PERMUFAKATAN PERHIMPUNAN POLITIK KEBANGSAAN IN-

DONESIA (PPPKI, Confederation of Indonesian Political Organiza- tions). Conference of nationalist groups, especially the Partai Nasional

Indonesia (PNI), Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia (PSII), Budi

Utomo, and Paguyuban Pasundan, formed in Bandung in December 1927 to give a relatively united voice to the nationalist movement. Deci- sions were taken by exhaustive deliberation (musyawarah), intended to avoid the imposition of majority views on minorities. In April 1929 the PPPKI recognized the Perhimpunan Indonesia (PI) as its representa- tive in the Netherlands. The term Permufakatan in its title changed in 1930 to Persatuan (Unity, Association) and the word Kebangsaan (Na- tionality) to Kemerdekaan (Freedom) in 1933. The PPPKI strongly opposed the restrictive labor regulations of the time (see COOLIE OR- DINANCE) and promoted nationalist education, but its internal diversity prevented it from acting decisively. In 1933 the colonial government refused to permit its annual conference, and the PPPKI with- ered. See also GABUNGAN POLITIK INDONESIA. [0613, 0661]

PERSATUAN BANGSA INDONESIA (PBI, Association of the Indone- sian People). Successor to one of the study clubs of Sutomo, formed in 1930 to promote self-help among Indonesians. It was involved in the promotion of cooperatives, education, and village banks and credit unions. In 1935 it merged with Budi Utomo to form the Partai Indone- sia Raya. [0661, 0888]

PERSATUAN INDONESIA RAYA (PIR, Greater Indonesian Associa- tion). Conservative party of civil servants and aristocrats founded in 1948. In 1953 it split over the issue of participation in the government of Ali Sastroamijoyo, and two PIRs, under respectively Hazairin and Wongsonegoro, competed in the 1955 elections, losing heavily. [0695]

PERSATUAN ISLAM (Persis, Islamic Union). Modernist Muslim organization founded in Bandung in 1923. It opposed nationalism on the

340 • PERSATUAN PERJUANGAN grounds that it divided Islam and because it was Western and humanist

in origin. It was active in establishing Muslim schools and was strongest in West Java. Its leaders included Mohammad Natsir. In 1939 it joined the Majelis Islam A’laa Indonesia (MIAI). [1023]

PERSATUAN PERJUANGAN (PP, Struggle Union). Coalition of radical nationalist organizations formed on 4–5 January 1946 to oppose the Re- publican government’s negotiations with the Dutch and Mohammad Hatta’s attempts to create a multiparty state rather than uniting Indonesian forces into a national front. Tan Malaka’s ideas of total struggle inspired the PP and the organization was supported at first by the army commander,

Sudirman. The movement brought down the first cabinet of Sutan Sjahrir

in February 1946, but was unable to agree on a coalition to replace him, partly because Sukarno moved deftly to break its fragile consensus on what should be done. On 17 March 1946 the government arrested Tan Malaka and some of his most prominent supporters. The PP then disinte- grated, though some of its members were involved later in 1946 in an am- biguous confrontation with Sukarno known as the 4 July Affair, and even- tually formed the core of the Gerakan Rakyat Revolusi (GRR, Revolutionary People’s Movement) and the Murba. [0643, 0674, 0807]

PERSATUAN TARBYIAH ISLAMIYAH (Perti, Islamic Education Asso- ciation). Founded in West Sumatra in 1930 to combat the influence of modernist Islamic associations, Perti was an organization of Minangk- abau and Acehnese Islamic traditionalists, based in religious centers and pesantren . Similar in style to the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), it was willing to trade its support on general political issues for specific concessions to Is- lam. It retained its major strength in West Sumatra, where it ran second to Masjumi in the 1955 elections. In the regional unrest of 1957, it sided first with the dissidents, then when the PRRI/Permesta was proclaimed in 1958 it shifted to the government side. Under Guided Democracy, it strongly supported the president and was sometimes considered pro-Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI); its leader H. Sirajuddin Abbas frequently vis- ited communist countries and was briefly detained because of alleged in- volvement in the Gestapu coup. After his release he returned to a leading position in the Perti, which was heavily purged after 1966. In 1973 it was merged into the Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP). [0695, 0807]

PERTAMINA (Perusahaan Tambang Minyak Negara, State Oil Mining Company). Created in 1969 as a state-owned monopoly with the task of

