NETHERLANDS, CONSTITUTIONAL RELATIONSHIP WITH IN-

NETHERLANDS, CONSTITUTIONAL RELATIONSHIP WITH IN-

DONESIA. From shortly after the first Dutch trading expeditions to the archipelago, Dutch power in the region was represented almost exclu-

NETHERLANDS, CONSTITUTIONAL RELATIONSHIP WITH INDONESIA • 295 sively by the Dutch East Indies Company (VOC) under a charter from

the Netherlands States General. On rare occasions, the Dutch govern- ment itself dispatched one or more commissioners-general to the East to act on its behalf, but for the most part it left the company with un- trammeled freedom of action in the region. The company’s possessions, however, were not thought of as strictly sovereign, since they derived neither from older ideas of divine appointment nor from newer ideas of popular assent. In practice, moreover, under the racially based legal or- der (see RACE) in VOC territories, the company exercised much less than full sovereign power. Even in 1795, when the Batavian Republic took over the assets of the VOC, it seems to have regarded them as pri- marily commercial rather than territorial and sovereign, though by that time the company was already the dominant power on Java.

From 1795 to 1815, the constitutional relationship remained confused and often vague. Until 1800, States General ruled formally through the VOC. When the company’s charter lapsed in 1800, the colony came un- der direct rule, but the Napoleonic Wars and later British occupation of Java made this of little significance. A Ministry of Colonies was formed in 1806, though it was often united with other departments, especially that of the navy, until 1842. From 1815 to 1848 the Ministry of Colonies, and thus the colony itself, was directly under the authority of the Dutch king, who used his position and shareholding in the Nederlandsche Handel Maatschappij (NHM) to make a considerable personal fortune. In the late 1820s the post of commissioner-general, as representative of the Dutch government, was first united with that of governor-general, as agent of the Ministry of Colonies, and then abandoned.

In the 20th century the Netherlands Indies gradually developed as a state distinct from the Netherlands. In 1903 the colonial treasury was separated from that of the Netherlands, and in 1913 the colonial govern- ment received the right to contract public loans. The colonial govern- ment established quasi-diplomatic representation in Arabia (in connec- tion with Muslim pilgrimage, see HAJ). Governors-General J. B. van Heutsz (1904–1909), A. W. F. Idenburg (1909–1916), and J. P. G. van Limburg Stirum (1916–1921) increasingly defended what they saw as Indies interests (which were not necessarily the interests of the indige- nous population) against those of the metropolis. The establishment of the Volksraad in 1918 gave a quasi-democratic weight to those Indies government actions that it supported. In 1922 the colony became for- mally a rijksdeel on a notionally equal footing with the Netherlands in the Dutch Constitution, though remaining under the Ministry of

296 • NETHERLANDS, RELATIONS WITH Colonies. On 27 November 1949 the Netherlands government trans-

ferred sovereignty over the Netherlands Indies, excluding West New Guinea (Papua), to the Republik Indonesia Serikat (RIS), which was linked to the Kingdom of the Netherlands in a Netherlands-Indonesian Union under the Dutch Crown. See also NETHERLANDS INDIES, EX- PANSION OF; NETHERLANDS, RELATIONS WITH; SUCCES- SION. [0006, 0638, 0674]

NETHERLANDS, RELATIONS WITH. Indonesian-Dutch relations be- gan in 1949 with a legacy of mistrust stemming from the experience of colonialism and the Revolution, from the unpopular Netherlands- Indonesian Union (see also DEBT, INTERNATIONAL), and from what was seen as Dutch support for the Republik Maluku Selatan (RMS) and other dissidents. Dutch unwillingness to contemplate a trans- fer of West Irian (Papua) to the Republic at or after the transfer of sov- ereignty in 1949, however, became the major stumbling block in rela- tions during the following years, especially after the Netherlands categorically refused to transfer the territory in 1952 and began plans to bring it to separate independence. Indonesia attempted to pressure the Netherlands on the issue by cooling relations: negotiations on the disso- lution of the Union began in 1954, though the two sides were unable to agree on how to achieve this and the Union was finally dissolved unilat- erally by Indonesia in 13 February 1956. The inherited debt was repudi- ated on 4 August of the same year, though practically all of it had by then been repaid. In October 1957, after the United Nations again refused to discuss the Irian issue, the government coordinated an anti-Dutch boy- cott that was followed by the nationalization of Dutch firms in Decem- ber. Indonesia finally cut all links on 17 August 1960, but relations were restored in March 1963, after the Dutch finally surrendered West Irian.

