15
could become a potential threat in the future. Its relation with Turkey, Turkey has showed consistently its support of Iran rights for enrichment using it’s uranium for
peaceful purposes. However, Iran also has tensions regarding the Syrian uprising, supporting the Nuri-al-Maliki Regime -A Shia dominated government in Iraq and also
the issue of Kurdistan. Turkey
Initially, both Turkey and Iran welcomed the Arab Awakening against the authoritarian Arab rules, but for different reasons. For Turkey, the Arab Spring is a reflection
of their own experiences on their success in a democracy and reducing the militarys role in the political sphere. In fact, this country has been seen as the role model for
emerging Arab democracies.
29
While Iran expected the uprising would topple pro-western dictators and emerged as the new ruler, which inlined with Iran’s interest. However, in the subsequent development
there was a different result to be expected by both parties, this even raised tension in their relations.
Moreover, the issue on the foreign policy of Turkey in Middle East is, so far, in Syria, Egypt, Iraq and Israel. When the Assad regime brutally suppressed the protestor, Turkey
firmly asked Assad to secede his power and recalled its ambassador as a form of protest against the atrocities on the people of Syria. The similar stance of Turkey when calling a
military coup to the president Mursi. Although this is a right thing, but was again isolated, hence for the reason of national interest, preferred to stay neutral or paid lip
service to the opponents of the coup. As a result Turkey would lose its important ally in the middle east and Arab world due to the significant role of Egypt in the region. In Iraq,
Turkey does not observe formalities with the PM Maliki due to the Shia-Sunni conflict. In contrast, Turkey started to improve its relations with Israel on the basis of national
interest.
5. Conclusion
To sum up in the wake of the Arab Spring, there are three fundamental geostrategic implication transforming the balance of power in Middle East. First, the people
movement in the Arab world seem have similarity of the root causes which heavily dominated by socio economic and socio political problem. However. the responses of
16
the regimes were dissimilar, causing the different level scale of upheaval. There six countries were experiencing a full scale of upheaval, namely Tunisia, Egypt, Libya,
Syria, Yemen and Bahrain. Among of them, four countries were successful to topple the old regimes. Due to the limitation, the paper only examine the combination
factors driven the revolt and the degree escalation in six countries mentioned above. The second geostrategic consequences is the fragmentationin of power whether on the
basis of ideology, sectarian or tribal, that led the proliferation of weak states. The new authority or the existing regimes were failed to reach a national consensus to calm the
sociopolitical unrest. The last is the geostrategic future of the Middle East is likely to be determined in the short and medium terms by interaction of three key regional players;
Saudi Arabia, Iran and Turkey while the United States and Rusia as international player also playing significant roles.
Note
1 Pike, J. “Arab Spring, Arab Awakening”. 06 August 2015. http:www.globalsecurity.orgmilitaryworldwararab-sping.htm
2 Dalacoura, K. “ The Arab Uprising Two Year On: Ideology, Sectarianism and The Changing
Balance of Power in The Middle East”. Insight Turkey. Vol 15 No.12013. pp. 75-89.
3 De Vriese. “Paradox of Globalization: New Arab Publics? New Social Contract?”. KoninkklijkeBrill NV, Leiden.PGDT 12. pp 114-134. 2013
4. Pike. supra note 1. 5 Ogbonnaya. “Arab Spring in Tunisia, Egypt Libya: A comparative Analysis of
Causes Determinants”. Alternative Turkish Journal of International Relations. Vol.12 no.3 Fall 2013
6 Elakawi. “The Geostrategic Consequences of The Arab Spring”. 22 November 2014. http:www.opendemocrazy.netarab-awakeninzaki-samy-elakawigeostrategic-
consequences-of-arab- spring
7 Abo, Bakr Elenndy. Arab Spring: Causes and Role of NSOs, Central Agency for Public Mobilization Statistics, CAPMAS, Egypt, February, 2012, p.
8 Ozekin Akkas. “An Emperical Look To The Arab Spring: Causes and Consequences”. Alternatives Turkish Journal of International Relations. Vol. 13, No. 1-2,
Spring-Summer 2014
17
9 IMF. “ Arab Republic of Egypt: 2010 Article IV Consultation-Staff Report”. IMF Report No.1094. April 2010
10 The World Bank WB, World Development Report, various issues; WB, World Bank Data, http:data.world- bank.orgindicatorNY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG?page=5; IMF,
World Economic Outlook Database, April 2013.
