SCENARIO SYSTEM DESCRIPTION THE FIVE FUNDAMENTALS OF SAFETY RISK MANAGEMENT — SUMMARY .1
1. SCENARIO
1.1 An air traffic service provider has received feedback from airport users expressing safety concerns regarding converging runway operations at XYZ International Airport. XYZ International Airport consists of three runways, 08L26R, 08R26L, and 1230 see Figure 5-App 2-1. Converging runway operations are occasionally conducted on runways 26R and 12. The air traffic service provider has requested its safety manager to re-evaluate the safety of the converging runway operations procedures for runways 26R and 12 at XYZ International Airport in light of the concerns expressed by users. 1.2 The Safety Action Group SAG is requested to assist the ATS service provider’s safety manager in re- evaluating the safety of converging runway operations procedures at XYZ International Airport. The SAG includes representatives from the ATS service provider, airlines operating into XYZ International Airport and their airline pilot’s association, airport representatives as well as representatives from the State’s oversight authority. The generic safety concern is the converging flight paths for aircraft departing and arriving into XYZ International Airport. The SAG applies a safety risk management process to re-evaluate the safety of the converging runway operations. Figure 5-App 2-1. XYZ International Airport 5-APP 2-2 Safety Management Manual SMM2. SYSTEM DESCRIPTION
One of the first tasks of the SAG is to describe the system in which operations are being carried out, as follows: a XYZ International Airport has three main runways and a small secondary runway service. b The airport has about 325 000 movements per year. c Runway 26L-08R is 11 000 feet long and is used for west and east departures and west and east arrivals. Runway 12-30 is 7300 feet long. Runway 12 is used mostly for arrivals. Runway 30 is used sometimes for departures and is seldom used for arrivals. Runway 12 physically crosses runways 08R-26L and is considered to be an “intersecting” runway. Runway 08L-26R is 9 940 feet long and is used primarily for arriving traffic and occasionally for departing traffic. Runway 08L is used only for arrivals because departure procedures have not yet been established. d Markings, signage and lighting on the airport meet the standards of both the oversight authorities and ICAO. e There are two control frequencies used for tower control. One frequency covers the south runway 26L-08R and the west runway 12-30. The second frequency covers the north runway 26R-08L. f The south runways 26L-08R have converging runway approaches published to avoid conflict with traffic on runway 12. There are no converging approaches published for the north runways 26R-08L, as technically, they are not considered intersecting since they do not physically intersect. While Runway 12 has an ILS approach, it is generally a VFR runway with the majority of landings made from visual approaches. g Runway 12 traffic information is currently passed to traffic on runway 08R-26L because the runways are considered intersecting. Traffic on both runways is controlled on the same frequency. However, because runways 08L-26R and 12 do not physically intersect, traffic on these runways is controlled on different frequencies. As a result, traffic information is not shared. h While IFR traffic separation is provided to IFR traffic on runway 26R, airport control service is provided to VFR and visual approaches to aircraft on runway 12. However, air traffic controllers will act immediately to resolve any known traffic conflicts. Standard procedure is to give traffic on runways 26R-08L priority and divert traffic on runway 12.3. HAZARD IDENTIFICATION PROCESS
Parts
» DOC 9859 FULL EN DOC 9859 FULL EN
» GENERAL OBJECTIVES CONCEPT CONTENTS .1
» OBJECTIVE AND CONTENTS .1 THE CONCEPT OF SAFETY .1
» THE EVOLUTION OF SAFETY THINKING .1
» ACCIDENT CAUSATION — THE REASON MODEL .1
» THE ORGANIZATIONAL ACCIDENT .1 BASIC SAFETY CONCEPTS
» PEOPLE, CONTEXT AND SAFETY — THE SHEL MODEL .1
» ERRORS AND VIOLATIONS Operational errors
» ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE .1 BASIC SAFETY CONCEPTS
» SAFETY INVESTIGATION .1 BASIC SAFETY CONCEPTS
» OBJECTIVE AND CONTENTS .1 THE SAFETY STEREOTYPE .1
» THE MANAGEMENT DILEMMA .1 INTRODUCTION TO SAFETY MANAGEMENT
» THE NEED FOR SAFETY MANAGEMENT .1
» STRATEGIES FOR SAFETY MANAGEMENT .1