Cordiality returned to the relationship only after the New Order came to power in 1965–1966. Indonesia asked the Netherlands to chair the Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia (IGGI), while the Nether- lands became Indonesia’s largest trading partner in Europe. Indonesia saw the Netherlands as a useful counterweight to the United States and Japan in international affairs, but became irritated by Dutch complaints over human rights abuses in Indonesia. Tension over this issue reached

a head in 1991 when the Dutch suspended aid to Indonesia after the Dili massacre in East Timor, and Suharto responded by disbanding the IGGI, which was replaced by the Consultative Group on Indonesia (CGI) from which the Netherlands was excluded. Relations between the

NETHERLANDS INDIES, EXPANSION OF • 297 two countries warmed slightly over succeeding years, and Queen Beat-

rice became the first Dutch monarch to visit Indonesia in September 1995, the 50th anniversary of the country’s independence. [0695, 1138, 1143, 1146]

NETHERLANDS INDIES CIVIL ADMINISTRATION (NICA). Mili- tarized Dutch colonial administrative corps attached to the advancing Al- lied forces during World War II to take over the government of areas lib- erated from the Japanese prior to the formal restoration of civil government. The prospect of a return to colonial rule aroused such hos- tility among Indonesians that the term was soon dropped officially, but NICA remained a derogatory shorthand word for the postwar Dutch ad- ministration until the end of the Revolution. See also MOOK, H. J. VAN. [1146]

NETHERLANDS INDIES, EXPANSION OF. Although Indonesian na- tionalists and Western historians alike were inclined to speak of “350 years of Dutch colonial rule,” the growth of Dutch power in the archi- pelago was gradual and uneven. The Dutch East Indies Company (VOC) established influence first by means of treaties with indigenous rulers. The earliest of these treaties typically gave the VOC a monopoly of trading rights in certain commodities (e.g., cloves and nutmeg) and the right to build trading posts. Coming from a Europe that had only re- cently emerged from the complex hierarchy of medieval feudal relation- ships, the VOC did not see its activities as formally diminishing the sov- ereignty of indigenous states. In successive years, however, both the character of new treaties and the interpretation of old ones changed to give the Dutch what increasingly amounted to sovereign powers. After 1825, at the end of the disruption caused by the abolition of the VOC and the Napoleonic Wars (see BATAVIAN REPUBLIC), Dutch authority extended over Java, parts of West Sumatra (Minangkabau), Palem-

bang, Bangka, Belitung, Banjarmasin, Pontianak, Makassar, the Mi-

nahasa, and much of Maluku; in addition, the Dutch held nominal au- thority over Lampung, Siak, and Riau. The independent regions thus still included Aceh, East Sumatra (including the Batak regions of the interior), Siak, Kutai and the interior of Kalimantan, the remainder of Sulawesi, Bali, Lombok, West Irian (Papua) and many regions of Maluku, and Nusatenggara.

The situation, however, was rather confused, with the Netherlands asserting a general sphere of influence over the entire archipelago yet

298 • NEW EMERGING FORCES formally acknowledging the independence of “native states in amity

with the Netherlands government,” a term that only disappeared in 1915 (see ZELFBESTUREN). From the mid-19th century and espe- cially after 1870, the colonial state began to fill out the territorial boundaries of modern Indonesia by conquering or incorporating these independent states. Increasingly, the colonial government preferred to demand verklaringen (declarations) of submission from indigenous rulers, rather than signing formal treaties with them. The sultan of Deli made such a declaration in 1862, a model formula for declarations was prepared in 1875, and in 1898 the so-called Korte Verklaring was adopted as a relatively standardized acknowledgment by indigenous rulers that they accepted the general suzerainty of the Netherlands In- dies, agreed to follow instructions from the governor-general, and agreed to have no relations with foreign powers. Dutch sovereignty was effectively established over the entire archipelago (with the possi- ble exception of the interior of Papua) by 1911. See also NETHER- LANDS, CONSTITUTIONAL RELATIONSHIP WITH INDONESIA. [0006, 0491, 0553, 0583, 0629, 0818]

