THE IMPERATIVE OF CHANGE .1 SAFETY MANAGEMENT — EIGHT BUILDING BLOCKS .1

Chapter 3. Introduction to Safety Management 3-13 3.6 THE IMPERATIVE OF CHANGE 3.6.1 As global aviation activity and complexity continue to grow, deeply changed operational contexts with their new challenges make traditional methods of managing safety to an acceptable level less effective and efficient. Different, evolved methods of understanding and managing safety are necessary. There is a transition currently taking place in international civil aviation, which reflects a significant shift from the paradigm espoused by the safety endeavours of the past. 3.6.2 As already discussed, the traditional safety paradigm relied on the accidentserious incident investigation process as its main safety intervention and method, and it was built upon three basic assumptions: a The aviation system performs most of the time as per design specifications i.e. baseline performance; b Regulatory compliance guarantees system baseline performance and therefore ensures safety compliance-based; and c Because regulatory compliance guarantees system baseline performance, minor, largely inconsequential deviations during routine operations i.e. processes do not matter, only major deviations leading to bad consequences i.e. outcomes matter outcome oriented. 3.6.3 A contrasting, contemporary safety paradigm is evolving, which is the one favoured by this manual. It is based on the notion of managing safety through process control, beyond the investigation of occurrences, and it builds upon three basic assumptions also: a The aviation system does not perform most of the time as per design specifications i.e. operational performance leads to the practical drift; b Rather than relying on regulatory compliance exclusively, real-time performance of the system is constantly monitored performance-based; and c Minor, inconsequential deviations during routine operations are constantly tracked and analysed process oriented. 3.7 SAFETY MANAGEMENT — EIGHT BUILDING BLOCKS 3.7.1 Eight basic and generic building blocks underlie the process of managing safety, as follows. a Senior management’s commitment to the management of safety. Managing safety, just like any other management activity, requires allocation of resources. This allocation of resources is, in all organizations, a function of senior management, hence the need for senior management’s commitment to the management of safety. In plain language: no money, no safety. b Effective safety reporting. It is a known aphorism that “one cannot manage what one cannot measure”. In order to manage safety, organizations need to acquire safety data on hazards that allow for measurement to take place. Most of such data will be acquired through voluntary and self-reporting by operational personnel. It is essential therefore for organizations to develop working environments where effective safety reporting by operational personnel takes place. c Continuous monitoring through systems that collect safety data on hazards during normal operations. Safety data collection is just the first step. Beyond collection, organizations must analyse 3-14 Safety Management Manual SMM and extract safety information and safety intelligence from data, because data that are collected and relegated to a drawer are as good as no data at all. Furthermore, it is essential to share the safety information and intelligence gleaned with those who operate the system daily for they are the ones who are in constant contact with the hazards, the consequences of which effective safety reporting aims to mitigate. d Investigation of safety occurrences with the objective of identifying systemic safety deficiencies rather than assigning blame. It is not as important to identify “who did it” as it is to learn “why it happened”. System resilience can be much more effectively reinforced by removing systemic deficiencies than by removing supposedly “unfit” individuals. e Sharing safety lessons learned and best practices through the active exchange of safety information. Another well-known aphorism eloquently illustrates the need for data sharing and exchange of safety information: “learn from the mistakes of others, you are not going to live long enough to make them all yourself”. The aviation industry’s excellent tradition of sharing safety data must be maintained and, if at all possible, reinforced. f Integration of safety training for operational personnel. Seldom do training curricula for operational personnel include dedicated safety training. There is an assumption that since “safety is everybody’s responsibility”, operational personnel are safety experts in their own right. The fallacy of this line of reasoning is evident and is discussed in Chapter 7. There is an urgent need to include dedicated training addressing the basics of safety management at all levels of operational personnel training. g Effective implementation of standard operating procedures SOPs, including the use of checklists and briefings. SOPs, checklists and briefings, whether on a flight deck, in an air traffic control room, in a maintenance shop or an aerodrome apron, are amongst the most effective safety devices operational personnel have to discharge their daily responsibilities. They are a powerful mandate from the organization regarding how senior management wants operations to be conducted. The safety value of realistic, properly written and constantly adhered to SOPs, checklists and briefings should never be underestimated. h Continuous improvement of the overall level of safety. Managing safety is not a one-day affair. It is an ongoing activity that can be successful only through continuous improvement. 3.7.2 The result of implementing these eight building blocks will be an organizational culture that fosters safe practices, encourages effective safety communication, and actively manages safety. 3.8 FOUR RESPONSIBILITIES FOR MANAGING SAFETY 3.8.1