11 Ozekin Akkas. supra note 7 12 Salih. “ The Roots and Causes of The 2011 Arab Uprising”. Arab Studies Quarterly.
Pluto Journal. Vol. 35. No. 2. Spring 2013
13 Dalacoura. “The 2011 Uprising in the Arab Middle East: Political Change and Geopolitical
Implications.” International Affairs. Vol. 88, No.1, 2012 14 Kwakbi Khadmani. “ Armies, People and Dictators”.
http:www.alsafhat.netblog?p=31496
15 International Institute for Strategic Studies IISS. “ The Arab Awakening”. Strategic Survey Vol. 2011. pp 43-96
16 Gamal M. “The United States and the Arab Spring: The Dynamics of Political Engineering”. Pluto Journal Vol.35, No. 3, 2013
17. Elakawi. supra note 6 18 Katz. “The International Relations of The Arab Spring”. Middle East Policy Vol.
XXI. no. 2, Summer 2014
19 Yakis. “Turkey after The Arab Spring: Policy Dilemmas”. Middle East Policy Vol. XXI no. 1, Spring 2014.
20 Akram. “Hamas Leader Abandons Longtime Base in Damascus.” New York Times, January
27, 2012. http:www.nytimes.com20120128worldmiddleeastkhaled-meshal-the- leader-of- hamas-vacates-damascus.html
21 Ayoob. “ The Arab Spring: Its Geostrategic Significance”. Middle East Policy. Vol. XIX, No. 3, Fall 2012
22 Al Monitor. Anberin Zaman. July 21, 2 01323 Rafati. “Iran and the arab Spring”.
http:www.lse.ac.ukIDEASpublicationsreportspdf SR011FINAL_LSE_IDEAS IranAndArabSpring_Rafati
24 Ayoob, supra note 21 25 Gilles. “ Islamists in Power: Governing the Arab World”. The Material of Public
lecture, London School of Economics, November 21, 2012
18
26 Coates Ulrichsen. “Small States with a big Role” HH Sheikh Nasser al Mohammad al SabahPublication Series, no. 3 october 2012.
http:www.dur.ac.ukresourcesalsabah Small StateswithaBigRole.pdf
27 Al Rasheed. “ Yes, It Could Happen Here: Why Saudi Arabia Is Ripe for Revolution”. Foreign Policy-Middle East Channel. February 28,2011.
http:wwwmideast.foreignpolicy.compost20110228yes_it_could_happen_here
28 Tisdal. “ Bashar al-Assad’s Syria offers Iran A Springboad into the Arab Middle East.” The Guardian , February 8, 2012.
http:www.guardian.co.ukcommentisfree2012feb08assad-syria- iran-middle-east.
29 Shadid. “In Riddle of Mideast Upheaval, Turkey Offers Itself as An Answer.” New York Times, September 26, 2011. http:www.nytimes.com20110927worldeuropein-
mideast- riddle-turkey-offers-itself-as-an- answer.html?scp=3sq=erdogan20in20cairost=cse.
19
ARAB SPRING, INDONESIAN DEMOCRACY, AND DIPLOMATIC BLIND SPOT
Ryantori
INTRODUCTION
The Arab Spring, a series of anti-government protests, uprisings and armed rebellions, spreads across the Middle East throughout 2011. A rhythmic chant echoed across the
Arab lands which showed that the people want to topple the regime. It has been widely seen as a watershed event which has irrevocably changed the region and the global
political landscape. A main force behind it was the call for a formative political change, with freedom, democracy and justice, and the attack on corruption and nepotism.
In the history of the Middle East, the opportunity to support democracy has never been as great as today. The momentum for democracy in the Middle East is at its peak Wandi,
2013. The people’s voice for freedom is at its loudest, while the regimes’ popularity is
at an all-time low. Regardless of external support, the oppressed will continue to revolt — it is a fight to the end. Most of those regimes clinging to power are teetering at the
edge of the precipice. Arab dictatorial regimes might spill more blood, but the darkest hour is just before the dawn.
Initially, the Arab Spring was an optimistic transformation of the Middle East into democratic region. Yet, until now, the progress is not as quite good as expected, not to
mention failed. In many public debates, there is a tendency to focus solely on Islamism as the major obstacle toward democratization in the region. Is it true that Islam and
Democracy are not compatible or even opposite each other?
WEST VS ISLAM
≈
DEMOCRACY VS ISLAM ?