» THE IMPERATIVE OF CHANGE .1 SAFETY MANAGEMENT — EIGHT BUILDING BLOCKS .1
» FOUR RESPONSIBILITIES FOR MANAGING SAFETY .1
» OBJECTIVE AND CONTENTS HAZARDS AND CONSEQUENCES .1
» FIRST FUNDAMENTAL — UNDERSTANDING HAZARDS .1
» SECOND FUNDAMENTAL — HAZARD IDENTIFICATION .1
» THIRD FUNDAMENTAL — HAZARD ANALYSIS .1
» GENERAL INFORMATION SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS
» UNDERSTANDING DATABASES FOURTH FUNDAMENTAL — DOCUMENTATION OF HAZARDS .1
» DATABASE LIMITATIONS DATABASE INTEGRITY
» SAFETY DATABASE CAPABILITIES DATABASE SELECTION CONSIDERATIONS
» OBJECTIVE AND CONTENTS DEFINITION OF SAFETY RISK .1
» FIRST FUNDAMENTAL — SAFETY RISK MANAGEMENT .1
» SECOND FUNDAMENTAL — SAFETY RISK PROBABILITY .1
» THIRD FUNDAMENTAL — SAFETY RISK SEVERITY .1
» FOURTH FUNDAMENTAL — SAFETY RISK TOLERABILITY .1
» FIFTH FUNDAMENTAL — SAFETY RISK CONTROLMITIGATION .1
» SCENARIO SYSTEM DESCRIPTION HAZARD IDENTIFICATION PROCESS
» SAFETY RISK ASSESSMENT PROCESS SAFETY RISK CONTROLMITIGATION PROCESS
» HAZARD IDENTIFICATION AND SAFETY RISK MANAGEMENT LOG
» SCENARIO SYSTEM DESCRIPTION THE FIVE FUNDAMENTALS OF SAFETY RISK MANAGEMENT — SUMMARY .1
» HAZARD IDENTIFICATION PROCESS SAFETY RISK ASSESSMENT PROCESS
» SAFETY RISK CONTROLMITIGATION PROCESS
» OBJECTIVE AND CONTENTS ICAO SAFETY MANAGEMENT SARPS — GENERAL .1
» STATE SAFETY PROGRAMME SSP .1
» ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF SAFETY ALoS
» SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM SMS .1
» SMS SAFETY PERFORMANCE .1 ICAO SAFETY MANAGEMENT SARPs
» MANAGEMENT ACCOUNTABILITY .1 ICAO SAFETY MANAGEMENT SARPs
» RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN AN SSP AND AN SMS .1
» COMPLIANCE AND PERFORMANCE .1 ICAO SAFETY MANAGEMENT SARPs
» OBJECTIVE AND CONTENTS INTRODUCTORY CONCEPTS .1
» SMS FEATURES .1 INTRODUCTION TO SAFETY
» SYSTEM DESCRIPTION .1 INTRODUCTION TO SAFETY
» GAP ANALYSIS .1 INTRODUCTION TO SAFETY
» SMS AND QMS .1 INTRODUCTION TO SAFETY
» SSPSMS AND THE ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION PROCESS .1 INTEGRATION OF MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS .1
» INTRODUCTION SYSTEM DESCRIPTION OF AN AERODROME
» GAP ANALYSIS ICAO SMS FRAMEWORK SMS GAP ANALYSIS FOR SERVICE PROVIDERS
» OBJECTIVE AND CONTENTS THE COMPONENTS AND ELEMENTS OF AN SMS .1
» THE ICAO SMS FRAMEWORK MANAGEMENT COMMITMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY .1
» SAFETY ACCOUNTABILITIES .1 SMS PLANNING
» APPOINTMENT OF KEY SAFETY PERSONNEL .1
» COORDINATION OF EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLANNING .1 SMS DOCUMENTATION .1
» OVERALL PURPOSE KEY ROLES Safety advocate RESPONSIBILITIES
» NATURE AND SCOPE QUALIFICATIONS AUTHORITY
» OBJECTIVE AND CONTENTS SAFETY RISK MANAGEMENT — GENERAL .1
» HAZARD IDENTIFICATION .1 SMS OPERATION
» RISK ASSESSMENT AND MITIGATION .1
» SAFETY ASSURANCE — GENERAL .1 SMS OPERATION
» SAFETY PERFORMANCE MONITORING AND MEASUREMENT .1
» PROTECTION OF SOURCES OF SAFETY INFORMATION .1
» CONTINUOUS IMPROVEMENT OF THE SMS .1
» THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SAFETY RISK MANAGEMENT SRM AND SAFETY ASSURANCE SA
» SAFETY PROMOTION — TRAINING AND EDUCATION .1
» OBJECTIVE AND CONTENTS WHY ADOPT A PHASED APPROACH TO SMS IMPLEMENTATION .1
» PHASE I — PLANNING SMS IMPLEMENTATION .1
» PHASE II — REACTIVE SAFETY MANAGEMENT PROCESSES .1
» REFERENCES DEFINITIONS GENERAL SAFETY POLICY AND OBJECTIVES 1 General requirements
» QUALITY POLICY IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SMS
» PHASE I — PLANNING SMS IMPLEMENTATION
» PHASE II — REACTIVE SAFETY MANAGEMENT PROCESSES
» PHASE III — PROACTIVE AND PREDICTIVE SAFETY MANAGEMENT PROCESSES
» PHASE IV — OPERATIONAL SAFETY ASSURANCE
» OBJECTIVES AND CONTENTS THE COMPONENTS AND ELEMENTS OF AN SSP .1
» THE ICAO SSP FRAMEWORK SSP DEVELOPMENT .1
» GAP ANALYSIS ICAO SSP FRAMEWORK
» STATE SAFETY PROGRAMME SSP GAP ANALYSIS
» GENERAL REMEDIAL MEASURES External training, communication and dissemination of safety information
» ENFORCEMENT PROCEDURES PROPORTIONALITY OF RESPONSES NATURAL JUSTICE AND ACCOUNTABILITY EXCEPTIONS
» GENERAL APPLICABILITY External training, communication and dissemination of safety information
» PROCEDURES External training, communication and dissemination of safety information
» State safety responsibilities and accountabilities
» INTRODUCTION External training, communication and dissemination of safety information
» ICAO REQUIREMENTS ERP CONTENTS
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