PROSIDING UI ISME 2015 Dinamika Budaya T

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DEWAN REDAKSI

SEMINAR INTERNASIONAL

DINAMIKA BUDAYA TIMUR TENGAH PASCA ARAB SPRING

PROGRAM STUDI ARAB

FAKULTAS ILMU PENGETAHUAN BUDAYA

UNIVERSITAS INDONESIA

Pelindung: Dekan Fakultas Ilmu Pengetahuan Budaya Universitas Indonesia Penasihat: Dr. Muhammad Luthfi

Drs. Juhdi Syarif, M.Hum Dr. Apipudin, M.Hum Dr. Fauzan Muslim Dr. Maman Lesmana Penanggung Jawab: Letmiros, M.Hum., M.A

Siti Rohmah Soekarba, M.Hum Ketua Panitia: Abdul Mutaali, Ph.D

Sekretaris: Yon Machmudi, Ph.D

Editor: Siti Rohmah Soekarba, M.Hum

PROSIDING UNIVERSITAS INDONESIA INTERNATIONAL SEMINAR OF THE MIDDLE EAST (UI ISME) 2015

Diterbitkan oleh Program Studi Arab

Fakultas Ilmu Pengetahuan Budaya Universitas Indonesia November 2015

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KATA PENGANTAR

Musim semi Arab atau lebih dikenal dengan istilah Arab Spring, adalah sebuah peristiwa sporadis yang melahirkan banyak perubahan dan masa depan bagi masing-masing negara di kawasan Timur Tengah. Pergolakan Arab Spring dan kejadian yang menyertainya adalah rentetan gerakan yang memiliki tujuan utama untuk tercapainya kebebasan, demokrasi dan reformasi ekonomi-politik.

Respon yang mengalir ke negara-negara Arab bak air bah, people power menjadi tren yang berhasrat ingin menggulingkan rezim yang dianggap diktator. Gerakan ini merembet ke Syiria, hingga negara-negara berpengaruh di Timur Tengah seperti Arab Saudi, Iran dan Turki ikut terseret dalam kancah ini dan saling berebut pengaruh dengan bermacam kebijakan dan manuver politiknya. Dan tentu saja ada efek dari berbagai sudut pandang yang menetas dari kejadian-kejadian tersebut.

Dinamika budaya yang lahir pasca Arab Spring adalah salah satu produk turunan yang dihasilkan. Hal ini yang membuat kami dari Program Studi Arab mengundang para akademisi internasional untuk menuangkan pemikiran, ide dan pandangannya dalam bentuk makalah.

Makalah–makalah pilihan yang dimuat dalam prosiding ini adalah makalah dari akademisi berbagai universitas dalam maupun luar negeri yang konsen dengan masalah dan dinamika budaya di Timur-Tengah.

Prosiding ini tidak akan hadir tanpa adanya kontribusi dari pihak-pihak baik secara langsung ataupun tidak. Oleh karenanya saya harus mengucapkan banyak terima kasih kepada semua pihak tersebut. Ucapan terima kasih kepada Bapak Rektor UI, Dekan FIB dan juga para pembantunya dan tentu tak lupa terima kasih kami kepada KAPRODI Arab dan seluruh staf pengajar atas bantuan, dukungan dan bimbingan langsung kepada kami sebagai panitia.

Ucapan terima kasih juga saya sampaikan kepada seluruh panitia yang telah bekerja keras hingga hadirnya prosiding ini dan juga seminar internasional.

Terakhir, izinkan saya memohon maaf atas berbagai kekurangan prosiding ini. Harapan kami semoga prosiding ini bermanfaat bagi pembaca dan juga ikut selalu berperan dalam perkembangan studi Arab bagi Indonesia.

Depok, 11 November 2015 Ketua Panitia UI ISME 2015

3 DAFTAR ISI

Dewan Redaksi 1

Pengantar 2

Daftar Isi 3

MAKALAH PEMBICARA UTAMA

The New Paradigm of Geostrategy in The Aftermath of Arab Awakening 5 (Indria Ernaningsih)

Arab Spring, Indonesian Democracy, and Diplomatic Blind Spot 19 (Ryantori, M.Si)

TATANAN BARU TIMUR TENGAH PASCA ARAB SPRING: Analisis 31

Deskriptif Budaya Arab (Zul Karnen, S.S., M.Si)

ISIS, Indonesian Sympathizers and International Relation 44

(Muhamad Syauqillah)

Peran Indonesia Dalam Membangun Demokrasi di Timur Tengah 58

(Inggar Saputra)

Pengaruh Media Sosial dalam Pembentukan Budaya Timur Tengah Pasca 68 Arab Spring

(Fany Dayang Sary)

The Influence of Middle East Scholars towards Political Islamic Movement 79 in Jogjakarta and Surakarta

(Dr. Istadiyantha, M.S.)

MAKALAH PARALEL

The Relation of Radical Islamic Movement in the Middle East and 96 Terrorism in Indonesia: the Study of National Integration Effort

(Dr. Istadiyantha, M.S. and Dr. Eva Farhah, M.A., Ph.D.)

Bahasa Arab di Wilayah Hijaz Arab Saudi: Kajian Geografi Dialek 110 (Muhammad Yunus Anis, S.S., M.A.)

Peran Barat terhadap Gejolak Politik Timur Tengah 129

(Muhammad Azizul Ghofar)

Strategi Tindak Tutur Meminta Bahasa Arab Amiyah 141

(Muhammad Ridwan, S.S., M.A.)

Sastra dan Politik pada Masyarakat Arab Zaman Umayyah (abad ke 7-8 m.) 153 (Dr. Fauzan Muslim, M. Hum)

Arab Spring di Mesir dan Prospek Perjanjian Perdamaian Camp David 187 (Agus Setiawan, Ph.D.)

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MAKALAH

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The New Paradigm of Geostrategy in the Aftermath of Arab Awakening

Indria Ernaningsih indriaerna5@gmail.com

MSc in Islamic Finance Hamad Bin Khalifa University

Abstract :

The wave of democratic revolt and consequent turnmoil in the Middle East have changed the landscape of socio-political and economics in the region, even in its relation in international affairs. Having said that, the paper attempts to discuss two main considerations. Firstly, it examines how the political unrest process which is commonly called "Arab Spring or Arab Awakening” has undergone in several different scale upheavals across the region due to its root causes as well as a set of factors such as; the state structures and responses of the regime, the role of security forces and the conflict of the ethnic and sectarian issues make up in the society. In addition the paper argues that the revolutionary waves tend to expand and impend nearby, further changing dramatically into a state alliance relationship, hence the second consideration is how to asses the uprising impact on the regional and international geostrategy alongside the roadmap of balance power of various players in this region after three years of “Arab Spring”.

1. Introduction

Currently, the Arab world is experiencing one of the most substantial transformations in socio- political and socio-economic movements. The movement is commonly labelled as “Arab Spring” or Arab Awakening”. More specifically, it describes the wave of demonstration, civil unrest and civil war uprising demanding greater democratic governance in the Arab world.1 The revolts grew either to overthrow their existing regime or turn it into a civil war. The six countries namely Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Syria, Bahrain and Yemen have faced a full scale of upheaval. Beyond those countries, the uprising also has caused domestic political unrest to other Arab countries

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at a lower scale such as in Morocco, Jordan and the rest of the GCC states. Meanwhile some countries such as Lebanon, Iraq, Algeria and Palestine have been relatively immune by this uprising. 2

The Arab Spring was triggered by the first protests that took place in Tunisia on December 18, 2010. A series of mass demonstrations resulted in the overthrow of the regime of Zine El Abidine Ben Ali who has ruled for 23 years. What happened in Tunisia spread far and wide like the domino effect across social media. The image of bravery embodying the spirit of change of the demonstrators went viral through Facebook, Twitter, Youtube and satellite TV inspiring thousands of others across the Arab world. Ultimately the power of media has proved effectively to build awareness and mobilize mass.3

The spirit of democratic movement has spilled over, as similar mass demonstrations then occurred in Egypt by the end of January 2011, calling for President Husni Mubarak’s resignation. Although President Mubarak has responded by not standing in the president election in September 2011, the pledge was rejected. After the massive wave of protestors occupying Tahrir Square in Cairo expressing “A Day of Departure” rally, eventually on 13 February 2011.

President Husni Mubarak was forced to step down.4 In Yemen, since President Saleh rejected the proposal of his resignation, divisions in its military forces have sparked, hence opening doors to a violent crackdown between the government and the opposition, tribesmen backed by defected military forces. In Bahrain, when the Shia majority population protested against its Sunni ruling Khalifa royal family, security forces quickly suppressed those supported by the “Peninsula Shield” forces from Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirate. In Libya, the protests started in the eastern city of Benghazi, before escalating to various cities including Tripoli and evolving into a open war between Gadaffi’s militaries and groups of anti government protesters which ultimately dragged NATO into the conflict.

Among those six countries, Syria experienced the most deteriorated of insurgencies since the Assad regime responded with extreme violence towards the peaceful protests. The heavy military repressing provoked strong resistance in the form of radicalism and militarism of the Syrian people leading to a bloody civil war.

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In fact, the Arab Spring outcome varied depending on socio-economic, political and environmental factors, the nature of each ruling regime, the degree of civility in surrounding environments, and the momentum in achieving the revolution's goals.5 By supporting that argument the paper also asserts that the Arab revolt has created a new socio-political and economy in the region. Having said that the paper assesses to what extent the root causes induce the several different levels of turbulence across the region. In parallel, the paper examines the impact of the uprising on regional and international geostrategy alongside the roadmap of balance power of various players in this region after three years of “Arab Spring”.