When we talk about democracy in this modern era, western democracy comes into surface immediately. The defining characteristics of such democracy sometimes called
20
‘liberal democracy’ include a commitment to fundamental freedoms, within a framework of laws designed to prevent their abuse, such as freedom to practice one’s
own religion; freedom of speech; freedom of association; freedom to publish; and
equality before the law.
It is important to distinguish from the beginning between democracy as means and democracy as goals. The most fundamental of the goals of democracy are probably four
in number. Firstly, to make the rulers accountable and answerable for their actions and policies. Secondly to make the citizens effective participants in choosing those rulers
and in regulating their actions. Thirdly, to make the society as open and the economy as transparent as possible; and fourthly to make the social order fundamentally just and
equitable to the greatest number possible. Accountable rulers, actively participating citizens, open society and social justice
– those are the four fundamental ends of democracy.
Birch, 2001
However, the way to achieve these goals has elicited different means. For examples, in making the rulers more accountable some democracies like the United States have
chosen separation of powers and checks and balances, while other democracies like the United Kingdom have chosen the more concentrated notion of sovereignty of
parliament. These are different means towards making the executive branch more accountable and answerable in its use of power. The same situation occurs related to
freedom of the press and speech. The United States has a highly permissive legal system on freedom of speech, but more restrictive public opinion. The United Kingdom has a
more restrictive legal system on freedom of the press, but a more tolerant public opinion.
Hensley, 2001; Feldman, 1993
Talking about the relationship between Islam and democracy,the debate over the relationship between them rests not only on Islamic doctrine but also on history. Even,
we can trace back to the debate over the relations between Islam and the West. Samuel P. Huntington 1993: 222-239 in The Clash of Civilizations? offers his hypothesis that
the fundamental source of conflict in this new world will not be primarily ideological or primarily economic. The great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of
conflict will be cultural. Nation states will remain the most powerful actors in world affairs, but the principal conflicts of global politics will occur between nations and
21
groups of different civilizations. The clash of civilizations will dominate global politics. The fault lines between civilizations will be the battle lines of the future. Conflict
between civilizations will be the latest phase in the evolution of conflict in the modern world.
Now, let us turn into the debate over democracy and Islam. Essentially, democracy is a system of governance where sovereignty lies in the hands of the people. But many will
say this contradicts with the doctrine of Islam, since in the Islamic view, sovereignty lies in the hand of God. Advocates of this line of thinking put forward three arguments
Kumoro, 2013.
First, there is the fundamentally different view of the nation, or ummah. The view of the nation in modern democracy is tied to a physical space marked by territorial and
geographical borders. On the other hand, Islam has its own understanding of a nation that is not bounded by borders, but by aqidah the basic tenets of Islam. Therefore, for
many Muslims, nation is defined by faith, not by geography. Second, some Muslim scholars see democracy as a worldly value, when spiritual goals are of primary
importance. Democracy thus becomes a secondary goal. Third, a contradiction arises because the people’s sovereignty that lies at the heart of democracy is absolute, meaning
the people are the ultimate holders of power. Laws and regulations are decided by the people through their representatives and not by Go
d. But for some scholars, the people’s sovereignty is not absolute at all, since it is bound by the laws of Islam. In Islam, only
God’s sovereignty is absolute.
These three interpretations are used by some Muslims to argue that there is no space for democracy in their lives. However, there are many Muslims who take the opposite view,
arguing that democracy is inherent in people and in line with Islamic teachings. They base their argumentation on Islamic doctrines
—justice, freedom, deliberation and equality
—that espouse the basic principles of democracy.
At this level, Islam does not speak about a procedural system but more about the basic soul and spirit of democracy. If the interpretation of democracy is the existence of
certain social and political ideals, like the freedom of thought, faith, opinion and equality before the law, there would seem no contradiction, as these are guaranteed by Islam.
22
ISLAM AND DEMOCRACY: INDONESIA’S EXPERIENCE
It is important to note that the absence of democracy in some Muslim World, such as countries of the Middle East
1
, is not a feature of the wider Muslim world. There are some Islamic societies which have made explicit commitments to some of the values
identified as those relating to Western societies. Many of these derive from a number of attempts to develop the concepts of traditional Islam to take account of the changes in
Western societies which have led to modernisation. In this context, democracy stands on first line.