NEW EMERGING FORCES. See NEKOLIM. NEW GUINEA: WEST, see PAPUA; see PAPUA NEW GUINEA. NEW ORDER (Orde Baru, Orba). General term for the political system in

force after the accession of Suharto to power in 1966 (see SUPERSE- MAR) until his fall in May 1998. It was first used to refer to the so-called New Order coalition of army, students, intellectuals, and Muslims op- posed to Sukarno and the Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI). The term soon came to imply a sharp contrast with the so-called Old Order (Orde Lama , Orla) of Sukarno, especially in government policies. The New Or- der abandoned Indonesia’s Confrontation with Malaysia as well as the Jakarta–Peking axis (see FOREIGN POLICY), opened the country to foreign investment, suppressed the PKI, purged both state and society of left-wing influence (see MASSACRES OF 1965–1966), and abandoned the rhetoric of popular democracy. Indonesia became strongly anticom- munist (especially anti-Chinese) in its foreign policy, promoted economic stabilization based on political stability, and emphasized the suppression of allegedly particularist interests in the cause of development.

Many authors have suggested, however, that the contrast between the Old and New Orders may not be as sharp as first appeared. They point in

NEWSPAPERS • 299

particular to the continuing and expanding role of the military, to contin- ued political repression, and to the patrimonial, neomonarchical styles of both Sukarno and Suharto. See also POLITICAL CULTURE. [0716–0752]

NEWS AGENCIES. The Algemene Nieuws en Telegraaf Agentschap

(ANETA, General News and Telegraph Agency), founded by D. W. Berretty (1890–1934), was the first news agency in the Indies, but it was followed quickly by a number of small Dutch and Indonesian firms, in- cluding the Borneo Pers en Nieuws Agentschap (1926) and the Indone- sische Pers Agentschap (Inpera) in 1936. Complaints that ANETA was neglecting local news led to the establishment of Antara in 1937. Many journalists tied to Antara worked in the Domei agency during the Japan- ese occupation. ANETA closed in 1940–1946 and changed its name in 1954 to Persbiro Indonesia. In 1963 it was merged into Antara. See also NEWSPAPERS. [1293, 1304]

NEWSPAPERS. From 1615, Governor-general J. P. Coen sent news from

the Indies to Europe in a handwritten circular later called Memorie der Nouvelles , but the first true newspaper produced for sale to the public, the Bataviase Nouvelles, appeared only in 1745 and was banned in 1746 on order of the Dutch East Indies Company (VOC). From 1810 the colonial government published the Bataviasche Koloniale Courant, which became the Java Government Gazette during the British interreg- num, and resumed publication as the Bataviasche Courant in 1816 and the Javasche Courant in 1828. Independent newspapers (apart from ad- vertisement bulletins) began publishing after 1848, the Java-Bode (Batavia) appearing in 1852 and De Locomotief (Semarang) in 1863. The earliest indigenous newspapers were the Javanese-language Bro- martani (1855) and the Malay Soerat Chabar Melajoe, and from the 1870s the number of newspapers in most regions grew dramatically. The nationalist press began with Abdul Rivai’s Bintang Hindia in West Sumatra (1902) and with the Medan Prijaji of Tirtoadisuryo appearing in Bandung in 1906. There was also a lively Chinese-language press, in- cluding Sin Po (1910). The Persatuan Jurnalis Indonesia (Indonesian Journalists’ Association) was formed in 1933 under Moh. Tabrani. It was replaced in February 1946 by the Persatuan Wartawan Indonesia (PWI, Indonesian Reporters’ Association).

During the Japanese occupation, publication was restricted to gov- ernment papers, notably Jawa Shinbun, but press publishing blossomed

300 • NEWSPAPERS again during the Revolution and the early 1950s; a national survey in

1954 recorded 105 dailies, though many of these were closer in style to political pamphlets than to conventional newspapers. During the 1950s and early 1960s the Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI) newspaper Har- ian Rakjat had the largest circulation, followed by Pedoman (Partai

Sosialis Indonesia [PSI]), Suluh Indonesia (Partai Nasional Indonesia [PNI]), and Abadi (Masjumi), with Indonesia Raya under Mochtar Lu-

bis a major investigatory paper. From the mid-1950s, however, and es- pecially after the declaration of martial law in 1957, increasing restric- tions were placed on the press, causing circulation and numbers to drop.

