Mohammad Hatta government, forming a Front Demokrasi Rakyat (FDR) in February of that year. When Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI)

leader Musso returned from Moscow in August 1948, Amir allied his FDR with the Communist Party, announcing that he had been a communist since before the war (a claim then widely doubted). In September he joined the unsuccessful Madiun uprising against the Sukarno/Hatta gov-

ANTARA • 17

ernment and was captured in late October. He was summarily shot by government troops at the start of the second Dutch “Police Action” on 19/20 December 1948. [0478, 0674, 0858, 0865, 1117]

AMUK . A temporary derangement that leads an individual (normally male)

to wild and directionless violence, usually against other people. It is not clear whether amuk has any strictly clinical causes; most observers at- tribute it to a reaction against the extreme suppression of personal feel- ings allegedly demanded in many Indonesian societies, but it may have developed, like the Viking berserk, as a technique for inspiring terror in enemies during battle and could apparently be encouraged by the use of cannabis or opium. See also LATAH; WARFARE.

ANAK BUAH . Literally, “fruit child.” Protégé, client. See BAPAK. ANGKATAN BERSENJATA REPUBLIK INDONESIA (ABRI). See

ARMED FORCES OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA. ANGKATAN ’45; ANGKATAN ’66. See GENERATIONS. ANGLO-DUTCH TREATY. Signed on 17 March 1824, it revised British

and Dutch colonial holdings in western Indonesia. The British, ceding Bengkulu to the Dutch and receiving Melaka in exchange, confined themselves to and were given exclusive rights on the Malay Peninsula, where they immediately established the port of Singapore. The Dutch were given a free hand on Sumatra but agreed to guarantee the independence of Aceh. The treaty permanently split the territories of the sultanate of Riau-Johor. It explicitly permitted the British to retain their in- terests in northern Borneo and to trade in areas not annexed by the Dutch. See also BELITUNG; NETHERLANDS INDIES, EXPANSION OF; RAFFLES, THOMAS STAMFORD. [0583]

ANSOR (from Arabic al-ansar, followers of the Prophet). Youth organiza-

tion founded in 1934 and affiliated with the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), known for its participation in massacres of communists, especially in East Java, in 1965–1966. See also MASSACRES OF 1965–1966.

ANTARA (“between”). Founded on 17 December 1937 by R. M. Sumanang

and A. M. Sipatuhar, it was developed by Adam Malik and others as a pri- vate, nationalist news agency. During the Japanese occupation, it was merged with the Japanese agency Domei but became Indonesia’s official

18 • ANTASARI news agency in 1945. Several agencies were merged with Antara in 1963

to form the Lembaga Kantor Berita Nasional (LKBN, National News Agency Institute), but the name Antara is retained for daily use. [1304]

ANTASARI. See BANJARMASIN. ARAB WORLD, RELATIONS WITH. Trade in spices linked Indonesia

and the Arab world even before the emergence of Islam, but it is the haj, or pilgrimage to Mecca, and the study of Islam in general that have taken the largest number of Indonesians to the Middle East. Arabs have always been prominent in the archipelago as traders and mercenaries. Some 10,000 Indonesians (so-called mukim) lived semipermanently in Arabia in the late 19th century. From the early 20th century, many In- donesians studied at Al-Azhar University in Cairo.

In November 1946 the Arab League recommended recognition of the Indonesian Republic, and Egypt and Syria in June 1947 were the first states to officially recognize it. In the 1950s, Indonesia joined Arab and other states in Asia and Africa to form the Non-Aligned Movement (see ASIA-AFRICA CONFERENCE). Muslim organizations, especially the modernist Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia (DDII, Indonesian Islamic Preaching Council) founded in 1967 by former Masjumi leaders, received donations from such countries as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Egypt for social and educational programs. During the 1970s and 1980s they established hundreds of schools and mosques, and increased their contacts with the Arab world, sending hundreds of students to centers of learning in the Middle East. Also, since 1987 the number of Indonesians working in the Middle East has increased substantially. Indonesia has no diplomatic relations with Israel but recognized the state of Palestine only in November 1988. Jemaah Islamiyah, the group accused of complicity in terrorist activities, including the Bali bombing, reportedly receives financial support and military training from Al Qaeda forces in the Middle East and has sent volunteers to train with them in Afghanistan. See also TURKEY, HISTORICAL LINKS WITH. [0084, 0543, 0774, 1031, 1039, 1363]

