THE ICAO SSP FRAMEWORK SSP DEVELOPMENT .1

11-2 Safety Management Manual SMM 11.2.4 The four components discussed in 11.2.2 constitute the basic building blocks of an SSP, in that they represent the four overarching safety management processes that underlie the actual management system SSP. Each component is subdivided into elements, which encompass the specific sub-processes, specific activities or specific tools that the actual State management system must engage or utilize in order to conduct the management of safety in a manner that combines prescriptive and performance-based approaches and supports the implementation of SMS by service providers. 11.2.5 The State safety policy and objectives component is composed of four elements: a State safety legislative framework; b State safety responsibilities and accountabilities; c accident and incident investigation; and d enforcement policy. 11.2.6 The State safety risk management component is composed of two elements: a safety requirements for the service provider’s SMS; b agreement on the service provider’s safety performance. 11.2.7 The State safety assurance component is composed of three elements: a safety oversight; b safety data collection, analysis and exchange; and c safety-data-driven targeting of oversight of areas of greater concern or need. 11.2.8 The State safety promotion component is composed of two elements: a internal training, communication and dissemination of safety information; and b external training, communication and dissemination of safety information. Note.— Within the context of the SSP, the term “service provider” refers to any organization providing aviation services. The term includes approved training organizations that are exposed to safety risks during the provision of their services, aircraft operators, approved maintenance organizations, organizations responsible for type design andor manufacture of aircraft, air traffic service providers and certified aerodromes, as applicable.

11.3 THE ICAO SSP FRAMEWORK

Note.— Detailed information on the ICAO SSP framework is contained in Appendix 1 to this chapter. 11.3.1 The four components, combined with the elements discussed in Section 11.2, comprise the ICAO SSP framework, which is intended as a principled guide for the development, implementation and maintenance of an SSP, as follows: Chapter 11. State Safety Programme SSP 11-3 1. State safety policy and objectives 1.1 State safety legislative framework 1.2 State safety responsibilities and accountabilities 1.3 Accident and incident investigation 1.4 Enforcement policy 2. State safety risk management 2.1 Safety requirements for the service provider’s SMS 2.2 Agreement on the service provider’s safety performance 3. State safety assurance 3.1 Safety oversight 3.2 Safety data collection, analysis and exchange 3.3 Safety-data-driven targeting of oversight of areas of greater concern or need 4. State safety promotion 4.1 Internal training, communication and dissemination of safety information 4.2 External training, communication and dissemination of safety information. 11.3.2 The SSP framework introduced in this chapter, and the safety management system SMS framework specified in Chapter 8, must be viewed as complementary, yet distinct, frameworks. 11.4 SSP DEVELOPMENT 11.4.1 It is proposed that States develop their SSP around the four components and eleven elements of the ICAO SSP framework. 11.4.2 State safety policy and objectives. A description of how the State will oversee the management of safety in the aviation activities of the State. This includes a definition of the requirements, responsibilities and accountabilities of the different State organizations regarding the SSP, as well as of the acceptable level of safety ALoS to be achieved by the SSP. 11.4.3 The three SSP components discussed in the following paragraphs can be effectively implemented only as part of an overall framework of accountabilities, responsibilities and liabilities. This overall framework becomes a “protective umbrella”, under which safety risk management, safety assurance and safety promotion by the State take place. The State safety policy and objectives component provides management and personnel explicit policies, procedures, management controls, documentation and corrective action processes that keep the safety management efforts of the State’s civil aviation authority on track. This component is also essential in generating confidence in the State’s ability to provide safety leadership in an increasingly complex and constantly changing air transportation system. A central activity under this component is the development of a State safety policy. Appendix 2 to this chapter includes guidance on the development of a State’s safety policy statement. 11.4.4 State safety risk management. A description of how the State will identify hazards and assess the safety risks of the consequences of hazards in the State’s aviation operations. This includes the establishment of controls rules andor regulations which govern how the State will manage safety, the rules andor regulations which govern how the service provider’s SMS operates, as well as agreement on the safety performance of the service provider’s SMS. 11-4 Safety Management Manual SMM 11.4.5 Safety management principles affect most activities of a State’s civil aviation authority, starting with rulemaking and policy development. Rather than pursuing only the causes of the most recent accident, SSP rulemaking is based on comprehensive analyses of the State’s aviation system. Regulations are based on identified hazards and analysis of the safety risks of the consequences of hazards. The regulations themselves provide frameworks for risk control, when integrated into the service provider’s SMS. 11.4.6 State safety assurance. A description of how the State will ensure that safety management within the State and the operation of the service provider’s SMS follow established controls regulatory compliance, how realistic implementation of the SSP ALoS will be achieved, though a combination of safety measurement by the State and safety performance measurement by service providers, and how the actual performance of the service provider’s SMS safety performance will be demonstrated safety performance measurement. This includes the establishment of the necessary arrangements oversight, inspections, audits, safety data analysis and so forth necessary to verify compliance and measure performance. 11.4.7 SSP oversight activities. SSP oversight activities, beyond rulemaking, are supported by analysis, and the resource allocation priorities of the State’s civil aviation authority are based on the safety risks of the consequences of the hazards identified through analysis. Certification and continuing operational safety decisions are based on assessments of performance of the service provider’s processes, products andor services. Flowing forward from the regulations that address defined hazards, compliance decisions are based on whether a service provider’s SMS addresses the hazard in regulations within the service provider’s specific operational environment. The State safety assurance processes are used to obtain confidence in the service provider’s safety management capability as demonstrated in assessments of its SMS. 11.4.8 State’s safety promotion. A description of the arrangements by the State to ensure that safety training, communication and dissemination of safety information take place. Under an SSP, this is a dual-track promotion; both within the State’s aviation organizations as well as among the service providers it oversees. This includes the establishment of the necessary means to provide training and communicate safety information. 11.4.9 None of the above changes the role of the State and its aviation organizations regarding the establishment of the State’s regulations and standards, or the requirement for State civil aviation personnel to possess high levels of knowledge and skills. On the contrary, it requires additional skills in areas such as safety risk analysis, system evaluation, and management system assessment, as well as in the many new technologies essential for the aviation industry to achieve its production objectives. This makes it incumbent on the State to provide for these competencies through training, recruitment and human resource management. 11.4.10 In developing the SSP, safety management principles provide a conceptual platform for parallel development of the SSP by the State and the SMS by service providers. An SSP developed from, and based upon, safety management principles bridges the gap that would otherwise inevitably develop between the internal and external safety processes within the State’s civil aviation organizations and the internal safety processes of service providers see Figure 11-1. As part of the SSP, the State promulgates SMS requirements for service providers requiring them to demonstrate their safety management capability up front, rather than waiting for accidents, incidents, or non-compliance with safety standards. This allows both the State and service providers to get ahead of safety risks. SMS requirements under the SSP also provide a structured framework allowing the State and service providers to interact more effectively in the resolution of safety concerns. In this way the shared, interactive nature of the SSP and the SMS comes to fruition. 11.5 SSP IMPLEMENTATION 11.5.1