PERTAMINA • 341 managing the country’s oil and gas development, Pertamina was In-

donesia’s sole state oil company, responsible for managing concessions and production-sharing agreements but little involved in production itself. Oil was already an important source of discretionary funds for Suharto’s government early in the New Order, but the sudden increase in oil prices in 1973 gave Pertamina under its president-director Ibnu Su- towo (1914–2001) enormous wealth that was funneled, along with bor- rowed funds, into a wide range of development projects and economic ventures, including an air service, Pelita, telecommunications, real estate, and the P. T. Krakatau Steel works in Cilegon, West Java. Sutowo was close to the Centre for Strategic and International Studies

(CSIS) think tank, which promoted import substitution industrializa-

tion rather than comparative advantage trading, and his freewheeling style attracted admiration from economic nationalists and condemnation from the so-called technocrats of Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Nasional (Bappenas). An investigation in 1970 criticized Pertamina sharply for loose auditing, for failure to pass on profits to the government, and for the luxurious lifestyle of its senior executives.

In March 1975 Pertamina was unable to meet payment on some short- term debts and a Bappenas investigation under J. B. Sumarlin revealed a huge debt problem (US$10.5 billion), brought about by corruption, op- timism, incompetence, and waste. Sutowo was dismissed from his post in 1976 and replaced by General Piet Haryono. Pertamina’s activities outside the oil business were curtailed and an austerity policy was introduced, so that the firm was solvent once more by 1978. In 1980 the In- donesian government took legal action in Singapore to try to recover allegedly corrupt income from the estate of the former Pertamina employee H. Tahir. But Pertamina retained its power because it was a critical source of capital for Suharto’s family and cronies, giving some of the president’s children their start in business through lucrative deals that included exclusive distribution contracts. It was estimated that in two years in the mid-1990s, Pertamina lost nearly $5 billion due to inef- ficiency and corruption.

After Suharto’s fall, the government made an effort to break up Perta- mina’s oil monopoly, with the B. J. Habibie administration failing in an attempt in 1999 to place major foreign oil firms directly under the Min- istry of Mines and Energy. In June 2000 the ministry tried again, draw- ing up legislation to break Pertamina’s monopoly by handing the control of production-sharing contracts to an agency created under the office of the president. In October 2001 the legislature passed an Oil and Gas Act,

342 • PESANTREN giving Pertamina two years to transform itself into a state-owned com-

mercial enterprise, relinquishing control over foreign and local oil com- panies and surrendering its downstream role to a separate regulatory agency (while maintaining control over its LNG contracts). But it was unclear whether the Megawati Sukarnoputri administration would have any more success than previous administrations in curbing the powerful company. In October 2002 the company signed an $8.5 billion deal to supply China with LNG from the Tanggung field in Papua. [0375, 0400, 0405, 0736, 0951]

PESANTREN. Called surau in Minangkabau and dajah in Aceh, these are traditional rural Islamic schools, headed by a kyai (religious teacher). Formerly, influenced by the style of Hindu-Buddhist asrama, pesantren instructed resident pupils in religious knowledge and mystical practice, emphasizing absolute submission to both Allah and the kyai. In the 19th century, influenced by returning pilgrims from Mecca (see HAJ), they took on the role of more formal religious instruction, though without dis- carding their primarily religious orientation. In the 1920s classroom teaching and a partly secular curriculum were introduced. The first pesantren for female students was opened at Jombang (East Java) in 1924.

In the early 20th century, the place of pesantren as the main providers of Muslim religious education on Java was challenged by madrasah, many of which were sponsored by the modernist Muhammadiyah, which disliked the traditionalist teaching in the pesantren.

Although reliable enrollment figures are not available for many of the pesantren and madrasah in the postwar period, they have continued to provide a significant part of the education of Indonesian children since 1945. Pesantren were valued both because of the moral values they taught and because they contributed to local social cohesion. Enroll- ments in Islamic schools apparently declined under the New Order but have had growing influence in the post-Suharto years. [0045, 1273, 1283, 1352]

PETITION OF FIFTY (Petisi Lima Puluh). In March and April 1980 President Suharto made speeches implying that he was the embodiment of Pancasila, describing it as under threat from nationalism, religion, and other ideologies, and calling on the armed forces to defend it against these challenges. The speeches aroused special alarm in two dissident groups whose members were generally associated with the establishment of the New Order in 1965–1966, namely, the Forum Studi dan Komu-