ARABS. Coming especially from Hadramawt, Arabs settled in Indonesia in small impermanent trading communities from perhaps the fifth century, and Arab adventurers founded the kingdom of Pontianak; other dy- nasties had Arab ancestry. As with the Chinese, Arab communities ab- sorbed much local culture, some disappearing altogether and others

ARCHEOLOGY • 19 forming distinctive peranakan communities. The greatest immigration

took place in the second half of the 19th century, when large communities settled especially on the north coast of Java. Sharing Islam with most Indonesians, the Arabs were often better able than the Chinese to

be accepted as part of the nationalist movement. In 1934 A. R. A. Baswedan founded the Persatuan Arab Indonesia (PAI, Indonesian Arab Association) in Semarang to encourage the allegiance of peranakan Arabs to Indonesia. The PAI joined the Gabungan Politik Indonesia (GAPI) in 1939–1940. An Indo-Arabische Beweging (Indo-Arab Move- ment) founded in 1939, on the other hand, argued for continued separate status. After independence Arabs were generally accepted as Indone- sians, and in the 1990s several Indonesians of Hadrami descent were cabinet ministers, notably long-serving foreign minister Ali Alatas.

The modernist Al Irsyad organization, established in 1913 by Arab In- donesians, is among the most active proponents of the introduction of Is- lamic law and establishment of an Islamic state. It runs a network of schools and colleges, including a school in Solo founded and headed by Abu Bakar Ba’asyir as well as about 140 missions and several hospitals. Its chief, Faisal Buasir, is also a prominent leader in the Partai Persat- uan Pembangunan (PPP). After the unification of Yemen in 1990, growing numbers of Indonesian young people traveled there each year to study at religious schools. The Arab community came under suspicion in the wake of the terrorist attacks in New York (2001) and Bali (2002) as several of the prominent Islamic militants in Indonesia (including Abu Bakar Ba’asyir and Laskar Jihad head Ja’afar Umar Thalib) are of Arab descent. [0480, 1041, 1057, 1069]

ARCHEOLOGY. The earliest serious archeological work in the archipelago was conducted by the Bataviaasch Genootschap van Kunsten en Wetenschappen, while in the early 19th century T. S. Raffles did some work on the antiquities of Java, such as the excavation and partial recon- struction of Borobudur. Extensive archeological work, however, did not begin until the foundation of the Commissie in Nederlandsch-Indië voor Oudheidkundig Onderzoek op Java en Madoera (Netherlands Indies Com- mission for Investigation of Antiquities on Java and Madura) in 1901 under J. L. A. Brandes. Headed successively by N. J. Krom (1910–1916),

F. D. K. Bosch (1916–1936), and W. F. Stutterheim (1936–1942), and becoming the Oudheidkundige Dienst (Archeological Service) in 1913, it was active in investigating and protecting the archipelago’s antiquities, though it paid greatest attention to the Hindu-Buddhist relics of Java. The

20 • ARCHIPELAGIC CONCEPT postindependence Dinas Purbakala dan Peninggalan Nasional (National

Archeological and Remains Service, now Pusat Penelitian Arkeologi Na- sional, National Center for Archeological Research) under H. R. van Heekeren (to 1956) and then Sukmono continued this work while giving greater attention to the archeology and prehistory of the other islands. [0112–0124, 0507]

