5-APP 2-2 Safety Management Manual SMM
2. SYSTEM DESCRIPTION
One of the first tasks of the SAG is to describe the system in which operations are being carried out, as follows: a XYZ International Airport has three main runways and a small secondary runway service.
b The airport has about 325 000 movements per year. c Runway 26L-08R is 11 000 feet long and is used for west and east departures and west and east
arrivals. Runway 12-30 is 7300 feet long. Runway 12 is used mostly for arrivals. Runway 30 is used sometimes for departures and is seldom used for arrivals. Runway 12 physically crosses runways
08R-26L and is considered to be an “intersecting” runway. Runway 08L-26R is 9 940 feet long and is used primarily for arriving traffic and occasionally for departing traffic. Runway 08L is used only for
arrivals because departure procedures have not yet been established.
d Markings, signage and lighting on the airport meet the standards of both the oversight authorities and ICAO.
e There are two control frequencies used for tower control. One frequency covers the south runway 26L-08R and the west runway 12-30. The second frequency covers the north runway 26R-08L.
f The south runways 26L-08R have converging runway approaches published to avoid conflict with
traffic on runway 12. There are no converging approaches published for the north runways 26R-08L, as technically, they are not considered intersecting since they do not physically intersect. While
Runway 12 has an ILS approach, it is generally a VFR runway with the majority of landings made from visual approaches.
g Runway 12 traffic information is currently passed to traffic on runway 08R-26L because the runways are considered intersecting. Traffic on both runways is controlled on the same frequency. However,
because runways 08L-26R and 12 do not physically intersect, traffic on these runways is controlled on different frequencies. As a result, traffic information is not shared.
h While IFR traffic separation is provided to IFR traffic on runway 26R, airport control service is provided to VFR and visual approaches to aircraft on runway 12. However, air traffic controllers will act
immediately to resolve any known traffic conflicts. Standard procedure is to give traffic on runways 26R-08L priority and divert traffic on runway 12.
3. HAZARD IDENTIFICATION PROCESS
The second task of the SAG is to identify the hazards and their consequences that will affect aerodrome operations, as follows:
a State the generic hazard 1 Converging flight paths on runways 26R-08L and 12, irrespective of aircraft on approach or
departure. b State the specific components of the hazard
1 Aircraft rejects landing on runway 26R against traffic landing on runway 12.
Chapter 5. Safety Risks Appendix 2
5-APP 2-3 2 Aircraft takes off on runway 26R against traffic landing on runway 12.
3 Aircraft approaches runway 08L against traffic landing on runway 12. 4 An aircraft conducts a side step from an approach on runway 08L to runway 08R or runway 08R
to runway 08L against traffic landing on runway 12. c Assess the consequences of the specific components of the generic hazard
1 Wake turbulence encounter. 2 Evasive action to avoid other traffic.
3 Loss of control following manoeuvre to avoid other traffic. 4 Runway overrun following an unstable approach.
5 Mid-air collision at the departure end of runway 26R between aircraft approaching runway 12 and aircraft approaching runway 08L or departing runway 26R worst-case consequence.
4. SAFETY RISK ASSESSMENT PROCESS
4.1 The SAG identifies the defences supporting converging runway operations for runways 26R-08L and 12 at
XYZ International Airport. Such defences take the form of technology, programmes and procedures aimed at reducing the safety risks of the consequences of converging flight paths for runways 26R-08L and 12.
4.2 The defences include:
a controller
coordination procedures;
b increased spacing to protect airspace for missed approaches during adverse weather; c restrictions on arrivals on runway 12 when runway 26R is used for departures;
d aerodrome surface detection equipment ASDE; e runway incursion prevention programme and wildlife control programme;
f airside driver initial and recurrent training and testing;
g continual monitoring and statistical follow-up of crosswind limits; h availability and use of approach radar;
i standards for runway occupancy time;
j separate tower frequencies; and
k markings
and signage.
5-APP 2-4 Safety Management Manual SMM
4.3 Based on these existing defences, the SAG, using the safety risk assessment matrix Chapter 5,
Figure 5-4 and the safety risk tolerability matrix Chapter 5, Figure 5-5, assesses the safety risks of the consequences of converging flight paths for runways 26R-08L and 12 as follows:
a Wake turbulence encounter: probability remote, severity major. Safety risk tolerability: 3C acceptable based on risk mitigation.
b Evasive action to avoid other traffic: probability remote, severity major. Safety risk tolerability: 3C acceptable based on risk mitigation.
c Loss of control following manoeuvre to avoid other traffic: probability remote, severity hazardous. Safety risk tolerability: 3B acceptable based on risk mitigation.
d Runway overrun following an unstable approach: probability remote, severity hazardous. Safety risk tolerability: 3B acceptable based on risk mitigation.
e Mid-air collision at the departure end of runway 26R between aircraft approaching runway 12 and aircraft approaching runway 08L or departing runway 26R: probability improbable, severity catastrophic. Safety
risk tolerability: 2A acceptable based on risk mitigation.
5. SAFETY RISK CONTROLMITIGATION PROCESS
Kategori