When Suharto came to power, his government closed about a quarter of Indonesia’s 160 or so newspapers because of their alleged communist links. Thereafter the remaining newspapers enjoyed a period of relative freedom, though any questioning of the official version of the events in September–October 1965 was forbidden. In 1974, however, in the after- math of the Malari incident, 12 newspapers were closed down, includ- ing Mochtar Lubis’s Indonesia Raya, and he and several other leading journalists were arrested; as a result, the press became more cautious. Any challenge to the Suharto government usually resulted in printing bans; for example, after the student protests of 1977–1978 seven Jakarta papers were temporarily banned, and after they published criticisms from the members of the Petition of Fifty, newspapers were forbidden from printing the members’ pictures or their comments. From July 1978 the government began a program known as koran masuk desa (newspapers enter the village), under which free copies of the armed forces newspa- pers Angkatan Bersenjata and Berita Yudha were distributed to villages throughout the country, but these were replaced in December 1979 by a new series of 27 weekly newspapers and magazines published by the government especially for distribution to the villages. In 1980 all news- papers were restricted to 12 pages in length.

Newspaper publication flourished during the 1980s, dominated in Jakarta by the dailies Kompas and Suara Pembaruan, and the weekly Tempo , joined in 1985 by the financial daily Bisnis Indonesia, financed by Liem Sioe Liong’s business interests. These groups in the capital competed also in publishing regional newspapers, alongside the Jawa Pos group in Surabaya and the Jakarta daily Media Indonesia. For ex- ample, the Kompas group collaborated with such regional newspapers as Sriwijaya Pos in Palembang, Serambi Indonesia in Aceh, Berita Na- sional in Yogyakarta, and Mandala in Bandung. The Suharto govern- ment maintained control over the press, however, by various forms of

NUSATENGGARA • 301 censorship and by having various members of the president’s family

(see SUHARTO FAMILY) and close associates buy into the media in- dustry. In 1993 Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia (ICMI) launched the daily newspaper Republika, which became a major outlet for B. J. Habibie’s policies.

The fall of Suharto led to an immediate burgeoning of newspapers when the information minister canceled the need for press publication permits and issued more than 1,200 licenses, and parliament in Septem- ber 1999 enacted a new Press Law guaranteeing freedom of the press. See also NEWS AGENCIES; KETERBUKAAN. [0756, 1290, 1293, 1295, 1304, 1307, 1309]

NGANTUNG, HENK (1921–). Painter especially noted for his landscapes and portraits of becak drivers and other people. He was elected to par- liament on the Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI) ticket in 1955 and was appointed by Sukarno to represent artists on the Dewan Nasional in 1957. In 1961 he became vice mayor of Jakarta and was city governor in 1964–1965. He was chairperson of the Central Committee of Lem- baga Kebudayaan Rakyat (Lekra). [0159]

NIAS. Island off the west coast of Sumatra, known especially for what was once seen as its surviving megalithic culture, associated with an- cestor worship, though this receded greatly when missionary activity be- gan in the late 19th century. Precolonial society was strictly divided into three classes: aristocrats, farmers, and slaves.

NICKEL. Formerly obtained both from meteorites and from mines in cen- tral Sulawesi (see LUWU). A large mine was opened at Soroako in south- east Sulawesi by the Canadian firm International Nickel in 1978. The state mining firm Aneka Tambang has been mining nickel on Pulau Gebe off Halmahera since 1978. See also METALWORKING. [0413, 0416]

NUSANTARA. Used in the Nagarakrtagama for the Outer Islands as dis- tinct from Java, but revived in the early 20th century as a poetic name for the Indonesian archipelago. See ARCHIPELAGIC CONCEPT; IN- DONESIA.

NUSATENGGARA (Lesser Sundas). The chain of islands stretching east from Java: Bali, Lombok, Sumbawa, Komodo, Sumba, Savu, Flores, Roti, Timor, and the Solor archipelago.

302 • NUTMEG NUTMEG (pala). Nut of Myristica fragrans (Myristicaceae), native of

Maluku and far western New Guinea (Papua), and cultivated from early times on Banda. Highly prized as a spice, the nuts were traded to China, India, and Europe from the sixth century. Like cloves, they were a ma- jor target of Portuguese expansion in the region. After the Dutch seized Maluku in the early 17th century, they extirpated wild and cultivated trees from all places they could find them except Banda in order to keep

a close control of the trade and to drive up prices (see DUTCH EAST INDIES COMPANY; HONGI RAIDS). In 1769 the French success- fully smuggled plants to Mauritius, from where they spread to Singa- pore, Penang, and Grenada (West Indies), breaking the Dutch monopoly. Extensive cultivation began in Minahasa in 1840, but declined after plantations were struck by disease in 1873. [0527]

