5. Developing an Alternative 191
can construct the set of sentences constituting the language: consequently, a given language can be defined as that which a given grammar produces.
Simpson 1994 :1896–1897
The problem here, however, is that the generative definition of language is, to para- phrase, “the output of the code.” In other words, the definition is circular; it does not
answer the question. Simpson concludes by stating:
It will be obvious that the impossibility of defining ‘a language’ as a technical term in linguistic theory does not prevent the widespread use of the phrase, especially in popular
speaking or writing. But within linguistics, and especially in sociolinguistic investigation, the term tends to be avoided and the neutral description ‘variety’ or ‘variety of language’ is used
instead. Simpson 1994
:1896
Of course, the replacement of the term language with the term variety or the phrase variety of language
simply points right back to the original problem. Sociolinguists are correct in noting that variety is the reality, but as Wardhaugh demonstrates in the
quotation above 1986
:5, this reality is in conflict with the sociolinguists own code model-based theories and notion of communication. As Harris states: “The word
language is a layman’s word. It is a word formed, as Bacon puts it, ‘at the will of the generality’. Anyone who takes it as mapping out a certain field of inquiry, or at least as
providing a starting point, would do well to ask himself what exactly that commits him to”
Harris 1981 :3.
5.2.1.2. The problem of categorization
As one might anticipate, the problem of categorization is also closely related to the problem of variation. Linguists working on grammars or phonologies rarely struggle with
this issue. Since they are generally working with data from an individual or a small group of individuals, those individuals provide them with a conventional name by which they
may refer to the idiolects surveyed.
As one would expect, however, the issue of categorization does present a problem for contemporary comparativists. Just as the Swedish naturalist Linnaeus 1707–1778 was
faced with the issue of determining what should constitute a species, the code model linguist is faced with the issue of determining what should constitute a language, dialect,
and so forth. In Linnaeus’ case, and in the case of code model linguistics, the result is species essentialism.
[Species essentialism] is the concept that all members of a species share a common natural state that serves to define and separate them from other species, with observed variations in
individuals of a species being caused by forces that interfere with the organism’s attainment of its natural state. This pre-evolution perspective holds that species are fixed entities, a view no
longer accepted by biologists.
Bothamley 1993 :497
Understandably, some comparativists may bristle at this assertion. Even so, the critique should be taken seriously. Species essentialism is an unavoidable logical
extension of a code model account of language. As should be clear at this point in the
192 5. Developing an Alternative
discussion, the fallacy of species essentialism is a core issue inherent in Saussure’s dichotomization of diachronic and synchronic approaches.
Categorization also presents a problem for sociolinguists. As Simpson notes 1994
:1896, sociolinguists, more so than the practitioners of most subdisciplines of linguistics, seem to be aware of the problem of defining language—thus their preference
for the term variety. Nevertheless, the code model perspective of language is woven into the metatheory of sociolinguistics. Even though sociolinguists may abandon the term
language in an effort to circumnavigate the reductionism inherent in Saussure’s develop- ment of synchronic linguistics, the code model and Aristotelian logic continually bring
the core issue to the forefront.
89
The logic states:
If people share a speech community, then they communicate. If they communicate, then they must share a code.
Therefore, if people share a speech community, they must share a code.
The problem in defining a code is, of course, directly related to the problem of defining a language. Thereby Wales states: “‘Code,’ as a term borrowed from
communication theory and semiotics, is so widely used in other fields, linguistic and literary, that it is in danger of becoming a mere synonym for language, variety, or
dialect”
Wales 1994 :577.
Cherry’s 1966
discussion of quantization brings the issue to the only reasonable conclusion, albeit one which presents an impasse for the Saussurean notion of langue
and, if taken seriously, the enterprise of synchronic linguistics:
The words “quantum” and “quantization” have become adopted with specialized sig- nificance by physicists, but are used in the present context with their original meaning of
“allowed amount,” “sufficient quantity,” or more precisely “significant change of quantity.” The concept is really very broad; quantization is a logical necessity of description. For
example, we quantize people [into language groups,] into political parties, into age groups, social classes and the like, though in truth [their language varieties,] their opinions, their ages,
and their fortunes are as varied as the winds. We merely do this for the purpose of discussion, that is, for communication.
Cherry 1966 :47
Most linguists will agree that individual varieties idiolects are grouped via quan- tization for the purpose of discussion. One may conjecture, however, that many are
unaware of how their practice of quantization conflicts with their own code model-based metatheory regarding the nature of language and communication.
5.2.1.3. Revolutionary response to the problem of variation