One good example of those Islamic societies is Indonesia. It is the world’s third largest
democracy after India and the United States of America and the world’s largest
muslim population The Pew Forum on Religion Public Life, 2010. Home to approximately 230 million people of which more than 85 follow Islam, there are
almost as many Muslims living in Indonesia as in the entire Arab-speaking world combined. Sunni Islam is the predominant branch of Islam, with only around one
million Indonesians being Shia. There is a wide array of other forms of Islam, including significant numbers of Sufi communities. The major fault line, however, lies
between santri who adhere to orthodox forms of Islam while the abangan practice more syncretic versions of Islam.
Indonesia has seen much success in the transition from an authoritarian regime to a democratic system of governance. While Indonesia still has a long way to go before
1
There are several cultural factors that have slowed the growth of democracy in the Islamic countries of the Middle East. First, there is a strong monolithic paradigm of thought over Islam. Such a paradigm stems from Middle Eastern
Muslims’ limited understanding of Islam’s nature and essence, both in regards to Koran and Hadith and in regards to history. Islam is often viewed as a divine instrument to understand the world, and such a perception has prompted
some Muslims to believe that Islam offers a complete way of life kaffah. In this understanding, Islam is an all- encompassing system of belief that offers a solution to all of life’s problems. This view of Islam as perfect and
comprehensive has a number of implications. If Islam is transformed for use at the level of political ideology and political practice, this could lead to the political belief that Islam must become the state’s basis of existence, Islamic
jurisprudence must be accepted as the state’s constitution and sovereignty would lie in the hands of God. In short, in the context of such a perspective the modern political system of rule by the people is in direct conflict with Islam.
Second, the absence of democracy in the Middle East could also be explained by the weak political will of the regimes to accommodate democracy. Leadership has long been based on family ties and regimes would lose this prerogative.
Third, the most ironic thing about the absence of democracy in the Middle East is the often tacit support of the Western world
—the United States in particular— for the existence of the authoritarian regimesSee Kumoro, 2013.
23
democracy fully takes root, at the very least it has been quite successful in tearing down the walls of tyrannical power. Since the authoritarian regime of President Suharto
collapsed in 1998, the most immediately visible change in Indonesian politics has been the implementation of an extensive regulatory framework that directs both executive and
legislative elections. In April 2009 Indonesia conducted the third legislative election of the post-Suharto era. As in 1999 and 2004, the recent election featured a
nationwide legislative election for the national parliament, the senate-like Regional Representatives Assembly, and for the parliaments at the provincial, district and
municipal level. Furthermore, direct elections for regents and mayors were held in 486 out of 510 regencies and municipalities and governor elections in 15 out of 33
provinces throughout the last few years. By the end of 2008, all the leaders of sub- national executive governments had been directly elected by the Indonesian people.
Finally, presidential election took place in 1999, 2004, and 2009 Buehler, 2009.
It is said that Islam and democracy are in a relationship fraught with problems as the former, allegedly, does not allow secular law to be put above divine law or accept the
legitimacy of worldly authorities see Table 1. This relationship is less problematic in Indonesia, a democratic Muslim-majority country, the argument goes, due to the
syncretic forms of Islam practiced in the archipelago state that are less dogmatic, and hence more conducive to democratic principles. While this is a valuable point, various
factors extraneous to ‘moderate Indonesian Islam,’ such as a fragmented Islamic authority in civil society, a weakly institutionalized party system as well as dynamics
triggered by recent institutional reforms all play a role in the continuing insignificance of political Islam in the country Buehler, 2009.
Table 1: TYPOLOGY IN MODERNIZATION CLAIMS
SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRACY SUPPORT FOR ISLAMISM
High Education Low Education
More Equitable Gender Attitudes Less Equitable Gender Attitudes
Higher Income Lower Income
Less Religious More Religious
Source: Jamal, 2006: 52
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To summarize, the reason why Islam and democracy seem to go well together in Indonesia has as much to do with broader dynamics within civil society, political parties
and state institutions as it has to do with the syncretist, hence moderate forms of Islam practiced in the archipelago.
PANCASILA DEMOCRACY: INDONESIAN MODALITY
As the most Muslim-populous democratic country in the world, Indonesia can play a significant role in efforts to promote democratization in the Islamic World, especially in
The Middle East. The nation is a real-world example of the compatibility of Islam and
democracy, one that could serve as a model for countries in the wider Islamic world.
