Human Right Violations and the Democratic Control of the Military

Human Right Violations and the Democratic Control of the Military

The first incident, a military raid on the village of Odi in November 1999, took place a few months after the democratic transition. The central government sought to prosecute suspects from Odi who allegedly had killed seven police officers. When the community failed to hand over the Youths the military attacked and destroyed Odi using armoured vehicles and tanks. Accounts of the death toll varied widely. While government sources reported 23 casualties, independent observers estimated that several hundred villagers had lost their lives in the attack (Interna- tional Crisis Group, 2006c , p. 6). Such events further increased the grievances of the Youths and strengthened militant groups (Watts, 2008 , p. 67), especially since there was no investigation in the Odi raid and no soldiers were prosecuted (Human Rights Watch, 2002 , p. 21). 38

37 Niger Delta Civil Society Coalition (NDCSC), 5 Sept 2008, http://www.wmd.org/documents/ 1008demnews10.pdf , accessed 19 February 2011.

38 The Nation, 31 October 2010, http://thenationonlineng.net/web3/Sunday-magazine/cover/ 17496.html , accessed 19 February 2011.

214 C.A. Lutz

The Odi incident brought a crucial problem of Nigerian civil-military relations to light: the lack of clear legislation over the deployment of troops. In the impeach- ment initiated by the House of Representatives against President Obasanjo in 2002, the latter was accused to have:

[. . ..] authorised the deployment of military troops to Odi to massacre innocent citizens without recourse to the National Assembly contrary to section 217(2) C of the 1999 Constitution which requires firstly for some conditions to be prescribed by an Act of the National Assembly for the use of the Military in that regard. 39

Obasajo, on the other hand, referred to section 218 (1) of the 1999 constitution and section 8(1) of the Armed Forces Act No. 105 of 1993, arguing that he is “not

required [. . .] to have recourse to the National Assembly”. 40 He further belittled the role of the National Assembly in the definition of the use of military by stating that:

Undoubtedly, it was not the intention of the framers of the Constitution that a Section of the country that is engulfed in crisis be allowed to degenerate and be destroyed only because the National Assembly is yet to enact an Act prescribing conditions under which the Armed Forces would operate when called upon to act in aid of civil authorities. And if the National Assembly has to enact laws for each situation the affected areas would have been completely destroyed before the Law is enacted. 41

This statement shows how Obasanjo places the operational effectiveness of the military over democratic control mechanisms. This is particularly crucial, as attacks like on Odi did not remain an isolated incident.

On 19 February 2005, soldiers of the JTF invaded Odioma village in Bayelsa State after an attack on a government delegation. The military opened fire on civilians, raped women, and pillaged the village (International Crisis Group, 2006c , p. 7). A similar raid occurred between 15 and 17 February 2005, on the Ijaw town Okerenkoko in an attempt to stop oil bunkering. As a result, the “[e]nraged youth all over Ijawland vowed revenge” (Okonta, 2005 , p. 12). The Youths’ radicalization as a reaction to military attacks is compounded by the entrenched impunity of soldiers and the lack of accountability for military actions. The Odioma raid was, in contrast to the Odi incident, examined by a judicial commission of inquiry, but the final report, handed over to Bayelsa State Governor Diepreye Alamieyeseigha in June 2005, was

never made public (Amnesty International, 2010 , p. 110). 42 The Chief of Defence Staff, Gen Andrew Azazi declared in 2008, that the invasion of Odioma was not authorized by the president and denied any involvement of the JTF in this incident. 43

39 Reps’ 17-point-charge against Obasanjo, September 2002, http://www.nigerdeltacongress.com/ rarticles/reps_17pointcharge_aginst_obasan.htm , accessed 19 February 2011.

40 Response of the President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria Chief Olusegun Obasanjo, GCFR, to Allegations made against him by the House of Representatives to the Peoples Democratic Party,

http://www.nigerdeltacongress.com/rarticles/response_to_house_of_representat.htm , accessed 19 February 2011.

