PARTAI REPUBLIK INDONESIA (Pari, Indonesian Republican Party).

A nationalist communist party established in Bangkok in 1927 by Tan Malaka, Soebakat, and Djamaloedin Tamin, three nationalist communists who had broken with the Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI) over the launching of the 1926–1927 uprising. [0635, 0807, 0873]

PARTAI SAREKAT ISLAM INDONESIA (PSII, Party of the Indonesian Islamic Union). Formed in 1923 by H. U. S. Tjokroaminoto and Haji Agus Salim (1884–1954) to formalize the political status of the Sarekat Islam (SI). Shorn of SI’s left-wing components, it soon shrank further with the secession of the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU). The party on Java was con- servative and pan-Islamic, though some of its branches, notably in West Sumatra, maintained a political and anticolonial stance until their leaders were arrested and exiled by the Dutch in 1933. After the death of Tjokroaminoto, the party came into the hands of Abikusno Cokrosuyoso and S. M. Kartosuwiryo. Salim and Mohamad Roem (1908–1983) were expelled, and the party took a hard-line, noncooperative attitude to the colonial government at a time when other parties had begun to soften under pressure of Dutch repression. Kartosuwiryo himself was expelled in 1940 and formed a “PSII Kedua” (Second PSII) in Malangbong, which later became part of the political base of the Darul Islam (DI). PSII activ- ity was banned by the Dutch in 1940 under State of War and Siege regula- tions, but it reemerged in 1947 under Aruji Kartawinata and the brothers

PARTAI SAREKAT ISLAM INDONESIA • 327

328 • PARTAI SOSIALIS Anwar and Harsono Tjokroaminoto, refusing to join the Masjumi coali-

tion. Never large, it campaigned incessantly for an Islamic state, but was

a supporter of Sukarno’s Guided Democracy. In 1973 it was forced to join the Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP). [0695, 1329]

PARTAI SOSIALIS (PS, Socialist Party). The PS was formed in Decem- ber 1945 as a merger of the Partai Rakyat Sosialis (Paras, Socialist Peo- ple’s Party) of Amir Sjarifuddin and the Partai Sosialis Indonesia (Parsi, Indonesian Socialist Party) of Sutan Sjahrir. It formed the basis of the successive governments of Sjahrir and Amir, but from early 1947 became increasingly factionalized between the two leaders and effectively split when Amir deposed Sjahrir in June 1947, though a formal division did not take place until February 1948, when Sjahrir established the Partai Sosialis Indonesia (PSI). See also SAYAP KIRI. [0661, 0674, 0865, 0916]

PARTAI SOSIALIS INDONESIA (PSI, Indonesian Socialist Party). In November 1945 Sutan Sjahrir formed a political party of this name (but abbreviated Parsi) that soon merged with Amir Sjarifuddin’s Partai Rakyat Sosialis (Paras, Socialist People’s Party) to form the Partai Sosialis (PS). A second party called PSI emerged from the Partai Sosialis in February 1948, again associated with Sjahrir. It had a generally Fabian socialist program, emphasizing economic planning, modernization, and social welfare, but it accepted the need for continued foreign capital in-

vestment in Indonesia and the political consequences of that. Sumitro

Djojohadikusumo was a prominent member of the party in the 1950s and influenced its emphasis on regional development programs, small- scale industry, and cooperatives. Popular among intellectuals, in some sections of the officer corps and among some minorities, the PSI never developed a significant mass base and won only five seats in the 1955

elections. After Sumitro’s participation in the PRRI/Permesta rebel-

lion, the party was banned in 1960. Under the New Order, however, Sumitro and a number of other PSI figures regained important policy influence to the extent of being viewed at times as a malign secretive influence, being accused for instance of involvement in the Malari Affair. [0661, 0695, 0865, 0916]

PARTAI UNI DEMOKRASI INDONESIA (PUDI, Indonesian Democ- racy Union Party). Sri Bintang Pamungkas, previously a member of the Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP), founded the PUDI in May

PARTICULIERE LANDERIJEN • 329 1996 because he believed that the existing political parties had no

ideals. This was at a time when the establishment of independent political parties was forbidden. The following year, Sri Bintang summarized PUDI’S political position as a rejection of the 1997 general elections and of the nomination of Suharto for president and calling for setting up a new political structure in the post-Suharto era. The party suffered from the fact that it was a “one-man show” and received only 140,980 votes in the 1999 elections and no seats in parliament. [0760, 1010]