–O–

OEI TIONG HAM (1886–1924). The biggest Chinese businessman in prewar Indonesia. He began as the holder of an opium farm or pacht from the colonial government, but after the Opiumregie was founded he diversified into sugar, banking, real estate, and general trading. His em- pire was managed after his death by his sons, but was nationalized in 1961. [0373]

OIL. Seeping naturally from the ground in northern Sumatra in early times, oil was collected for use as medicine, for fuel, for caulking boats, and as an incendiary, especially in naval warfare. The commercial search for oil began in 1866, after the development of drilling techniques in the United States, and the first sales of oil, extracted by the Dortsche Petro- leum Maatschappij from wells near Surabaya, took place in 1889. Ex- ploratory drilling began in Sumatra in 1883 in Langkat, where oil was found at 100 meters in depth. From 1890 the wells at Langkat and from 1892 the refinery at Pangkalan Brandan became the center of the oil in- terests of the Koninklijke Nederlandsche Maatschappij tot Exploitatie van Petroleumbronnen in Nederlandsch-Indië (generally known as the “Koninklijke”). Another company, later called Shell Oil, began drilling in Kutai in East Kalimantan in 1891. After an oil boom in the last decade of the 19th century, which saw dozens of companies rise and fall, the Koninklijke and Shell merged in 1907 to form the Bataafse Petro- leum Maatschappij (BPM). Although the BPM dominated the Indonesian

OIL • 303 oil industry from that time and launched a number of joint ventures with

the colonial government (see also STATE ENTERPRISES), a signifi- cant part of the production was in the hands of the Nederlandsche Kolo- niale Petroleum Maatschappij, a subsidiary of the American Standard Oil Company.

Although production began on Java, fields there were soon overshad- owed by those of Sumatra, which produced a light grade of oil, and, even more important, those of East Kalimantan, which produced a heavy grade suitable in some cases for direct use as ship’s fuel. The Netherlands Indies fields were especially important to Japan, and it was an embargo on oil supplies from the colony to Japan that, among other things, prompted the Japanese to invade the region in 1941–1942. The wells of East Kalimantan were a major target, though considerable damage was done to them by Dutch scorched-earth tactics before the Japanese arrival. They were also among the first areas seized by the Allies on their return to the archipelago in 1945.

Oil from Cepu in Java was an important source of fuel for the In- donesian Republic during the Revolution, and the south Sumatra fields were contested by the Republic and the Dutch. The American compa- nies Stanvac and Caltex as well as Japanese firms took important shares of postwar production, but all foreign companies were under pressure to distribute a larger share of the profits to Indonesia. Indone- sia joined the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in 1962, and foreign companies increasingly operated as production- sharing agents of the three state oil firms, all under army control: Per- mina, headed by Ibnu Sutowo and based in the south Sumatra fields; Permigan (formerly Nglobo Oil Mining) in Central Java and eastern In- donesia, controlled by the army’s Diponegoro Division; and Pertamin (formerly Permindo), formerly a BPM-government joint venture. Oil was a major, though insufficient, source of state income under the Guided Economy.

Production-sharing agreements continued and expanded under the New Order. The state companies merged in 1968 to form Pertamina, which rode a wave of enormous profits, with new oil discoveries and a dramatic increase in oil prices, until its debt crisis in 1975. In 1977 the United States replaced Japan as Indonesia’s largest customer. The de- cline of oil prices in 1982 and 1986 imposed severe budget restrictions. The government responded by attempting to diversify Indonesia’s ex- ports, so that oil and liquefied natural gas fell from 73 percent of In- donesia’s exports in 1984 to 51.7 percent in 1987.

304 • OIL PALM In the late 1990s oil companies increased their exploration activities,

pumping $4.8 billion into exploration in 1997, compared with $3.6 bil- lion the previous year. In 2002 ExxonMobil discovered possibly the largest oilfield on Java (at Cepu), perhaps containing 1 billion barrels of oil, and offered Pertamina a 10 percent stake in the field. Pertamina, however, was holding out for a 50 percent share of the profits together with a $400 million signing fee. The decentralization law drawn up in 1999 planned to allow the regions to keep 15 percent of all their oil rev- enues (except for Aceh, which was to be allowed 70 percent of the province’s net oil income), and the Oil and Gas Act of 2001 attempted to force Pertamina to cede its control over production-sharing contracts with foreign and domestic oil companies to a separate regulatory agency by November 2002. Violence continued to plague the operations of ExxonMobil in Aceh, which was forced to close down production for four months in 2001 and thereafter employ 3,000 Indonesian troops to guard its facilities. In 2002 Acehnese villagers brought a suit against the company in U.S. courts for tolerating the brutality and human rights abuses of the troops guarding its facilities. See also MAP 11. [0294, 0371, 0375, 0400, 0405, 0448]

