3. The Code Model Decoded 69
then processed via a code and a signal was assembled that corresponds, within the limita- tions of the system, to her original message. That signal is typically composed of one or a
combination of the following:
a Coordinated movements of the vocal articulators and diaphragm in turn producing the movement of air and resulting sound waves, including pitch and
intonation b Coordinated movements of the hands and fingers as they hold a writing
instrument, manipulate a keyboard, or articulate a signed language c Gestures and body movements, including facial postures and eye movements
The primary message text is related to the vocal or dextral movements via a code, but that code was not involved in the assembly of that message. This is not to say that an
awareness of the coding possibilities did not factor into the assemblage. Rather, it is to point out that the construction of the primary message and the construction of the signal
are separate events.
The system is not responsible for assembling the primary message. Neither is the system responsible for defining a relationship if there is one between the
primary message and the semantic concepts conceived by the speaker. The system is, however, responsible for assembling the constructed message also a text, and it does
employ the code in that process. The system is not, however, responsible for defining a relationship between the constructed message and any semantic concepts conceived by
the hearer.
With this explanation in view, it should be clear that there is only one area in which the model of communication proposed in Shannon
1948 ,
1949 can be legitimately
applied to human oral communication: articulatory and acoustic phonetics and their relationship to phonology. The transmitter handles articulation and the receiver handles
auditory reception. Shannon’s theory would then be concerned with the accuracy to which the speaker can “read” an articulatory-text that is, a string of phonemes and
transmit a sequence of sound waves, which, in turn, the receiver can hear and “write” i.e., construct a corresponding acoustic-text also a string of phonemes.
As has been addressed, it is a condition of Shannon’s theory that the transmitter and receiver have the same code. But this says nothing about the semantic perceptions of the
hearer i.e., meaning. Shannon’s theory does not address these. This is an important distinction that has been historically neglected by linguists. Undoubtedly the interference
posed by Saussure’s speech circuit contributes to that oversight. The integration of the Saussurean speech circuit with information theory will be addressed in section
3.3.3 .
3.2.3.2. A brief review of Weaver’s contributions
As has been addressed, in 1949 Shannon’s 1948
paper was republished in con- junction with an expansion of the explanation provided by Warren Weaver. Shannon’s
treatise was altered only slightly, but bound together with Weaver’s paper, it was to have a significant impact, not just within electrical engineering, but in other disciplines as
well, including the social sciences see
Pollack 1968 .
70 3. The Code Model Decoded
Weaver made several substantial additions, including the identification and delim- itation of three levels of communication problems. He lists the levels as follows:
Level A. How accurately can the symbols of communication be transmitted? The technical problem.
Level B. How precisely do the transmitted symbols convey the desired meaning? The semantic problem.
Level C. How effectively does the received meaning affect conduct in the desired way? The effectiveness problem.
Weaver 1949b :96
The addition of levels ‘B’ and ‘C’ was to have a somewhat ambiguous impact on the effectiveness and perceived usefulness of Shannon’s theory. As stated previously, in its
initial form, Shannon’s theory was not intended to account for meaning in any way. Of course Shannon recognized that messages may be used in a meaningful way, but he had
avoided the semantic and effectiveness problems which Weaver now highlighted. Weaver himself avoided attempting to explicitly account for elements other than those
involved in Level A, the “technical problem,” but he nevertheless suggested the need for work on other levels. Unfortunately, in his zeal to see information theory applied to
human communication he failed to identify these areas as being outside the scope of information theory. For example, he writes:
Thus when one moves to levels B and C, it may prove to be essential to take account of the statistical characteristics of the destination. One can imagine, as an addition to the diagram,
another box labeled “Semantic Receiver” interposed between the engineering receiver which changes signals to messages and the destination. This semantic receiver subjects the message
to a second decoding, the demand on this one being that it must match the statistical semantic characteristics of the message to the statistical semantic capacities of the totality of receivers,
or that subset of receivers which constitute the audience one wishes to affect.
Weaver 1949b
:115
Weaver also made a comparison essential to the development of the code model, a comparison Shannon seems to have avoided: “In oral speech, the information source is
the brain, the transmitter is the voice mechanism producing the varying sound pressure the signal which is transmitted through the air the channel”
Weaver 1949b :98.
While Weaver’s description is not necessarily problematic, it has been easily misread, particularly since in referring to the brain as information source he doesn’t isolate the
roles the brain performs. The brain handles the meaning and pattern qualities of the message as well as the articulatory qualities. Shannon’s theory, however, only accounts
for the articulatoryacoustic process.
In addition to these adjustments, Weaver introduced several conduit metaphorisms in the discussion, thereby multiplying the metonymy and semantic pathology already inher-
ent in Shannon’s choice of terminology.
38
The integration of conduit metaphors with information theory will be addressed in section
3.3.2 .
38
As will be discussed in section 3.3.2
, semantic pathology results “whenever two or more incompatible senses capable of figuring meaningfully in the same context develop around the same name”
Ullman 1957 :122;
Reddy 1979
.
3. The Code Model Decoded 71
Unfortunately, many communication scholars have failed to differentiate Weaver’s suggestions from the theory proposed by Shannon. Quoting Ritchie
1986 , Rogers
writes:
One source of confusion on the part of communication scholars is “the habit of citing ‘Shannon and Weaver’ when it is Weaver’s speculations that are being quoted, under the
assumption that they are somehow supported by Shannon’s mathematics.” When the Shannon and Weaver book is cited by communication scholars, they are usually referencing ideas from
Weaver’s part … rather than from Shannon’s part ….
Rogers 1994 :425, n. †
3.2.3.3. The diffusion of information theory into linguistics