2. The Root Causes of The Arab Spring

Indeed, in the beginning there were three fundamental demands of the Arab Spring movement that wanted to be achieved; (a) domestic freedoms, (b) good governance and (c) social justice.6

These three demands were voiced by the famous slogan of the Arab protestors ash– shabyuridisa at an–nixam (the will of the people is to bring down the regime).7 These claims emerged as a form of protest against all socio-economic and political problems that deteriorated the quality of life. These factors include high employment, government corruption, violation of human rights, the change of demographic profiles, and further deterioration of economies due to global financial and high inflation precipitated by rising food and energy prices.8 Nonetheless financial pressures seems to be a pivotal trigger especially when corruption of the ruling elite was so blatantly revealed to the public.

Despite the warning that has been expressed from many parties including academic researches about the increasing popular dissatisfaction due to the impairment of economics, the Arab regimes and international financial institution have failed to predict the political turmoil. They still believed in the number of economics indicators that suggested the economies were undergoing a high growth rates, approximately five percent per annum. The IMF report released seven month prior the collapse of Mubarak even praised the sustainable and wide ranging reforms both in monetary and fiscal policy, without mentioning the demographic problem as a potential factor that enable to spark turmoil.9

8 Table 1. GDP Growth Rates, 1980-2012

Period Country 1980-1990

1990-2001

2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012

Developed Economies

US 3.4 3.5 2.7 1.9 0.0 -3.5 3.0 1.6 2.2

Canada 3.4 3.0 2.8 2.2 0.7 -2.8 3.2 2.4 1.8

UK 3.1 2.6 2.8 2.7 -0.1 -4.9 1.4 0.8 0.2

France 2.2 1.8 2.5 2.3 -0.1 -2.7 1.5 1.7 0.0

Sweden 2.2 2.0 4.3 3.3 -0.6 -5.2 5.6 4.0 1.2

Germany (West) 2.1 1.5 3.7 3.3 1.1 -5.1 3.7 3.1 0.9

Japan 4.1 1.3 2.0 2.4 -1.2 -6.3 4.0 -0.7 2.0

Australia 3.4 4.0 3.1 3.8 3.7 1.3 2.7 2.1 3.6 Non-Oil Arab Countries

Egypt 5.0 4.6 6.8 7.1 7.2 4.7 5.1 1.8 2.2

Jordan - 4.8 7.9 8.5 7.6 2.3 3.1 2.6 2.8

Syria 2.1 5.5 5.0 5.7 4.7 6.0 3.2 - -

Tunisia 3.6 4.7 5.7 6.3 4.7 3.1 3.7 -1.8 3.6

Morroco 4.0 2.5 7.8 2.7 5.6 4.8 3.7 4.9 3.0

Sources : World Bank10

A combination of the increasing birth rate , the declining infant mortality rate and also the rising life expectancy over the last few decades have caused the Arab regions to face an unprecedented boom in its youth population which is almost three quarters of the population under the age of thirty. In addition, the rise of female participation in workforce has put a tremendous pressure on labor markets, social services and social stability. The youth workforce are also more educated and politically demanding. However, the region has showed the lowest share of employed workforce in the working-age population, which is reflected in the figure below.11

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Figure 2. Share of Employed People in Working Age Population (+15)

70 ₆₄

52 55 57 57

52.5 47 50

35

17.5

0

MENA ECA LAC SA EAP SSA EU25 Sources : World Bank, 2009 cited in Ozekin & Akkas 2014

MENA =Middle East & North Africa; ECA = Europe & Central Asia; LAC = Latin America & the Caribbean; SA = South Asia; EAP = East Asia & the Pacific; SSA = Sub-Saharan Africa; EU = European union.

Due to pressures from the IMF and World Bank, the majority of Arab countries were forced to reform their economies based on the economic liberation program called “Structural Adjustment Program (SAP)” in the mid 1980s. In order to follow the program, government started to revoke the subsidies of basic essential commodities, decreasing the number of government jobs, increasing taxation and consumption for citizens; on the other side, local and foreign investors were granted custom and taxation exemption. The economic impoverishment of the majority of people occurred as result of the rising food prices and unemployment particularly among the youth. Meanwhile, the ruling elite through corruption seem to be ongoing enrichment themselves by managing numerous amount of wealth which triggered a potential social conflict.12 In addition, there were massive violation of human rights as a form of the repressive and violent nature of the Arab regimes that reflected on the report issued by World Bank in 2011. This report has title “the Worldwide Governance Indicators” showed that MENA region has the second lowest score after former Soviet Union. Finally, the culmination of socio-economic and socio political problems coupled with increasingly deteriorating economy aftermath of financial crisis sparked the Arab Uprising led by youth.

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Figure 3. Voice and Accountability by Region, 1998 - 2010

Sources ; World Bank, 2011 “ The Worldwide Governance Indicators cited in Ozekin & Akkas

2014

MENA =Middle East and North Africa; SSA = Subsaharan Africa; SA = South Asia; EA = East

Sources ; World Bank, 2011 “ The Worldwide Governance Indicators cited in Ozekin & Akkas 2014

MENA =Middle East and North Africa; SSA = Subsaharan Africa; SA = South Asia; EA = East Asia; LA = Latin America; EUB = Eastern Europe & Baltics; FSU = Former Soviet Union3. The Difference in Escalation of the Arab Uprising

In fact the military institutions have played a pivotal role responding the escalation of Arab movement through three different stances; (a) disassociation with the regime and welcoming the transition, (b) loyalty to the status quo; (c) defection and becoming part of the opposition. In the case of Tunisia and Egypt, the military kept distance from repression committed by the police and security forces to demonstrators, hence the regime was overthrown in a relatively smooth manner. Furthermore, the collapse of Hosni Mubarak led to a military take over and allowed the democratic election to be won by Freedom and Justice-the party of the Muslim Brotherhood both in People’s Assembly-the Parliament’s lower house (47.2%) and the Consultative Council (58%); ultimately their candidate Mohammad Morsi won the presidency in May 2012.13 In Tunisia, the transition was even better than Egypt because the military was already frustrated with the policy of marginalization and neutralization implemented by president Zine El Abiding Ben Ali.14

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The military in Syria and Bahrain on the contrary were different to their counterparts in Tunisia and Egypt; they put themselves loyal to the ruler. In Syria, the Assad regime adopted policies for recruiting military and security forces particularly for the top officer - they were mostly taken from the Alawite minority population-the loyal Shia supporter of Assad. Moreover the brutal tactic of the army in the face of the demonstrators spawned fierce resistance from the opposition and brought international intervention. Quickly the uprising transformed into a bloody civil war and caused fragmentation of the country in terms of the sects (Shia vs Sunni), ethnicities (Kurdish vs Arab) and ideologies (the Islamists and secularist). This regime has survived until now, because of, not only the loyalty of the army, but also the ingenuity of Bashar in utilizing his allies.

In Bahrain, the military also remain unified to King Hamad but not due to sectarian relation. The opposition, who were mostly composed of the Shia, demanded more participation in social and political discourses. The revolt was immediately put out by the Sunni rulers who assisted GCC forces that was mainly composed of Saudis. The danger of the Sunni-Shia friction threatened Saudi security hence there was no option for Saudi but to support the Bahrain ruler at any cost.

In Libya and Yemen, the military forces were not solid, as a split of stand point on how to respond to the revolt occurred. The division comes as a result of the weak institutional state structure.15 As regards Libya, the protestors faced stiff opposition from the ruling regime. The military and militias were loyal to Qaddhafi, killing numerous demonstrators that induced international condemnation. The Arab League called for the imposition of a no fly zone over Libya to protect civilians from Qaddhafi forces. The United States took action quickly to the internationalised Libya crisis through the help of Qatar by sending military forces supported by NATO allies under legitimization of Resolution 1970 adopted by UN Security Council.16

Shortly, after the outbreak of the uprising, under General Abdul Fatah Younis and Musa Kusa - Qaddafi's right-hand, some army units and intelligences defected and joined the rebellion. The revolt then moved uncontrolled, although Qaddafi has been assassinated, Libya was the fragmented into numerous fractions. The post-Qaddafi ruler was weak and failed to rebuild their institutions, especially in the security sector. Moreover military bases and mercenaries during the civil war later transferred to the National Movement of Azawad, Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, Al Ansar-Dine and the

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Touareg Movement (in north of Mali), causing open instability and tension as well as geopolitical chaos.17

With regards to Yemen, initially the demonstration ran peacefully, without any crackdown. However the situation did not last long, with the authorities becoming impatient and using violence to disperse demonstration that caused disintegration within the military and defection of some its leaders; later they joined the rebels. After following a series of government massacres against the revolutionary forces, the Saudi backed US, forced President Ali Abdullah Saleh to step down and ceded his office to vice president Abdu Mansour Hadi. Since then Hadi’s government also became an ally of the Saudis since Hadi’s foreign policy was similar to the former president Saleh.18

4. The Arab Uprising Implication : Geostrategy Configuration

The Arab Spring has changed the Middle east region on the levels of ideology, sect and power politic. After three years euphoria declined, the new political order in the Middle East is marked by rebalancing power within each state at national level, changing allies at regional level as well as geostrategic configuration. As the upheavals continue grow in number, especially in strategic countries such as Syria and Bahrain, they will continue to have a large effect on regional politics as well as a great power interest.

