegemony under democratic auspices. As the discourse on military reform during the first phase of power transfer was restricted to the issue of the military’s return to the barracks and re-professionalization, after Obasanjo’s election the scope of military reform was not too ambitious either. A “worst case” scenario would see military reform accomplished through the military return to the barracks; a “best case” scenario would address the need to professionalize and modernize the armed forces together with the exercise of civilian supremacy. Adding to this, the weak participation of civil society and the public at large as well as the new and inexperienced National Assembly were factors that did not encourage the development of a comprehensive concept of military reform and a critical mass base to pressure for its implementation. For his part, President Obasanjo initiated a range of reforms that strengthened the executive control of the armed forces, with no contribution, however, from the legislature or civil society. Moreover, the gap between Obasanjo’s policy rhetoric and practice can

be highlighted by contrasting his speech at the War College in Abuja, on 24 July 1999 laying down the fundamentals of his concept of civilian supremacy with the measures initiated after his instalment in office. In this speech Obasanjo laid down the following criteria for military reform:

29 See Tell, 17 May 1999, pp. 21–25.

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1. [An] elected civilian president as commander in chief of the armed forces, and the supremacy of elected state officials over appointed officers at all levels; 2. Civilian headship of the ministry of defense and other strategic establishments; 3. Decisions regarding the goals and conduct of military operation must serve the political

and strategic goals established by the civil authority; 4. Application of civil principles to all military investigations and trials; 5. Right of civil (Supreme Court) authority to review any actions or decision taken by

military judicial officers. 6. Other instruments for achieving supremacy of civil authority include constitutional clauses and legislative oversight functions.

Contrary to this announcement, during the first 2 years of Obasanjo’s executive leadership, the government mainly focused on the first two points of the reform agenda. Although rhetorically acknowledged, the remaining points are still far from an adequate implementation and are constrained by a malfunctioning and corrupt judiciary system. But the most disappointing aspects of military reform in Nigeria, which enjoy great significance in the current paradigm of security sector reform, are those vaguely subsumed under the last point. President Obasanjo’s power struggles with the National Assembly have certainly weakened the prospects for the enact- ment of military legislation and constitutional amendments in support of military reforms. Moreover, the notion of democratic control through the media, civil society and the defense epistemic community is largely missing both in the discourse on military reform as well as in its practice (see also the chapter of Emmanuel Remi Aiyede in this volume).

Shortly after assuming office, in a surprise move, President Obasajo retired 93 high-ranking military officers. Among them were 26 generals from the army, 12 from the air force and 11 from the navy. 30 All of them were considered “political officers” who had served the preceding military dictatorships as ministers, governors and military administrators especially between 1985 and 1999. 31 This purge was framed as an action of depoliticizing and re-professionalizing the armed forces. Ignoring the preferences of the incumbent service chiefs, who lobbied for staying in office on the ground that these positions are non-political appointments and new

reshuffles could lead to restiveness in the military, 32 Obasanjo also replaced the military leadership. Unlike in the past, the majority of these officers did not come from the Hausa-Fulani dominated north, but belonged to minority ethnicities of the Middle Belt. With this choice, Obasanjo sought to pre-empt an eventual misuse of the military by frustrated northern opposition which might have regarded the election of a Yoruba president as a threat to their traditional political hegemony.

Although Obasanjo entrusted the defense portfolio to Theofilus Danjuma, a retired military general, he went a long way in the civilianization of the defense ministry. All ministers of state for defense were civilians, with one of them, Modupe Adelaja, being a woman (International Institute for Democracy and

30 Tell, 28 June 1999, p. 20–29. 31 Daily Times, 11 June 1999, p. 1; Tell, 28 June 1999, pp. 20–29. 32 This Day, 15 April 1999, p. 10; Tell, 13 May 1999, p. 23.