OIL PALM (Elaeis guineensis, Arecaceae). Originally from Africa, the oil palm first appeared in Indonesia as an ornamental tree in 1848. The first commercial plantation was established on Java in 1859, but oil palm did not become a major crop until the laying out of extensive estates in East Sumatra from 1911. Not until the Suharto regime, however, did oil palm plantations begin to replace the forests in many parts of Sumatra and Kalimantan. Suharto sanctioned the conversion of large areas of Kalimantan and coastal Sumatra from native vegetation to oil palm plan- tations, aiming to make Indonesia the world’s largest palm oil producer. According to some estimates, the land affected could be measured in millions of hectares. Land clearing was carried out during severe drought conditions, and this was one of the major causes of the fires that swept through both islands in 1997. Many of the plantations were developed on

a sensitive peat soil base that, when burned, loosed large carbon emis- sions into the air. By 2001 Indonesia and Malaysia accounted for more than 80 percent of global palm oil output, and in that year Indonesia low- ered its export tax from 5 percent to 3 percent. See also FORESTRY. [0316, 0331, 0332, 0765]

OLD ORDER. See NEW ORDER.

OPIUM • 305 ONTVOOGDING . See DECENTRALIZATION; ZELFBESTUREN. OPERASI KHUSUS (OPSUS, Special Operations). Organization estab-

lished within Komando Cadangan Strategis Angkatan Darat (Kostrad) in circa 1963 by Ali Murtopo, an intelligence officer and member of Suharto’s inner circle, and Sujono Humardani (1919–1986). It was used initially to establish covert contacts with the Malaysian gov- ernment during Confrontation. Opsus later helped to ensure progovern- ment votes in the 1969 “Act of Free Choice” in West Irian (Papua) and in the general elections in 1971 and after. It played an important role in the restructuring of political parties after 1971 and was officially dis- banded in 1974, partly in response to the Malari Affair. See also IN- TELLIGENCE SERVICES.

OPIUM (Papaver somniferum Papaveraceae). Widely cultivated in India

from the 15th century, extensive exports of opium to Indonesia began soon after. Opium had some use in Tantric religious rituals, but its main use was recreational. From about 1670 the Dutch East Indies Company (VOC) dominated the trade to Indonesia, and sale on Java was subject to a loosely enforced company monopoly, for the sake of which produc- tion in the archipelago was banned.

Various methods were used to market opium. Initially it was sold di- rectly by the VOC, but company rights were transferred in 1745 to an Opium Society consisting of private traders; this society was replaced in 1794 by a state Opium Directorate, which Herman Willem Daendels re- placed in turn with a system of farms or pachten. Thomas Stamford Raffles attempted to restrict sales, partly for humanitarian reasons, partly because of extensive smuggling, but he was overruled by the British au- thorities in Bengal. Control of opium sales was given to the Nederland- sche Handel Maatschappij (NHM) from 1827 to 1833, when the farms were restored. In 1894, after a prolonged humanitarian campaign in the Netherlands, the farm system was replaced once more by a state monop- oly, the Opiumregie, which imported raw opium, refined it in Batavia, and sold it to registered addicts through a network of government shops. Sales continued on a smaller scale during the Japanese occupation, and the Indonesian Republic earned important foreign exchange during the national Revolution by selling the remaining Opiumregie stocks within Indonesia and abroad. The Regie was abolished in 1950.

Proceeds, direct or indirect, from opium sales were a significant part of state revenues, especially during the 19th century, and were most

306 • ORANGUTAN commonly associated with forced labor. Opium addiction helped to

keep laborers pliant and subservient through both clinical dependence and debt. Opium farms were generally in the hands of Chinese entre- preneurs who maintained private security forces to enforce their re- gional monopolies. During the 19th century the vast majority of addicts were Javanese, but in the 20th century a strong campaign by both na- tionalists and Ethical Policy–minded colonial officials, combined with the effects of the Depression of the 1930s, dramatically reduced con- sumption, and by 1942 most users were Chinese. [0599, 0630, 1061]