Democratic Control of the Military Through Constitutional Amendments and Legislation

Democratic Control of the Military Through Constitutional Amendments and Legislation

Since Nigerians acknowledge the Constitution as the most important act regulating the defense sector, it would be logical to expect that civilian actors will try to amend the military-drafted 1999 Constitution after the return to democracy. Although

68 M.-G. Manea and J. R€uland constitutional debates indeed started soon after regime change, they only margin-

ally touched upon civil-military relations (Fayemi, 2002b , p. 227; Nwanko, 2003 , p. 95). In June 1999, the Centre for Democracy and Development (CDD), a civil society forum, organized a high-profile conference on “Constitution and the Future of Democracy in Nigeria” that launched the formation of the Citizens’ Forum for

Constitutional Reform as a pressure group lobbying for a new constitution. 38 The President also appointed an expert commission under Clement Ebri (a former

Governor of Cross River state) to study amendments to the 1999 Constitution (Abia, 2008 , p. 172), followed by the Nigerian National Assembly which established a bicameral review committee in 2001. Instead of easing the constitu- tional review, the existence of multiple forums rather contributed to its deadlock, especially due to an intensifying dispute between the House of Representatives and the presidency over budgetary powers. The government-installed Ebri Commission proposed the inclusion of a provision retroactively sanctioning coup makers with the argument that, although the constitution in Article 1 (2) outlaws coups, it does not provide for sanctions for such an offence (Abia, 2008 , p. 172). This proposed amendment would have made coup attempts punishable as an act of treason and empowered every Nigerian to resist them (ibid., p. 172). In spite of wide support in the legislature and amongst the public, this article together with other amendments was eventually aborted in an attempt to resist the inclusion of a constitutional clause on a third term at the request of President Obasanjo (ibid., p. 172). More surprising, however, is the Nigerian public’s view that with regard to military affairs the

Constitution is clear beyond doubt. 39 It putatively regulates the functions of the armed forces comprehensively so that – except for a strengthening of the anti-coup clause – there is no urgent need for constitutional amendments (Yoroms, 2005 , pp. 178, 179).

Similar to constitutional amendments, reforming the military through enactment of new legislation remained a largely unused policy medium. Only the special committee set up by House Speaker Na’Abba in order to study how civil-military relations in Nigeria can be improved proposed four bills entrusting the military with developmental functions. Although the House of Representatives eventually passed the bills, there was no more time for the Senate to consider them before its term expired in early 2003. The newly elected National Assembly never tabled

them again. 40 The bills were strongly associated with Speaker Na’Abba, who launched the most forceful of several impeachment challenges against President Obasanjo in August 2002 (Oyewo, 2004 , p. 112) 41 and in the 2003 elections lost his parliamentary mandate.

38 This Day, Sunday Newspaper, 21 October 2001, p. 30. 39 See also (International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance 2000:186). 40 Authors’ interview, 23 February 2009. 41 Tell, 1 July 2002 pp. 30–32; 2 September 2002, pp. 22–29, 16 September 2002, pp. 31–44, 30

September 2002, pp. 22–25; Newswatch, 23 September 2002, pp. 20–29; The Lawmaker, Vol. 6, No. 119, 2nd Half, May, 2005, p. 22.

3 Taking Stock of Military Reform in Nigeria 69

These bills were an attempt to legalize the involvement of the military in some areas of civilian governance and business. Inspired by early modernization theory they sought to harness professional capacities of the armed forces such as engineer- ing, construction, medical services and disaster management to the benefit of society. The promoters of this legislative package believed that such an extended mission would give the military dignity and distract it from political ambitions. However, such views which, as Elaigwu argues, are in line with age-honoured African traditions on civil-military relations, were at variance with the Western security sector paradigm (on this debate, see also the contribution of Isawa Jonah Elaigwu in this volume).

Beyond this, the rest of military legislation only had a symbolic value unable to intrude upon the military domain. One such example is the Nigerian Military Act, a decree first issued in 1993 under military rule that was enacted into law by the National Assembly without any attempt at revision in spite of occasional critical

voices in the parliament. 42 Similarly, the law renaming the National War College to the National Defense College was mainly a symbolic exercise. Only in 2009 did the National Assembly table a more significant bill specifying the conditions under which the president is allowed to deploy troops for the purpose of quelling civil disturbances, which, if passed, would increase the oversight powers of the National Assembly on force deployment. 43