PARTICULIERE LANDERIJEN. Private estates, especially on the northern coastal plain of West Java, given or sold by the Dutch East Indies Company (VOC) from 1630 to its servants and supporters. Owners held not only freehold title to the land but also quasi-feudal rights over its inhabitants, including compulsory labor services (heren- diensten ), a portion of all crops, and a wide range of incidental taxes. In some texts these rights are described as “sovereign” and the landlords likened to the semiautonomous native rulers or zelfbesturen. It was on these estates that commercial sugar cultivation was first introduced, but by the 19th century rice for Batavia was the main crop. By the 20th century some of the estates, such as the British-owned Pamanukan- & Tjiasemlanden (P & T Lands), had developed into efficient commercial operations with well-trained staffs; other estates remained de- pressed backwaters. Such estates remained outside the colonial government’s provision of education, health, and other social services under the Ethical Policy, and became a byword for agricultural misery. Liter- acy rates were very low, morbidity was high, and bandit gangs were powerful. From 1912 the colonial government began the repurchase of estates, which were then incorporated into the administrative structure of the rest of Java. Repurchases stopped during the Depression, but in 1935 the government established a semiofficial company, the Javasche Particuliere Landerijen Maatschappij, to acquire and administer estates, using the proceeds both for further purchases and to bring social services and infrastructure to a level where the estates could be turned over to the government without placing extra strain on the treasury. Under the Japanese the remaining estates were nationalized, but the landlords were generally retained as administrators. Estate workers and bandits took control of the estates during the Revolution, but former owners were restored with freehold title, but without feudal rights, after the Dutch seized West Java in 1947. The last of the foreign-owned estates was nationalized in 1954. [0585]

330 • PARTIES, POLITICAL PARTIES, POLITICAL. The formation of political parties in the Nether-

lands Indies was first permitted in 1918, though several parties had ex- isted effectively earlier as nominally cultural, social, or commercial as- sociations. In 1912, the Indische Partij had been banned, and throughout the 1920s and 1930s the colonial government frequently banned or re- stricted the activities of individual parties (see NATIONALISM). The Japanese dissolved all party organizations for the duration of their oc- cupation, and the independent Republic of Indonesia briefly considered permitting only a single all-encompassing national party, the Partai Na- sional Indonesia (PNI-Staatspartij). Parties, however, quickly emerged after the declaration of independence, and the multiparty system was of- ficially authorized by Decree “X” of 16 October 1945. Twenty-seven parties won seats in the 1955 parliamentary elections.

From 1956 feeling arose increasingly that the parties were too strong in defending their sectional interests and too weak in considering the national interest. In 1956 Sukarno urged the parties to “bury themselves,” and Guided Democracy was in part a system designed to diminish the ac- cess of parties to state power. Presidential Edict no. 7 of 1959 required all parties to adhere to the 1945 Constitution, Pancasila, and MANIPOL- USDEK and sought to eliminate smaller parties by requiring all parties to have 150,000 members spread over 65 electoral districts. In 1960 Sukarno issued a decree banning parties that had taken part in rebellions against the state; this was used to ban Masjumi and the Partai Sosialis Indone- sia (PSI) but not the Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI). Further bans fol- lowed, leaving only 11 legal parties at the close of Guided Democracy. The PKI and Partai Indonesia (Partindo) were banned in 1966.

At the outset of the New Order, the army was determined that the open multiparty system of the 1950s should not be restored and a considerable debate opened over just what role parties should play. The parties themselves were given little opportunity to influence this debate: leading figures from before 1965 were often removed from party posi- tions under government pressure and compliant supporters of the government were put in their places. Some army groups favored an en- trenched two-party system; others suggested a “simplification” into five groups: Islamic, Christian, nationalist, socialist-Pancasila, and func- tional. The 1969 Law on Political Parties banned independent candidates and denied legal status to any party with fewer than 1.2 million members, 100 branches, and 2 percent of the vote in the coming election. Nine parties were elected to parliament in 1971, but the government forced their representatives in parliament to form two blocs (and allowed each bloc only one formal spokesperson). In 1973 these semiformal parliamentary

PARTIES, POLITICAL • 331 groupings were formalized under government pressure by a fusion of the

party organizations into the Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP), comprising the four Muslim parties, and the Partai Demokrasi Indone- sia (PDI), comprising the rest. The 1975 Law on Political Parties and Golkar banned parties from maintaining permanent branches below kabupaten level, as well as removing their right to challenge Pancasila. The government electoral organization, Golkar, was not regarded offi- cially as a party and was exempt from these restrictions, although it increasingly assumed the character of a party. There were persistent sug- gestions during the latter years of Suharto’s rule that it should become the basis of a partai tunggal, or sole party.

