NETHERLANDS, CONSTITUTIONAL RELATIONSHIP WITH IN- DONESIA.

NETHERLANDS, CONSTITUTIONAL RELATIONSHIP WITH IN- DONESIA.

MISSIONARY ACTIVITY. See CATHOLICISM; PROTESTANTISM. MOESO. See MUSSO. MOLUCCAS. See MALUKU. MONEY. See CURRENCY. MONGOL INVASION. See CHINA, HISTORICAL LINKS WITH; MA-

JAPAHIT. MONOLOYALITAS (monoloyalty). Exclusive loyalty to the state and gov-

ernment demanded by the Suharto government of all state employees, especially in elections. First articulated in 1970, monoloyalitas was in- tended to prevent the bureaucracy from being an arena for competing in- terests and to guarantee the bureaucratic base of the New Order. See CENTRE FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES; FLOATING MASS; KORPS PEGAWAI REPUBLIK INDONESIA. [0736]

MOOK, HUBERTUS JOHANNES VAN (1894–1965). Indies-born colo- nial official and politician, van Mook studied Indology at Leiden Uni- versity where he was strongly influenced by the “Ethical” ideas of Cor- nelis van Vollenhoven and others. He returned to the Indies, where he held the increasingly senior administrative posts of director of economic affairs in 1937–1941, lieutenant governor-general in 1941–1942 and 1944–1948, and minister of colonies in 1941–1945. Unusually for colo- nial civil servants, he was also involved in politics, as leader of the Stuw group and from 1931 member of the Volksraad. He was an advocate of increased autonomy for the Indies and the gradual elimination of racial distinctions.

Van Mook headed the colonial government-in-exile in Australia dur- ing World War II and returned to Indonesia in October 1945 as head of the Netherlands Indies Civil Administration (NICA) and later of the re- stored colonial government, though he was never promoted to governor- general. His hope that the Indonesian-Dutch conflict could be resolved

MUHAMMADIYAH • 279 by dealing reasonably with “moderate” nationalists such as Sutan

Sjahrir was frustrated by the metropolitan Dutch insistence on restoring Dutch authority and on limiting concessions to nationalism, but his own insistence that the Dutch retain a tutelary role during an extended transi- tion to independence was unacceptable to a great many Indonesian na- tionalists. By 1948 his unpopular role in the development of federalism and in the launching of the first “Police Action” had made him a liability in Dutch negotiations with the Republic, and he was dismissed on 25 Oc- tober 1948. See also SUCCESSION. [0478, 1146]

MUFAKAT. See MUSYAWARAH. MUHAMMADIYAH (“followers of Muhammad”). Muslim organization

founded in 1912 by Kyai Haji Ahmad Dahlan (1868–1933), a mosque of- ficial in Yogyakarta to promote the modernist Islamic thought devel- oped by Muhammad Abduh and Rashid Rida in Cairo. Modernists be- lieved that the condition of Muslims under colonial rule and other despotism was in part a consequence of their own straying from the ba- sic principles of the religion, and their aim was thus, as they saw it, to cleanse and revitalize Islam by discarding tradition and ritual and re- turning to the central texts, that is, the Qur’an and the Hadiths. These views brought them into direct conflict with Islamic traditionalists who stressed the importance of studying the full body of Islamic texts in or- der to understand the Qur’an correctly (see NAHDLATUL ULAMA [NU]). The modernists stressed the strict observance of the five pillars of Islam (the confession of faith, prayer five times a day, fasting during Ra- madan, paying the religious tax or zakat, and making the haj if possible). They also advocated the use of head-covering by women and the segre- gation of the sexes in public.

Muhammadiyah’s main aims were to spread adherence to Islam and to promote the religious understanding of believers. It emphasized social welfare, including education, and under the Dutch advocated nonin- volvement in politics, though individual branches of the organization, such as that in West Sumatra, defied such directives. In 1945 it advo- cated an Islamic state for Indonesia and joined Masjumi, which soon came to be dominated by modernist ideas. It survived the banning of Masjumi in 1960 and continued to be a major Muslim cultural and edu- cational institution, claiming a membership of over 20 million.