ARCHIPELAGIC CONCEPT (Wawasan Nusantara). On independence, Indonesia inherited a three-mile territorial waters limit around each of its (then) 13,677 islands. Largely for security reasons, this was expanded by

a declaration of 13 December 1957 and an Act of 18 February 1960 to

12 miles, measured from a straight baseline drawn from the outermost points of each island, thus covering the entire archipelago. The 1973 Act on Indonesia’s Continental Shelf claimed seabed resources but required the reaching of seabed agreements with Malaysia (1969, 1971, 1981), Thailand (1971, 1975, 1977), Australia (then including Papua New Guinea) (1971, 1972, 1973), India (1974, 1977), Singapore (1973, 1978), and Papua New Guinea (1980). A further treaty was signed with Australia in 1988, establishing a marine border in the so-called Timor Gap, covering the territorial waters of former Portuguese Timor. Over- lapping claims with Vietnam and China in the South China Sea remain unresolved, the most troubling for Indonesia being Beijing’s unilaterally declared boundary that in 1995 included Indonesia’s rich Natuna Island gas field. The principle, argued by Indonesia since the 1958 Convention on the Law of the Sea, that an archipelagic nation is entitled to claim all waters between its islands as internal waters was upheld by the United Nations International Convention on the Law of the Sea in 1982, though the Sunda and Lombok straits are recognized as international water- ways. On 21 March 1980 Indonesia claimed a 200-kilometer Exclusive Economic Zone around its outer perimeter, and this was formalized by law in 1983. In 1994 Indonesia’s claim to archipelagic status was recognized under the United Nations Law of the Sea Convention, giving In- donesia an additional 3 million square km of territorial waters and juris- diction over another 3 million square km Economic Exclusion Zone. See also CONTINENTAL DRIFT; PIRACY. [1108]

ARCHITECTURE. Austronesian migrants to Indonesia in circa 3000

B.C. apparently brought with them techniques for building thatched communal dwellings (see MIGRATIONS) of a kind still seen among the Dayaks. In later times, however, smaller dwellings for individual

ARMED FORCES OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA • 21 (extended) families became more common, and the typical house

throughout much of the archipelago was a light, impermanent structure built of palm and bamboo materials, with a steep roof against tropical rains and constructed on poles as a protection against flooding. Royal palaces adopted the same style on a grander scale. In Java, the characteristic structure of royal palaces is the pendopo, consisting of a steep roof with decorated ceiling supported on pillars over a raised floor, with no walls.

Foreign influences may have registered first in religious architecture: Hindu and Buddhist temples were often of stone and brick, and many examples still survive especially on Java (see ARCHEOLOGY; BOROBUDUR; KRATON). The style of mosque most common in In- donesia, especially Java, is also distinctive, being square, with four sup- porting pillars and a veranda (serambi) facing east. European trading companies used brick and stone extensively for their trading posts, partly for defensive reasons, and their early dwelling houses were closely modeled on European styles. A distinctive Dutch colonial architecture emerged in the early 19th century, with high ceilings, marble or tiled floors, deep verandas, neoclassical pillars, living areas opening directly onto the garden, and separate pavilions for cooking, bathing, and the like. This style declined in the 20th century with a return to European urban models. Since independence, many Indonesian architects have endeav- ored to incorporate traditional forms and motifs in their work. While the Suharto government was often suspicious of manifestations of regional ethnic identity in matters such as language, it expressly encouraged the preservation of the strikingly different characteristic architectural styles of Indonesia’s many ethnic groups; this official sanctioning is seen perhaps most clearly in Jakarta’s Taman Mini Indonesia Indah (Beautiful In- donesia in Miniature theme park). [0125–0131, 0536]

ARISAN . A rotating credit association, typically of 10–20 persons, common on Java. Members meet regularly to pay fixed contributions, the entire kitty at each meeting being taken by one member, chosen by lot or prior agreement. The arisan ends when all members have drawn from it. See also PAWNSHOPS.

