The Military’s Engineered Transition and Reform (1998–1999)

The Military’s Engineered Transition and Reform (1998–1999)

From June 1998 to April 1999 new foundations of the Nigerian political system and armed forces had been laid down through a 10-month transitional program under the leadership of Gen. Abdulsalami Abubakar. The very choice of Gen. Abubakar as future interim head of state by the Provisional Ruling Council (PRC), the highest

political body through which the military ruled the country, 6 apparently signalled a move away from Abacha’s loyalist group. 7 Economic mismanagement, corruption, and massive human rights violations had thrown the country into deep decay (Ihonvbere & Shaw, 1998 ). Beyond this, the Western world made political liberal- ization a precondition for Nigeria to access much needed external economic and financial assistance. In response to expectations from inside and outside the coun- try, Gen. Abubakar was able to navigate the country to an early power transfer on

29 May 1999 in spite of massive intra-military pressures for delaying the process to October 1999 or even to the year 2000. 8 Very limited measures at this stage targeted structural reforms of the military organization. At that time the bargaining over the conditions of the power transfer had much higher priority. Gen. Abubakar employed a strategy of appeasement towards the military with the aim of ensuring their support for political retreat and power handover to democratically elected civilians. Soon after his instalment, he

dissolved the federal cabinet and appointed his own staff. 9 He toured military barracks, explaining why it is “imperative for the military to go back to its constitutional role of defending the territorial integrity of the country.” 10 Within

10 months, Gen. Abubakar led the military twice, in August 1998 and on 12 May 1999, to a collective open undertaking declaring: “[. . .] never again to hijack the

political process. [. . . The armed forces] should subject themselves to the democratically elected government and play the roles assigned to them, to defend Nigeria’s territorial integrity.” 11

Moreover, the government increased the salaries of soldiers and officers by the end of 1998 (Olonisakin, 1999 , p. 32) and set up a committee on the “Reorientation

5 Tell, 25 January 1999, pp. 16–19. 6 The News, 29 June 1998, pp. 11–17; Tell, 25 January 1999, pp. 16–19. 7 Tell, 25 January 1999, pp. 16–19. 8 Tell, 25 January 1999, pp. 16–19. 9 Newswatch, 14 September 1998.

10 The Guardian, 27 November 1998, p. 11; Newswatch, 31 August 1998, pp. 17–19. 11 The Guardian, 13 May 1999, p.1.

62 M.-G. Manea and J. R€uland of the Armed Forces and the Police towards Enduring Democracy.” Under this

framework workshops had been organized in Abuja and the six geo-political zones of the federation 12 on issues pertaining to the welfare of the military and adequate remuneration, re-professionalization and the need for the armed forces to commit themselves to the democratic transition. 13 This was also in response to the U.S. and U.K. governments’ demands to professionalize the military, which continued until Abubakar’s exit in May 1999. 14 These efforts, however, represented a military inward-looking process of persuasion that did not engage the public and civilians over the concept of military retreat.

Beyond this, Abubakar’s administration abolished several decrees and political restrictions which considerably relaxed the political atmosphere and liberalized politics. On 20 July 1998, Abubakar scraped Abacha’s transition program initiated in October 1995 and launched his own 10-month transition plan scheduled to end on

29 May 1999 after parliamentary elections and the direct election of a civilian president in February 1999. The five formally accepted and controlled political parties established under Gen. Abacha’s rule with a view to being involved in the envisaged electoral exercise legitimizing his rule were dissolved. Founding and funding political parties became an independent affair of civilians. The military government decided not to finance any political party in the future in order to ensure that the political process could not be controlled by the military. 15

Furthermore, political prisoners were released to the satisfaction of many oppo- sition groups and civil society organizations such as the National Democratic Opposition (NADECO), Civil Liberties Organization, Campaign for Democracy

and the Nigerian Bar Association (NBA). 16 Abubakar also promised to order the investigation of “genuine claims” of torture and human rights violations by Abacha’s henchmen. 17 Shortly before leaving office, Abubakar indeed repealed State Security Decree No. 2/1984 allowing for the discretionary detention of

persons, on the ground that it violated the newly enacted 1999 Constitution. 18 Much more contested, however, was the non-transparent drafting of the 1999

Constitution laying down flawed constitutional rules for the future political game (Nwankwo, 2003 , p. 95; Olonisakin, 1999 , p. 31). 19 Only a small group of individuals, such as members of the military government and the junta-appointed

12 Nigeria is sub-divided into six major geo-political zones, among which political posts in the federation are shared: Southwest, Southeast, South-South, Northeast, Northwest, North-Central

geo-political zones. 13 Newswatch, 7 June 1999, pp. 52–54.