Throughout much of the Suharto regime it maintained its apolitical stance, concentrating on social and religious activities promoted through

280 • MUIS, ABDUL its schools, health clinics, mosques, and welfare institutions. This

changed when Amien Rais became chair of the organization and used it as a podium for stringent criticisms of the corruption and malfeasance of the president and his family and cronies. Though much of the Muhammadiyah distanced itself from these criticisms, emphasizing that it favored a gradual and peaceful approach to reform, younger members enthusiastically embraced the oppositional stance of its chairman. [0627, 0648, 1016, 1358, 1361]

MUIS, ABDUL (1890–1959). Journalist and politician, educated as a pro- tégé of J. H. Abendanon (1852–1925) under the Association Principle, but best known for his novel Salah Asuhan (A Wrong Upbringing, 1928), which describes the difficulties faced by European-educated Indonesians in fitting into their own society. [0224]

MULTATULI. See DOUWES DEKKER, EDUARD; MAX HAVELAAR. MURBA (Partai Murba, Proletarian Party). Founded in October 1948 by

followers of the radical nationalist communist Tan Malaka, after the government of Mohammad Hatta crushed the Partai Komunis In- donesia (PKI) in the Madiun Affair. The party strongly opposed nego- tiations with the Dutch, and Hatta banned it shortly before the second Dutch “Police Action” of December 1948. It revived in the early 1950s as a bitter competitor of the PKI but though several of its leaders (notably Adam Malik and Chaerul Saleh) played influential political roles, the party only won 0.5 percent of the vote in the 1955 elections, gaining two seats. It strongly supported Guided Democracy and moved closer to the Soviet Union when the PKI was adopting a more pro-China stance. In 1964, in a move to combat the growing influence of the PKI, Adam Ma- lik and others associated with the Murba formed an organization under the name of Body to Support Sukarno (BPS), portraying it as an alterna- tive to Marxism. The PKI persuaded Sukarno that this was in fact a move to undermine him and persuaded the president to ban both the BPS (in December 1964) and Murba (in January 1965). Murba reemerged un- der the New Order, but won no seats in the 1971 elections and was ab- sorbed in 1973 with other secular parties into the Partai Demokrasi In- donesia (PDI). See also BADAN PENDUKUNG SUKARNOISME; PERSATUAN PERJUANGAN. [0695]

MURDANI, L. BENNY (1932-). A Javanese Catholic, born in Cepu, Mur- dani joined the revolutionary struggle at the age of 16 in December 1948.

MURDANI, L. BENNY • 281 He was trained in the Resimen Para Komando Angkatan Darat

(RPKAD) after the Revolution and became a company commander. As a paratroop officer in the Cakrabirawa regiment, he took part in the com- mando raid on West Sumatra in 1958 to quell the PRRI/Permesta re- bellion. He was associated with Suharto in 1964 when Suharto headed the Mandala Command for the Liberation of West Irian (Papua), and Mur- dani won acclaim for leading a successful parachute attack in Merauke. Suharto appointed him to the General Staff, and he began his intelligence career in Komando Cadangan Strategic Angkatan Darat (Kostrad).

Murdani acted as liaison for Ali Murtopo in the negotiations to end Confrontation, and in August 1966 he was sent to head the new In- donesian liaison office in Kuala Lumpur. After a tour as consul general in Seoul, South Korea, in the early 1970s, he was recalled to Indonesia at the time of the Malari Affair and resumed his intelligence career as as- sistant for intelligence in the Defense Ministry from August 1974. From August 1977 he was also concurrently head of the Center for Strategic Intelligence (Pusintelstrat) in the Defense Ministry, and from early 1978 deputy head of Badan Koordinasi Intelijen Negara (Bakin). By the early 1980s he had become one of the most powerful men in Indonesia, holding key intelligence positions in the (Departemen) Pertahanan dan Keamanan (Hankam, Department of Defense and Security), Komando Operasi Pemulihan Keamanan dan Ketertiban (Kopkamtib), and Bakin and having been entrusted by Suharto with sensitive clandestine tasks in foreign affairs, such as negotiating purchase of jet fighters from Israel, planning and directing the invasion of East Timor, acting as liai- son with the Vietnamese government in Hanoi, and supervising the storming of a highjacked Garuda jetliner in Bangkok in 1981.

Murdani became commander in chief of the armed forces in 1983, while continuing to head Pusintelstrat (now reorganized into Badan In- telijen Strategis [Bais]), holding the post until 1988. During his tenure he increasingly centralized power over the military in his own hands, a sit- uation that raised the suspicions of the president, who abruptly removed him from the post of commander in chief in February 1988, appointing him instead as minister of defense. During the following five years, Mur- dani unsuccessfully attempted to regain his powers, but Suharto dis- missed him from the Defense Ministry in 1993, shortly afterward re- placing Bais by a new intelligence body (BIA), thus further undermining Murdani’s personal ties in the intelligence community. Thereafter Mur- dani’s influence drastically declined, though several officers retained feelings of loyalty to him and even after B. J. Habibie became president

282 • MURTOPO, ALI there were indications that his advice was still heeded. [0031, 0680,