4.1 The Case of Syria

What actually happens in Syria is the proxy war of world powers (US and Rusia) and regional powers (Turkey, Iran and Saudi Arabia); duplicating the Iraq and Afghan scenario. When the reputation of United Stated tarnished after the failures in Afghanistan and Iraq, the Syrian conflict is lucrative gate for Russian regain the dominance. In fact, Syria was the locus of the Soviet Union in the Middle East also the home of Rusian naval base which placed in the Syrian harbor of Tartous. Meanwhile for the US, the region is still important to maintenance the security of Israel, although might be shifted of its strategy related energy source.19

In context of regional politic, Iran initially welcomed the Arab Awakening in the hope that they would be more anti-western and pro-Islamist that encourage an emergence new ally for Iran. However, by the passage time, the revolt was even more away than expected. Iran has realized of the current development, especially Syria conflict has let out Hamas of their ally and back into its religious Sunni fold; “ Hamas Leader Khaled

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Mishaal abandon longtime base in Damascus by January 2012”.20

Therefore, there is no option for Iran except to fully support Assad’s regime. Furthermore Assad’s regime is 33 years ally of Iran due to some reasons; channel for military and financial support to Hezbollah also resistance fronts against Israel. Syrian crisis and domestic political development are challenge for Iran to be the natural Shia leader on the region through strengthening the Alawite (Nusairi) who hold strong power in Syria right now.

On the other hand, in order to stem Iran-Shia political leverage; accordingly, Saudi together with Qatar and Turkey as Sunni allies, support to the Syrian opposition in the form of financial, weapon and military training.21 Moreover, Turkey also has expressed interest in Syria due to Kurds which live in many parts of Syria, heavily concentrated in the northeast province of Hasakah. These tribes are better organized than many ethnic or sectarian groups in Syria. They have 12 Kurdish political parties, one of the most important is Democratic Union Party (PYD) which has close links with the Kurdistan Worker Party (PKK)- the terrorist organization in Turkey.22

4.2 The Case of Bahrain

Bahrain like Syria has a pivotal role in both regional and international affairs. In the region, Bahrain is the battlefield of the “Cold War” between the two Gulf powers, Saudi and Iran, which has been increasingly chilly since the fall of the Ba’ath in Iraq 2003 and consequently weakened the geopolitical role of Baghdad. In Saudi’s perspective, neutralization of the influence of Shia is a must and cannot to fail in a way by strengthening the power of the Khalifa ruling familly-sunni ally. On the contrary Iran plays on the Issue “ The Bahrain nation is an oppressed nation”, to seek sympathy of the outside. As we know, Bahrainis following Shia are approximately seventy percent of the total population.23

Internationally, Bahrain is the home of a US military base-the US Fifth Fleet which is responsible for the American naval forces in the Persian Gulf, Red Sea, Arabian Sea ad the East African coast as far south as Kenya. This facility is to safeguard places of American interest, Israel and his allies. Moreover, the presence of a military facility, pushes the US government to be proactive on all issues, both domestic and regional; any major transformation of the domestic political order in Bahrain could threaten the naval base. In addition, since Iran has always perceived as “destablising force in a volatile region”, the military significance of the fifth fleet has been greatly

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enhanced particularly when Washington intended to launch strikes against Iranian nuclear facilities. 24

4.3 The Pivotal Players

Despite major uncertainties accompanying the current uprisings, one thing is clear: the uprising has reshaped the rivalry of Shia-Sunni, which has converted the region into one “Geopolitical Great Game”. There are three regional main players; Saudi, Iran and Turkey, which have triggered power struggles throughout the Middle East.

Saudi Arabia

Saudi Arabia is one of the predominant powers in the Arab region, who has enormous oil wealth, respectable demographic base, and geostrategic competition with Iran since it proclaims itself as “the protector of Sunni interest’’. In order to curb the growth of the Iranian influence in the region, including to break down the Al Qaeda linked terrorist organizations, Saudi has used to its power to draw Bahrain, Oman and possibly also Kuwait closer to its circle of influence and domination.25 While the United Arab Emirates are trying to stay out of the imbroglio, Qatar has been one step ahead, ready to use its high international profile and ability to chart its own independent course, as a newly emerging active player in the region. The influential al Jazeera news channel which is based in Doha is one of the important means to support its role.26

Saudi in its rivalry with Iran often sustains its capabilities, primarily by the transfer of high-tech weapons from the United States and has to rely, simply, on funds to influence events. Conversely, it has a lack of genuine political institution and intervention in the region. Thus, Saudi’s inherent weakness on its foreign policy means it becomes less effective in regional diplomacy.27

Iran

The top priority of Iran’s foreign policy, in aftermath of Arab Spring is Syria, Iraq, Lebanon and Bahrain. According to the political analyst Simon Tisdall, the close bilateral relationship between Iran and Syria is based on similarity on ideological and physical confrontation with Israel and US and its buffer against the pro Western Sunni monarchies of the gulf. Syria, to Iran, is the springboard into the Arab Middle East, conversely Iran is a source of protection, security and funds for the Assad regime.28 In Libya, any foreign intervention has always been addressed carefully by Iran because it

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could become a potential threat in the future. Its relation with Turkey, Turkey has showed consistently its support of Iran rights for enrichment using it’s uranium for peaceful purposes. However, Iran also has tensions regarding the Syrian uprising, supporting the Nuri-al-Maliki Regime -A Shia dominated government in Iraq and also the issue of Kurdistan.

Turkey

Initially, both Turkey and Iran welcomed the Arab Awakening against the authoritarian Arab rules, but for different reasons. For Turkey, the Arab Spring is a reflection of their own experiences on their success in a democracy and reducing the military's role in the political sphere. In fact, this country has been seen as the role model for emerging Arab democracies.29

While Iran expected the uprising would topple pro-western dictators and emerged as the new ruler, which inlined with Iran’s interest. However, in the subsequent development there was a different result to be expected by both parties, this even raised tension in their relations.

Moreover, the issue on the foreign policy of Turkey in Middle East is, so far, in Syria, Egypt, Iraq and Israel. When the Assad regime brutally suppressed the protestor, Turkey firmly asked Assad to secede his power and recalled its ambassador as a form of protest against the atrocities on the people of Syria. The similar stance of Turkey when calling a military coup to the president Mursi. Although this is a right thing, but was again isolated, hence for the reason of national interest, preferred to stay neutral or paid lip service to the opponents of the coup. As a result Turkey would lose its important ally in the middle east and Arab world due to the significant role of Egypt in the region. In Iraq, Turkey does not observe formalities with the PM Maliki due to the Shia-Sunni conflict. In contrast, Turkey started to improve its relations with Israel on the basis of national interest.

5. Conclusion

To sum up in the wake of the Arab Spring, there are three fundamental geostrategic implication transforming the balance of power in Middle East. First, the people movement in the Arab world seem have similarity of the root causes which heavily dominated by socio economic and socio political problem. However. the responses of

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the regimes were dissimilar, causing the different level scale of upheaval. There six countries were experiencing a full scale of upheaval, namely Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Syria, Yemen and Bahrain. Among of them, four countries were successful to topple the old regimes. Due to the limitation, the paper only examine the combination factors driven the revolt and the degree escalation in six countries mentioned above.

The second geostrategic consequences is the fragmentationin of power whether on the basis of ideology, sectarian or tribal, that led the proliferation of weak states. The new authority or the existing regimes were failed to reach a national consensus to calm the sociopolitical unrest. The last is the geostrategic future of the Middle East is likely to be determined in the short and medium terms by interaction of three key regional players; Saudi Arabia, Iran and Turkey while the United States and Rusia as international player also playing significant roles.

Note

1 Pike, J. “Arab Spring, Arab Awakening”. 06 August 2015. http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/arab-sping.htm

2 Dalacoura, K. “ The Arab Uprising Two Year On: Ideology, Sectarianism and The Changing Balance of Power in The Middle East”. Insight Turkey. Vol 15/ No.1/2013. pp. 75-89.

3 De Vriese. “Paradox of Globalization: New Arab Publics? New Social Contract?”. KoninkklijkeBrill NV, Leiden.PGDT 12. pp 114-134. 2013

4. Pike. supra note 1.

5 Ogbonnaya. “Arab Spring in Tunisia, Egypt &Libya: A comparative Analysis of Causes & Determinants”. Alternative Turkish Journal of International Relations. Vol.12 no.3 Fall 2013

6 Elakawi. “The Geostrategic Consequences of The Arab Spring”. 22 November 2014.

http://www.opendemocrazy.net/arab-awakenin/zaki-samy-elakawi/geostrategic-consequences-of-arab- spring

7 Abo, Bakr Elenndy. Arab Spring: Causes and Role of NSOs, Central Agency for Public Mobilization & Statistics, CAPMAS, Egypt, February, 2012, p.

8 Ozekin & Akkas. “An Emperical Look To The Arab Spring: Causes and

Consequences”. Alternatives Turkish Journal of International Relations. Vol. 13, No. 1-2, Spring-Summer 2014

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9 IMF. “ Arab Republic of Egypt: 2010 Article IV Consultation-Staff Report”. IMF Report No.10/94. April 2010

10 The World Bank (WB), World Development Report, various issues; WB, World Bank Data, http://data.world- bank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG?page=5; IMF, World Economic Outlook Database, April 2013.