The fall of Suharto in 1998 opened up the political process and political parties proliferated. Initially 234 parties were established. However, a Team of Eleven was assigned to verify which political parties were eligi- ble to compete in the forthcoming elections, and eventually only 48 met the guidelines imposed. Under these, the party had to demonstrate among other things that it had branches in nine provinces with offices in at least half the districts in each of these provinces. In the 1999 elections, 21 of these parties received enough votes for them to be allotted at least one seat in parliament, but the top five (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia—Perjuan-

gan [PDI-P], Golkar, Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa [PKB], PPP, and Par-

tai Amanat Nasional [PAN]) received 86.7 percent of the vote. The other parties gaining more than one seat were the Partai Bulan Bintang (13 seats), Partai Keadilan (7 seats), Partai Keadilan dan Kesatuan (PKK, Justice and Unity Party, 4 seats), Partai Nahdlatul Ulama (PNU, Party of the Revival of Religious Scholars, 5 seats), Partai Demokrasi Kasih Bangsa (PDKB, People’s Love for Democracy Party, 5 seats), and the PDI (2 seats). Twenty-seven of the 48 contending parties rejected the election re- sults, so they were never approved by the General Elections Commission.

In 2001–2002 splits occurred in many of the major parties, which had been plagued by widespread dissatisfaction with their ineffectiveness and corruption. Only six of the 1999 parties (PDIP, Golkar, PPP, PKB, PAN, and PBB) qualified to run in the 2004 elections, along with 18 new parties (see APPENDIX F). Although the Partai Keadilan failed to qualify, it joined with another Islamic party to form the new Partai Keadilan Se- jahtera (PKS, Justice and Welfare Party). In order to nominate a presidential candidate in 2004 a party has to win 16 seats (3 percent) or 4 percent of the votes in the April election. Two new parties, the Partai Karya Peduli Bangsa (PKPB), headed by former army chief of staff General R. Hartono, and the Partai Demokrat (PD, Democratic Party) were hoping to nominate General Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, and Siti Hardijanti

332 • PASAI Rumnana (Suharto’s daughter, usually known as Mbak Tutut) respectively

as their presidential candidates. See also ELECTIONS. [0695, 1001, 1012] PASAI (Samudra). This state in northern Sumatra was based near modern

Lhokseumawe. After converting to Islam at the end of the 13th century, Pasai became the major port of the Strait of Melaka, maintaining diplo- matic contacts with China, India, and Siam. It exported pepper, oil (from seeps close to the surface), and perhaps silk. It was visited by

Marco Polo in 1292 and Ibn Battuta in 1355 and was raided by Ma-

japahit in the 1360s. In the late 15th century it was increasingly eclipsed by Melaka and by Aceh, which conquered it in 1524.

PASISIR (Javanese, “coast”). The northern coast of Java (and by extension coastal regions of Sumatra and elsewhere), especially as distinguished from the kingdoms and courts of the interior. Opportunities for trade to and from Java gave rise from at least the 13th century to a succession of prosperous city states along this coast—Banten, Demak, Cirebon, and Surabaya—which were incorporated only with difficulty, if at all, into the agrarian kingdoms of the interior. With the conversion of these cities to Islam from the 15th century, political tension between the two regions grew. The inland kingdom of Majapahit was defeated by a coalition of coastal states led by Demak, and Majapahit’s successor Mataram only briefly controlled the Pasisir rulers, who increasingly recruited assis- tance from the Dutch East Indies Company (VOC) to resist the court, giving the VOC a foothold in Javanese politics.

