SAFETY RISK CONTROLMITIGATION PROCESS

5-APP 2-4 Safety Management Manual SMM 4.3 Based on these existing defences, the SAG, using the safety risk assessment matrix Chapter 5, Figure 5-4 and the safety risk tolerability matrix Chapter 5, Figure 5-5, assesses the safety risks of the consequences of converging flight paths for runways 26R-08L and 12 as follows: a Wake turbulence encounter: probability remote, severity major. Safety risk tolerability: 3C acceptable based on risk mitigation. b Evasive action to avoid other traffic: probability remote, severity major. Safety risk tolerability: 3C acceptable based on risk mitigation. c Loss of control following manoeuvre to avoid other traffic: probability remote, severity hazardous. Safety risk tolerability: 3B acceptable based on risk mitigation. d Runway overrun following an unstable approach: probability remote, severity hazardous. Safety risk tolerability: 3B acceptable based on risk mitigation. e Mid-air collision at the departure end of runway 26R between aircraft approaching runway 12 and aircraft approaching runway 08L or departing runway 26R: probability improbable, severity catastrophic. Safety risk tolerability: 2A acceptable based on risk mitigation.

5. SAFETY RISK CONTROLMITIGATION PROCESS

5.1 The SAG recognizes that prohibiting operations on converging runways would effectively eliminate the worst possible consequence of converging flight paths for runways 26R-08L and 12: a mid-air collision at the departure end of runway 26R. However, safety management action must be efficient, not just effective. Prohibiting the use of converging runways would be inefficient. 5.2 The SAG concludes that are no safety concerns at XYZ International Airport regarding converging runway operations for runways 26R and 12 that require urgent, immediate action. Existing defences for the safety risks of the consequences of converging flight paths for runways 26R-08L and 12 at XYZ International Airport, including the worst- case scenario a mid-air collision are effective controls to keep safety risks ALARP as low as reasonably practicable. Nevertheless, recommendations for reinforcing the safety of operations at XYZ International Airport are made. While not of an urgent nature, implementation of these recommendations would provide a greater margin of safety. 5.3 The recommendations include: a Initiate a continuing campaign to encourage flight crews to pass pilot reports PIREPs to air traffic control units when weather conditions differ from those forecast or expected. b Study the appropriateness and effectiveness of the implementation of a converging runway display aid CRDA as an essential safety and capacity enhancement device at XYZ International Airport. c If CRDA is not implemented at XYZ International Airport, establish separation criteria and procedures for adjusting the landing aircraft spacing such that an aircraft that may reject a landing on runway 26R has protected airspace from aircraft that may be approaching runway 12. d Depict a range of approach speed constraints on arrival type charts; and modify air traffic controller communication procedures so traffic on runway 08L-26R is kept advised of intersecting traffic on runway 12. Chapter 5. Safety Risks Appendix 2 5-APP 2-5 e Install an emergency frequency override so that one controller can switch to another controller’s frequency to issue emergency instructions. 5.4 The SAG documents this decision process for future follow-up with the air traffic service safety manager.

6. HAZARD IDENTIFICATION AND SAFETY RISK MANAGEMENT LOG