11 Ozekin & Akkas. supra note 7

12 Salih. “ The Roots and Causes of The 2011 Arab Uprising”. Arab Studies Quarterly. Pluto Journal. Vol. 35. No. 2. Spring 2013

13 Dalacoura. “The 2011 Uprising in the Arab Middle East: Political Change and Geopolitical Implications.” International Affairs. Vol. 88, No.1, 2012

14 Kwakbi & Khadmani. “ Armies, People and Dictators”. http://www.alsafhat.net/blog/?p=31496

15 International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). “ The Arab Awakening”. Strategic Survey Vol. 2011. pp 43-96

16 Gamal M. “The United States and the Arab Spring: The Dynamics of Political Engineering”. Pluto Journal Vol.35, No. 3, 2013

17. Elakawi. supra note 6

18 Katz. “The International Relations of The Arab Spring”. Middle East Policy Vol. XXI. no. 2, Summer 2014

19 Yakis. “Turkey after The Arab Spring: Policy Dilemmas”. Middle East Policy Vol. XXI no. 1, Spring 2014.

20 Akram. “Hamas Leader Abandons Longtime Base in Damascus.” New York Times, January

27, 2012. http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/28/world/middleeast/khaled-meshal-the-leader-of- hamas-vacates-damascus.html

21 Ayoob. “ The Arab Spring: Its Geostrategic Significance”. Middle East Policy. Vol. XIX, No. 3, Fall 2012

22 Al Monitor. Anberin Zaman. July 21, 201323 Rafati. “Iran and the arab Spring”. http://www.lse.ac.uk/IDEAS/publications/reports/pdf/ SR011/FINAL_LSE_IDEAS IranAndArabSpring_Rafati

24 Ayoob, supra note 21

25 Gilles. “ Islamists in Power: Governing the Arab World”. The Material of Public lecture, London School of Economics, November 21, 2012

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26 Coates & Ulrichsen. “Small States with a big Role” HH Sheikh Nasser al Mohammad al SabahPublication Series, no. 3 (october 2012).

http://www.dur.ac.uk/resources/alsabah/ Small/ StateswithaBigRole.pdf

27 Al Rasheed. “ Yes, It Could Happen Here: Why Saudi Arabia Is Ripe for Revolution”. Foreign Policy-Middle East Channel. February 28,2011.

http://wwwmideast.foreignpolicy.com/post/2011/02/28/yes_it_could_happen_here 28 Tisdal. “ Bashar al-Assad’s Syria offers Iran A Springboad into the Arab Middle East.” The Guardian , February 8, 2012.

http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2012/feb/08/assad-syria- iran-middle-east. 29 Shadid. “In Riddle of Mideast Upheaval, Turkey Offers Itself as An Answer.” New York Times, September 26, 2011. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/27/world/europe/in-mideast-

riddle-turkey-offers-itself-as-an-answer.html?scp=3&sq=erdogan%20in%20cairo&st=cse.

19

ARAB SPRING, INDONESIAN DEMOCRACY,

AND DIPLOMATIC BLIND SPOT

Ryantori

INTRODUCTION

The Arab Spring, a series of anti-government protests, uprisings and armed rebellions, spreads across the Middle East throughout 2011. A rhythmic chant echoed across the Arab lands which showed that the people want to topple the regime. It has been widely seen as a watershed event which has irrevocably changed the region and the global political landscape. A main force behind it was the call for a formative political change, with freedom, democracy and justice, and the attack on corruption and nepotism.

In the history of the Middle East, the opportunity to support democracy has never been as great as today. The momentum for democracy in the Middle East is at its peak (Wandi, 2013). The people’s voice for freedom is at its loudest, while the regimes’ popularity is at an all-time low. Regardless of external support, the oppressed will continue to revolt — it is a fight to the end. Most of those regimes clinging to power are teetering at the edge of the precipice. Arab dictatorial regimes might spill more blood, but the darkest hour is just before the dawn.

Initially, the Arab Spring was an optimistic transformation of the Middle East into democratic region. Yet, until now, the progress is not as quite good as expected, not to mention failed. In many public debates, there is a tendency to focus solely on Islamism as the major obstacle toward democratization in the region. Is it true that Islam and Democracy are not compatible or even opposite each other?

WEST VS ISLAM

≈

DEMOCRACY VS ISLAM ?

When we talk about democracy in this modern era, western democracy comes into surface immediately. The defining characteristics of such democracy (sometimes called

20

‘liberal democracy’) include a commitment to fundamental freedoms, within a framework of laws designed to prevent their abuse, such as freedom to practice one’s own religion; freedom of speech; freedom of association; freedom to publish; and equality before the law.

It is important to distinguish from the beginning between democracy as means and democracy as goals. The most fundamental of the goals of democracy are probably four in number. Firstly, to make the rulers accountable and answerable for their actions and policies. Secondly to make the citizens effective participants in choosing those rulers and in regulating their actions. Thirdly, to make the society as open and the economy as transparent as possible; and fourthly to make the social order fundamentally just and equitable to the greatest number possible. Accountable rulers, actively participating citizens, open society and social justice – those are the four fundamental ends of democracy.(Birch, 2001)

However, the way to achieve these goals has elicited different means. For examples, in making the rulers more accountable some democracies (like the United States) have chosen separation of powers and checks and balances, while other democracies (like the United Kingdom) have chosen the more concentrated notion of sovereignty of parliament. These are different means towards making the executive branch more accountable and answerable in its use of power. The same situation occurs related to freedom of the press and speech. The United States has a highly permissive legal system on freedom of speech, but more restrictive public opinion. The United Kingdom has a more restrictive legal system on freedom of the press, but a more tolerant public opinion. (Hensley, 2001; Feldman, 1993)

Talking about the relationship between Islam and democracy,the debate over the relationship between them rests not only on Islamic doctrine but also on history. Even, we can trace back to the debate over the relations between Islam and the West. Samuel P. Huntington (1993: 222-239) in "The Clash of Civilizations?" offers his hypothesis that the fundamental source of conflict in this new world will not be primarily ideological or primarily economic. The great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural. Nation states will remain the most powerful actors in world affairs, but the principal conflicts of global politics will occur between nations and

21

groups of different civilizations. The clash of civilizations will dominate global politics. The fault lines between civilizations will be the battle lines of the future. Conflict between civilizations will be the latest phase in the evolution of conflict in the modern world.

Now, let us turn into the debate over democracy and Islam. Essentially, democracy is a system of governance where sovereignty lies in the hands of the people. But many will say this contradicts with the doctrine of Islam, since in the Islamic view, sovereignty lies in the hand of God. Advocates of this line of thinking put forward three arguments (Kumoro, 2013).

First, there is the fundamentally different view of the nation, or ummah. The view of the nation in modern democracy is tied to a physical space marked by territorial and geographical borders. On the other hand, Islam has its own understanding of a nation that is not bounded by borders, but by aqidah (the basic tenets of Islam). Therefore, for many Muslims, nation is defined by faith, not by geography. Second, some Muslim scholars see democracy as a worldly value, when spiritual goals are of primary importance. Democracy thus becomes a secondary goal. Third, a contradiction arises because the people’s sovereignty that lies at the heart of democracy is absolute, meaning the people are the ultimate holders of power. Laws and regulations are decided by the people through their representatives and not by God. But for some scholars, the people’s sovereignty is not absolute at all, since it is bound by the laws of Islam. In Islam, only God’s sovereignty is absolute.

These three interpretations are used by some Muslims to argue that there is no space for democracy in their lives. However, there are many Muslims who take the opposite view, arguing that democracy is inherent in people and in line with Islamic teachings. They base their argumentation on Islamic doctrines—justice, freedom, deliberation and equality—that espouse the basic principles of democracy.

At this level, Islam does not speak about a procedural system but more about the basic soul and spirit of democracy. If the interpretation of democracy is the existence of certain social and political ideals, like the freedom of thought, faith, opinion and equality before the law, there would seem no contradiction, as these are guaranteed by Islam.

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ISLAM AND DEMOCRACY: INDONESIA’S EXPERIENCE

It is important to note that the absence of democracy in some Muslim World, such as countries of the Middle East1, is not a feature of the wider Muslim world. There are some Islamic societies which have made explicit commitments to some of the values identified as those relating to Western societies. Many of these derive from a number of attempts to develop the concepts of traditional Islam to take account of the changes in Western societies which have led to modernisation. In this context, democracy stands on first line.

One good example of those Islamic societies is Indonesia. It is the world’s third largest democracy after India and the United States of America and the world’s largest muslim population (The Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life, 2010). Home to approximately 230 million people of which more than 85% follow Islam, there are almost as many Muslims living in Indonesia as in the entire Arab-speaking world combined. Sunni Islam is the predominant branch of Islam, with only around one million Indonesians being Shia. There is a wide array of other forms of Islam, including significant numbers of Sufi communities. The major fault line, however, lies between santri who adhere to orthodox forms of Islam while the abangan practice more syncretic versions of Islam.

Indonesia has seen much success in the transition from an authoritarian regime to a democratic system of governance. While Indonesia still has a long way to go before

1

There are several cultural factors that have slowed the growth of democracy in the Islamic countries of the Middle East. First, there is a strong monolithic paradigm of thought over Islam. Such a paradigm stems from Middle Eastern Muslims’ limited understanding of Islam’s nature and essence, both in regards to Koran and Hadith and in regards to history. Islam is often viewed as a divine instrument to understand the world, and such a perception has prompted some Muslims to believe that Islam offers a complete way of life (kaffah). In this understanding, Islam is an all-encompassing system of belief that offers a solution to all of life’s problems. This view of Islam as perfect and comprehensive has a number of implications. If Islam is transformed for use at the level of political ideology and political practice, this could lead to the political belief that Islam must become the state’s basis of existence, Islamic jurisprudence must be accepted as the state’s constitution and sovereignty would lie in the hands of God. In short, in the context of such a perspective the modern political system of rule by the people is in direct conflict with Islam. Second, the absence of democracy in the Middle East could also be explained by the weak political will of the regimes to accommodate democracy. Leadership has long been based on family ties and regimes would lose this prerogative. Third, the most ironic thing about the absence of democracy in the Middle East is the often tacit support of the Western world —the United States in particular— for the existence of the authoritarian regimes(See Kumoro, 2013).

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democracy fully takes root, at the very least it has been quite successful in tearing down the walls of tyrannical power. Since the authoritarian regime of President Suharto collapsed in 1998, the most immediately visible change in Indonesian politics has been the implementation of an extensive regulatory framework that directs both executive and legislative elections. In April 2009 Indonesia conducted the third legislative election of the post-Suharto era. As in 1999 and 2004, the recent election featured a nationwide legislative election for the national parliament, the senate-like Regional Representatives Assembly, and for the parliaments at the provincial, district and municipal level. Furthermore, direct elections for regents and mayors were held in 486 out of 510 regencies and municipalities and governor elections in 15 out of 33 provinces throughout the last few years. By the end of 2008, all the leaders of sub-national executive governments had been directly elected by the Indonesian people. Finally, presidential election took place in 1999, 2004, and 2009 (Buehler, 2009).