The term pasisir has also been applied particularly to the culture of this coastal region, suggesting an alternative Javanese cultural tradition to that of the courts of the interior. This culture is identified as interna- tionally minded (many rulers of pasisir states were not Javanese), com- mercially oriented, and culturally eclectic. The batik of this region, for instance, shows considerable Chinese and European influence. [1371]

PASTEUR INSTITUTE. Established in 1895 for the treatment of rabies victims and attached to the already existing Parc Vaccinogène (see SMALLPOX). The institute began research on cholera in 1910, on bubonic plague in 1911, and later on typhus, staphylococcus, and other diseases. [1194]

PASUNDAN. Official prewar name for the colonial province of West Java

and the name commonly used for the political party Paguyuban Pasun-

PAWNSHOPS • 333 dan. On 24 April 1948 the Dutch sponsored a federal state called Pasun-

dan in the territories they controlled in West Java, led by the former bupati of Bandung, R. A. A. M. Wiranatakusumah, in an attempt to exploit Sundanese fears of Javanese domination (see FEDERALISM). After the second Dutch “Police Action,” however, the West Java state largely dis- integrated, under pressure not only of the forces of the Republic’s return- ing Siliwangi division but also of the Darul Islam (DI). In late 1949, leaders of the state toyed briefly with the idea of seeking full independence as an Islamic state on the model of Pakistan, perhaps with backing of the DI, and also negotiated with the Dutch adventurer R. P. P. West-

erling for armed backing. After Westerling’s abortive putsch in Bandung

and Jakarta in January 1950, Pasundan was discredited, and it was dissolved on 9 February 1950. [0661, 0674, 1146]

PATRIMONIALISM. Term coined by Max Weber to describe states in which a single ruler disposes of state wealth and power by virtue of traditional authority, rather than charisma or a regularized legal and administrative system. As an ideal type, it has some application to traditional In- donesia and fits closely with the Indian-derived ideology of the dharma-raja or all-powerful king (see INDIA, HISTORICAL LINKS WITH). Some authorities have questioned, however, whether traditional states were truly patrimonial, pointing both to elements of collegiality among powerful men within each kingdom (especially regional authorities such as the bupati) and to supposedly democratic elements in the re- lationship between ruler and subject. The term “neopatrimonialism” has been used to describe the concentration of state authority in the hands of leaders of independent Indonesia. See also WHITE RAJAS. [0521, 0796]

PATTINGALLOANG (c. 1600–1654). Son of Matoaya, chief minister of Makassar, and from 1639 also chief minister. Fluent in several Euro- pean languages, he was a keen follower of the latest developments in ge- ography and astronomy, and also had European works on gunnery trans- lated into Makassarese. He maintained his father’s policy of keeping Makassar an open port for all traders, but fractured the previous alliance between Bugis and Makassarese by conquering Bone in 1646, laying the basis for the later rebellion of Arung Palakka.

PAWNSHOPS. The right to run pawnshops was farmed, like other state revenue sources (see PACHT), until 1903 when a government pawnshop service was created for Java and Madura. The service operated to some extent in the Outer Islands, but most of the 457 government pawnshops

334 • PEARLING in the Netherlands Indies in 1931 were on Java and Madura. Annual

profits were ƒ6 to ƒ11 million. PEARLING. This was widespread in the archipelago in early times, and

pearls were among exports to China from the 10th century. The coasts of Java were once known for seed pearls, used in medicine, but with the grad-

ual exhaustion of shell beds fishing retreated to eastern Indonesia. Western companies began to move into the industry from the 1860s after the in- vention of the diving suit. Since the early 20th century, the Aru islands have been the industry’s main center. Culturing of pearls has been done by the Marine Fisheries Research Institute in Aru and Sulawesi since 1960.

PEDIR (Pidië). Muslim state in northern Sumatra in the 15th century. Like Pasai, it was an important entrepôt for pepper. It was conquered by Aceh in 1524.

PEMBANGUNAN (“development”). See DEVELOPMENT IDEOLOGY. PEMBELA TANAH AIR (Peta, Defenders of the Fatherland). Military

force formed by the Japanese in October 1943 on Java (equivalent to the Giyugun on Sumatra) to involve Indonesians in defending the archipelago against the Allies. The Peta consisted of 65 battalions by Au- gust 1945, with 37,000 men. Battalion commanders were generally lo- cally prominent Indonesian civilians—teachers, officials, and the like—whose role was to recruit and to maintain morale rather than to command. Military leadership was mainly in the hands of company commanders and Japanese instructors. Training included use of weapons and elementary tactics, but it emphasized spirit (semangat) and intense disci- pline. In February 1945 a Peta unit at Blitar revolted under command of Supriyadi (?–1945) but was crushed by Japanese forces. Between 18 and

