Sentral Organisasi Karyawan Seluruh Indonesia (SOKSI), Koperasi

Sentral Organisasi Karyawan Seluruh Indonesia (SOKSI), Koperasi

Serba Guna Gotong Royong (Kosgoro), and Musyawarah Kekeluar- gaan Gotong Royong (MKGR). In 1967 the Suharto regime announced that Golkar would be the regime’s parliamentary vehicle, and the New Order used it after 1971 to reshape Indonesia’s electoral system. Al- though the organization itself remained a federation of social groups, it was dominated by the army and to a lesser extent the bureaucracy. In general elections civil servants were obliged to vote for Golkar, and the government controlled the system so completely that Golkar could rely on a consistent vote of over 60 percent of the electorate.

Over the years attempts to make Golkar a more independent organiza- tion foundered on President Suharto’s reluctance to permit any revital- ization of the political system and the large military contingent in its membership. In October 1983, when state secretary Sudharmono be- came chairman of Golkar, he attempted to lessen its dependence on the executive but ran into determined opposition from both Suharto and the military. The army succeeded in pushing him out of the chairmanship in 1988 in favor of Wahono (1925–), a military man who had been Suharto’s assistant in Komando Cadangan Strategis Angkatan Darat (Kostrad) in 1965. Wahono served as chairman until 1993, when Suharto ensured that Information Minister Harmoko (1939–) should suc- ceed to the post, and two of Suharto’s children (Siti Hardijanti Rukmana and Bambang Trihatmodjo) were appointed to Golkar’s executive board.

162 • GORONTALO In May 1998 Harmoko’s announcement of his lack of support for

Suharto’s leadership was one of the critical factors in the president’s downfall, but subsequently other Golkar leaders pressed for Harmoko’s removal from office, and in the Golkar congress of July 1998, Akbar Tanjung (former chairman of Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam [HMI] and close to Suharto’s successor, B. J. Habibie) was elected to head the party.

In the 1999 elections Golkar came second behind Megawati

Sukarnoputri’s Partai Demokrasi Indonesia-Perjuangan (PDI-P)

and Akbar Tanjung became speaker of parliament. In September 2002 Tanjung was sentenced to a three-year jail term for allegedly embez- zling $4.5 million in state funds meant for the poor and channeled through the Badan Urusan Logistik (Bulog). The sentence was up- held by the Jakarta High Court in January 2003, but overturned on ap- peal by the Supreme Court on 12 February 2004. Throughout the process Tanjung refused to resign his leadership position in Golkar and was expected to be a leading contender for the party’s nomination in the July 2004 presidential election. Its organizational strength through- out the country and the widespread popular disillusionment with the PDI-P augured well for Golkar to achieve a strong showing in the April 2004 general elections. See also DWIFUNGSI; MONOLOYALITAS. [0736, 0748, 0760, 0998, 0999]

GORONTALO. City and kingdom in northern Sulawesi. The Suwawa kingdom was founded here in the eighth century, but its links with the 14th-century trading kingdom of Gorontalo are unknown. Ternate dom- inated the area in the 15th and 16th centuries, and the vassal King Ma- tolodulakiki declared Islam the state religion in the 16th century. A fed- erated kingdom of Lima Pohalaa emerged in 1673.

GOTONG ROYONG. “Mutual self-help” was said to be the principle in- spiring village life throughout Indonesia, especially on Java (see DESA). While the existence of social differentiation in the village was acknowledged, under gotong royong all members of the village had a right and a duty to participate in the economic activities of other vil- lagers. Thus, for instance, if a house were to be built, all would join in the construction; if a field were to be harvested, all had a right to take part and to receive a share of the crop as their reward. The share a har- vester received was intended to be in proportion to the amount she or he

GREEN REVOLUTION • 163 had collected, but as the number of harvesters grew with the village pop-

ulation, the share of the crop received by the harvesters en masse tended to grow in accord with the principles of gotong royong. Landlords, how- ever, have often tried to restrict access to the harvest to smaller groups of privileged workers, sometimes entirely from outside the village, in order to increase their own crop share and to ensure a more docile workforce.

The concept was also discredited during World War II when Japanese authorities instructed village officials to use it in extracting forced labor from the villagers in projects for the Japanese war effort. Similarly under the Suharto administration, people outside Java in particular viewed go- tong royong as a method by which the government sought local cooperation in imposing its centralizing policies. See also LAND REFORM; RICE.