14 Newswatch, 12 October 1998, p. 15. 15 Newswatch 3 August 1998, pp. 8–14. 16 Including the release of the former military ruler Olusegun Obasanjo on 9 June 1998, but for

undisclosed reasons not the winner of the 1993 presidential elections Chief M.K.O. Abiola. 17 Newswatch, 21 September 1998, pp. 16–17.

18 Vanguard, 10 May 1999, p. 3; The Guardian, 29 May1999, p. 2.

3 Taking Stock of Military Reform in Nigeria 63 Tobi Committee, 20 which was also tasked to organize country-wide public

consultations, were involved in the writing of the 1999 Constitution. The military government was charged with simulating genuine interest in the work of the Tobi Committee while, in reality, writing the 1999 Constitution on the PRC’s own terms 21 as publicly asserted by the NBA Chief, Thomson Onomigho-Okpoko, the co-

draftsman of the 1999 Constitution, 22 and human rights activists. Femi Falana, a noted human rights lawyer from the Joint Action Committee of Nigeria (JACON),

and the Committee for the Defense of Human Rights, warned the public that the 1999 Constitution essentially “bars the incoming civilian administration from questioning the conduct and activities of the military that ruled the country from

December 1983 to 29 May 1999.” 23 Moreover, the Constitution was hastily enacted by Military Decree (Ibeanu & Egwu, 2007 , pp. 81, 82; Ugoh, 2005 , p. 168). 24 In spite of this criticism, the military resisted all public demands for the organization of a Sovereign National Conference (SNC) as a more legitimate and inclusive forum for the constitutional process. But to the credit of Abubakar’s military government, the 1999 Constitution, through Sections 217–220, restored the concept of democratic control of the armed forces by placing the military under the supervision of the National Assembly and in terms of its command chain and operational use under the President as Commander in Chief (Nwolise, 2002 , pp. 325, 326).

In an attempt to safeguard the elections from military interference, both active and retired military officers were advised not to get involved in the presidential race. 25 The former Chief of Staff, Maj. Gen. (rtd.) Tunde Idiagbon, emphasized that the presidential elections “should be a signal for a genuine return of the military to the barracks,” 26 while Abubakar demanded that “any uniformed personnel who harbours political ambition should resign his commission, join a political party and effect his wish through the political process” as the military’s duty is not to

govern. 27 It must be said that Abubakar’s consistent follow up on his transitional program was also motivated by substantial external pressure, especially from the U.S. and the U.K. 28 However, the military still exerted influence over the choice of candidates through behind-the-scenes deals, although it ultimately supported a compromise candidate in the person of Olusegun Obasanjo, a retired general

20 Tobi Committee was composed of a number of 25 members appointed by the Provisional Ruling Council.

21 Tell, 9 August 1999, pp. 20–23. 22 Vanguard, 21 June 1999, p. 1. 23 The Punch, 5 May.1999, p. 6. 24 This Day, 15 April 1999, p. 10. 25 The Guardian, 2 December 1998, p. 8. 26 The Guardian, 28 May 1999, p. 3. 27 The Guardian, 16 April 1999, p. 1. 28 Tony Lloyd, the British deputy minister for African affairs at that time, who met Gen. Abubakar

shortly after his appointment on 27 June 1998, conveyed the EU message that sanctions would be eased only if political changes take place. See Newswatch, 13 July 1998.

64 M.-G. Manea and J. R€uland (Adekanye, 2005 , p. 11). In the words of a Nigerian analyst, the power transfer was

“an affair between elite solidarity and communal support” (Njoku, 2001 , p. 87). Overshadowing the withdrawal of the military from political power as promised by Abubakar 10 months earlier, allegations of large-scale corruption and looting of public funds by his administration prior to its exit are abundant in the media reports

of the time. 29 Behind them may have been acts of self-enrichment of the outgoing transitional government, but also pay-offs to smoothen the military’s exit from

executive power.