0733, 0972] MURTOPO, ALI (1924–1984). Murtopo was born in Blora in 1924 the son

of a batik trader in an impoverished priyayi family. Toward the end of the Japanese occupation, he joined the Hizbullah, becoming a company commander when it was absorbed into the Indonesian army. He served in Ahmad Yani’s Banteng Raiders unit of the Diponegoro division in 1952, becoming deputy chief of the Diponegoro’s territorial and political affairs branch in 1957. He followed Suharto into army intelligence headquar- ters and from there into the West Irian (Papua) campaign and Komando Cadangan Strategis Angkatan Darat (Kostrad). During the West Irian campaign in the early 1960s, Murtopo developed a new combat intelli- gence unit that became Operasi Khusus (Opsus). As head of Opsus he opened secret contacts with Malaysian officials in August–September 1964, and in November he went to Bangkok for secret negotiations aimed at limiting and eventually ending Confrontation. He also established contacts with former PRRI/Permesta rebels and with them organized massive regional smuggling in rubber and other commodities. He spent much of this period outside Indonesia arranging emergency funding for Suharto from Chinese business sources in Singapore, Hong Kong, and Taiwan. In 1969, as head of Opsus, he was deeply involved in persuading (largely through arrests and bribes) leaders in West Irian to opt for In- donesia. He became one of Suharto’s closest advisors (SPRI) and deputy head of Badan Koordinasi Intelijen Negara (Bakin).

Murtopo was closely tied with a group of Catholic intellectuals of Chi- nese descent who cooperated with him in the early postcoup period, and

he sponsored and headed their think tank, the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). He was closely involved in directing the success achieved by Golkar in the first New Order elections in 1971, and in the amalgamation of the political parties immediately afterward. In October 1974 Suharto put him in charge of negotiations with Portugal over East Timor, and he took control of the Operasi Komodo (Komodo Operation), which was closely involved in fomenting the civil war in the region that eventually led to Indonesia’s invasion of East Timor in De- cember 1975. Murtopo remained until his death one of Suharto’s closest advisers. [0031, 0736, 0845]

MUSIC. The long tradition of cultural hybridization, especially in Indone- sian port cities, was also reflected in musical history. Although tradi- MUSIC. The long tradition of cultural hybridization, especially in Indone- sian port cities, was also reflected in musical history. Although tradi-

MUSSO (or Moeso) (1897–1948). One of the major leaders of the Partai

Komunis Indonesia (PKI) until killed by Republican forces after the Madiun Affair. He was born in the residency of Kediri and attended teacher training school in Batavia. Musso lived for a while in Surabaya at the boarding house run by the wife of Umar Said Tjokroaminoto, with whom he became close and where he met Sukarno. A leading fig- ure in the PKI when it broke off from the Sarekat Islam (SI), Musso was arrested by the Dutch over the Afdeling B affair. After his release he be- came active especially in the PKI’s relations with labor. He was proba- bly present at the Prambanan meetings where the party decided to mount the 1926–1927 uprising, but was in Moscow seeking Comintern support for the revolt during the planning period. He was in Singapore when the revolt broke out and was briefly arrested by the British authorities, but then released and allowed to return to the Soviet Union. Musso returned briefly to Indonesia in 1935, where he established the so-called Illegal PKI. He finally returned to Yogyakarta in August 1948, where he headed a new coalition of communist and leftist forces under the PKI and posed a direct challenge to the Sukarno-Hatta leadership. When the Ma- diun rebellion broke out in September 1948, he was on a tour of central Java with other leaders, including Amir Sjarifuddin, but he came out in support of the rebellion and publicly challenged the people to choose between him and Sukarno. The rebellion was soon put down and Musso

MUSSO • 283

284 • MUSYAWARAH fled to the countryside, where he was captured and killed at the end of

October 1948. [0478, 0661, 0683, 0684] MUSYAWARAH. Discussion of issues, often at exhaustive length, by all

involved in order to reach a consensus (mufakat). Many nationalists, es- pecially Sukarno, argued that musyawarah was the basis of traditional village democracy in Indonesia and that it should be used in place of a Western-style system of decision making by majority vote. See also GO- TONG ROYONG .

MYSTICISM. See KEBATINAN.

–N–

NAGARAKRTAGAMA. Also known in many other spellings, including Negarakertagama , this lengthy panegyric poem in Old Javanese was composed by Prapanca, poet to the 14th-century court of Hayam Wuruk, king of Majapahit. The poem praises the king while providing a detailed description of the life and social structure of Majapahit. A lontar leaf manuscript of the Nagarakrtagama was captured by Dutch troops on Lombok in 1894; further copies were found on Bali in 1978. [0528]