It is said that Islam and democracy are in a relationship fraught with problems as the former, allegedly, does not allow secular law to be put above divine law or accept the legitimacy of worldly authorities (see Table 1). This relationship is less problematic in Indonesia, a democratic Muslim-majority country, the argument goes, due to the syncretic forms of Islam practiced in the archipelago state that are less dogmatic, and hence more conducive to democratic principles. While this is a valuable point, various factors extraneous to ‘moderate Indonesian Islam,’ such as a fragmented Islamic authority in civil society, a weakly institutionalized party system as well as dynamics triggered by recent institutional reforms all play a role in the continuing insignificance of political Islam in the country (Buehler, 2009).

Table 1:

TYPOLOGY IN MODERNIZATION CLAIMS

SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRACY SUPPORT FOR ISLAMISM

 High Education  Low Education

 More Equitable Gender Attitudes  Less Equitable Gender Attitudes

 Higher Income  Lower Income

 Less Religious  More Religious

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To summarize, the reason why Islam and democracy seem to go well together in

Indonesia has as much to do with broader dynamics within civil society, political parties and state institutions as it has to do with the syncretist, hence moderate forms of Islam practiced in the archipelago.

PANCASILA DEMOCRACY: INDONESIAN MODALITY

As the most Muslim-populous democratic country in the world, Indonesia can play a significant role in efforts to promote democratization in the Islamic World, especially in The Middle East. The nation is a real-world example of the compatibility of Islam and democracy, one that could serve as a model for countries in the wider Islamic world.

Yet, there is important question related to the phenomena above. If the goals of democracy are the same while the means for achieving them differ, are there Indonesian means of achieving those same four goals of accountability of rulers, participation of the citizens, openness of the society and greater social justice? That is the challenge facing constitution makers in Indonesia – how to keep the democratic goals constant while looking for democratic means more appropriate to people. In this context, let us focus on Indonesia’s genuine democracy: Pancasila Democracy.2

Pancasila Democracy (democracy based on five basic pillars) was formally labeled under President Suharto in 1966. It is inspired by the noble values of the Indonesian nation. Pancasila itself, which means the five principles, is the name given to the foundation of the Indonesian Republic. The five principles of Pancasila are Belief in the One and Only God; A Just and civilized humanity; the Unity of Indonesia; Democracy

2

Since its independence in 1945, Indonesia has implemented three models of democracy. Liberal democracy was applied in 1950 to 1959, guided democracy was championed by President Sukarno in 1959 to 1965, and Pancasila democracy (democracy based on five basic principles) was formally labeled under President Suharto in 1966 to 1998. Many Indonesians regarded liberal democracy as a failure because they saw it as incompatible with Indonesian culture. Liberal democracy was considered a Western tradition that stressed “one man, one vote,” while the Indonesian ideal emphasized consensus. At the other hand, the guided democracy championed by Sukarno found its roots in the idealized version of simple village life. It was the “rediscovery of the treasure of the Indonesian people which had been buried by hundreds of years of foreign rule.” Unfortunately, its implementation was centralized in the hands of the president who monopolized ideological wisdom. At the time, Sukarno acknowledged the authoritarian aspects of traditional Indonesian democracy. The key ingredient was “guidance.” To the “guide” fell the task of reconciling conflicting views into formulations that were palatable to each faction. Without strong leadership capable of synthesizing the final decision, the system failed.

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guided by the inner wisdom of deliberations of representatives; and Social Justice for all the Indonesian people.

Pancasila Democracy is a system of government based on popular sovereignty. It is the people who determine the shape and content of the desired rule. Based on these meanings, it is clear that people are not objects, but subjects who could play an active role. For example, most Indonesians believe that the individual exists in the context of his family. And the family is the building block of society. There are cultural differences between Western and Indonesian societies and these differences influence their understanding of democracy. Meanwhile, Indonesians believe human beings should pursue balance between individual and communal interests. In the past, all aspects of the individual’s life in Indonesia were regulated through structures and by coercive pressures, both formal and informal. In such a setting, organized opposition was not only out of place, but antisocial.

Pancasila itself, as a genuine ideologi, can be define as following: (Pilliang, 2010) First Pillar: Deity.

Second Pillar: Humanity. Third Pillar: Nationality. Fourth Pillar : Democracy. Fifth Pillar : Socialism.

Thus, Pancasila Democracy means democracy based on people's sovereignty, which is inspired by and integrated with the other principles of Pancasila. This means that the use of democratic rights should always be in line with the sense of responsibility towards God Almighty according to the respective faith; uphold human values in line with human dignity; guarantee and strengthen national unity; and be aimed at realizing social justice for the whole of the people of Indonesia.

It is almost certain that Indonesian democracy differs from liberal democracy. In terms of cultural origins, liberal democracy is rooted in Western culture while Indonesian democracy has its own roots that emphasized the harmony between individual and communal interests. Gotong Royong (mutual cooperation) is one of the underpinnings of Indonesian society that has to be preserved.

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The other difference relates to the role of religion vis-a-vis the state. All liberal democratic states are secular in nature. Indonesia is neither a theocratic nor a secular state. It believes that God Almighty is a spiritual guide who drives everyday life. As for social democracy, this system is relatively close to Pancasila democracy in terms of values. These two political ideologies are in the same camp in perceiving social justice and the role of the state in regulating economic and social life. When it comes to the issue of religion and the state, they have opposite views (Sriyono, 2013).

Syeikh Ali Zainuddin, a religious cleric from Lebanon, addressed his respect to Pancasila. “Pancasila is a living philosophy that serve as a guidance to live quite harmoniusly for Indonesian people from various backgrounds, such as tribes, religions, cultures and languages” (Tribunnews, 2013). As we know, Lebanon is one of fragile countries in the world because of prolonged sectarian conflicts. In addition, Australian ambassador Greg Moriarty says Indonesia has shown the "Arab Spring" countries that Islam and democracy guided by Pancasila values are compatible, and demonstrated the wisdom of not marginalising groups on religious grounds. "Each country is unique, but Indonesia has shown the world democratic transitions can be made, that Islam and democracy are compatible, and that the yearning of people to have a say in how they are governed is universal (www.theaustralian.com.au).

As a comparison, let us see what Japanese people did in pursuing their national philosophical ideology. The Japanese after the Meiji Restoration in 1868 asked themselves: “Can we economically modernize without culturally Westernizing?” The Japanese said “YES – we shall seek Western techniques and maintain the Japanese spirit.” They retained Japanese tastes; and expanded their Western skills. Following the Second World War, they economically interlocked specifically with the American economy, even displacing American dominance in areas like the automobile industry – without giving up their Japanese spirit (Waswo, 1996).

DIPLOMATIC BLIND SPOT= DIFFICULT HOME WORK

Indonesia with its bebas aktif foreign policy – a “free and active” approach to international relations that champions activism on the world stage has been monitoring

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and anticipated the Arab Spring since its beginning. Now, Indonesian foreign policy over the next five years under President Joko Widodo will be focused on three priorities: maintaining Indonesia’s sovereignty, enhancing the protection of Indonesian citizens, and intensifying economic diplomacy. The last is the most promising priority if Indonesia can set up a good economic scheme in the region. In order to support its claim to a greater role in Middle East politics as peacemaker and mediator, Indonesia generated a set of arguments that highlighted its distinctive attributes and credentials.

With such modality mentioned above, Indonesia is predicted to be able to gain political and economic benefit from its relations with other countries, and also from Arab Spring countries, for the shake of its nation. Unfortunately, this country often fail in many cases to do. This is what foreign policy experts call “diplomatic blind spot”, which entails the idea of neglected strategic issues in diplomacy. The term could also refer to diplomatic achievements on which we have failed to capitalize in the national interest (Yahya, 2015).

Indonesia had often missed multiple chances to take advantage of its “political dividends”, although this country certainly have our political assets. Valuable experience of democratic transition and managing bureaucratic transformation could be shared with other countries — this is no less significant than economic investment. The above examples show the success of our many diplomats in projecting Indonesia’s role to assist our partners in finding solutions to some of their internal, regional and global challenges. However, lack of coordination between the ministries and other institutions, especially in the economic sector, seems to have resulted in poor follow-up. Hence the economic benefits of our diplomatic achievements have not been fully exploited.

In the 1990s, a prescription to treat and cure this disadvantage was offered by the New Order government, with the idea of creating “Indonesia Incorporated”. The core of Indonesia Incorporated as suggested by President Soeharto was a synergy among governmental institutions, the private sector and civil society in managing and realizing integrated economic development (Yahya, 2015)

This promising idea should be revitalized together with the new economic concept “creative economy” (Howkins, 2013). The largest sectors of such economy are art,

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culture, design, entertainment, media and innovation, all of these are very open for Indonesia to go through. It is the first kind of economy where imagination and ingenuity decide what people want to do and make. And what they want to buy. A creative economy is measured just like any other: demand, price, profit and margins. This economy also look at jobs, output and productivity in great measurement.. At the heart of today’s changes is the private determination of individuals to think of new and often surprising ideas that might stimulate others. Brought together, people all around the world are fuelling the creative economy and shaping the future. At this point, Indonesia must be able to get out of the box and become a big player in it.

CONCLUSION

Will Arab Spring succeed or fail? I propose in this paper that Arab countries should have their own democracy standard just like what Indonesia has experienced so far. On broader context, many say that there are many roads to democracy and the Arab countries cannot follow a Western standard or recipe. In short, Islamic values and western democratic philosophy can be blent to have a middle eastern democratic taste.