ARMED FORCES OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA. Until 1999 (when its name was changed and the police separated from it), the armed forces was named Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia (ABRI) and encompassed the army (Angkatan Darat), navy (Angkatan Laut), air

22 • ARMY force (Angkatan Udara), and police (Polisi Negara or Angkatan Ke-

polisian). In 1962 Sukarno created ABRI as a central body over the previously separate individual forces, mainly as a device to remove General

A. H. Nasution from command posts. Until the advent of the New Or-

der, therefore, the central armed forces command had little power over the separate services. After the abolition of separate service ministries in 1967, however, the armed forces, except the police, were gradually inte- grated within a single command structure under the Ministry of Defense and Security (Hankam, Departemen Pertahanan dan Keamanan). From 1967 to 1983, the posts of defense minister and ABRI commander were always held by the same man. In 1988 the armed forces consisted officially of 284,000 personnel, with a further 800,000 in “reserves,” which included the village guards (Hansip, Pertahanan Sipil).

In April 1999 the armed forces were renamed Tentara Nasional In- donesia (TNI, Indonesian National Army), the name they had held during most of the Revolution and the 1950s. On that same date the police were formally separated from the armed forces, although this order was not implemented until the following year. In 2000 the armed forces com- prised 300,000 men in the army, air force, and navy. Armed Forces Day is celebrated on 5 October.

For a list of armed forces commanders, see APPENDIX E. See also DEFENSE POLICY; DWIFUNGSI; “FIFTH FORCE.” [0037, 0714, 0930, 0968, 0972, 0974, 0975]

ARMY (Angkatan Darat, AD). The Indonesian army dates its founding to

5 October 1945, when the new national government announced the creation of a Tentara Keamanan Rakyat (TKR, People’s Security Army) and gave a mandate for the actual formation of an army to Urip Sumoharjo,

a retired major from the Dutch colonial army (Koninklijk Nederland- sch Indisch Leger [KNIL]). The government had previously (on 22 Au- gust) created a quasi-military Badan Keamanan Rakyat (BKR, People’s Security Organization), responsibility for which was largely devolved to regional national committees (Komité Nasional Indonesia, KNI); BKR units in general formed the basis of the TKR.

The new army drew its officer corps principally from former soldiers and officers of the KNIL and the Japanese-sponsored Pembela Tanah Air (Peta) on Java and Giyugun on Sumatra. For about 40 years, the army remained under the domination of the so-called Generation of ’45 (see GENERATIONS) who first made their mark and obtained command posts during the national Revolution. The ranks of this generation

ARMY • 23 were thinned in later years by the exclusion and self-exclusion of many

fundamentalist Muslims and leftists so that the social base of the officer corps could increasingly be described as conservative, abangan, and from the small town elites of Java.

After 1945 a gradual centralization of military authority took place. Initially most army units depended financially and logistically on local civilian governments, and regional commanders enjoyed extensive autonomy from the center. Senior officers met in Yogyakarta on 12 No- vember 1945 and elected Sudirman as army commander, relegating the government’s choice, Urip, to the post of chief of staff. The navy and air force were separate organizations under the Ministry of Defense. Hier- archy was further weakened by the existence of numerous armed organizations outside the army (see BADAN PERJUANGAN; HIZBUL- LAH; LASYKAR). Gradually, however, military authority was concentrated in the general staff, dominated by former KNIL officers. With the help of the Ministry of Defense under Amir Sjarifuddin, ir- regular armed units were disbanded or incorporated, Sudirman’s authority was gradually diminished, and “reliable” officers were gradually placed in key positions. In this process the TKR changed its name to Ten- tara Keselamatan Rakyat (TKR, 1 January 1946), Tentara Republik In- donesia (TRI, 24 January 1946), and Tentara Nasional Indonesia (TNI, June 1947). In 1949 the Republic’s armed forces were merged with the KNIL to form the APRIS (Angkatan Perang Republik Indonesia Serikat, Armed Forces of the RIS), becoming APRI in August 1950.