Yet, there is important question related to the phenomena above. If the goals of democracy are the same while the means for achieving them differ, are there Indonesian
means of achieving those same four goals of accountability of rulers, participation of the citizens, openness of the society and greater social justice? That is the challenge facing
constitution makers in Indonesia – how to keep the democratic goals constant while
looking for democratic means more appropriate to people. In this context, let us focus on Indonesia’s genuine democracy: Pancasila Democracy.
2
Pancasila Democracy democracy based on five basic pillars was formally labeled under President Suharto in 1966. It is inspired by the noble values of the Indonesian
nation. Pancasila itself, which means the five principles, is the name given to the foundation of the Indonesian Republic. The five principles of Pancasila are Belief in the
One and Only God; A Just and civilized humanity; the Unity of Indonesia; Democracy
2
Since its independence in 1945, Indonesia has implemented three models of democracy. Liberal democracy was applied in 1950 to 1959, guided democracy was championed by President Sukarno in 1959 to 1965, and Pancasila
democracy democracy based on five basic principles was formally labeled under President Suharto in 1966 to 1998. Many Indonesians regarded liberal democracy as a failure because they saw it as incompatible with Indonesian culture.
Liberal democracy was considered a Western tradition that stressed “one man, one vote,” while the Indonesian ideal emphasized consensus. At the other hand, the guided democracy championed by Sukarno found its roots in the
idealized version of simple village life. It was the “rediscovery of the treasure of the Indonesian people which had been buried by hundreds of years of foreign rule.” Unfortunately, its implementation was centralized in the hands of
the president who monopolized ideological wisdom. At the time, Sukarno acknowledged the authoritarian aspects of traditional Indonesian democracy. The key ingredient was “guidance.” To the “guide” fell the task of reconciling
conflicting views into formulations that were palatable to each faction. Without strong leadership capable of synthesizing the final decision, the system failed.
25
guided by the inner wisdom of deliberations of representatives; and Social Justice for all
the Indonesian people.
Pancasila Democracy is a system of government based on popular sovereignty. It is the people who determine the shape and content of the desired rule. Based on these
meanings, it is clear that people are not objects, but subjects who could play an active role. For example,
most Indonesians believe that the individual exists in the context of his family. And the family is the building block of society. There are cultural differences
between Western and Indonesian societies and these differences influence their understanding of democracy. Meanwhile, Indonesians believe human beings should
pursue balance between individual and communal interests. In the past, all aspects of the individual’s life in Indonesia were regulated through structures and by coercive
pressures, both formal and informal. In such a setting, organized opposition was not only out of place, but antisocial.
Pancasila itself, as a genuine ideologi, can be define as following: Pilliang, 2010 First Pillar: Deity.
Second Pillar: Humanity. Third Pillar: Nationality.
Fourth Pillar : Democracy. Fifth Pillar : Socialism.
Thus, Pancasila Democracy means democracy based on peoples sovereignty, which is inspired by and integrated with the other principles of Pancasila. This means that the use
of democratic rights should always be in line with the sense of responsibility towards God Almighty according to the respective faith; uphold human values in line with
human dignity; guarantee and strengthen national unity; and be aimed at realizing social justice for the whole of the people of Indonesia.
It is almost certain that Indonesian democracy differs from liberal democracy. In terms of cultural origins, liberal democracy is rooted in Western culture while Indonesian
democracy has its own roots that emphasized the harmony between individual and communal interests. Gotong Royong mutual cooperation is one of the underpinnings of
Indonesian society that has to be preserved.
26
The other difference relates to the role of religion vis-a-vis the state. All liberal democratic states are secular in nature. Indonesia is neither a theocratic nor a secular
state. It believes that God Almighty is a spiritual guide who drives everyday life. As for social democracy, this system is relatively close to Pancasila democracy in terms of
values. These two political ideologies are in the same camp in perceiving social justice and the role of the state in regulating economic and social life. When it comes to the
issue of religion and the state, they have opposite views Sriyono, 2013.
Syeikh Ali Zainuddin, a religious cleric from Lebanon, addressed his respect to Pancasila. “Pancasila is a living philosophy that serve as a guidance to live quite
harmoniusly for Indonesian people from various backgrounds, such as tribes, religions, cultures and languages” Tribunnews, 2013. As we know, Lebanon is one of fragile
countries in the world because of prolonged sectarian conflicts. In addition, Australian
ambassador Greg Moriarty says Indonesia has shown the Arab Spring countries that Islam and democracy guided by Pancasila values are compatible, and
demonstrated the wisdom of not marginalising groups on religious grounds. Each
country is unique, but Indonesia has shown the world democratic transitions can be made, that Islam and democracy are compatible, and that the yearning of people to have
a say in how they are governed is universal www.theaustralian.com.au.