As the biggest muslim country in the world, Indonesia would thus seem to prove that Islamic doctrine itself is not in contradiction with democracy. Instead, Muslims’ interpretation of Islamic doctrine and cultural heritage forms their views on the value of democracy and its relationship to Islam. Moreover, the existence of various models of democracy in Indonesia has given rise to an intellectual question on what kind of democracy is the best fit, whether to be combined with another ideology or to be “pure” a la western countries.

Nonetheless, Indonesia should gain from, not just pose as role model for, Arab Spring politically as well as economicly. There must be a synergy among governmental institutions, the private sector and civil society in managing and realizing integrated economic development in the Middle East in order not to get trapped into diplomatic blind spot.

29 1. Books

Birch, Anthony H. 2001. Concepts and Theories of Modern Democracy , 2nd ed. London; New York: Routledge.

Choueiri, Yousef. 1990. Islamic Fundamentalism, Boston, MA.

Feldman, David. 1993. Civil Liberties And Human Rights In England And Wales. Oxford, England: Clarendon Press; New York: Oxford University Press.

Halliday, F. 1995. Islam and the Myth of Confrontation (Chapter 4—Islam and the West: "Threat of Islam" or "Threat to Islam"?). London: I.B. Tauris.

Hensley, Thomas R. ed. 2001. The Boundaries of Freedom Of Expression & Order in American Democracy. Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press.

Howkins, John. 2013. The Creative Economy: How People Make Money From Ideas. Penguin Business.

Nasr, Seyyed Vali Reza. 1994. Vanguard to the Islamic Revolution : the Jama`at-i Islami of Pakistan . Berkeley : University of California Press.

Nasr, Vali. 2009. Forces of Fortune: The Rise of the New Muslim Middle Class and What It Will Mean for Our World, Free Press.

Ruthven, Malise. 2002. A Fury For God : the Islamist Attack on America. London; New York: Granta.

Waswo, Anne. 1996. Modern Japanese Society. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.

2. Article in Book

Piliang, Indra Jaya. 2010. “Demokrasi Pancasila dalam Budaya Politik dan Etika Politik” in Bahan Diklat Lemhanas. The Indonesian Institute.

3. Articles in Journals

Esposito, John L. 2000. “Political Islam and the West”, JFQ, Spring.

Buehler, Michael. 2009. “Islam and Democracy in Indonesia”. Insight Turkey. Vol. 11 No. 4.

Huntington, Samuel P. 1993. “The Clash of Civilizations”. Foreign Affair. Summer. Vol. 72 No. 3.

Jamal, Amaney A. 2006. “Reassessing Support for Islam and Democracy”. World Affairs. Fall. Vol. 169 No. 2.

4. Website

Kumoro, Bawono. “Indonesia, Islam and Democracy: Analysis”. May 13, 2013. www.gnfi.com. Accessed on May 17, 2013.

Sriyono, A. Agus. “Pancasila Democracy the Right Fit For Every One of Indonesia’s 240m”. July 31, 2012. www.jakartaglobe.com. Accessed on May 25, 2013. The Weekend Australian. “Indonesia a Model for Arab Uprising”.

http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/world/indonesia-a-model-for-arab-uprisings/story-e6frg6so-1226123161330. Accessed on Nov 3, 2015 Tribunnews. “Pancasila Disukai Ulama Lebanon”. 10 Mei 2011.

http://www.tribunnews.com/2011/05/10/pancasila-disukai-ulama-lebanon. Accessed on May 25, 2013.

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Wandi, Agus, “On the Right Side of History Indonesia and the Arab Spring”

http://jakartaglobe.beritasatu.com/archive/on-the-right-side-of-history-indonesia-and-the-arab-spring/ Accessed on No 2, 2015

Yahya, Tantowi, “Foreign Policy vs Indonesia inc.”.

http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2015/07/27/foreign-policy-vs-indonesia-inc-time-reap-diplomatic-dividends.html#sthash.TXJGF5jD.dpuf. Accessed on Nov 2, 2015.

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TATANAN BARU TIMUR TENGAH PASCA ARAB SPRING

(Analisis Deskriptif Budaya Arab)

Zul Karnen

Universitas Al Azhar Indonesia zulkarnen@uai.ac.id

Abstract

Arab Spring is a phenomenon that occurs in the countries of the Middle East arising from a social dynamic who want a new order that can change the state of a country in the form of protest or rebellion committed by the pro-democracy in the Middle East and North Africa against authoritarian regimes in the region that started around the year 2010 up to 2011. In the Arab Cultural studies is not a new phenomenon in the Middle East, because Hitti (2006) says that Arab culture egalitarian and typical barren desert geography is a factor which form the main character and personality are hard and unyielding. Descriptive analysis of the qualitative approach to the Arab culture of the Arab Spring phenomenon is so rare that, the author hopes this paper can describe the Arab culture studies in the phenomenon of the Arab Spring. New order which is the main hope of social dynamics is still far from the hope, so in this paper the authors provide an alternative to the establishment of a regional and community based theory of post-Islamic Arab society institutions.

Keywords: Arab Spring, Dynamics, Culture, Arab

Pendahuluan

The Arab Spring (Musim Semi Arab) yang menjadi istilah baru terkait dinamika yang terjadi di kawasan Timur Tengah, terutama negara-negara Arab, dimulai sejak tahun 2010 sampai dengan 2011 ditandai dengan kebangkitan harapan akan lahirnya sistem politik yang lebih baik dan lebih demokratis dan berjatuhannya para pemimpin otoriter (Sahide, 2013: 227).

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Arab Spring merupakan fenomena yang timbul dari sebuah dinamika sosial yang menginginkan adanya sebuah tatanan baru yang dapat merubah keadaan sebuah negara yang berupa gelombang protes atau bahkan pemberontakan yang dilakukan oleh masyarakat pro-demokrasi di Timur Tengah dan Afrika Utara terhadap rezim-rezim otoriter di wilayah tersebut yang dimulai dari Tunisia, Zein Al-Abidin Ben Ali (Ben Ali), kemudian merambat ke Mesir yang melengserkan Hosni Mubarak, terus menyeberang ke Libya, yang mengakhiri pemerintahan Moammar Khadafy yang sudah berlangsung kurang lebih 40 tahun lamanya.

Dalam kajian budaya Arab. fenomena ini bukanlah hal baru di Timur tengah, karena Hitti (2006) mengatakan bahwa budaya Arab yang egaliter dan geografi tandus khas padang pasir merupakan faktor utama yang membentuk karakter dan kepribadian yang keras dan pantang menyerah.

Pendekatan analisis Deskriptif kualitatif budaya Arab dari Fenomena Arab Spring masih sangat langka, sehingga penulis mengharapkan makalah ini dapat mendeskripsikan kajian budaya Arab dalam fenomena Arab Spring.

Tatanan baru yang merupakan harapan utama dari dinamika sosial ini masih jauh panggang dari api, sehingga dalam makalah ini penulis memberikan alternatif pembentukan sebuah kawasan dan masyarakat berdasarkan teori pranata masyarakat Arab pasca Islam.

Kerangka Teori

Fenomena

Fenomena adalah kenyataan yang menampakkan diri (Hardiman, 2007: 28) seperti yang penulis kutip dari KBBI online yang mendefinisikan Fenomena adalah hal-hal yg dapat disaksikan dengan pancaindra dan dapat diterangkan serta dinilai secara ilmiah.

Kant kemudian membedakan antara fenomena dan nomena. Wilayah fenomena menurutnya masih dapat diketahui oleh akal, sedangkan wilayah nomena yang tidak dapat diketahui. Tuhan adalah wilayah nomena ini. Sehingga Fenomena adalah gejala yang tampak dan dapat diamati, sedangkan nomena adalah mengukur Tuhan dengan

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akal (meminjam pemikiran Ibn Khaldun) sama dengan menimbang emas gunung dengan timbangan emas (Sukardi, 2003: 67) .

Perlu dicermati di sini adalah fenomena tidak sama dengan masalah. Fenomena adalah fakta yang kita temukan di lapangan. Untuk mengetahui apa masalah yang sebenarnya terjadi, kita perlu mengidentifikasi penyebab masalah untuk berbagai masalah (Rangkuti, 2011: 53). Karena Fenomena adalah entitas yang diam, di mana maknanya ditentukan oleh sudut pandang, termasuk kepentingan orang yang melihatnya (Bagir, 2005)

Penulis dalam makalah ini menggunakan definisi Fenomena yang berarti berpikir fenomenologis yaitu mencoba memahami dan bukannya mempertanyakan mengapa suatu kelompok manusia berpikir dan bertindak sesuatu. (Jatmika, 2009: 64).

Dinamika

Kelompok sosial selalu mengalami perubahan. Hal ini terjadi karena setiap kelompok tidaklah bersifat statis atau stagnan. Tahapan demi tahapan perkembangan kelompok sosial dan perubahannya disebut dinamika kelompok sosial (Huntington, 1996: 29).

Dinamika dalam KBBI berarti gerak (dari dalam); tenaga yang menggerakkan; semangat. Sementara dinamika kelompok merupakan gerak atau kekuatan yang dimiliki sekumpulan orang dalam masyarakat yang dapat menimbulkan perubahan dalam tata hidup masyarakat yang bersangkutan dan dinamika sosial diartikan sebagai gerak masyarakat secara terus-menerus yang menimbulkan perubahan dalam tata hidup masyarakat yang bersangkutan.

Pengertian dinamika kelompok sosial dapat diartikan sebagai sebuah proses perubahan dan perkembangan akibat adanya hubungan beberapa orang atau kelompok dalam masyarakat yang bersifat terus menerus yang kemudian memiliki kekuatan untuk menimbulkan perubahan dari dalam.

Ruth Benedict (2005) mengungkapkan terdapat pokok persoalan (aspek) yang dipelajari dalam dinamika kelompok sosial, diantaranya:

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Dalam persoalan kohesi akan terlihat tingkah laku para anggota dalam suatu kelompok, seperti proses pengelompokan, intensitas anggota, arah pilihan dan nilai-nilai dalam kelompok.

