4. Code Model Linguistics: Patch or Abandon? 111
specific limbs then obscure his view of the basic-level limbs and trunk which unite the structure as a whole.
62
The question of commensurability is also tied to the strength of an individual’s and group’s conceptual commitments. If an individual is strongly committed to a particular
disciplinary matrix or paradigm community, then he or she is likely to find it difficult to consider the position proposed under an alternative paradigm. But if a researcher has no
commitments or only weak commitments to the disciplinary matrix or communities involved, then he or she may more readily give alternative arguments equal
consideration.
Within paradigm communities, a degree of receptivity is often practiced in consid- eration of sibling terminal nodes in a hierarchy, but is less common in comparisons of
higher-level nodes or terminal nodes that do not share a close genetic relationship. The higher the nodes concerned in the comparison, the more abstract are the commitments
being questioned. An individual may be cognizant of his commitments to a theory, but his commitments to a metatheory are more abstract, and therefore more elusive. And this,
of course, contributes to incommensurability. As philosopher Ian Barbour has suggested, “There can be complementary models [and theories] within [the disciplinary matrix of] a
paradigm, but paradigms are evidently not complementary; a person can fully share the outlook of only one tradition at a time”
1974 :147.
There are advantages to Kuhn’s having redescribed ‘paradigm’ as commitment to a disciplinary matrix. For example, identification of the various elements of the matrix
symbolic generalizations, models, values, and exemplars helps to facilitate a more detailed examination of how particular paradigms are related. Paradigms may not be
complementary, but that does not mean that the respective elements in the disciplinary matrices are the exclusive “property” of individual paradigms. While Kuhn does not
address such “element sharing” specifically, he does allude to it in discussing the ‘values’ component, stating that values are “more widely shared among different communities
than either symbolic generalizations or models”
Kuhn 1996 :184.
4.1.10. Objectivity versus intersubjectivity
Kuhn notes that many of his critics have inaccurately charged him with teaching subjectivity and irrationality. He offers the following objection:
Some readers have felt that I was trying to make science rest on unanalyzable individual intuitions rather than on logic and law. But that interpretation goes astray in two essential
respects. First, if I am talking at all about intuitions, they are not individual. Rather they are the tested and shared possessions of the members of a successful group, and the novice
acquires them through training as a part of his preparation for group-membership. Second, they are not in principle unanalyzable.
Kuhn 1996 :191
62
This issue will be illustrated below in regard to the relationship of various traditions within linguistics. Some theorists would suggest that linguist traditions are related via a rhizomatic structure. This study suggests, however,
that an arboreal structure is evident, provided the analysis examines the metatheory of the respective traditions, and not simply the species-level concerns.
112 4. Code Model Linguistics: Patch or Abandon?
Kuhn is not suggesting that science is a practice in subjectivity, but rather, that it involves intersubjectivity. This is, of course, in contrast to some who would argue that
science is or can be objective. Obviously, Kuhn has joined an age-old debate. Rudolf Flesch anecdotally highlights
the crux of that debate:
There is a little book on my shelves that contains a set of rules for thinking. Rule Number One reads: “Define the primary facts in connection with your observation, and separate these
facts from any opinions or impressions.” An excellent rule—except for one little thing: it can’t be done.
Flesch 1951 :26
Kuhn suggests that the perceptions of the individual cannot be objective in any absolute sense, for no observations exist independently of opinion or impression. But his
position should be seen as contrasting with the historically common position held by subjectivists. Whereas subjectivists would argue that each perception is individually
derived, and therefore subjective, Kuhn emphasizes that perception is not purely indi- vidual, rather, perception is largely conditioned through interaction with the group. For
those working within the group, observations may appear to be objective. This is because presuppositions driving those observations are largely shared, and because of the absence
of alternative presuppositions. However, observations gathered by one paradigm commu- nity commonly diverge from those gathered by another. This is, of course, a funda-
mental issue in Kuhn’s position on incommensurability, to be discussed in section
4.1.8 .
Without the notion of a paradigm or something of that sort, one might be required to choose between the poles of objectivity and subjectivity. If science is objective, then
there is difficulty accounting for competing theories or the fact that theories seem to have a “life span.” If science is subjective, then there is difficulty accounting for the myriad
sensations which seem to be shared by a group of scientists, shared experiences which allow them to communicate and work together.
Obviously the world of science is neither entirely objective nor entirely subjective. The concept of intersubjectivity and ‘paradigm’ serves to explain how intra-group
activity can have the appearance of objectivity, while inter-group comparisons suggest subjectivity.
63
4.1.11. The idea of progress
