Internal Security

Internal Security

In 2000, in order to professionalize the security sector, the parliament passed a law giving the military the responsibility for national defense. Additionally, the police were separated from the military and given the mandate to deal with maintaining internal security. It was an attempt to get the TNI back in the barracks without involvement in domestic policy or policing. This was a severe blow to the military as it had seen itself as the prime security providing institution against domestic and external threats. For the military, internal security, and national defense are an inseparable “gray zone”. Moreover, taking the internal security tasks away from the military also denies the military access to economic resources and rent-seeking activities. Indeed, with the police having a greater responsibility for internal security, it carved out for itself a greater share of the spoils that the TNI formerly enjoyed (Mietzner & Misol). However, rising communal violence, separatism (mainly in Aceh) and terrorist attacks paved the way for the TNI to re-enter the realm of domestic policing. Some even believed that rogue military elements were behind violence in various parts of Indonesia, in an attempt to destabilize the young democracy (R€uland & Manea). For example, Honna details in his chapter how the army with excessive force tried to undermine the ceasefire agreement in Aceh which the Wahid government had negotiated in 2000. Parliament did not hold the TNI accountable for its covert operations in Aceh. On the contrary, because national unity was at stake, the majority of parliamentarians sided with the armed forces and gave the military full discretion over its operations (R€uland & Manea). Furthermore, while the responsibility for anti-terrorism activities was given to the police after the Bali bombings of 2003, the military was able to take much of it back by integrating all anti-terrorism efforts into one unit (called BNPT), directly under the president, in 2010 (Honna). This signifies a long-term strategy of the military to restore its role in domestic security by branding the forces behind separatism and terrorism as enemies of the state that must be countered by military force.

11 Reviving Security Sector Reform in Transition . . . 229

External Security

On paper, civilian supremacy over external defense and security policy seems to

be well established. Law No. 2/2002 regulates, among other issues, the role and authority of the Ministry of defense in defense policy making. Consequently, the Ministry of defense released four official documents in 2008: one each on defense doctrine, strategy and posture as well as a fourth, the defense white paper, in 2008. In reality, however, the military still plays the dominant role in this area with little input from civilian authorities, let alone from civil society groups (Sukma). Furthermore, in terms of military deployments abroad (and at home), Law No. 34/ 2004, for instance, stipulates that the TNI cannot deploy a military task force without approval of the president and that the DPR needs to be informed of military deployments within 48 hours. However, the provisions of this law are incomplete, as they hold no obligation on the part of the president to determine the strategic objective, time limit and operational terms of the military operation, nor the rules of engagement. Without these provisions, there are no parameters for parliament to approve or reject the president’s decision. Furthermore, there are no provisions to promote parliamentary oversight over the scope and direction of military operations (Sebastian & Iisgindarsah).