2. motif atau dorongan

Persoalan motif berkisar pada perhatian anggota terhadap kehidupan kelompok, seperti kesatuan kelompok, tujuan bersama dan orientasi diri terhadap kelompok. 3. Struktur

Persoalan ini terlihat pada bentuk pengelompokan, bentuk hubungan, perbedaan kedudukan antar anggota, dan pembagian tugas.

4. Pimpinan

Persoalan pimpinan sangat penting pada kehidupan kelompok sosial, hal ini terlihat pada bentuk-bentuk kepemimpinan, tugas pimpinan dan sistem kepemimpinan.

5. perkembangan kelompok

Persoalan perkembangan kelompok dapat dilihat dari perubahan dalam kelompok, perpecahan kelompok, keinginan anggota untuk tetap berada dalam kelompok dan sebagainya.

Saat ini banyak pihak menyadari pentingnya mempelajari dinamika kelompok sosial karena alasan berikut:

1. Kelompok sosial merupakan kesatuan-kesatuan sosial yang selalu ada dalam setiap masyarakat.

2. Dinamika kelompok sosial berkaitan dengan perubahan sosial dan kebudayaan masyarakat.

Faktor-faktor pendorong dinamika kelompok sosial

Adanya kelompok sosial yang mengalami perkembangan maupun perubahan selalu berkaitan dengan faktor pendorong. Adapun faktor-faktor yang menyebabkannya sebagai berikut:

1. Faktor Pendorong Dinamika Kelompok Sosial dari Luar (ekstern):

Faktor pendorong dari luar kelompok merupakan pengaruh luar yang menyebabkan berkembangnya suatu kelompok sosial, di antaranya sebagai berikut:

35 a. Perubahan situasi sosial

b. Perubahan situasi ekonomi c. Perubahan situasi politik

2. Faktor Pendorong Dinamika Kelompok Sosial yang berasal dari Dalam (Intern):

Faktor ini merupakan kondisi di dalam sebuah kelompok sosial yang menyebabkan perkembangan suatu kelompok sosial, di antaranya sebagai berikut:

a. Adanya konflik antar anggota kelompok b. Adanya perbedaan kepentingan

c. Adanya Perbedaan paham

Proses perkembangan berbagai kelompok sosial:

Dinamika kelompok sosial tidak lepas dari perkembangan kelompok sosial dari kelompok yang sederhana menjadi kelompok yang kompleks. Perkembangan kelompok sosial dalam masyarakat dimulai dari kelompok sosial yang paling homogen dan sederhana yaitu kelompok kekerabatan, yang kemudian berkembang menjadi kelompok sosial yang kompleks yaitu masyarakat perkotaan sehingga dapat dilihat sebagai berikut:

a. Kelompok Kekerabatan

Keluarga merupakan kelompok sosial terkecil dalam masyarakat. Keluarga inti yang terdiri dari ayah, ibu dan anak-anaknya yang belum menikah. Dari keluarga inti berkembang menjadi keluarga besar (extended family) yang disebut kelompok kekerabatan. Dalam kelompok kekerabatan terdapat hubungan darah atau hubungan persaudaraan. Kelompok kekerabatan ini merupakan cikal bakal terbentuknya masyarakat.

Dalam kelompok kekerabatan nilai-nilai tradisional masih dijunjung tinggi sehingga kehidupan kelompok terpusat pada tradisi kebudayaan yang telah dipelihara secara turun-menurun. Menurut Huntington (1996) kemungkinan mengubah tradisi kebudayaan yang telah dipelihara secara turun temurun memang sulit, tetapi melalui proses inovasi khususnya dalam bidang ekonomi dan politik yang dilakukan secara bertahap, perubahan-perubahan dalam kelompok kekerabatan dapat terjadi dalam waktu yang cukup lama.

36 b. Kelompok Okupasional

Kelompok kekerabatan merupakan masyarakat homogen yang menganut nilai-nilai, norma-norma, ataupun pola tingkah laku yang relatif sama sehingga pembagian kerja dilakukan secara sederhana berlandaskan pada tradisi dan perbedaan jenis kelamin. Dalam masyarakat tradisional belum terdapat spesialisasi pekerjaan, tetapi tidak ada satu masyarakat pun yang benar-benar tertutup dari pengaruh luar. Ketika kelompok kekerabatan mendapat pengaruh dari luar, maka kelompok tersebut berkembang menjadi suatu masyarakat yang heterogen. Dalam masyarakat yang heterogen timbul spesifikasi pekerjaan atas dasar bakat dan kemampuan.

Pada perkembangan selanjutnya, spesifikasi semakin berkembang lebih khusus lagi, munculnya berbagai industri menuntut para pekerja bertanggung jawab pada satu unsur tertentu saja sehingga para pekerja semakin ahli dalam bidang tertentu dan kurang mampu mengerjakan pekerjaan lainnya.

Ketika masyarakat semakin maju, spesifikasi dikembangkan secara ilmiah melalui lembaga-lembaga pendidikan tertentu sehingga menghasilkan orang-orang yang ahli dalam ilmu-ilmu tertentu. Oleh sebab itu, munculah kelompok-kelompok profesi (kelompok okupasional) yang terdiri dari kalangan professional yang memiliki etika profesi.

c. Kelompok Volunter

Berkembangnya komunikasi dan media online secara luas dan cepat menyebabkan tidak ada satu masyarakat pun yang benar-benar tertutup terhadap dunia luar. Akibatnya, heterogenitas masyarakat semakin luas. Dengan semakin berkembangnya suatu masyarakat, maka tidak semua kebutuhan para anggota masyarakat terpenuhi. Oleh karena itu, muncullah kelompok-kelompok volunteer.

Kelompok volunteer terdiri dari orang-orang yang mempunyai kepentingan-kepentingan yang sama, tetapi tidak mendapatkan perhatian dari masyarakat yang semakin luas daya jangkaunya. Kelompok volunteer tersebut memenuhi kebutuhan-kebutuhan para anggotanya secara mandiri tanpa mengganggu kepentingan masyarakat umum. Kelompok volunteer dapat berkembang menjadi kelompok yang mantap karena diakui oleh masyarakat umum.

37

Teori-teori di atas menggambarkan bahwa negara-negara di kawasan Timur Tengah seyogyanya memulai kembali dari awal, melalui makalah ini penulis berharap dapat memberikan kontribusi dalam mengembalikan stabilitas di kawasan tersebut sehingga tercipta situasi yang damai, aman dan harmonis.

Sebagaimana dapat kita pahami bersama sebelum terjadinya sebuah kebudayaan yang mapan dalam sebuah tatanan masyarakat perlu dilakukan langkah-langkah terobosan guna memperoleh kesepahaman bersama, di mana kesepahaman inilah yang kemudian disebut sebagai pranata yang berlaku dan disepakati bersama oleh seluruh masyarakat.

Pranata sendiri memiliki definisi sebagai sistem tingkah laku sosial yang bersifat resmi serta adat-istiadat dan norma yang mengatur tingkah laku itu, dan seluruh perlengkapannya guna memenuhi berbagai kompleks kebutuhan manusia dalam masyarakat; institusi (KBBI).

Dari definisi di atas kemudian dikembangkan definisi pranata oleh para ahli diantaranya yang penulis kutip dalam makalah ini adalah pendapat Horton dan Hunt (1980: 198), yang menyatakan bahwa pranata sosial adalah suatu sistem norma untuk mencapai suatu tujuan atau kegiatan yang oleh masyarakat di pandang penting. pranata sosial dalam setiap pembahasan selalu mengenai tiga kata kunci yaitu:

1. nilai dan norma

2. pola prilaku yang menjadi prosedur umum; dan

3. sistem hubungan, yaitu institusi-institusi yang berlaku dan digunakan untuk melaksanakan perilaku sesuai dengan prosedur umum yang berlaku dan disepakati oleh masing-masing pihak.

Pembahasan

Arab Spring mulai giat diperbincangkan oleh para ahli ketika terjadi berbagai peristiwa yang mengguncang bahkan meruntuhkan rezim berkuasa di beberapa negara di timur-tengah.

Peristiwa yang terjadi pada tahun 2010 sampai dengan 2011 ditandai dengan berbagai protes terkait dengan kondisi negara yang dianggap tidak memberikan kontribusi yang nyata terhadap tuntutan warga negaranya.

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Gelombang protes ini terus berlanjut dalam bentuk demontrasi kemudian berkembang menjadi konflik bersenjata, di mana negara bertarung melawan rakyatnya sendiri yang mengangkat senjata dengan membentuk aliansi-aliansi (kelompok-kelompok) diantara mereka yaitu menggerakkan kebangkitan harapan akan lahirnya sistem politik baru yang lebih baik.

Arab Spring merupakan sebuah fenomena merebaknya revolusi demokrasi di dunia Arab. Peristiwa ini diawali oleh Tunisia pada sekitar pertengahan tahun 2010, kemudian merambah ke negara-negara lain, seperti Mesir, dan Syiria yang hingga saat ini masih bergejolak.

Nama Arab Spring sendiri berarti musim semi di Arab. Kata ini merujuk pada peristiwa 1848 (Rubin, 1998), yang mana terjadi revolusi rakyat di sebagian wilayah Arab. Dalam konteks Arab Spring, sesuatu yang bersemi adalah nilai-nilai demokrasi yang kemudian menyebar dengan efek domino ke negara-negara sekitarnya.

Tetapi pendapat Rubin di atas dibantah oleh Sahrasad (2012) yang menyatakan bahwa demokratisasi yang dipaksakan oleh negara-negara barat di negara-negara timur tengah tidak bisa terealisasi dengan baik, sehingga Sihbudi (2007: 135) mengatakan Amerika Serikat harus menerapkan politik standar ganda dalam memberikan dukungan ke sejumlah negara di kawasan ini.