25 August, after the surrender and before Indonesia’s declaration of independence was widely known, the Japanese disarmed and disbanded most Peta units. Many, however, soon reassembled to form part of the basis of the Republic’s army. See also HEIHO. [0663, 0664]

PEMERINTAH DARURAT REPUBLIK INDONESIA (PDRI, Emer- gency Government of the Republic of Indonesia). In November 1948 Vice President Mohammad Hatta sent Sjafruddin Prawiranegara to Sumatra to establish a government presence there should the Dutch suc- ceed in overrunning Java. After the Dutch in their second “Police Ac- tion” of 19 December 1948 arrested Sukarno, Hatta, and most of their

PEMUDA PANCASILA • 335 cabinet, Sjafruddin Prawiranegara proclaimed an Emergency Govern-

ment on 22 December. The PDRI was headquartered in the interior of West Sumatra and viewed itself as a legal successor to the Republican government. Headed by Sjafruddin, it had Sumatra governor Tengku Mo- hammad Hassan as his deputy, and the Republic’s representative in India, Mr. Maramis, as minister of foreign affairs. The PDRI was recognized by the Republic’s guerrilla forces on Sumatra and Java (under General Sudirman), but it was ignored by the Dutch and by the jailed Republic leadership when in April 1949 they entered into the talks that led to the Roem–van Roijen Agreement of the following month. Both the PDRI and General Sudirman opposed the concessions made in these agree- ments but were ultimately persuaded to go along. Sjafruddin returned his mandate to Sukarno in Yogyakarta on 13 July 1949. [0660, 0686]

PEMUDA (youth). The notion of youth was a strong element in the national awakening of Indonesia in the early 20th century, especially through their role in promulgation of the “youth pledge” of 1928. The term pemuda came into common political use, however, only during the national Revolution of 1945–1949, when young Indonesians spear- headed the declaration of independence and flocked in tens of thousands to the armed units that endeavored to defend that independence against the Dutch. Pemuda in that time came to denote a spirit of daring and re- fusal to compromise. Pemuda were later important instruments in Sukarno’s ouster when they acted in close cooperation with the army in establishing the New Order government. See also GENERATIONS; STUDENTS. [0643, 0652]

PEMUDA PANCASILA. Founded as a subordinate wing of A. H. Nasu-

tion’s Ikatan Pendukung Kemerdekaan Indonesia (IPKI) party on

28 October 1959, Pemuda Pancasila was formally inaugurated at IPKI’s 1961 congress. It became prominent in the closing years of Sukarno’s rule when it offered to send troops in support of the West Irian (see

PAPUA) campaign (Trikora). Pemuda Pancasila had centers in Jakarta

and Medan, where it was largely an extortion agency, operating prima- rily against Chinese businesses. It was active in both areas after the 1965 coup (see GESTAPU), taking a leading role in killing suspected communists particularly in North Sumatra. Under Suharto it became one of the foremost organizations of gangs, carrying out “thug” politics (politik premanisme). These gangs formed part of the security apparatus and were closely tied to the military in organizing riots and extracting money from businesses. Pemuda Pancasila groups reemerged in the

336 • PEMUDA RAKYAT early 1980s in the aftermath of the Petrus (Pembunuhan Misterius)

killings, when they were reportedly the major instrument used by Suharto and Benny Murdani in wiping out Ali Murtopo’s gangster organization. Their ties to the military became closer in the late 1980s when their regional branches were matched with the army’s Komando Daerah Militer (Kodam) structure, and their militias were used by the army in maintaining local control. Pemuda Pancasila was suspected of providing many of the gangs that attacked Megawati Sukarnoputri’s Partai Demokrasi Indonesia (PDI) headquarters in July 1996, and the organization’s leaders were some of Suharto’s last outspoken supporters in May 1998, again being suspected of responsibility for much of the destruction of businesses on 13–14 May. Their influence apparently de- clined after Suharto’s fall. [0743]

PEMUDA RAKYAT (People’s Youth). Youth organization affiliated with the Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI), formed in 1950 to replace the Pe- muda Sosialis Indonesia (Pesindo). It used educational and social activities to draw the interest of young people, especially in the urban and rural kampung, but was banned along with the PKI in 1966. [0994]

PARTAI REPUBLIK INDONESIA (Pari, Indonesian Republican Party).