The postrevolutionary army was overlarge (perhaps 500,000 in late 1949) and deeply segmented. Divisional commanders, especially of the Siliwangi, Diponegoro, and Brawijaya divisions in West, Central, and East Java respectively, enjoyed great autonomy, while the regional commanders in East Sumatra and Minahasa maintained major smuggling operations. The high command was unable to meet army financial needs and the following decades saw a gradual movement toward reduction of size and centralization of authority, promoted particularly by A. H. Na- sution as minister of defense. This process included the creation of elite commando-style units (Komando Cadangan Strategis Angkatan

Darat [Kostrad], Resimen Para Komando Angkatan Darat [RP-

KAD], and Banteng Raiders) directly under central command and an expansion of formal military training both at the Army Staff and Command School (Seskoad, Sekolah Staf dan Komando Angkatan Darat) in Ban- dung and at Fort Leavenworth in Texas. In 1952, Nasution began a program of transferring regional commanders away from their power bases.

24 • ARMY When the officers mobilized parliamentary support against the transfers

and demobilizations, Nasution and others organized demonstrations in Jakarta on 17 October, calling for the dissolution of parliament. Sukarno refused and Nasution was suspended from duty for three years, leaving the high command much weakened.

With his reinstallation as chief of staff in November 1955, Nasution resumed his transfer program, which sparked the regional military coups preceding the regional rebellions. Martial law was instituted throughout the country. Dismissals after the PRRI/Permesta rebellion and an expansion of the army to 330,000 for the West Irian (Papua) campaign increased the power of the high command, headed from 1962 by Ahmad Yani. During Guided Democracy, President Sukarno, suspicious of army power, promoted the distinctive identities of the navy, air force, and police, but in 1967–1970, after General Suharto became president, the four separate ministries were reabsorbed into the Defense Ministry.

Under President Suharto, the role of the army expanded into all levels of the administration when dwifungsi, the official doctrine authorizing the armed forces’ extensive participation in politics and government in- troduced in 1960, was expanded and implemented. During the early years of the New Order, the top positions within the army were still dominated by the 1945 generation of officers, but by the early 1980s these officers were gradually retiring from active service to be replaced by a new “professional” generation graduated from the Military Acad- emy, established in Magelang in 1957. With this development there was

a decline in the importance of affiliation with the historic territorial divisions (Siliwangi, Diponegoro, and so on) of the Revolution, and greater emphasis was placed on technical service specializations (infantry, ar- tillery, engineers, and the like). Javanese dominance of the officer corps continued, however, into the early 1990s, with between 60 and 70 percent of senior officers of Javanese origin, a proportion that lessened to approximately 55 percent by the end of the New Order. By 1988, all members of the ’45 generation had retired.

During the 1980s, under Benny Murdani (who held the post of commander in chief of the armed forces from 1983 to 1988), the army’s influence expanded throughout all sectors of the state and society. In 1985–1986 there was a major reorganization of the armed forces, whereby the 16 regional commands instituted in the late 1950s were reduced to 10 (see map 8). Power within the army was further centralized within the hands of Commander in Chief Murdani, and roles previously

ARMY • 25 held by the navy and air force were taken over by the army. The aims of

the reorganization were primarily to emphasize the importance of internal security vis-à-vis that of external threat. In 1988 army personnel officially numbered 215,000. Murdani’s strengthening grip on the military, however, drew the suspicion of the president, leading to his abrupt re- moval from his position as commander in chief in February 1988 (though

he was appointed minister of defense and held onto his post as Kop- kamtib commander) and replacement by army chief of staff and former Suharto aide, Try Sutrisno.

From that point on, particularly after Murdani’s later dismissal from his post as minister of defense in 1993, it became clear that Suharto was attempting to strengthen his personal control over the army, a situation reflected in the rapid personnel changes in the top army leadership throughout the mid-1990s. The growing strength of Suharto’s connection to Muslim organizations and the resultant increase in the influence of Muslim officers, together with a shift in the army’s relations with Golkar and the increasing influence of Suharto family members, such as the president’s son-in-law Prabowo Subianto in the army and his daughter Siti Hardijanti Rukmana (Tutut) in Golkar, led to increasing schisms within the officer corps and a resultant weakening of its power.