As a comparison, let us see what Japanese people did in pursuing their national philosophical ideology. The Japanese after the Meiji Restoration in 1868 asked
themselves: “Can we economically modernize without culturally Westernizing?” The Japanese said “YES – we shall seek Western techniques and maintain the Japanese
spirit.” They retained Japanese tastes; and expanded their Western skills. Following the
Second World War, they economically interlocked specifically with the American economy, even displacing American dominance in areas like the automobile industry
– without giving up their Japanese spirit Waswo, 1996.
DIPLOMATIC BLIND SPOT= DIFFICULT HOME WORK
Indonesia with its bebas aktif foreign policy – a “free and active” approach to
international relations that champions activism on the world stage has been monitoring
27
and anticipated the Arab Spring since its beginning. Now, Indonesian foreign policy over the next five years under President Joko Widodo will be focused on three priorities:
maintaining Indonesia’s sovereignty, enhancing the protection of Indonesian citizens, and intensifying economic diplomacy. The last is the most promising priority if
Indonesia can set up a good economic scheme in the region. In order to support its claim to a greater role in Middle East politics as peacemaker and mediator, Indonesia
generated a set of arguments that highlighted its distinctive attributes and credentials.
With such modality mentioned above, Indonesia is predicted to be able to gain political and economic benefit from its relations with other countries, and also from Arab Spring
countries, for the shake of its nation. Unfortunately, this country often fail in many cases to do. This is what foreign policy experts call
“diplomatic blind spot”, which entails the idea of neglected strategic issues in diplomacy. The term could also refer to diplomatic
achievements on which we have failed to capitalize in the national interest Yahya, 2015.
Indonesia had often missed multiple chances to take advantage of its “political
dividends”, although this country certainly have our political assets. Valuable experience of democratic transition and managing bureaucratic transformation could be shared with
other countries — this is no less significant than economic investment. The above
examples show the success of our many diplomats in projecting Indonesia’s role to assist our partners in finding solutions to some of their internal, regional and global challenges.
However, lack of coordination between the ministries and other institutions, especially in the economic sector, seems to have resulted in poor follow-up. Hence the economic
benefits of our diplomatic achievements have not been fully exploited.
In the 1990s, a prescription to treat and cure this disadvantage was offered by the New Order government, with the idea of creating “Indonesia Incorporated”. The core of
Indonesia Incorporated as suggested by President Soeharto was a synergy among governmental institutions, the private sector and civil society in managing and realizing
integrated economic development Yahya, 2015
This promising idea should be revitalized together with the new economic concept “creative economy” Howkins, 2013. The largest sectors of such economy are art,
28
culture, design, entertainment, media and innovation, all of these are very open for Indonesia to go through. It is the first kind of economy where imagination and ingenuity
decide what people want to do and make. And what they want to buy. A creative economy is measured just like any other: demand, price, profit and margins. This
economy also look at jobs, output and productivity in great measurement.. At the heart of today’s changes is the private determination of individuals to think of new and often
surprising ideas that might stimulate others. Brought together, people all around the world are fuelling the creative economy and shaping the future. At this point, Indonesia
must be able to get out of the box and become a big player in it.
CONCLUSION
Will Arab Spring succeed or fail? I propose in this paper that Arab countries should have their own democracy standard just like what Indonesia has experienced so far. On
broader context, many say that there are many roads to democracy and the Arab countries cannot follow a Western standard or recipe. In short, Islamic values and
western democratic philosophy can be blent to have a middle eastern democratic taste.
As the biggest muslim country in the world, Indonesia would thus seem to prove that Islamic doctrine itself is not in contradiction with democracy. Instead, Muslims’
interpretation of Islamic doctrine and cultural heritage forms their views on the value of democracy and its relationship to Islam. Moreover, the existence of various models of
democracy in Indonesia has given rise to an intellectual question on what kind of democracy is the best f
it, whether to be combined with another ideology or to be “pure” a la western countries.
Nonetheless, Indonesia should gain from, not just pose as role model for, Arab Spring politically as well as economicly. There must be a synergy among governmental
institutions, the private sector and civil society in managing and realizing integrated economic development in the Middle East in order not to get trapped into diplomatic
blind spot.
REFERENCES:
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1. Books