GOVERNOR-GENERAL, OFFICE OF THE. Post created in 1610 by the directors of the Dutch East Indies Company (VOC) to centralize control over the company’s trade operations in the East and to organize its military operations. The governor-general was also in charge of the administration of law in the colony. Headquarters of the governor-general were first on Ambon but shifted under Jan Pieterszoon Coen to Batavia. From 1815 to 1848 the governor-general was appointed per- sonally by the Dutch king and thereafter by the Crown on the advice of cabinet. From 1815 to 1836 and from 1854 to 1925, the governor-general (also known as the Landvoogd) ruled jointly with the Raad van Indië, but he remained the sole official point of contact between the colonial government and the metropolitan power: all instructions and requests from The Hague passed formally through the governor-general. A lieu- tenant governor-general was occasionally appointed, and under Huber- tus Johannes van Mook, when no governor-general was appointed, this was the highest administrative post in the colony. In November 1948 the post of governor-general was abolished and replaced by that of Hoge Vertegenwoordiger van de Kroon (HVK, high representative of the Crown). For a list of the governors-general, see APPENDIX A. See also COMMISSIONER-GENERAL; NETHERLANDS, CONSTITU- TIONAL RELATIONSHIP WITH INDONESIA. [0491, 0638]

GOWA. See MAKASSAR.

GREEN REVOLUTION. General term for the dramatic increase in agri-

cultural production, especially of rice, begun in the mid-1960s. The

164 • GROWTH TRIANGLES program started as an agricultural extension program in the Karawang

area of West Java in 1963 and from 1964 was extended to the rest of the island under the name Bimbingan Massal (Bimas, Mass Guidance), cov- ering 462,000 hectares (ha) by 1966 and over 2 million ha by 1969. The program included the introduction of new high-yielding varieties (HYV) of rice and new cultivation techniques, especially with machinery, ex- tended irrigation, and the use of pesticides and fertilizer, that allowed up to five crops in two years. It is said to have nearly doubled production on Java between 1968 and 1985. It was supported by the international chemical producers CIBA and Hoechst. Problems with the program have included the vulnerability of HYVs to disease and weather variation, the high cost and unreliability of seed and chemical supplies, the poisoning of fishponds and rivers by pesticides and fertilizers, corruption, and the fact that the continual cultivation of rice fails to break the life cycle of insect pests such as the wereng. [0319, 0333, 0341]

GROWTH TRIANGLES. Indonesia has been involved in three regional “growth triangles” in which adjacent regions in three different countries are given a special association on the basis of complementary economic strengths. The Singapore–Johor–Riau (Sijori) growth triangle covers Singapore, the Malaysian state of Johor, and the Indonesian provinces of Riau and West Sumatra. It was proposed by Singapore in December 1989 as a measure to complement the developing relationship between Singapore and the Indonesian island of Batam. Private companies in Singapore provided capital for establishing labor-intensive industries on the territory of its partners, with the local governments providing man- power and facilities. Trilateral agreements establishing the growth trian- gle were signed in December 1994, but connections between Johor and the Indonesian provinces remain meager.

An Indonesia–Malaysia–Thailand Growth Triangle (IMTGT) cover- ing the Indonesian provinces of Aceh, North Sumatra, Riau, and West Sumatra, together with the Kedah and Langkawi in Malaysia and the southern part of Thailand, was formalized in 1993. In the following year, 1994, the Brunei–Indonesia–Malaysia–Philippines Eastern ASEAN Growth Area (BIMP-EAGA) was established, but both it and the IMTGT have yet to show significant results. [0362, 0363]

GUIDED DEMOCRACY (Demokrasi Terpimpin). General term for the years 1959–1965, in which Indonesia was dominated politically by Sukarno and during which enormous political tension arose between the

GUIDED ECONOMY • 165 army and the Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI). Guided Democracy

was initially a reaction to the apparent mendacity and divisiveness of par- liamentary governments in the 1950s, and to the fact that the parties were unable to agree on a cabinet after the fall of the second Ali Sastroami- joyo cabinet in 1957 or on a constitution to replace the provisional 1950 Constitution. Parliamentary democracy was further discredited by the in- ability of the central government to maintain control in the provinces and by the participation of members of the Masjumi and Partai Sosialis In- donesia (PSI) in the PRRI/Permesta rebellion. The transition to Guided Democracy began with a declaration of martial law and Sukarno’s ap- pointment of himself as prime minister, and it ended with Sukarno’s restoration of the country’s original 1945 Constitution on 5 July 1959.

The rhetoric of Guided Democracy was both radical and conservative; on the one hand, Sukarno dedicated the nation to completing the unfin- ished Revolution and incorporated Marxist ideas extensively in his nu- merous ideological statements, especially Nasakom (Nasionalisme, Agama, Komunisme). He praised the PKI, attempted to protect it from army hostility, and promoted its participation in the institutions of the state. On the other hand, Sukarno consistently eschewed class conflict, promoting instead a corporatist view of the state in which there were no fundamental conflicts of interest between different social groups. He ar- gued especially against what he described as the Western notion of 50 percent + 1 democracy, which enabled a tyranny by the majority. (See also MANIFESTO POLITIK.)