As dissension grew with the financial crisis and collapse of the rupiah in late 1997 and early 1998, Suharto made efforts to protect himself by placing officers of undisputed loyalty in key positions around the nation’s capital, but the army became incapable of decisive action. This was clear in May 1998 when Suharto called on the military to defend him and, instead, Armed Forces Commander in Chief Wiranto was one of those who advised the president to abdicate in favor of his vice president

B. J. Habibie. Immediately after Suharto’s resignation Prabowo, as Kostrad commander, made an effort to replace Wiranto but was instead himself dis- missed. Subsequently Wiranto moved to remove or transfer officers closely allied with Prabowo from influential positions and subsequently announced a program of military reforms reducing the army’s political role in Indonesian society. On Armed Forces Day (5 October) 1998, he announced the separation of the national police from the armed forces and the reversion of the armed forces’ name to Tentara Nasional Indone- sia (TNI), publicly cutting the army’s ties to Golkar and declaring its neutrality in the forthcoming electoral campaign. He also agreed to the TNI’s representation in parliament being reduced from 75 to 38 seats, and he drastically reduced the numbers of army personnel seconded to

26 • ARMY nonmilitary governmental positions. It was subsequently announced that

the army’s territorial structure would revert to the pre-1984 system of 17 rather than 10 Kodam (four each in Sumatra, Java, and Kalimantan, two in Sulawesi, and one each in Nusatenggara, Maluku, and Irian [Papua]).

But the army was discredited by its reactions to the unrest in Aceh and its role in sponsoring militias involved in the 2001 massacre in East Timor. Wiranto had been replaced as armed forces commander in chief by his deputy Admiral Widodo Adisutjipto (1944–) in November 1999, being appointed instead to the position of coordinating minister for political and security affairs, and then forced to resign from that position in May 2000. The new president Abdurrachman Wahid overrode many of Wiranto’s policies, particularly in Aceh, and publicly disagreed with his plans for reorganizing the military’s territorial structure. Subsequent fierce infighting among the officer corps was exacerbated by investiga- tions into human rights abuses by military elements in East Timor and other restless areas. President Wahid’s interference in military affairs alienated much of the officer corps, who established close ties with his vice president, Megawati Sukarnoputri. Army Chief of Staff Endri- artono Sutarto (1947–) refused to back President Wahid when he tried to proclaim a state of emergency and dissolve parliament in early 2001; instead, the army supported moves in parliament to impeach the president.

When Megawati replaced Wahid as president, she seemed intent on ap- pointing Army Chief of Staff Sutarto as armed forces commander in place of Admiral Widodo, though he was not due for retirement until 2004. Lieutenant-General Ryamizard Ryacudu (1950–), head of the Army Strategic Reserve, replaced Sutarto as army chief of staff. Both Sutarto and Ryamizard have close links not only to Megawati but also to her hus- band Taufik Kiemas and the Partai Demokrasi Indonesia—Perjuangan (PDIP), and Ryamizard is also the son-in-law of Try Sutrisno. Despite its close alliance with the president, however, the military seemed unlikely to resume a major parliamentary role—with its current representation of

38 appointees scheduled to end in 2004. Former defense minister Juwono Sudarsono criticized its forces for acting as mercenaries in their general policy of collecting protection money from large and small businesses—

a practice that had been common since the late 1970s when the state cut the army budget, but one that gained publicity with the killings of Amer- icans near the Freeport mine in August 2002. The army began making at- tempts in early 2003 to supersede civilian control in the event of a national emergency, introducing a provision to a TNI bill before parliament

ARTS, ARTISTS • 27 authorizing the armed forces chief to deploy troops when he determines

the well being of the state is at risk, needing only to inform the president

24 hours after so doing. Such a provision would directly contravene the Indonesian Constitution as well as the 2002 Defense Act, which stipu- lates that the sole authority to declare a national emergency rests with the president.