PHILIPPINES • 343 nikasi (FOSKO), including H. R. Dharsono, and Lembaga Kesadaran

Berkonstitusi (LKB, Institute for Constitutional Awareness), including

A. H. Nasution and Ali Sadikin. In response, a group of 50 former gen- erals, politicians, academics, students, and others, including Nasution, Sadikin, Mohammad Natsir, and Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, signed a petition dated 5 May 1980 expressing concern about the speeches and inviting the Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat (MPR) to “review” them. The government reacted strongly to this criticism, banning news coverage of the petitioners, preventing them from traveling, and depriv- ing firms associated with them of their government contracts. [0733]

PETRUS (Pembunuhan Misterius, mysterious killings, or Penembakan Mis- terius mysterious shootings). An acronym given to a paramilitary operation lasting for two years from March 1983 to curb the incidence of violent crime, in which at least 5,000 and perhaps more than 10,000 people la- beled criminals were murdered in a number of Indonesia’s main cities, be- ginning in Yogyakarta. The operation was probably planned and organ- ized by Benny Murdani and the Komando Operasi Pemulihan Keamanan dan Ketertiban (Kopkamtib), which he then headed. [0721, 0734, 0969]

PHILIPPINES. The Austronesian people reached Indonesia through the Philippines (see MIGRATIONS), and contacts between the southern islands and eastern Indonesia remained strong, especially in trade. In the 17th century the Dutch and Spanish fought for influence in Mindanao, and the Dutch alliance with the Mindanao sultanate was partly responsible for its emergence as paramount power in the region. After the United States conquered the Philippines in 1898, the Americans initially saw the Netherlands Indies as offering many lessons in the management of a tropical colony, and American welfare expenditure in the Philippines found echoes in the Ethical Policy. As the Philippines progressed toward self-government, however, the Dutch grew increasingly uneasy, fearing both encouragement for Indonesian nationalism and possible southward expansion by Japan. These fears were heightened by the visit of Manuel Quezon to Indonesia in 1934 and the later founding of a (short-lived) Pan-Malayan People’s Union under Philippine leadership. During the In- donesian Revolution, Manila was an important source of supplies for the beleaguered Republic.

Since 1950, Indonesia and the Philippines have combined to limit commerce and other traffic across their borders, so as to discourage links

344 • PIAGAM JAKARTA between the Muslim Moro rebels in Mindanao and Sulu and radical Mus-

lims in Indonesia, and between Christian communities in Minahasa and the northern Philippines. But during the PRRI/Permesta rebellion, American and rebel pilots made use of bases in the Philippines to bomb sites in eastern Indonesia, raising tensions between the two countries. The two did, however, cooperate in 1963 in initial opposition to the establishment of Malaysia and in attempting to realize Philippine Presi- dent Diosdado Macapagal’s concept of Maphilindo, an effort that failed though it contributed to the later formation of the Association of South- east Asian Nations (ASEAN). As another archipelagic nation, the Philippines has strongly supported Indonesia’s archipelagic concept, but has been in dispute with Indonesia over jurisdiction over seas around the Indonesian island of Miangas, off Mindanao, known by the Filipinos as Las Palmas. [0833, 1106]

PIAGAM JAKARTA (Jakarta Charter). See ISLAMIC STATE, DE- MANDS FOR.

PIG (Sus scrofa). Until the 20th century, it is difficult to distinguish ac- counts of the introduced domestic pig from those of indigenous warty pigs (S. verrucosus of Java, S. barbatus on Kalimantan and Sumatra, and S. celebensis on Sulawesi). It seems likely, however, that S. celebensis was the first species to be domesticated and was taken by people to Timor and that the pigs of Papua are a stable hybrid of S. celebensis and S. scrofa developed between 8000 and 4000 B.C. Wild pigs were an important food source for most peoples until the arrival of Islam, and Dou- glas Miles has shown that the adoption of Islam among Dayaks has had significant nutritional effects. Feral and warty pigs are widespread in the archipelago and seem to do best where human cultivation provides abun- dant accessible food. Since the early 1970s, the introduction of the pig tapeworm Taenia solium into Papua has had serious health conse- quences. See also TIGER. [1154]

PIRACY. A distinction between the regular depredations of the state and the irregular depredations of criminals was slower to emerge on the sea than on land in traditional Indonesia (see BANDITRY). “Piracy,” in the form of waterborne raids against neighboring communities and the plun- dering of passing vessels, formed an important part of the political order in maritime societies in Indonesia (see also HONGI RAIDS). It pro- vided an important source of income in the form of products and slaves

PLURAL SOCIETY • 345 (see SLAVERY), and within communities it established the social basis

for rule by pirate chiefs. It also gave successful chiefs the means to sub- jugate rivals and to regularize their plunder by guaranteeing safe passage through their sphere of influence in exchange for a fixed payment. The suppression of piracy and the subjugation of rivals were thus often two sides of the same coin. Conversely, when trade declined or departed, kingdoms often returned to piracy. Although this approached a system of customs collection, war vessels were often still needed to force passing merchant vessels to call at the required port. This system was adopted by the Portuguese on their arrival in the East.

