Nigeria Elite Recruitment

After over 50 years of independence, of which more than three decades were under military rule, there are still signs that the elite are taking the threat of military coups seriously. The most important symbol of the fear for military coups is the “anti- coup” article in the new constitution of Nigeria: “The Federal Republic of Nigeria shall not be governed, nor shall any persons or group of persons take control of the Government of Nigeria or any part thereof, except in accordance with the provisions of this Constitution” (Section 1 (2), Federal Government of Nigeria, 1999 ). Another expression of the fear of coups is that legislators called for the removal of military barracks from Abuja in order to keep the military as far away from the centre of power as possible (Aiyede). While some fear military coups, others desire the military to come back in politics. Various politicians and former top generals have indicated that only the military is capable of ruling the country, that they regret that the military did not stage a coup in the last decade or that the After over 50 years of independence, of which more than three decades were under military rule, there are still signs that the elite are taking the threat of military coups seriously. The most important symbol of the fear for military coups is the “anti- coup” article in the new constitution of Nigeria: “The Federal Republic of Nigeria shall not be governed, nor shall any persons or group of persons take control of the Government of Nigeria or any part thereof, except in accordance with the provisions of this Constitution” (Section 1 (2), Federal Government of Nigeria, 1999 ). Another expression of the fear of coups is that legislators called for the removal of military barracks from Abuja in order to keep the military as far away from the centre of power as possible (Aiyede). While some fear military coups, others desire the military to come back in politics. Various politicians and former top generals have indicated that only the military is capable of ruling the country, that they regret that the military did not stage a coup in the last decade or that the

While the military has no reserved seats in parliament, a large pool of retired military officers have entered the political system at various levels, as is the case, for example, with former President Olusegun Obasanjo or the current President of the Senate David Mark – both are examples of influential retired military officers that occupy influential positions in politics. Nearly every parliamentary committee dealing with defense issues has a former military officer as a member. While not every retired military officer in parliament acts as an extended arm of the armed forces, it might create real or perceived conflicts of interest with negative consequences for the effectiveness of parliament as it gets too closely associated with the armed forces. Effective parliamentary oversight over the military is hindered by three further factors. First, parliamentary oversight is heavily fragmented with nine committees dealing with defense issues – four in the Senate and five in the National Assembly. The reason for this high amount of committees is that parliamentary committees are opportunities for patronage in terms of appointments, contracts and funds (Aiyede). Second, while the military-parliamentary liaison office (headed by a military officer) might facilitate oversight, it also increases the risk of the parliament becoming too dependent on information from the military, instead of information provided by other independent sources, notably civil society. Third, as is the case in Indonesia, the effectiveness of the parliament is diminished by the low re-election rate of members of parliament (less than 30%), which decreases the average experience and expertise of parliamentarians dealing with the oversight of the armed forces.

While both parliament and civil society can play an important role as independent watchdogs, the space for civil society to fulfil the functions of advocacy, education, informal oversight and independent monitoring of the military is very limited in Nigeria. As both Aiyede and Manea & R€uland point out, the activities of NGOs in Nigeria depend strongly on the space permitted by the military. Defense-related research and training institutions tightly control the experts and scholarly networks dealing with the armed forces in Nigeria. It is yet to be seen to what extent the recently adopted Freedom of Information Act in 2011 will facilitate research and investigatory journalism in defense-related matters due to greater access to information.

Nigeria Elite Recruitment