The problem of defining ‘language’

5. Developing an Alternative 189 continues to be the object of study of virtually every approach to which the name ‘lin- guistics’ is accorded” 1994 :3665. The point to be made in this section of the present study is that Saussure’s reductionism regarding linguistic variation creates an anomaly for which code model linguistics and the Saussurean paradigm generally cannot account. That is, the code model account of communication is incompatible with the reality of variation in human speech communities. If Saussure’s speech circuit model were not integrated with Shannon’s information theoretic model, this fact might be more readily recognized. But since the two have been integrated, the anomaly is masked. As discussed, in legitimate applications of Shannon’s information theoretic model the fixed- and shared-code condition is a justified and essential requirement. Most linguists, having at best a limited grasp of Shannon’s theory, borrow from it an unwarranted sense of confidence in the code model. They do not recognize how different Shannon’s notion of the code is from the notion of code devel- oped in Saussure’s langue. The gravity of this anomaly is clear in the following quotation from Wardhaugh, wherein Wardhaugh both accepts and struggles with the langueparole distinction here reconstrued as competenceperformance. The quotation also appears in section 4.4.1.3.2 . The competence-performance distinction just mentioned is one that holds intriguing pos- sibilities for work in linguistics, but is one that has also proved to be most troublesome, particularly when much of the variety that is so interesting within language is labeled ‘performance’ and then brushed to one side by those who consider ‘competence’ to be the only valid concern of linguists. The language we use in everyday living is remarkably varied. In fact, to many investigators it appears that it is that very variety which throws up serious obstacles to all attempts to demonstrate that each language is at its core, as it were, a homogeneous entity, and that it is possible to write a complete grammar for a language which makes use of categorical rules, i.e., rules which specify exactly what is—and therefore what is not—possible in the language. Everywhere we turn we seem to find at least a new wrinkle or a small inconsistency with regard to any rule one wishes to propose; on too many occasions it is not just a wrinkle or inconsistency but actually a glaring counter-example. When we look closely at any language, we will discover time and time again that there is considerable internal variation, and that speakers make constant use of the many different possibilities offered to them. No one speaks the same way all the time, and people constantly exploit the nuances of the language they speak for a wide variety of purposes. The consequence is a kind of paradox; while many linguists would like to view any language as a homogeneous entity and each speaker of that language as controlling only a single style, so that they can make the strongest possible generalizations, in actual fact that language will be seen to exhibit considerable internal variation, and single-style speakers will not be found or, if found, will appear to be extremely ‘abnormal’ in that respect, if in no other. Wardhaugh 1986 :5

5.2.1.1. The problem of defining ‘language’

Related to the problem of variation is the problem of defining the term language and by extension the terms dialect and sub-dialect. In focus here is the sense of the term which Crystal defines as follows: “In such phrases as ‘first language’, ‘the English 190 5. Developing an Alternative language’, the sense is the abstract system underlying the collective totality of the speechwriting behavior of a community the notion of langue, or the knowledge of this system by an individual the notion of competence” 2003 :255. The point is that if the linguist accepts the reality of variation, then this sense of the term language can only be arbitrarily or conventionally applied. Eagleton comments on this problem in relation to the false dichotomization of literary versus ordinary language: The Formalists, then, saw literary language as a set of deviations from a norm, a kind of linguistic violence: a literature is a ‘special’ kind of language, in contrast to the ‘ordinary’ language we commonly use. But to spot a deviation implies being able to identify the norm from which it swerves. Though ‘ordinary language’ is a concept beloved of some Oxford philosophers, the ordinary language of Oxford philosophers has little in common with the ordinary language of Glaswegian dockers. The language both social groups use to write love letters usually differs from the way they talk to the local vicar. The idea that there is a single ‘normal’ language, a common currency shared equally by all members of society, is an illusion. Any actual language consists of a highly complex range of discourses, differentiated according to class, region, gender, status and so on, which can by no means be neatly unified into a single homogeneous linguistic community. Eagleton 1983 :4–5 As ironic as it may seem, the term ‘language’ cannot be clearly defined in the terms of the Saussurean paradigm. Simpson explains: Language is not definable in linguistic theory. No firm boundary can necessarily be drawn between one language and another and one language may contain vast differences of pronun- ciation, grammar, and vocabulary. ‘A language’ was glossed as being a ‘mode of speaking or writing common to a group of people.’ In spite of the difficulties just mentioned, it could be imagined that all speakers of a language can understand each other and that a postulated mutual intelligibility could be used as the distinguishing mark of a language. But mutual intelligibility is not definable either and therefore cannot be used as the criterion for a language. … It will be obvious that the impossibility of defining ‘a language’ as a technical term in linguistic theory does not prevent the widespread use of the phrase, especially in popular speaking or writing. Simpson 1994 :1896 Simpson is not suggesting here that “language” is a useless term or concept. Rather, she simply points out that the idea of language as a fixed and shared, disembodied object cannot be supported by the data available from study of natural language. Clearly, both linguists and speakers identify “languages,” that is, English, German, Swahili, and so forth; however, the objects to which they refer are better understood as conceptual proto- types held by individuals. These prototypes are based upon accumulated experience with the behavior of others, who employ similar, although never identical prototypes. Simpson does note that generativists have developed a definition of the term language: A particular use of the phrase ‘a language’ is that of transformational-generative grammar where a language is held to be an infinite set of sentences, each sentence being finite in length and constructed out of a finite set of elements. This view … is thus able, it is claimed, to give a precise definition of a language; for a language is seen to be the output of the grammar that 5. Developing an Alternative 191 can construct the set of sentences constituting the language: consequently, a given language can be defined as that which a given grammar produces. Simpson 1994 :1896–1897 The problem here, however, is that the generative definition of language is, to para- phrase, “the output of the code.” In other words, the definition is circular; it does not answer the question. Simpson concludes by stating: It will be obvious that the impossibility of defining ‘a language’ as a technical term in linguistic theory does not prevent the widespread use of the phrase, especially in popular speaking or writing. But within linguistics, and especially in sociolinguistic investigation, the term tends to be avoided and the neutral description ‘variety’ or ‘variety of language’ is used instead. Simpson 1994 :1896 Of course, the replacement of the term language with the term variety or the phrase variety of language simply points right back to the original problem. Sociolinguists are correct in noting that variety is the reality, but as Wardhaugh demonstrates in the quotation above 1986 :5, this reality is in conflict with the sociolinguists own code model-based theories and notion of communication. As Harris states: “The word language is a layman’s word. It is a word formed, as Bacon puts it, ‘at the will of the generality’. Anyone who takes it as mapping out a certain field of inquiry, or at least as providing a starting point, would do well to ask himself what exactly that commits him to” Harris 1981 :3.

5.2.1.2. The problem of categorization