From the early 19th century Dutch and British colonial authorities, in the name of free trade, worked not just to suppress slavery and unam- biguous piratical activities but also to prevent local rulers from collect- ing customs dues. For much of the 19th century, Dutch efforts to crush piracy were impeded by the fact that people moved freely between piracy and other occupations, and were thus often easily able to evade attempts at capture. By the early 20th century, however, piracy was in retreat, in part because Europeans were able to hunt down the pirates’ ships with steam-powered vessels that were able to sail against the wind and also because the colonial state had spread its control to many of the periph- eral areas that harbored the pirates. Occasional incidents of piracy con- tinue to occur in the Strait of Melaka. It was reported that more than a quarter of the world’s 445 major piracy incidents in 2003 occurred in In- donesian waters, including the Melaka Strait. [0637, 0833]

PIRES, TOMÉ (1468-1539?). Portuguese apothecary and author of the Suma Oriental, which describes his residence in Melaka from 1512 to 1515. Rediscovered in 1937, this work is a major account of daily life and political and economic conditions in Southeast Asia in this period. [0082]

PLAGUE. See BUBONIC PLAGUE. PLANNING, ECONOMIC. See ECONOMY; GUIDED ECONOMY;

RENCANA PEMBANGUNAN LIMA TAHUN. PLURAL SOCIETY. Term coined by J. S. Furnivall to characterize a so-

ciety in which “two or more elements or social orders . . . live side by side . . . without mingling in one political unit,” by which he was refer- ring to the legal and social separation of ethnic groups in the Netherlands Indies. See DUALISM; LAW. [0606]

346 • POENALE SANCTIE POENALE SANCTIE. See COOLIE ORDINANCE. POLICE. Until the 20th century, police tasks in the Netherlands Indies were

primarily the responsibility of local authorities. Indonesian officials com- manded their own local police squads under a variety of names, the officers of Chinese communities were in charge of policing their own people, and policing functions in the European community lay largely with the civil bureaucracy itself, while all policing forces were backed ulti- mately by the colonial army (see KONINKLIJK NEDERLANDSCH INDISCH LEGER; LAW; MARÉCHAUSSÉE; NATIVE TROOPS). Some centralization of policing was achieved with the creation of mobile “armed police” (gewapende politie) in 1897, but it was only after the establishment of the Office of the Attorney-General (Procureur-Generaal) that central control of the police emerged. The police force nonetheless remained divided into distinct rural police (veldpolitie, who absorbed the gewapende politie in 1920), urban police (stadspolitie), and political (Politiek Inlichtingen Dienst) sections.

The Japanese (1942–1945) dismissed some senior staff from the Dutch period and handed political surveillance to the Kenpeitai, but oth- erwise preserved and strengthened the police force. During the Revolu- tion (1945–1949), the police were at first formally under the control of the Internal Affairs ministry but shifted in July 1946 to the Prime Minis- ter’s Office. Much of the police force, however, was dispersed by social revolutions, and a multitude of local police forces emerged, generally at- tached to regional armed forces, regular and irregular. Dual control by Internal Affairs and the prime minister was established in 1950, but in 1962 the police were formally militarized and placed under the authority of the armed forces commander.

After the fall of Suharto, tensions rose between the police and armed forces particularly over the violence in Maluku and other regions, and moves began in 1999 to separate the police from the army and place them under civilian control, a division that formally went into effect in April 1999 but was not completed until early 2001. The effectiveness of the 190,000-strong police force was hindered by its insufficient numbers and lack of training, and there was dissatisfaction among younger officers with police chief Surojo Bimantoro. However, when President Ab- durrachman Wahid attempted to dismiss Bimantoro in June 2001 and ordered the deputy chief to assume command, 100 top police officers de- fied him and were instrumental in Wahid’s downfall the following month. The police were expected to have a better relationship with Pres-

POLITICAL CULTURE • 347

ident Megawati Sukarnoputri, but it was unclear whether they would

be any more effective in their peacekeeping functions. Tension continued between the police and the army, particularly over internal security re- sponsibilities, with the most violent clash breaking out in North Suma- tra on 30 September 2002, allegedly over control of the marijuana trade, when a five-hour gun battle between them resulted in eight people dead and more than 20 wounded.

