112 4. Code Model Linguistics: Patch or Abandon?
Kuhn is not suggesting that science is a practice in subjectivity, but rather, that it involves intersubjectivity. This is, of course, in contrast to some who would argue that
science is or can be objective. Obviously, Kuhn has joined an age-old debate. Rudolf Flesch anecdotally highlights
the crux of that debate:
There is a little book on my shelves that contains a set of rules for thinking. Rule Number One reads: “Define the primary facts in connection with your observation, and separate these
facts from any opinions or impressions.” An excellent rule—except for one little thing: it can’t be done.
Flesch 1951 :26
Kuhn suggests that the perceptions of the individual cannot be objective in any absolute sense, for no observations exist independently of opinion or impression. But his
position should be seen as contrasting with the historically common position held by subjectivists. Whereas subjectivists would argue that each perception is individually
derived, and therefore subjective, Kuhn emphasizes that perception is not purely indi- vidual, rather, perception is largely conditioned through interaction with the group. For
those working within the group, observations may appear to be objective. This is because presuppositions driving those observations are largely shared, and because of the absence
of alternative presuppositions. However, observations gathered by one paradigm commu- nity commonly diverge from those gathered by another. This is, of course, a funda-
mental issue in Kuhn’s position on incommensurability, to be discussed in section
4.1.8 .
Without the notion of a paradigm or something of that sort, one might be required to choose between the poles of objectivity and subjectivity. If science is objective, then
there is difficulty accounting for competing theories or the fact that theories seem to have a “life span.” If science is subjective, then there is difficulty accounting for the myriad
sensations which seem to be shared by a group of scientists, shared experiences which allow them to communicate and work together.
Obviously the world of science is neither entirely objective nor entirely subjective. The concept of intersubjectivity and ‘paradigm’ serves to explain how intra-group
activity can have the appearance of objectivity, while inter-group comparisons suggest subjectivity.
63
4.1.11. The idea of progress
On a similar note, Kuhn has expressed dismay that some of his critics accuse him of destroying the notion of progress in science. To the extent that this has occurred, it
reflects the influence of Kuhn’s overzealous readers, rather than direct influence on his part. For example, in an interview with John Horgan, Kuhn relates “a painful memory of
63
In commenting on intersubjectivity, K. A. McElhanon points out that, from the insider’s position, an emic perspec- tive seems to be objective, because it is never challenged by fellow members of the group. An etic perspective, as
produced by an outside observer, highlights subjectivity by comparing the emic perspectives held by various groups 1998, personal communication. Readers should note that this use of the terms emic and etic appeals to usage
employed by K. L. Pike, rather than to that of M. Harris see Headland, Pike, and Harris 1990
.
4. Code Model Linguistics: Patch or Abandon? 113
sitting in on a seminar and trying to explain that the concepts of truth and falsity are perfectly valid, and even necessary—within a paradigm.” But the host professor was not
convinced—not even by Kuhn himself. He finally looked at Kuhn and, speaking of Structure,
said, “Look, you don’t know how radical this book is” Horgan 1996
:45. While some of his disciples may have taken such a radical position, Kuhn himself
seems to have held to the idea of progress, at least as progress continues through the work of normal science. Consider, for example, the following:
Ask now why an enterprise like normal science should progress, and begin by recalling a few of its most salient characteristics. Normally, the members of a mature scientific com-
munity work from a single paradigm or from a closely related set. Very rarely do different scientific communities investigate the same problems. In those exceptional cases the groups
hold several major paradigms in common. Viewed from within any single community, however, whether of scientists or of non-scientists, the result of successful creative work is
progress. How could it be anything else?
Kuhn 1996 :162
Kuhn argues that scientists and non-scientists do “contribute to progress, if only to that of the group that shares [a set of] premises”
Kuhn 1996 :162. This is the crux of
Kuhn’s argument regarding progress. He continues:
If we doubt, as many do, that non-scientific fields make progress, that cannot be because individual schools make none. Rather, it must be because there are always competing schools,
each of which constantly questions the very foundations of the others. … These doubts about progress arise, however, in the sciences too. Throughout the pre-paradigm period when there
is a multiplicity of competing schools, evidence of progress, except within schools is very hard to find. This is the period described … as one during which individuals practice science, but in
which the results of their enterprise do not add up to science as we know it. And again, during periods of revolution when the fundamental tenets of a field are once more at issue, doubts are
repeatedly expressed about the very possibility of continued progress if one or another of the opposing paradigms is adopted
Kuhn 1996 :162–163.
64
Kuhn later adds, “With respect to normal science, then, part of the answer to the problem of progress lies simply in the eye of the beholder”
Kuhn 1996 :163.
In its normal state, then, a scientific community is an immensely efficient instrument for solving the problems or puzzles that its paradigms define. Furthermore, the result of solving
those problems must inevitably be progress. There is no problem here. Seeing that much, however, only highlights the second main part of the problem of progress in the sciences. Let
us therefore turn to it and ask about progress through extraordinary [i.e., revolutionary] science. Why should progress also be the apparently universal concomitant of scientific
revolutions?
Kuhn 1996 :166
In reply, Kuhn argues that it need not. In the course of a paradigm shift, one of the paradigms must necessarily win out over the other. From the perspective of the
“winners,” progress has been made. As Kuhn suggests, “Will that group ever say that the result of its victory has been something less than progress? That would be rather like
admitting that they had been wrong and their opponents right”
Kuhn 1996 :166 But
64
As addressed in section 4.1.7
of the present study, in his 1970
Postscript, Kuhn revised his position regarding this “pre-paradigm” periods, suggesting instead that the contrast was better cast as a distinction between the extent of
unification around a single paradigm and a shift to problem-solving Kuhn 1996
:178–179.
114 4. Code Model Linguistics: Patch or Abandon?
Kuhn continues, pointing out that such new communities invariable rewrite the history of the discipline they now dominate:
When it repudiates a past paradigm, a scientific community simultaneously renounces, as a fit subject for professional scrutiny, most of the books and articles in which that paradigm had
been embodied. Scientific education makes use of no equivalent for the art museum or the library of classics, and the result is sometimes a drastic distortion in the scientist’s perception
of his discipline’s past. More than the practitioners of other creative fields, he comes to see it as leading in a straight line to the discipline’s present vantage. In short, he comes to see it as
progress.
No alternative is available to him while he remains in the field. Kuhn 1996
:167; italics added
Kuhn also writes, “There are losses as well as gains in scientific revolutions, and scientists tend to be peculiarly blind to the former”
Kuhn 1996 :167. In an illuminating
footnote to this sentence, Kuhn adds:
Historians of science often encounter this blindness in a particularly striking form. The group of students who come to them from the sciences is very often the most rewarding group
they teach. But it is also usually the most frustrating at the start. Because science students “know the right answers,” it is particularly difficult to make them analyze an older science in
its own terms. Kuhn 1996
:167, n. 3
In summary, Kuhn conceives of that progress as being punctuated by revolutionary periods, in which revolutionary science redefines the direction and goal of a discipline’s
notion of progress. As such, revolution “is a destructive as well as a creative act” Horgan 1996
:43. Kuhn has “denied that science is constantly approaching truth. At the end of Structure he asserted that science, like life on earth, does not evolve toward any-
thing, but only away from something,” namely, its former state of being and definition Horgan 1996
:43–44. Kuhn is simply suggesting that the interests, goals, and applications of sciences are contingent. They may remain relatively stable for a period of
time, but they are subject to change.
4.2. Critiques within linguistics