Institutionally, too, the picture was confused: the PKI made use of Sukarno’s protection and the favorable ideological climate to expand its membership dramatically, while, as a result of martial law and the na- tionalization of Dutch property, the armed forces became firmly estab- lished in government and the economy. It became common to speak of

a political triangle consisting of Sukarno, the army, and the PKI, but the strengths of each were very different and uncertainty over where Guided Democracy was leading the country contributed to growing tension in the 1960s, which culminated in the Gestapu coup attempt of 30 Sep- tember 1965. See also GUIDED ECONOMY. [0696, 0697 0704, 0706, 0850, 0859]

GUIDED ECONOMY (Ekonomi Terpimpin). Sukarno’s vision of a polit- ical reconstruction of Indonesia under Guided Democracy was paired with plans for a thoroughgoing restructuring of the country’s economy. Whereas parliamentary governments in the 1950s had generally aimed at

166 • GUSMÃO, JOSE ALEXANDRE “XANANA” Indonesianization of the economy by encouraging indigenous entrepre-

neurs, Sukarno proposed massive state direction of and intervention in the economy by means of regulation and direct state involvement. In Sukarno’s view, much of Indonesia’s economic difficulty stemmed from its subordination to economic imperialism, and he aimed by means of state investment both to do without foreign capital investment and to create an industrial base that would lessen Indonesia’s import of manu- factured goods. These plans were laid down in an Eight-Year Plan an- nounced in August 1960 and were restated in the Economic Declaration (Deklarasi Ekonomi, Dekon) of March 1963.

The nationalization of Dutch enterprises in 1957–1958 provided the state with control of major parts of the economy, and government con- trols on other sectors tightened considerably. The money for reinvest- ment, however, was not there. Nationalized businesses, many of them in military hands, were milked for funds both corruptly and to cover short- falls in the government budget. Plantations in particular, already badly neglected in the 1940s and short of funds in the 1950s, were starved of reinvestment capital needed for replanting. Production declined steadily, leaving the budget steadily less able to meet government commitments. Inflation reached 500 percent a year by late 1965 as the government cov- ered expenditures by printing money and the balance of payments steadily declined.

GUSMÃO, JOSE ALEXANDRE “XANANA” (1946–). Born in a small town on the north coast of East Timor, Gusmão attended a seminary in Baucau in the early 1960s. He fulfilled national service in the Por-

tuguese army from 1968 to 1971. He joined the Frente Revolucionária

do Timor Leste Independente (Fretilin) leadership shortly before the 1975 Indonesian invasion and fought with them against the Indonesian assault. After fleeing to the mountains in late 1978 he assumed leader- ship of both the party and its military army Falintil after the death of its guerrilla leader, Nicolau Lobato, at the end of that year. Gusmão changed Fretilin’s strategy in the mid-1980s, constructing a broad alliance with nationalist groups inside and outside East Timor under an umbrella group Conselho Nacional da Resistencia Timorense (CNRT), of which

he became chairman. In the late 1980s he urged Fretilin to establish con- tacts with urban young people and begin a campaign of nonviolent re- sistance. Indonesian forces captured Gusmão in 1992 in a house on the outskirts of Dili, and in May 1993 he was sentenced to life in prison, a term later cut to 19 years and eight months.

HABIBIE, BACHARUDDIN JUSUF • 167 On 10 February 1999, President B. J. Habibie’s government trans-

ferred Gusmão from prison to house arrest in Jakarta, and he was finally released in mid-September, returning to East Timor the following month. After initially participating in the territory’s interim parliament, he quit in April 2001, stating that the internal squabbling was hampering East Timor’s transition to independence. Despite initial reluctance, he an- nounced in August that he would run for president, and he was over- whelmingly elected in the presidential elections of April 2002 with ap- proximately 80 percent of the vote. He presided over the ceremony of independence on 19 May and became the first president of the indepen- dent Republic of East Timor.

–H–

HAATZAAI ARTIKELEN. See SUBVERSION. HABIBIE, BACHARUDDIN JUSUF (1936–). Born in Pare Pare, South

Sulawesi, Habibie became acquainted with Suharto in the early 1950s when Suharto was serving in South Sulawesi and regularly visited the Habibie family. He was educated at the Bandung Institute of Technology (1954–1955) and graduated from Aachen Institute of Technology in Ger- many in 1960. After working in Germany, Habibie was appointed in 1973 as technology and aeronautics advisor to Suharto and adviser to Pertam- ina. In 1978 he became minister of research and technology, and he founded and chaired the Badan Pengkajian dan Penerapan Teknologi (BPPT, Body for the Management of Strategic Industries) and the Dewan Riset Nasional (DRN, National Research Council). Habibie helped found the Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia (ICMI) in 1990 and became its chairman. In 1992–1993 he was also director-general of PT PAL, the state naval dockyard in Surabaya; of PT Pindad, the army industrial com- pany for the manufacture of arms and ammunition; and of the state-owned Industri Pesawat Terbang Nusantara (IPTN, National Aircraft Industry) founded in 1976. Suharto also gave him control over the economic devel- opment of eastern Indonesia and Batam and of the exploitation of the Natuna gas field in the South China Sea. In March 1998 Suharto chose him as his vice president. He succeeded Suharto as president on 19 May 1998 and served until defeated in the election of May 1999.