Hal inilah yang menurut penulis layak untuk dikaji secara budaya karena kajian-kajian dengan pendekatan politik maupun hubungan internasional menemui jalan buntu dalam analisis yang tepat dan lebih predictable.

Sementara timur tengah terus menggelora dan huru-hara ini terus menambah deretan korban manusia dan sejumlah masalah bagi dunia internasional seperti masalah pengungsi yang sampai hari ini belum ada penyelesaiannya.

Fenomena yang timbul dari sebuah dinamika kelompok sosial ini menginginkan adanya tatanan baru yang dapat merubah keadaan sebuah negara di kawasan Timur Tengah dan Afrika Utara terhadap rezim-rezim otoriter di wilayah tersebut yang dimulai dari Tunisia, Zein Al-Abidin Ben Ali (Ben Ali), kemudian merambat ke Mesir yang melengserkan Hosni Mubarak, terus menyeberang ke Libya, yang mengakhiri pemerintahan Moammar Khadafy.

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hak individu tersebut dipenuhi, kelompok Ikhwanul Muslimin diyakini paling berpotensi untuk memanfaatkan ruang tersebut untuk menjatuhkan rezim yang tengah berkuasa.25

Dunia Arab sendiri terutama kalangan Sunni sangat berharap adanya perubahan politik yang signifikan di Mesir di tengah ketidakstabilan politik yang terjadi di beberapa negara Timur Tengah setelah terpilihnya Mursy. Namun harapan yang dibebankan ke pundak pemerintah Mesir yang baru tidak semudah situasi yang sesungguhnya dihadapi pemerintahan baru tersebut. Pertama adalah keunggulan suara Mursy dalam pemilu tersebut adalah keunggulan tipis atas Jendral Ahmad Shafiq yakni 51,7 persen melawan 48,3 persen. Hal ini menunjukkan bahwa masyarakat yang mendukung sisa-sisa loyalis Mubarak masih tergolong kuat sehingga hampir bisa dipastikan perjalanan pemerintahan Mursy akan menemui oposisi yang kuat selain belum akan menurunnya keinginan masyarakat secara umum yang menuntut transparansi pemerintah baru agar ketertutupan yang dilakukan oleh rezim lama tidak terulang.

Prospek Perjanjian Camp David Paska Arab Spring di Mesir.

Terpilihnya Muhammad Mursy menjadi presiden Mesir mengundang pertanyaan akan sikap pemerintah Mesir terhadap kelangsungan Perjanjian Camp David. Mursy sendiri melepaskan atribut kelompok Ikhwan sebagai upaya awal bahwa ia berupaya untuk merangkul semua kelompok yang berseteru termasuk kelompok yang mendukung dan menolak Perjanjian Camp David yang telah berumur lebih dari 30 tahun tersebut. Kekhawatiran Amerika Serikat dan Israel terhadap perubahan sikap Mesir terkait Perjanjian Camp David nampaknya tidak beralasan jika melihat situasi perpolitikan di Mesir saat Mursy mulai memimpin Mesir. Hal ini dikarenakan kubu militer masih memiliki kekuatan politik ditambah peran militer untuk mengawasi setiap manuver politik Mursy dan kelompok Ikhwan. Sisi diktator kelompok militer sendiri nampak belum hilang dari percaturan politik di sebagian negara-negara Timur Tengah yang dengan alasan menjaga ketertiban dan keamanan dari kerusuhan sosial yang mungkin timbul sebagai ekses dari ketidakpuasan situasi politik dapat mengambil kekuasaan dan membentuk junta militer. Eksistensi kelompok militer sendiri seringkali tidak terusik dengan kecaman dunia internasional jika sewaktu-waktu mengambil kekuasaan dari hasil pemilu yang sah tidak lain karena adanya dukungan yang kuat dari Amerika Serikat.

Bagi Amerika Serikat dan Israel, bagaimanapun juga latar belakang Mursy yang lekat dengan organisasi Ikhwanul Muslimin dikhawatirkan akan mengubah berbagai sikap

25

Khalil, Magdi, 2006.”Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood and Political Power: Would Democracy Survive?”, Middle East Review of International Affairs,10.(3).

pemerintahan Mesir yang ia pimpin ke arah sebuah hubungan dan koreksi masa lalu termasuk semua yang telah disepakati dalam Perjanjian Camp David. Latar belakang keberafiliasian Mursy inilah yang nampaknya menjadi sorotan kedua negara tersebut. Jika spektrum geopolitik Mesir dan Israel diperluas, maka hubungan baik atau buruk kedua negara juga tidak terlepas dengan konflik Palestina terlebih Gaza sebelumnya berada dalam administratif Mesir. Lagi-lagi Israel tentu akan sangat mempertimbangkan keberadaan Ikhwanul Muslimin yang merupakan organisasi yang menjadi motor terpilihnya Mursy dikarenakan kelompok Ikhwan adalah pendukung kelompok Hamas yang dianggap sebagai organisasi teroris karena kelompok yang paling menentang keberadaan dan legalitas Israel di Palestina.

Dengan demikian saat dunia Arab menyambut dengan gembira hasil pemilihan presiden di Mesir, maka Israel justru menjadi negara yang paling khawatir dengan terpilihnya Mursy sebagai presiden kendati Mursy sendiri telah menyatakan komitmennya dengan berbagai perjanjian internasional yang telah disetujui pemerintah Mesir sebelumnya. Kekhawatiran Israel mengacu pada tidak disebutkannya secara spesifik mengenai perjanjian internasional yang dimaksud oleh Mursy dan tentunya kemungkinan berubahnya pandangan Mesir jika sewaktu-waktu terjadi konflik Palestina yang meluas karena Mursy tentunya akan sangat memperhatikan pandangan-pandangan Ikhwanul Muslimin. Mursy juga diperkirakan akan mengganti pimpinan intelijen Mesir dengan tokoh militer yang Islamis sekaligus sebagai langkah awal untuk mendekatkan kelompok militer Islamis dengan Ikhwanul Muslimin. Jika ini terjadi, maka sinergi antara militer Islamis dan kelompok Ikhwan akan melahirkan kekuatan baru Mesir yang dikhawatirkan Israel dan Amerika Serikat.

Selain kekhawatiran Israel terhadap sikap Mursy terkait Perjanjian Camp David, situasi Arab Spring di negara lain juga menjadi hitung-hitungan politik yang juga harus dikontrol oleh Amerika Serikat dan Israel. Kemenangan Mursy bisa jadi akan dapat menginspirasi kelompok reformis di negara Timur Tengah lain sebagai gelombang demokratisasi yang menumbangkan rezim-rezim dukungan Barat. Demokratisasi di negara-negara yang dilanda gelombang Arab Spring bisa menjadi sebuah bola salju yang menggelinding hebat yang pada waktunya menjelma menjadi bom waktu bagi konflik Timur Tengah berikutnya.

Kesimpulan

Arab Spring merupakan sebuah fenomena yang di beberapa negara menjadi sebuah anomali karena mungkin tidak terbayangkan akan terjadi terlebih di beberapa dekade sebelumnya.

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sebelumnya. Dengan demikian sebab-sebab dan akibat dari fenomena ini berbeda di setiap negara kendati muara dari demokratisasi Arab Spring adalah keinginan untuk mengganti rezim totaliter yang tengah berkuasa dengan pemerintahan yang dipilih secara demokratis. Namun berbeda dengan kawasan lain, pemain dan petualang politik dalam tataran institusi negara di Timur Tengah menjadikan setiap fenomena yang muncul bisa merubah tatanan bahkan geopolitik dalam skala luas. Hal ini dikarenakan Timur Tengah juga menyimpan kekayaan minyak sebagai sumber energi yang belum tergantikan dan mengundang negara-negara industri besar seperti Amerika Serikat untuk tetap bercokol dan berupaya untuk mempertahankan hegemoninya di kawasan tersebut.

Bagi Mesir yang di masa lalu khususnya pada periode 1940-1980 telah memainkan peran signifikan dalam kancah politik di Timur Tengah, demokratisasi merupakan sebuah era baru yang diharapkan dapat memperbaiki kehidupan politik mereka. Eksistensi negara ini kembali diperhitungkan setelah sempat dikucilkan setelah ikut menandatangani Perjanjian Camp David. Peran politik inilah yang sesungguhnya telah ditunggu oleh dunia Arab seiring dengan perubahan kepemimpinan yang terjadi. Kendati sikap Mesir tidak akan berubah drastis terhadap Perjanjian Camp David, namun upaya pemulihan ekonomi yang sudah seharusnya menjadi prioritas pemerintahan Mursy lambat laun akan berupaya untuk sedikit demi sedikit mengurangi ketergantungan mereka dari negara-negara Barat. Andaikan proses ini dapat dilalui dengan baik, maka kedudukan Mesir di mata negara-negara Arab bisa jadi akan lebih baik dibandingkan dengan era Nasser atau Anwar Sadat. Jika tiga pendahulu Mursy berasal dari kalangan militer, maka pendekatan pembangunan yang dilakukan untuk bisa merangkul seluruh kelompok dan lapisan masyarakat Mesir akan mengundang simpati tidak hanya publik Mesir tetapi juga dunia Arab pada umumnya. Sejauh ini keterpurukan negara-negara Arab umumnya dikarenakan berbagai masalah sosial dan ekonomi yang membuat mereka dipandang sebelah mata oleh negara-negara Barat. Ketimpangan income percapita diantara negara-negara Arab ini menimbulkan kesenjangan dan perbedaan tujuan, cara dan arah perjuangan. Seiring dengan adanya fenomena Arab Spring, Mesir diharapkan menjadi jembatan bagi penyatuan perjuangan di tengah berbagai permasalahan yang dihadapi oleh dunia Arab.

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