Opening Up the Space: Democratization, Military Reform and the Civil Society

Opening Up the Space: Democratization, Military Reform and the Civil Society

The process of Indonesia’s military reform began with, and was made possible by, the fall of the New Order regime in May 1998. With the collapse of the regime, the public immediately singled out the military and also former President Suharto himself, as the two main actors responsible for all the nation’s problems. In such circumstances, the military became the target of severe criticism from almost all segments of the society due to its role as the main perpetrator and willing execu- tioner of Suharto’s anti-democratic policies. The attacks and criticism on the

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military had centred primarily, but not exclusively, on the dwi fungsi doctrine which manifested itself in ABRI’s extensive and dominant role in politics. As the cases of the military’s abuse of power began to be revealed publicly, primarily in the form of human rights violations, the military’s role in politics, and, indeed, the dwi fungsi doctrine itself, was seen as an obstruction to democracy in Indonesia, and therefore, should be abolished (Haseman & Lachica, 2005 , p. 65).

Indeed, many ordinary Indonesians and the civilian elite had lost faith in an institution once revered as “the people’s army”. For ABRI itself, the abrupt end of President Suharto’s rule came as a shock. It was obvious that the ABRI leadership had failed to anticipate the scale of the political crisis and the depth of resentment against Suharto’s New Order government by the end of 1997 (Walters, 1999 , p. 60). In such circumstance, as the central pillar of Suharto’s power, ABRI found it difficult to escape the charge of being guilty by association. Seen from this context, ABRI’s close association with Suharto’s authoritarian rule has cost the institution dearly. With the departure of Suharto from power, its privileged position within the state guaranteed by the New Order regime was now seriously contested. Indeed, for the first time since the country’s independence, the Indonesian military was presented with an acute sense of uncertainty regarding its place and future role in post-Suharto Indonesia.

However, at the beginning of the Era Reformasi (reform era), no one outside the military seemed to know how to initiate military reform. While pro-reform civilian forces were still outside the government, the new civilian government was not prepared to challenge the military directly. Indeed, under Suharto’s immediate successor, President BJ Habibie, the reform of the military was very much left to ABRI leadership itself. Under General Wiranto (both as Minister of Defense and ABRI Commander-in-Chief), ABRI soon embarked upon a series of initiatives aimed at restoring its image by issuing an internal guideline for reform called Paradigma Baru ABRI or The New Paradigm of the Indonesian Armed Forces. It envisaged that ABRI’s reformasi internal would be based on four principles: (1) it is not always necessary for the military to be at the forefront of politics; (2) the military no longer seeks to “occupy” positions in the state but would only “influence” government decisions; (3) the method to influence the political process would be changed from “directly” to “indirectly”, and (4) the military would act upon the principle of “role- sharing” (a partnership in making decisions on important state and governmental affairs) with other national components. Through the introduction of this New Paradigm, the military leadership clearly expected that ABRI’s tarnished image would soon be restored and the institution’s place in a new Indonesia secured (for more on the early stages of Indonesia’s military reform, see also the contributions of Sebastian & Iisgindarsah and R€uland & Manea in this volume).

The initiative by ABRI to initiate and shape the direction of its own reform was made possible by the nature of democratic transition in Indonesia itself. In this context, it is important to note that the departure of President Suharto from power had not immediately meant the complete removal of the political system he had created 32 years ago. Regime change in May 1998 did not immediately lead to a

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collapse of the New Order regime in its entirety. It is an “intrasystemic transfer of power” from President Suharto to his Vice President B.J. Habibie that “avoided the complete destruction of the regime and allowed many of its key components, including the armed forces, to make a relatively smooth transfer into the new

polity” (Mietzner, 2006 , p. 5, 2009 , 2011a , b ). It was a negotiated regime change, especially between the military, the regime and the opposition forces, that “avoided

a sharp break with the political power structure that had underpinned the regime” (Mietzner, 2006 , p. 7). The negotiation was made possible by the absence of unity among opposition forces, particularly among three main groups led by three influential figures: Amien Rais-led modernist Islam, Abdurrahman Wahid-led traditional Islam, and Megawati- led nationalist-secular groups. In fact, the three opposition groups were locked in a political competition and rivalry and opted to support the interim government-led process of gradual reform for fear of social anarchy and public disorder. Within such political context, elements of the previous regime, including the military, managed to create a space for a continuous negotiation with the opposition elites “who had been for years on the fringes of political power” (Mietzner, 2006 , p. 7, 2009 ). The influence and power of the key obstacle to the democratization process in the previous regime – the military – was left intact and, in fact, was allowed not only to define and shape its own course of reform, but also determine the pace and directions of reform.

Indeed, a clear guidance from civilian institutions on how the military reform should be carried out was conspicuously absent. Indonesia’s highest law-making civilian body, the People’s Consultative Assembly (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat, MPR), only provided a general direction for military reform in the form of

two decrees: MPR Decree No. VI/2000 and No. VII/2000 (MPR-RI 2000a , b ). While Decree No. VI/2000 mandates the separation of the police from the military, 1 the Decree No. VII/2000 sets out to distinguish the functions that the police and the military should perform. The MPR Decree No. VII/2000 stipulates that the (internal) security function (keamanan) is now assigned to the police, while the military is only responsible for defense (pertahanan). The MPR does not specify how this division should be carried out, and what changes are required to implement the two decrees. More importantly, the two decrees fail to mention the need to establish an objective civilian control over the military as the core objective of military reform. Conse- quently, the military was virtually given a free-hand in initiating its own reform.

Outside the formal political process, however, the military found itself in a difficult position from which to re-dominate the whole process without facing strong resistance from the resurgence of civilian politics. Student demonstrations continued to call for the complete withdrawal of the military from politics. Even though the military remained influential, the proliferation of new civilian power

1 The Indonesian Police was part of the military until its separation in April 1999, an initiative taken by the military itself before the MPR issued a decree mandating the military to do so. In the

same year, the military also changed its name from ABRI to the Indonesian Defense Forces (Tentara Nasional Indonesia, TNI).

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centres – especially the emergence of new political parties and pro-democracy NGOs – was also inevitable. On the other hand, despite their suspicion of the motives behind ABRI’s self-styled reform, civilian forces were unable to ask the military to simply go “back to the barracks”. Both pro-democracy opposition forces and the new civilian government, as mentioned earlier, were not prepared to take the lead and in fact continued to accommodate the military’s corporate interests (Callahan, 1999 ). On its part, the military refused to go further beyond what it had

already promised to do. 2 Consequently, by the end of 1999, the military and pro- democracy forces found themselves in a deadlock. Both sides had to negotiate their respective agendas in determining the nature of the civil-military relationship in post-Suharto Indonesia. The most difficult issue during this negotiation process had been on the problem of redefining the function, the place and role of the military within a new democratic Indonesia. The process of reform had thus far not guaranteed that the Indonesian military would never return to politics in the future.

The state of reform, and the pace with which it proceeded, worried pro-democracy elements within the civil society – particularly NGO activists and academics – who had taken part in the reform movement even in the years preceding the onset of democratization. They have worked on the prospects and the need for democratic change in Indonesia through various means: direct participation in the democratic movements, policy advocacy, and conducting research and studies on the issue. Focus on the military dimension of democratic reform, however, is still limited. As the prospects for military reform became uncertain in the late 1999, some academicians and NGO activists began to see the need for putting together a coordinated effort to address the issue. The opening up of political space after the collapse of New Order regime provided an opportunity for their involvement. It was within that context that a coalition of civil society elements began to take form at the end of 1999.