Despite calls by reformers wishing to dismantle the territorial system, the current army leadership is apparently trying to expand the number of territorial units. They see such an expansion as strengthening their political power at both the national and local level while helping ease their financial difficulties. For a list of army commanders, see APPENDIX E. See also DEFENSE POLICY; MILITARY BUSINESS OPERATIONS; WARFARE. [0668, 0669, 0709, 0714, 0727, 0731, 0733, 0877, 0968, 0972, 0973, 0981, 1005]

ARTS, ARTISTS. Indonesia’s prehistory yielded works of durable materials like stone, metal, and sometimes clay, which are still preserved today. Other art forms are still perpetuated, although often in a new medium. These include dance, the wayang (shadow play), and the classical dance drama of Java and Bali. Parallel to traditional art forms are contempo- rary painting and sculpture. Portuguese sources indicate that there were experts in painting at the court of Majapahit in the early 16th century, and Western influences on indigenous art may have begun with pictures brought by agents of the Dutch East India Company (VOC) as gifts to local rulers in the 17th century.

Modern Indonesian painting has its roots in the 19th century when a number of Dutch and other European artists lived in the Indies. The first Western-trained Indonesian painter of significance was Raden Saleh (1816–1880). Following him, the “Beautiful Indies” school of painting, with its emphasis on naturalistic landscapes and portraits, was prevalent in the early decades of the 20th century. The modern Indonesian art that emerged in the late 1930s was characterized by its growing emphasis on the individual and its increasing experimentation with new approaches to painting. After independence in 1945, two fine arts departments were established in Indonesia modeled on Dutch academies—the Faculty of Fine Art and Design in Bandung “espousing aesthetic formalism” and the In- donesian Academy of Fine Art (ASRI) in Yogyakarta, practicing “an art rooted in social realities.” Both schools played important roles in the development of modern Indonesian art. In Bali the tradition of painting and sculpture provided the foundation for modern artists (for example, Agus

28 • ARU Djaja [Djajasuminta]), while in Java the artists drew largely on Western

influences (for example, Affandi, Basoeki Abdullah, Hendra Gunawan, and Anton H. Sudjojono).

In 1965 the overthrow of the Sukarno regime and the resulting massacres silenced many of the socially engaged artists, especially those who had been affiliated with the Lembaga Kebudayaan Rakyat (Lekra). It was not until the mid-1970s that a group of young artists, calling themselves the New Art Movement, challenged the more established artists in the academies and tried to bring their art closer to In- donesian life. In the closing decades of the 20th century, according to As- tri Wright, “Official Indonesian definitions of modern art to a large degree cluster around the old Javanese philosophical values halus and kasar, ” with halus referring to the “‘universalist’ aesthetic adhered to by many senior artists” and kasar represented by younger artists seeking to view society “from an ant’s perspective” and focusing on the less refined and more disturbing aspects of modern Indonesian society. See also CULTURE, MUSIC. [0150, 0159, 0172, 0201, 0202]

ARU. Malay-Batak kingdom on the east coast of Sumatra, near modern Deli. Seldom fully independent, it was occupied by Javanese forces from Majapahit in 1350, became briefly independent around 1460, and was later contested by the Muslim rulers of Aceh and Riau. It fell to Aceh in about 1600 but during the 17th century reemerged as the independent sultanate of Deli. [0818]

ARU ISLANDS. Archipelago in southeastern Indonesia with a largely Melanesian population. The islands were formally annexed by the Dutch

East Indies Company (VOC) in 1623 as a source of pearls and birds

of paradise, but there was little active Dutch presence and they were ef- fectively under Bugis and Makassarese domination until Dutch administration was established in 1882. Commercial pearl fishing expanded in the early 20th century. [0032]