Despite his short and rather erratic tenure as president, Habibie insti- tuted basic changes in the government of Indonesia, the most significant

168 • HAJ being his willingness to allow East Timor to move along the path to in-

dependence and his approval of measures for decentralizing the Indone- sian political and economic structure. [0760, 0761]

HAJ. The Muslim pilgrimage to Mecca, one of the five pillars of Islam. The steady stream of Indonesian pilgrims was and remains one of the important channels of political and cultural contact between Indonesia and the Arab world. Already itself a sign of faith, the haj tends to in- crease the conviction of those who undertake it and for this reason the Dutch feared it as a potential source of political unrest. From 1825, therefore, they tried to discourage pilgrims by requiring them to obtain a passport and to pay a tax of ƒ110. They also encouraged the local tradi- tion that seven pilgrimages to Demak, site of the first Muslim state on Java, were equivalent to one to Mecca. The tax, however, was abolished in 1852, and numbers began to increase, raising Dutch fears and leading to increasing surveillance of those making the haj. Until the early 20th century, most pilgrimages were arranged by so-called pilgrim sheikhs, who organized tickets, accommodation, and often finance for the jour- ney. From 1922, however, the haj came under state control under the so- called Pelgrimsordonnantie, which regulated shipping, passports, vacci- nation, quarantine, and the welfare of Dutch subjects in Arabia. In 1926–1927, 52,412 pilgrims traveled from the Netherlands Indies to Ara- bia, the largest group from any country.

After independence the government maintained tight control over the haj for similar reasons and also to preserve Indonesia’s foreign exchange and to prevent people from selling rice lands to finance the pilgrimage. Under the New Order, the Suharto government removed the subsidy to those undertaking the haj and in 1969 forbade pilgrims from using any programs except those organized by the government. In 1989 the num- ber of pilgrims was 57,903, and this number increased to 205,000 by 2001. President Suharto made the haj in 1991, and in the 1990s many government officials also undertook the pilgrimage as Islam became an acceptable part of the political scene. [0627, 0637, 0641, 0983]

HALMAHERA (Gilolo, Jailolo). Large island facing Ternate and Tidore. The coastal people are largely Malay, with aboriginal tribes (“Alfurs”) in the interior. A sultanate of Jailolo briefly emerged in the 17th century but was conquered by Ternate. Christian conversions under the Dutch were largely confined to northern Halmahera, while the southern regions re- mained mostly Muslim. The sultans of Ternate and Tidore competed for

HAMKA • 169 influence in the area, with the Ternate sultan drawing his major support

from Christians in the north, while the Tidore sultan’s basis of support was largely among Muslims in the center and south.

In the early 1990s as Muslims made political gains in Jakarta, tension arose between the religious communities in Halmahera. When the gov- ernment of B. J. Habibie created a new province of north Maluku con- flict was renewed, fueled by competing claims to the proceeds of a local gold mine between Muslims and Christians allied with the two sultans. At the end of 1999 violence broke out in northern Halmahera, with at least 907 people killed by early January 2000. [0026, 0570, 0781, 1341]

HAMENGKUBUWONO IX (1912–1988). Sultan of Yogyakarta. After studying Indology in Leiden, he became sultan on 18 March 1940, steer- ing the sultanate to slightly greater autonomy under the Japanese from 1942. He is best remembered, however, for siding immediately with the In- donesian Revolution in 1945 and for putting his domains at the disposal of the Republic. Yogyakarta became first de facto and then formal capital of the Republic and the sultan, as minister of state and general in the Re- publican army, took part in the senior counsels of the Republic, especially in 1948–1949. His refusal to cooperate with the Dutch after the fall of Yo- gyakarta in December 1948 helped to force the Dutch to restore Republi- can government in July 1949. Hamengkubuwono held the Defense Min- istry in 1949–1950 and 1952–1953 and was governor of the Yogyakarta Special Territory until his death. He reentered the cabinet in 1963 as head of the State Audit Board (Badan Pemeriksa Keuangan). In the early New Order he emerged as a prominent figure in the Suharto regime, becom- ing deputy prime minister for economics, finance, and development in March 1966 and vice president in 1973–1978. [0643, 0695, 0854]