66 M.-G. Manea and J. R€uland Electoral Assistance, 2000 , p. 182). After the retirement of Lt. Gen. (rtd.) Danjuma

in 2003, all subsequent defense ministers were civilians as were about half of the defense ministry’s staff. One of the more intrusive tentative reforms of the executive was Danjuma’s plan to downsize troop strength from 80,000 to a supposed 50,000 soldiers (ibid., p. 178). Strong resistance from military quarters, however,

forced the minister to abandon these plans. 33 Another early move towards military reform was President Obasanjo’s decision

to set up a Human Rights Investigation and Violation Commission in June 1999. The Commission, headed by Justice Chukwudifu Oputa and henceforth known as the Oputa Panel, was tasked with investigating “the causes, nature and extent of all gross violations of human rights in Nigeria between January 15, 1966 and May 28,

1999.” 34 While the commission was set up to keep potential opposition by former military rulers at bay, it was also one of the panel’s objectives to educate Nigerians about the excesses of military rule and to impress upon them the virtues of democracy. In its 3 years of existence, the Panel gained much recognition for its tireless work. It examined more than 10,000 petitions, listened to 2,000 witnesses and

received 1,750 exhibits. 35 It submitted to the government a final report of eight volumes and 15,000 pages. Not unexpectedly, however, the human rights investigations did not contain, but rather stirred, political opposition and ethnic violence in many parts of the country. Former military rulers like Ibrahim Babangida, Muhammadu Buhari and Abdulsalami Abubakar refused to follow the summons of the commission, with Babangida challenging the constitutionality of

the commission in court. 36 The court eventually ruled that the panel was not duly set up and by implication had no power to summon Babangida. In the end, an embattled government decided to lay to rest the panel’s findings, neither publishing them nor

acting upon them. 37 Beyond its symbolic impact, the Panel did not have any judicial powers as it was an investigative effort that largely bypassed the judiciary. Although inspired by a similar parliamentary commission that successfully dealt with the human rights issues in South Africa, the Oputa Panel did not work under the Nigerian National Assembly which could have rather increased its judicial impact. Neither did the Nigerian Congress initiate its own work on past human rights abuses.

Less ambiguity characterizes the Nigerian military justice system. Crimes committed by military personnel are tried by civilian courts and military court decisions are subject to Supreme Court review. However, the high number of petitions submitted by retired and active military officers to the National Assembly, often complaining about unjust dismissal or non-payment of pension funds, points to shortcomings in the functioning of both the military justice system and its

33 The Guardian, 19 August 1999, p. 56. 34 Tell, 16 August 1999, p. 25. 35 Tell, 17 June 2002, p. 26. 36 Newswatch, 17 June 2002, p. 15. 37 Newswatch, 17 June 2002, p. 15.

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oversight through the civilian courts. Thousands of prematurely cashiered soldiers are a persistent problem in the Nigerian military and a source for intra-military tension that may be easily exploited by coup plotters.

Another step to promote military reform was the government’s hiring of Military Professional Resources Incorporated (MPRI), an American consultancy company specializing in military affairs (International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 2000 , p. 184). MPRI was tasked to devise a plan to civilianize the Nigerian military, to provide technical assistance, to conduct workshops on civil-military rela- tions for military officers and civilians and to train Nigerian soldiers for peacekeeping missions (Fayemi, 2005 , p. 329; Garba, 2008 , p. 186). Like in the reform measures mentioned above, no other actors were involved either in the decision of contracting MPRI or in monitoring its activities (Fayemi, 2002a , p. 17). The latter’s mission, which was co-sponsored by USAID and the U.S. Defense Ministry, was highly controversial and military opposition to it led to the early retirement of Army Chief Gen. Victor Malu (Fayemi & Olonisakin, 2008 , p. 262; Yoroms, 2005 , p. 79). In fact, it seemed that the decision to hire MPRI was largely a symbolic exercise, targeted at the audience abroad without much impact on military transformation.

Military Reforms Under Executive Dominance (1999–2001)