ARUNG PALAKKA (1634–1696). Prince of the Bugis state of Soppeng in southern Sulawesi. After rebelling against Sultan Hasanuddin of Makassar in 1660, he took refuge with his followers on Buton before they served as mercenaries for the Dutch East Indies Company (VOC) in Batavia in 1663. He joined the VOC attack on Makassar in 1666–1667 and as a reward was made commander in chief and later (1672) Arumpone, or king, of Bone. He assisted the VOC against Trunojoyo on

ASLI • 29

Java in 1678. His autocratic rule in South Sulawesi prompted an exodus of Bugis to other parts of the archipelago. [0549]

ASAHAN. Malay-Batak and Acehnese sultanate on the east coast of

Sumatra, founded 1695 and formerly subordinate to Siak. It was annexed by the Dutch in 1865 and the sultan exiled to Riau, but in 1885

he was returned with reduced powers to provided a legal and political basis for the expansion of European tobacco cultivation, later replaced by rubber. In 1932 Dutch firms involved in the mining of bauxite on Bintan made plans for an alumina plant powered by hydroelectricity from the Asahan River, which flows out of Lake Toba. War and other concerns delayed plans and not until July 1979 did work begin on the so-called Asahan project, a joint venture with Japanese investors that opened in February 1982 and involved the construction of a hydro- electric dam on the Asahan River to supply power for an aluminum smelter at Kuala Tanjung. Since that time, however, the water level in Lake Toba has dropped two meters as a result of declining rainfall in the catchment area, and the factory has at times had to cease produc- tion. [0818]

ASIA-AFRICA CONFERENCE (Bandung Conference). Held in April

1955 on the initiative of the Ali Sastroamijoyo cabinet and attended by the leaders of 29 Asian and African states, including Zhou Enlai of China, Jawaharlal Nehru of India, Prince Norodom Sihanouk of Cam- bodia, and Gamal Nasser of Egypt. The conference endorsed Indonesia’s claim to West Irian (see PAPUA) and helped to establish Sukarno’s cre- dentials as a major Non-Aligned Bloc leader. See also FOREIGN POL- ICY. [0695, 1102, 1122]

ASLI (“original”). Term widely used to describe cultural elements and tradi-

tions believed to predate Muslim, Christian, and often Hindu-Buddhist influence. Several small tribal groups—the Badui (West Java), Tenggerese (East Java), Bali Aga (Bali), Buda (Lombok), and Donggo (Sumbawa)— are believed to preserve the traditional culture of their respective regions. (See also SAMIN MOVEMENT. [0487])

Asli is also an ambiguous term for indigenous people, often used in the context of some form of discrimination against foreigners. Asli may mean “born in Indonesia”—the 1945 Constitution prescribes that the president shall be asli and seems to be based on the article of the U.S. constitution, which requires the president to be native-born—or it may

30 • ASMAT refer more narrowly to ethnicity, thus excluding descendants of Chinese,

Arabs, and Europeans. See also PRIBUMI. ASMAT. Ethnic group inhabiting the swampy lowlands of southeastern

Papua. Their skilled woodcarving attracted much attention from collec- tors and ethnographers, but since the 1970s Asmat society has been seri- ously disrupted by labor recruitment for the timber industry and by the relocation of communities for this purpose. [0803, 1230]

ASSOCIAÇÃO POPULAR DEMOCRÁTICA TIMORESE (APODETI, Timorese Popular Democratic Association). Formed in Portuguese Timor in 1974 by Arnoldo dos Reis Araujo to press for the colony’s integration into Indonesia as an autonomous province, APODETI drew its rather meager support from the small Muslim community and from people in border areas. It received substantial financial aid from Badan Koordinasi Intelijen Negara (Bakin) and the Indonesian consulate in Dili. It allied with the União Democrática Timorese (UDT) in July 1975, just before the UDT coup, and many of its leaders were jailed by Fretilin in the subsequent civil war. It disappeared as a party after the Indonesian invasion of December 1975, but many of its followers were appointed to posts in the new provincial government after 1976. [0806]

Mohammad Hatta government, forming a Front Demokrasi Rakyat (FDR) in February of that year. When Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI)