SAFETY RISK ASSESSMENT PROCESS SAFETY RISK CONTROLMITIGATION PROCESS
4. SAFETY RISK ASSESSMENT PROCESS
The third task of the SAG is to identify and assess the safety risks of the consequences of the hazards, and the existing defences, as follows: a The SAG assessment leads to the conclusion that there is a remote probability that a construction vehicle will deviate from prescribed procedures and cross the primary runway without an escort. b There are night air carrier operations at the airport, so there is a remote probability that an aircraft could conflict with a crossing vehicle. c While the probability of an aircraftconstruction vehicle conflict is remote, the SAG assesses that, should such conflict occur, the severity of the occurrence could be catastrophic. d The SAG assesses existing defences driver training programme, use of escorts for construction vehicles, signs, markings and lighting. e Using the safety risk assessment matrix Chapter 5, Figure 5-4 and the safety risk tolerability matrix Chapter 5, Figure 5-5, the SAG assesses the safety risk index as 3A unacceptable under the existing circumstances. f The SAG concludes that the safety risk of the consequences of the hazard generated by movement of construction vehicles to the construction site is, under the prevailing conditions, unacceptable and that controlmitigation is necessary.5. SAFETY RISK CONTROLMITIGATION PROCESS
The fourth and last task of the SAG is to mitigate the safety risk of the consequences of the hazards, as follows: a The SAG decides to control the safety risk of the consequences of the hazard by using an existing aerodrome perimeter road to gain access to the construction site. All construction vehicles will be escorted on the perimeter road. b With this mitigation, the SAG reassesses the probability of construction vehicles crossing the primary runway without an escort, or that aircraft could conflict with a crossing vehicle, as being extremely improbable. Nevertheless, should an aircraftconstruction vehicle conflict occur, the severity of such an occurrence would still be catastrophic. Chapter 5. Safety Risks Appendix 1 5-APP 1-3 c Use of the perimeter road as mitigation may delay construction vehicles due to the added driving distance, but in the assessment of the SAG: 1 While it does not entirely remove the possibility of the consequences of the hazard from occurring construction vehicles may still cross the primary runway due to a number or combination of circumstances, it nevertheless brings the safety risks of the consequences construction vehicle deviating from prescribed procedures and crossing the primary runway without an escort; and aircraft in conflict with a crossing vehicle to a level as low as reasonably practicable ALARP. d Using the safety risk assessment matrix Chapter 5, Figure 5-4 and the safety risk tolerability matrix Chapter 5, Figure 5-5, the SAG reassesses the safety risk index as 1A acceptable; e The SAG documents this decision process for future follow-up with the Anycity International Airport safety manager.6. HAZARD IDENTIFICATION AND SAFETY RISK MANAGEMENT LOG
Parts
» DOC 9859 FULL EN DOC 9859 FULL EN
» GENERAL OBJECTIVES CONCEPT CONTENTS .1
» OBJECTIVE AND CONTENTS .1 THE CONCEPT OF SAFETY .1
» THE EVOLUTION OF SAFETY THINKING .1
» ACCIDENT CAUSATION — THE REASON MODEL .1
» THE ORGANIZATIONAL ACCIDENT .1 BASIC SAFETY CONCEPTS
» PEOPLE, CONTEXT AND SAFETY — THE SHEL MODEL .1
» ERRORS AND VIOLATIONS Operational errors
» ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE .1 BASIC SAFETY CONCEPTS
» SAFETY INVESTIGATION .1 BASIC SAFETY CONCEPTS
» OBJECTIVE AND CONTENTS .1 THE SAFETY STEREOTYPE .1
» THE MANAGEMENT DILEMMA .1 INTRODUCTION TO SAFETY MANAGEMENT
» THE NEED FOR SAFETY MANAGEMENT .1
» STRATEGIES FOR SAFETY MANAGEMENT .1
» THE IMPERATIVE OF CHANGE .1 SAFETY MANAGEMENT — EIGHT BUILDING BLOCKS .1
» FOUR RESPONSIBILITIES FOR MANAGING SAFETY .1
» OBJECTIVE AND CONTENTS HAZARDS AND CONSEQUENCES .1
» FIRST FUNDAMENTAL — UNDERSTANDING HAZARDS .1
» SECOND FUNDAMENTAL — HAZARD IDENTIFICATION .1
» THIRD FUNDAMENTAL — HAZARD ANALYSIS .1
» GENERAL INFORMATION SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS
» UNDERSTANDING DATABASES FOURTH FUNDAMENTAL — DOCUMENTATION OF HAZARDS .1
» DATABASE LIMITATIONS DATABASE INTEGRITY
» SAFETY DATABASE CAPABILITIES DATABASE SELECTION CONSIDERATIONS
» OBJECTIVE AND CONTENTS DEFINITION OF SAFETY RISK .1
» FIRST FUNDAMENTAL — SAFETY RISK MANAGEMENT .1
» SECOND FUNDAMENTAL — SAFETY RISK PROBABILITY .1
» THIRD FUNDAMENTAL — SAFETY RISK SEVERITY .1
» FOURTH FUNDAMENTAL — SAFETY RISK TOLERABILITY .1
» FIFTH FUNDAMENTAL — SAFETY RISK CONTROLMITIGATION .1
» SCENARIO SYSTEM DESCRIPTION HAZARD IDENTIFICATION PROCESS
» SAFETY RISK ASSESSMENT PROCESS SAFETY RISK CONTROLMITIGATION PROCESS
» HAZARD IDENTIFICATION AND SAFETY RISK MANAGEMENT LOG
» SCENARIO SYSTEM DESCRIPTION THE FIVE FUNDAMENTALS OF SAFETY RISK MANAGEMENT — SUMMARY .1
» HAZARD IDENTIFICATION PROCESS SAFETY RISK ASSESSMENT PROCESS
» SAFETY RISK CONTROLMITIGATION PROCESS
» OBJECTIVE AND CONTENTS ICAO SAFETY MANAGEMENT SARPS — GENERAL .1
» STATE SAFETY PROGRAMME SSP .1
» ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF SAFETY ALoS
» SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM SMS .1
» SMS SAFETY PERFORMANCE .1 ICAO SAFETY MANAGEMENT SARPs
» MANAGEMENT ACCOUNTABILITY .1 ICAO SAFETY MANAGEMENT SARPs
» RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN AN SSP AND AN SMS .1
» COMPLIANCE AND PERFORMANCE .1 ICAO SAFETY MANAGEMENT SARPs
» OBJECTIVE AND CONTENTS INTRODUCTORY CONCEPTS .1
» SMS FEATURES .1 INTRODUCTION TO SAFETY
» SYSTEM DESCRIPTION .1 INTRODUCTION TO SAFETY
» GAP ANALYSIS .1 INTRODUCTION TO SAFETY
» SMS AND QMS .1 INTRODUCTION TO SAFETY
» SSPSMS AND THE ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION PROCESS .1 INTEGRATION OF MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS .1
» INTRODUCTION SYSTEM DESCRIPTION OF AN AERODROME
» GAP ANALYSIS ICAO SMS FRAMEWORK SMS GAP ANALYSIS FOR SERVICE PROVIDERS
» OBJECTIVE AND CONTENTS THE COMPONENTS AND ELEMENTS OF AN SMS .1
» THE ICAO SMS FRAMEWORK MANAGEMENT COMMITMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY .1
» SAFETY ACCOUNTABILITIES .1 SMS PLANNING
» APPOINTMENT OF KEY SAFETY PERSONNEL .1
» COORDINATION OF EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLANNING .1 SMS DOCUMENTATION .1
» OVERALL PURPOSE KEY ROLES Safety advocate RESPONSIBILITIES
» NATURE AND SCOPE QUALIFICATIONS AUTHORITY
» OBJECTIVE AND CONTENTS SAFETY RISK MANAGEMENT — GENERAL .1
» HAZARD IDENTIFICATION .1 SMS OPERATION
» RISK ASSESSMENT AND MITIGATION .1
» SAFETY ASSURANCE — GENERAL .1 SMS OPERATION
» SAFETY PERFORMANCE MONITORING AND MEASUREMENT .1
» PROTECTION OF SOURCES OF SAFETY INFORMATION .1
» CONTINUOUS IMPROVEMENT OF THE SMS .1
» THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SAFETY RISK MANAGEMENT SRM AND SAFETY ASSURANCE SA
» SAFETY PROMOTION — TRAINING AND EDUCATION .1
» OBJECTIVE AND CONTENTS WHY ADOPT A PHASED APPROACH TO SMS IMPLEMENTATION .1
» PHASE I — PLANNING SMS IMPLEMENTATION .1
» PHASE II — REACTIVE SAFETY MANAGEMENT PROCESSES .1
» REFERENCES DEFINITIONS GENERAL SAFETY POLICY AND OBJECTIVES 1 General requirements
» QUALITY POLICY IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SMS
» PHASE I — PLANNING SMS IMPLEMENTATION
» PHASE II — REACTIVE SAFETY MANAGEMENT PROCESSES
» PHASE III — PROACTIVE AND PREDICTIVE SAFETY MANAGEMENT PROCESSES
» PHASE IV — OPERATIONAL SAFETY ASSURANCE
» OBJECTIVES AND CONTENTS THE COMPONENTS AND ELEMENTS OF AN SSP .1
» THE ICAO SSP FRAMEWORK SSP DEVELOPMENT .1
» GAP ANALYSIS ICAO SSP FRAMEWORK
» STATE SAFETY PROGRAMME SSP GAP ANALYSIS
» GENERAL REMEDIAL MEASURES External training, communication and dissemination of safety information
» ENFORCEMENT PROCEDURES PROPORTIONALITY OF RESPONSES NATURAL JUSTICE AND ACCOUNTABILITY EXCEPTIONS
» GENERAL APPLICABILITY External training, communication and dissemination of safety information
» PROCEDURES External training, communication and dissemination of safety information
» State safety responsibilities and accountabilities
» INTRODUCTION External training, communication and dissemination of safety information
» ICAO REQUIREMENTS ERP CONTENTS
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