41 Ibid. 42 Amnesty International, 19 February 2006, Public Statement, AFR 44/005/2006, p. 1. 43 Vanguard, 24 February 2008, http://groups.yahoo.com/group/Naija-news/message/4985 ,

10 The Niger Delta Conflict and Military Reform in Nigeria 215

Heavy clashes between the military and MEND also occurred in late 2010, when

19 days after an attack on JTF forces on 18 November 2010, the military invaded the town of Ayakoromo (Delta State) in order to arrest a militant leader. The operation allegedly claimed over 100 casualties and seemed to have been an attempt to take revenge for the eight soldiers killed in November. The JTF denies these claims, but also refused to provide an official death toll. Due to public pressure and media reports on genocide in Ayakoromo, an IYC delegation was

allowed to visit the town several days after the attack. 44 However, no official investigation was implemented to reveal the circumstances of the engagement by the JTF, triggering accusations that raids by the JTF are often not directed to enforce security. Civil society groups claim that the JTF has a habit of punishing communities which are believed to cooperate with militants after members of the security sector are killed by armed rebels. 45

These three incidents demonstrate major problems in the democratic control of the military: an unclear legislation on troop deployment, lack of transparency and accountability, as well as unauthorized operations by the military. This deplorable state of affairs is particularly disturbing in a situation like the large-scale military attack between May and June 2009. Senate Leader Teslim Folarin stated that his chamber was not even officially informed of the attacks in May 2009 and added that

“soldiers are reacting to the death of their own”. 46 With regard to the high level of engagement and the humanitarian consequences for non-militant residents, this act shows the dominance of executive decision-making in national security affairs, and the urgent need of a clear definition of the conditions for the use of military force in domestic affairs. The House of Representatives proposed such a bill in February

2009, but at the time of writing in early 2012 no act has been passed. 47 That such a bill is highly urgent was seen once again in January 2012, when President Goodluck Jonathan deployed soldiers in Lagos, in a response to local strikes against the

reduction of oil subsidies. 48 But if one considers the strong legislative support for

44 This Day, 19 November 2010, http://www.thisdaylive.com/articles/jtf-intensifies-raids-on- militants-camps/73836/ , accessed 19 February 2011; This Day, 8 December 2010, http://www.

thisdaylive.com/articles/ayakoromo-attack-the-truth-and-fiction/72425/ , accessed 19 February 2011; Stakeholder Democracy Network, Newswire Late 2010, p. 1.

45 Stakeholder Democracy Network, Newswire Late 2010, p. 1. 46 Nigerian Best Forum, 30 May 2009, http://www.nigerianbestforum.com/generaltopics/?

p¼5139 , accessed 19 February 2011; This Day, 30 May 2009, http://www.nigerianbestforum. com/generaltopics/?p¼6518 , accessed 19 February 2011.

47 A Bill for an Act to prescribe conditions under which the President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria can call out the Armed Forces to suppress insurrection and for related matters, http://www.

nass.gov.ng/nass2/legislation.php , accessed 10 February 2012. This Day, 24 February 2009, http:// allafrica.com/stories/200902250278.html , accessed 19 February 2011; Leadership, 25 February 2009, http://allafrica.com/stories/200902250472.html , accessed 19 February 2011.

48 GIN, 18 January 2012, http://saharareporters.com/news-page/nigeria-orders-troops-lagos-union- heads-cancel-strike , accessed 10 February 2012; Saturday Tribune, 21 January 2012, http://tribune.

com.ng/sat/index.php/politics-today/6402-when-can-a-president-deploy-troops-in-the-country.html ,

216 C.A. Lutz

the military engagement in the Niger Delta, it seems very unlikely that this bill is going to pass as long as the Niger Delta Conflict does not ease and civil authorities are more concerned about security restoration than democratic control.

A very illustrative example for the lack of interest in overseeing the Niger Delta operations of the military is the debate in the House of Representatives immediately after the first major military raids in May 2009. A motion to stop military operations in order to support the affected areas with relief material was quickly aborted by the

House of Representatives. 49 A prayer to “call on all parties to [sic] the Niger Delta confrontations to maintain peace” was rejected, as well as the amendment to “[u]rge the Joint Task Force to be discrete and efficient in the use of their Military

power”. 50 Instead, the House passed a resolution that supported the operations and, beyond that, favored the extension of military action to neighboring states. The majority of the House considered this as a necessary action in order to prevent a

relocation of militia camps. 51 Thus large-scale attacks of the military became a feature of Niger Delta politics with the blessing of the legislature. A popular, albeit cynical, argument of the supporters of the use of military force in the Niger Delta is that the Nigerian army is fully prepared to fight against rebels, because over 2,000 soldiers served in peacekeeping missions and gained experience in such

deployments. 52 Nevertheless, the argument of the northern representative, Mohammed Ibn N’Allah (People’s Democratic Party, PDP) that the Nigerian state “can do away with 20 million militants for the rest [sic] 120 million Nigerians

to live” 53 shows literally how geopolitical zones dominated parliamentary voting. The domestic use of military forces is supported by the legislature and political elites, especially from the northern part of Nigeria, as long as it is perceived to be promoting state security.