Mocked for their ineptitude in the pursuit of Tommy Suharto (see SUHARTO FAMILY), the police gained more respect in their investigation of the Bali bombings and other terrorist actions when, working in conjunction with investigators sent from the United States and Aus- tralia, they succeeded in capturing and bringing to trial a number of suspected leaders of the terrorist network. See also BAKIN. [0635, 0653]

“POLICE ACTIONS” (Politionele acties). Military operations launched

by the Netherlands Indies against the Indonesian Republic in Java and Sumatra on 21 July 1947 and 19 December 1948. They were called police actions to stress their allegedly internal character and to avoid giving the Indonesian Republic the formal recognition as belligerent im- plied by an act of war. The first, called Operation Product, was aimed primarily at seizing plantation areas to improve the parlous financial sit- uation of the colonial government. The resulting demarcation line was known as the van Mook line and left the Republic on Java crowded into heavily populated parts of the island’s center and east and Banten. On Sumatra, the Dutch did no more than significantly expand their coastal enclaves in east, west, and south Sumatra. The second Police Action was intended to destroy the Republic, and Dutch troops entered all regions except Aceh. Guerrilla warfare (see GERILYA), however, kept Dutch forces too thinly spread to consolidate their initial advances, and international pressure brought the Dutch to negotiate once more with the Re- public, leading to the Round Table Conference. Indonesian texts generally refer to the “police actions” as Agresi or Clash I and II. [0660, 0661]

POLITICAL CULTURE. The proposition that shared cultural values can

lead to a shared attitude toward politics is a plausible one and has led many analysts, Indonesian and foreign, to argue for the existence of a distinctive Indonesian political culture. A major objection to this has tra- ditionally been the ethnic and cultural diversity of the archipelago. The

348 • POLITICAL PARTIES Dutch in particular saw pronounced cultural dissimilarities among the

peoples of the colony and at times claimed on this basis that only their rule would preserve Indonesian unity. The argument, however, is generally not that particular values are universally held, but that they are dominant values that to a greater or lesser extent establish the terms on which people must operate politically. Hildred Geertz identified a “metropoli- tan super-culture” as providing such dominant values.

Indonesian political leaders have often argued that the collectivist village culture of traditional Indonesia leads to a preference for consensual politics with especial attention being given to the wisdom of the elders in society (see DESA; MUSYAWARAH; SUKARNO), making Indone- sia unsuited to the supposedly adversarial style of Western party politics. Under the New Order, this has led to the labeling of criticism of Presi- dent Suharto and his family as un-Indonesian (see SUBVERSION). Other observers, such as Mochtar Lubis, have argued that Indonesian political culture is characterized by a feudal deference to constituted authority, while still others have seen this deferential submissiveness (nrimo) as typical only of Javanese society and as contrasting with more dynamic and independent styles in the other islands.

Western observers have been intrigued by apparent parallels in style between both Sukarno and Suharto on the one hand and traditional Ja- vanese kings on the other. Most of the parallels refer to elements of in- dividual style: Sukarno’s monument building (especially the lingga-like National Monument in Jakarta; see SEX, POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF), his unification of seeming irreconcilables, and his sexual encoun- ters; Suharto’s reluctance to exercise his power visibly; both leaders’ em- phasis on unity, the centralization of authority, and the use of powerful words; and both leaders’ avoidance of naming a successor. The principal objection to this line of argument is that it provides at best only a partial explanation of those leaders’ actions and that much of the behavior involved can be explained in terms of realpolitik calculations. [0132, 0891, 0896, 0897, 0906, 0926]

POLITICAL PARTIES. See PARTIES, POLITICAL. POLITICAL POLICE. See BAKIN; INTELLIGENCE SERVICES;

KENPEITAI; POLITIEK INLICHTINGEN DIENST. POLITICAL PRISONERS. See BOVEN DIGUL; EXILE; TAHANAN

PERMUFAKATAN PERHIMPUNAN POLITIK KEBANGSAAN IN-